hermes-agent/gateway/AGENTS.md

gateway/ — messaging gateway, adapters, delivery

Applies on top of the root AGENTS.md. Long-form: website/docs/developer-guide/gateway-internals.md. New platform adapter: follow gateway/platforms/ADDING_A_PLATFORM.md step by step.

Shape

gateway/run.py is the facade; phases live in run_*.py (startup, adapters, inbound, turn, busy, goals, notifications, shutdown, ...), sessions in session*.py, slash handlers in slash_commands_*.py mixins, authorization in authz_mixin.py, adapters in platforms/<name>.py over platforms/base.py. builtin_hooks/ is the extension point for always-registered gateway hooks (none shipped). The gateway reads user YAML raw (run.py + config.py), not through DEFAULT_CONFIG — a key the CLI sees but the gateway doesn't means you're on the wrong loader (hermes_cli/AGENTS.md). Each adapter picks a base toolset (Telegram → "messaging").

Slash commands: handlers are looked up by name through _command_handler_table; a command is listed in _IDLE_COMMANDS or _PLAIN_COMMANDS (works mid-run) in run_busy.py. No if canonical == ... chains. Registry + adding a command: hermes_cli/AGENTS.md.

The gateway has TWO message guards — both must bypass approval/control commands

While an agent is running, an inbound message passes two sequential guards: (1) the base adapter (platforms/base.py) queues it in _pending_messages when session_key in self._active_sessions; (2) the runner (run.py/run_busy.py) intercepts /stop, /new, /queue, /status, /approve, /deny before they reach running_agent.interrupt(). Any new command that must reach the runner while the agent is blocked (approval prompts) MUST bypass BOTH guards and be dispatched inline — never via _process_message_background(), which races session lifecycle.

Streaming delivery contract (stream-is-the-message adapters)

Adapters with draft_stream_is_message = True (relay Slack native streaming) keep ONE cumulative native stream per turn; the stream IS the final message. Four invariants, each from a live duplicate-final incident (NS-658 canary ledger, hermes#85796 / gateway-gateway#210); violating any re-creates a duplicate or frozen stream:

1. Draft frames are prefix-stable. Frame N must be a string prefix of frame N+1. Never mutate drafts per tick — no fence-closing (ensure_closed_code_fences), cursor suffix, segment-state resets at tool boundaries, or mrkdwn conversion. A non-prefix frame forces a whole-snapshot re-append ("stacked copies"). The finalize path may still transform the real final.
2. The consumer declares the final; the adapter never guesses. finish(final_text) carries the completed final_response (verifier footer, completion explainer included). New post-stream augmentation MUST ride this payload — mutating final_response after the seal re-opens the delivered_final_matches mismatch → corrective duplicate send.
3. Interim sends carry metadata["_interim_send"] = True. Any consumer-side adapter.send() that is not the turn-final (commentary, segment-tail flushes) must set it or seal-interception seals the live stream with interim text. Seal-interception exists at BOTH egress doors (send() and send_for_platform()); a new egress door needs the same two checks.
4. Reconcile by edit, never by plain send. A lane delivering a final beside a sealed stream (queued follow-ups, media-accompanied finals) first tries edit_message on the consumer's message_id; plain send() only when no editable message exists. A sealed native stream is a regular message — chat.update works (live-verified).

Contract tests: tests/gateway/test_stream_final_contract.py (mutation-checked). Slack ground truth: chat.*Stream speaks STANDARD markdown, not mrkdwn; stopStream.markdown_text APPENDS; startStream/stopStream are Tier 2 (~20/min). Check draft_stream_is_message is True — MagicMock adapters in older tests auto-create truthy attributes.

Background process notifications

terminal(background=true, notify_on_complete=true) arms a watcher on the gateway loop (run_notifications.py::arm_process_watcher) that starts a new turn on completion; verbosity is display.background_process_notifications. Injection requires the admit_internal_event receipt (a handler returning None is not acceptance); refused admission refunds every claimed batch sibling without spending an attempt. Long form: website/docs/developer-guide/gateway-internals.md § Background process notifications.

/login (off-turn, paired DM only)

GatewayLoginCommandsMixin refuses outside a real paired DM (ntfy, raft and a2a report dm for broadcast surfaces) and binds the WHOLE install's providers.nous, so shared gateways must set allow_admin_from. It drains anon_auth.run_sign_in on its private single-worker _login_executor (never the shared pool), allows one attempt per process, and on completion evicts agents still on nous/welcome instead of writing a model override. Long form: gateway-internals.md § /login.

Gateway lifecycle vs. the Desktop app

hermes serve (control plane, desktop-spawned child) dies with the app — by design. The messaging gateway (gateway run) SURVIVES the app: the serve backend's /api/gateway/* endpoints spawn it detached (_spawn_hermes_action — start_new_session / DETACHED_PROCESS), so before-quit's SIGTERM never reaches it and bots keep running. The known breach is the Windows shim-unlock teardown (taskkill /T /F on venv-shim holders, #85265), which exists to let updates proceed and is replaced by #92091's pause-for-update. Do NOT "fix" gateway-dies-with-app by re-parenting the gateway under the backend, and do NOT "fix" update locks by widening the tree-kill. Gateways stamp code_sha/code_version into gateway_state.json (status.py) so the updater can verify a fleet.

Profile scope (adapters, turns, and everything between turns)

• One identity per inbound event, canonicalized FIRST. gateway/session_identity.py::resolve_identity answers "which bot received it / who may admit it / where does it run" ONCE per event and pins a frozen RoutingIdentity on the source (wire-invisible, like _transport_adapter_ref). Every ingress path calls the canonicalize seam before it derives a key: the adapter side (platforms/base.py::_canonicalize — handle_message, _enqueue_text_event, Telegram photo / album routing, _handle_message_while_active, every _source_session_key) and the runner side (run_adapters.py::_canonicalize — the per-profile / default message, busy and platform-event handlers, the adapter auth-check callback, run_inbound.py::_hm_admit_event). No key derivation before it; an unresolved identity under multiplexing (route to an unserved profile) is dropped with one WARNING at the first seam it reaches, never keyed into agent:main. _transport_owner, _authorization_home_for_source, _resolve_profile_home_for_source, _session_key_profile and _resolve_profile_for_key read the identity when present and fall back to their old chain only for sources nothing resolved (restored rows, hand-built sources). Never derive a second answer next to the identity; extend the object. transport_profile ≠ runtime_profile is normal (shared bot → routed satellite). A source copy goes through session_identity.replace_source so the identity travels with it (_apply_topic_recovery does).
• Intake vs delivery adapter. authz_mixin.py::_intake_adapter_for(source) is the bot that RECEIVED the event (live transport ref → relay socket → identity's transport_profile); it gates intake policy (ignored channels, relay fronting, re-dispatch of a still-live event) and fails closed to None for a source with no live provenance. _delivery_adapter_for(source) is the bot that ANSWERS — the receiving bot whenever known, else the unique owner of (platform, runtime_profile) via _adapters_for_profile. Never read self.adapters[platform] for a source; never add a third resolver. The matrix (tests/gateway/test_multiplex_transport_matrix.py):

  Topology	runtime	intake	delivery
  per-credential bot, no route	owner	owner adapter	owner adapter
  shared credential → satellite (profile_routes)	routed	receiving adapter	receiving adapter (_is_shared_bot_satellite after restart)
  shared bot → profile that owns its own bot	routed	receiving adapter	receiving adapter (conversation continuity; #70625's "routed bot" reading was not adopted)
  secondary-owned bot → default (bot_profile)	default (agent:main)	receiving adapter	receiving adapter
  restored / hand-built, no live provenance	stored source.profile	None	unique owner of (platform, runtime); a disconnected secondary → None, never the default bot

• Identity survives the process. SessionEntry.transport_profile (routing index + sessions.transport_profile, nullable, reconciled by SCHEMA_SQL) persists the receiving bot next to the key namespace; the namespace says where a lane RUNS, the column says which bot may DELIVER to it. Anything reviving a session from durable state (auto-resume, heartbeat restore, plugin injection, background-process events) reads entry.origin through authz_mixin.py::_restored_source, which re-pins a RoutingIdentity(transport=None) via session_identity.restore_identity; _delivery_adapter_for then delivers through that bot's adapter or nothing (never the default bot by heuristic). Rows without the column (pre-PR-5) keep the _is_shared_bot_satellite fallback. Deferred callbacks capture the identity/home at command time (/model picker); _run_in_executor_with_context carries the scope over thread hops. Relay: _with_scope echoes the routed profile on every outbound frame and follow_up derives it from the key namespace so the connector stamps it on the next passthrough_forward. Ambient get_active_profile_name() reads in gateway/ are boot-only and marked # launch profile, pre-identity; a path with an identity reads identity.runtime_profile.
• Token locks. An adapter that connects with a unique credential (bot token, API key) calls acquire_scoped_lock() from gateway.status in connect()/start() and release_scoped_lock() in disconnect()/stop(), so two profiles cannot share one credential. Canonical: plugins/platforms/irc/adapter.py.
• Multiplex profile-scoped env reads MUST fail closed — never borrow from os.environ (agent/secret_scope.py; #72348, #86905). Under gateway.multiplex_profiles, os.environ holds the DEFAULT profile's values; a secondary profile's .env exists only in its secret scope, bound per profile activity by _profile_runtime_scope (turn, callback, eviction, tick — never only "per turn"). All profile-level env config — credentials (app_secret, tokens) AND authorization (FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS, {PLATFORM}_ALLOW_ALL_USERS, GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS, group_policy, allow_bots) — is read scope-aware: adapters via gateway.platforms._shared.get_scoped_secret (the ONE implementation; adapters import it as _get_scoped_secret; extra_or_secret / seed_extra_from_env / env_is_connected build on it), gateway authz via _shared.platform_gate_env (imported by authz_mixin.py as _auth_env). Scope installed + multiplex active → a scoped miss returns the default, NEVER os.environ (a leaked allowlist skips the allow-all check and silently rejects every secondary-profile sender, #86905). The unscoped default-profile path (UnscopedSecretError) and single-profile deployments keep the os.environ read — there it IS the profile's own value. Never re-implement the reader in an adapter (the try get_secret / except UnscopedSecretError: os.getenv shape drifts into a fallback-after-miss leak); import the shared one. tests/gateway/test_shared_platform_boilerplate.py asserts every plugin's _env_enablement reads only through it.
• Scope is bound per profile activity, not per turn. run.py::_profile_runtime_scope(home) wraps a routed turn (run_turn.py::_profile_scope_for_source); the same binding wraps every path that touches a session's home, secrets or terminal scope with no turn on the stack: release and eviction (run_agent_cache.py::_run_release_in_profile_scope — TTL, LRU and memory-pressure eviction all route through it so on_session_end/memory flush hit the OWNING profile's provider), shutdown (run_shutdown.py::_finalize_session), post-turn media delivery (platforms/base.py::_media_delivery_scope), deferred callbacks (pickers, reactions — capture the routed home at command time, re-enter the scope in the callback), notifiers and outbound webhooks. Resolve the owning home from the session record (profile_home, agent:<profile>: key), never from os.environ, which holds the launch profile. Why: eviction that flushed under the launch scope wrote a secondary profile's memories into the default profile's store, silently.
• api_server rebuilds the agent per request but not the memory provider. The adapter bypasses TurnRunner and the agent cache (per-request callbacks, model route, ephemeral prompt), so platforms/api_server_memory_sessions.py parks each session's initialised MemoryManager between requests (exclusive check-out in _create_agent, check-in in the turn's finally, keyed by profile home + agent.session_id; idle/LRU eviction shuts down under the owning home) and AIAgent(memory_manager=...) adopts it without a second provider init. Without it the previous turn's queued recall never reaches the next request (#120116).
• multiplex_profiles: false is not "no scope ever". A native hosted room serving a second profile flips the process-wide guard (tui_gateway/launch_profile_policy.py:: activate_multi_profile_hosting) inside the gateway process, after the adapters were wired; every standalone entry point (run_turn.py::_profile_scope_for_source, the primary adapter's message / busy / platform-event handlers via run_adapters.py::_standalone_scoped) then binds the launch profile's OWN scope through run_turn.py::_standalone_launch_scope — .env over the env frozen at activation, never a .env-only rebuild (systemd / op run keys have no file) and never live os.environ. Gate a new standalone path on that helper, not on the config flag (#112878).
• Hooks and observers register per served profile. builtin_hooks/, agent/shell_hooks.py:: register_from_config and lifecycle observers are prepared under each profile's scope at startup and on profile add/remove; idempotence keys include the profile, and hooks/ paths resolve at call time (a module constant freezes to the first importer).
• Adapter YAML never reaches os.environ under multiplex. platforms/_shared.py:: apply_yaml_bridge seeds PlatformConfig.extra and skips the environ write under a secondary profile's scope; gate/allowlist reads go through platform_gate_env. A if not os.getenv(X): os.environ[X] = … bridge is first-profile-wins across the process — test two profiles with conflicting flags before touching precedence.
• Unserved is reported, never silent. Shared-ingress platforms (Relay) run on the default profile only; a secondary enabling one is logged once with the remedy and stamped into runtime status (run_adapters.py::_note_unserved_secondary_platform). The WhatsApp bridge is per profile: a paired secondary gets its own adapter and port (plugins/platforms/whatsapp/bridge_ownership.py), an unpaired one is reported as whatsapp_unpaired, and a secondary never adopts or signals a bridge its own pidfile (pid + start time + port) does not identify. needs_attention is set and cleared at the single writer (_update_platform_runtime_status) on the connect path.
• One launch-home identity. "Does this task serve a routed profile?" compares the override with hermes_constants.get_routing_process_hermes_home() (agent/secret_scope.py:: serves_routed_profile and _is_process_home, tools/environments/local.py::_is_routed_home, hermes_cli/env_loader.py::_process_hermes_home), never with os.environ["HERMES_HOME"] read live: an embedding host that mirrors the served profile into the env var per turn (Hermes WebUI) pins its own home with pin_process_hermes_home(), and without a pin the resolver is get_process_hermes_home() unchanged. Do not add another routing decision that compares against get_process_hermes_home() directly; that resolver is for process-level assets.

Tests

tests/gateway/. Adapter tests exercise the real delivery path with a fake transport; never assert on hardcoded platform lists or command counts (root: no change-detectors). Session-key and guard behaviour are invariants worth a test; platform API quirks belong in connector comments + tests, not in prose.