A bare SQLITE_CORRUPT/NOTADB on a live write (not FTS-scoped, not a
replaced file) now sets a sticky per-instance flag: later writes fail
fast with StateDbCorruptError, the handle never reopens after close(),
and close() skips its explicit PASSIVE WAL checkpoint. Gateway and agent
flush paths divert pending transcripts to JSONL/spool like the replaced
case instead of retrying forever.
Field evidence: a handle that kept writing for ~50 minutes after the
first structural error checkpointed 15 pages under the wrong page
numbers on shutdown (page 1 <- messages_fts_trigram_data leaf), turning
"malformed" into "file is not a database".
Refs #90837, #90950, #97940, #89332, #45383
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CNX8rNYHqA5pT4tAGSzXtb
Regression coverage for the #100130 salvage, all against real SessionDB
files and a real child process holding the flock:
* errno table for `is_advisory_lock_contention` (EAGAIN/EWOULDBLOCK/EACCES
contend; ESTALE/ENOTSUP/ENOLCK/EIO fail fast); no misleading "held by
another process" line on the fast-fail path; `_cross_process_repair_lock`
shares the filter (sibling site).
* `retry_deferred_fts_recovery`: open under a live holder -> stale; retry
returns in <2s with a 30s admission budget (timeout=0); rate limit +
60s->120s backoff engaged; holder dies -> same instance recovers, triggers
restored, breadcrumb cleared; no-op when not stale / read-only.
* `_start_gateway_housekeeping` tick (real loop, 50ms interval) recovers a
stale shared-registry SessionDB with no direct call and no extra thread.
Backoff floor: a monkeypatched 0s base interval must not zero the doubled
interval (min 1s), so the cap math is testable.
Sabotage run (source at origin/main, these tests): 16 failed / 35 passed,
including 30s timeouts on the fast-fail tests.
Two pieces of PR #100130 (@HexLab98) re-applied on top of the orphaned-flock
break (894fc35337) and fail-closed admission (#100895) that landed since:
* `is_advisory_lock_contention` (hermes_state_common): only EAGAIN /
EWOULDBLOCK / EACCES / EDEADLK mean "another process holds the lock".
ESTALE / ENOTSUP / ENOLCK / EIO from flock or msvcrt.locking are
environment failures that polling cannot fix — `_acquire_db_flock` and
both Windows msvcrt loops (FTS rebuild admission, state.db repair lock)
now defer immediately with the real errno instead of burning the full
120s / holder timeout and then logging a fake "held by another process".
* `retry_deferred_fts_recovery` (hermes_state_schema): a SessionDB whose
open-time `_recover_stale_fts` deferred (foreign holders or busy rebuild
lock) stayed `_fts_stale` — LIKE-only search — until the process
reopened state.db. Short-lived CLIs reopen every run; the gateway opens
once and stays up for days, so the deferral was effectively permanent
(#100108). The retry runs from the EXISTING gateway housekeeping tick
(`_start_gateway_housekeeping`, 60s) against the shared SessionDB
instances via `hermes_state_registry.live_shared_session_dbs()`:
non-blocking admission (`fts_rebuild_admission(timeout_seconds=0)`),
bounded backoff 60s -> 1h, no new thread, still fails closed on live
holders. `fts_rebuild_admission` gains the `timeout_seconds` kwarg.
* WAL-reset warning names `sys.executable` so a "linked SQLite 3.45.1"
line can be matched to the interpreter that actually linked it
(#100108 point 3).
Deliberately NOT carried from #100130: the "leftover lock file = holder"
premise (a 0-byte lock file never blocked flock; the real cause was the
fork-inherited fd, fixed in 894fc35337) and the `_rebuild_fts_once`
one-shot rework.
Co-authored-by: HexLab98 <liruixinch@outlook.com>
The #14694 recovery clock (`_anti_thrash_recovery_deadline`) was a
process-local `time.monotonic()` value zeroed in `bind_session_state()`.
The gateway rebuilds the AIAgent (and its ContextCompressor) on every
cache eviction, so each fresh compressor bound to a durably tripped
session row (#69872) re-armed a full 300s window and the half-open probe
never fired — a long messaging conversation above the threshold stayed
blocked permanently.
Persist the deadline as a wall-clock epoch in a new
`sessions.compression_recovery_deadline REAL` column (declarative column
reconciliation; SCHEMA_VERSION 26 -> 27) with
`SessionDB.get/set_compression_recovery_deadline`. The compressor loads it
in `bind_session_state()` and writes it on change only via
`_set_anti_thrash_recovery_deadline()`. A fresh compressor with no stored
deadline still starts a full window blocked (#54923 restart contract); one
that loads an armed deadline resumes that window. Backward clock jumps are
bounded to one window. The 300s window is unchanged.
Minimal salvage of #100185 (the probe-lease/fencing state machine and
model_config-blob storage were not carried).
Refs #100185
Co-authored-by: Komzpa <me@komzpa.net>
Every gateway/plugin platform adapter hard-coded aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True)
(~20 sites), so a gateway launched by a Windows Scheduled Task that inherits a stale
HTTP_PROXY (Clash/V2Ray on 127.0.0.1:7890) looped on 'Cannot connect to host' with no
way to opt out short of NO_PROXY hacks per vendor host.
- gateway/platforms/base.py: gateway_trust_env() reads gateway.trust_env (default true);
resolve_proxy_url() skips generic HTTP(S)_PROXY/ALL_PROXY + macOS system-proxy
auto-detect when false (explicit per-platform vars still win).
- All aiohttp ClientSession sites in weixin, qqbot, matrix, line, wecom, slack, sms,
teams, google_chat now pass trust_env=gateway_trust_env(); mattermost + homeassistant
bare sessions gain the same kwarg (intent of #70119 / #56229).
- DEFAULT_CONFIG + cli-config.yaml.example + messaging docs.
- tests/gateway/test_gateway_trust_env.py: config flip + no-bare-literal sweep.
Reported-by: @ranlingfeng (#48820), @frontnopipe-cloud (#76309)
Co-authored-by: rcarrata <rcarratalasanchez@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Backroads4Me <TEDLANHAM@GMAIL.COM>
Follow-up to the salvaged #100114 commit. Its two-pass anchor selection
scanned steers first and real user rows second, so a transcript shaped
[user A, tool(steer B), ..., user C] anchored the already-consumed steer B
over the newer real request C — the same replay class the PR set out to
fix. Replace it with one reversed positional scan that picks whichever
intent-bearing row is last (real role=user or steer-bearing role=tool),
and make the compressed-transcript steer check count only role=tool rows
(the only place the runtime delivers a steer), so a summary quoting the
marker cannot masquerade as live intent.
Adds S1/S2/S3 regression tests (steer dropped by compaction, steer
surviving in tail, newer user turn after steer) plus alternation and
use-exactly-once assertions.
Compression with display.busy_input_mode: steer embeds the follow-up
as an out-of-band marker inside the latest role=tool result. The
post-compression user-turn preservation path only classified
non-scaffolding role=user rows as real intent, so a compressed
transcript that contained no role=user row would discard the steer
and clone an older historical role=user message as the new active
turn, re-activating a previously consumed request.
Fix _ensure_compressed_has_user_turn to (1) treat a compressed
transcript that already carries a steer marker as having user intent,
and (2) prioritize the latest steer payload from the original
transcript over historical user cloning, inserting it as a proper
role=user turn via _insert_real_user_anchor. This preserves the
actual current intent exactly once and never turns history into new
input.
Closes#100053
The _clean_registry fixture clears _generations and _retired between
tests; the new _opening map needs the same reset so a test that aborts
mid-construction cannot leave a stale opening event that stalls the
next test's cold acquire.
Every bot-to-bot DM is a fresh `hermes -p <bot> chat -Q` process, so it
pays agent startup on each hop. Profiling one hop showed the single
largest controllable cost was a live GET /models against the provider on
EVERY launch (0.3-0.6s normally, up to the 15s probe timeout on a slow
endpoint) — the in-memory endpoint-metadata cache is per process and the
Nous persistent context cache is bypassed by design so the portal stays
authoritative.
- model_metadata: memoize successful remote /models probes on disk
(cache/endpoint_model_metadata.json) with the SAME 300s TTL as the
in-memory cache, so authority semantics are unchanged (reconciliation
still lands within 5 minutes) but the answer is shared across
processes. Local endpoints are never memoized (LM Studio reloads).
- bot_relay: the cross-machine reply waiter polls the reply file every
250ms instead of every 2s — up to 2s of dead air on every relayed reply.
Nothing here changes turn ordering: DMs and group rounds stay serial.
Live (polis-hermes bot, spawn -> first API request, cold, 5-6 runs):
main median 1.23s (one 20.8s outlier = probe stall) -> 0.96s, no stalls.
A plain roster click fronted whatever bots-workspace tab the user last had
active for that bot (#96649). A '+' side thread persists in Local Storage
across restarts, so it won every click forever while the row kept previewing
the canonical Bot Chat (profiles.list canonical_session) — sidebar and center
described two different conversations; a message typed there landed in the
side thread and the row never moved. Support thread "[Bots] - Sessions is not
in sync again" (bundle 7dfff039), reproduced live on origin/main.
- roster-actions: the open-tab shortcut may front only the canonical chat
(registry id or lineage tip, via a new onlyStoredIds allowlist on
focusWorkspaceOwnerSessionTile); anything else resolves the registry and
opens in place. Side tabs stay open beside it. "Open Bot Chat" in the row
menu is the same action; the `canonical` option goes away.
- roster-actions: when the FOCUSED Bot Chat's canonical session advances on
the gateway (cron bot-chat delivery, message_agent, group round, CLI turn —
none reach this window's stream), re-open it in place so the transcript
refreshes instead of waiting for an app restart (#99393 class).
Tests: the fronting-shortcut unit file and its e2e spec pinned the reversed
behavior; replaced by one unit file (5 tests) and one e2e spec that fails on
main and passes here. group-to-local-bot-handoff e2e still passes.
Two new right-click-toggleable status bar items, mirroring the CLI/TUI
Pantheon status bar upgrades: prompt-cache hit rate ("87%") and rolling
output throughput ("42 t/s"). Both are hidden by default and enabled from
the bar's existing 'Show in status bar' context menu, like the context meter.
Renderer-only: the tui_gateway already emits cache_hit_pct and avg_tps in
every session.usage tick and message.complete payload, so the items ride
the same UsageStats the context meter reads — no new RPC, no polling.
Labels show a placeholder until the backend has data, never self-hide.
#101112 made round members take their turns concurrently. That changed what
a group chat IS: later speakers in a round no longer saw earlier speakers'
replies, so bots answered the user independently instead of building on
each other. Group rooms are serial round-robin by design — this restores the
pre-#101112 round engine (group-rounds.ts, group-chat.ts, group-chat-view.tsx,
their tests, and the docs) byte-for-byte.
What stays from #101112: the per-turn poll wakes on the member session's
terminal frame (message.complete / error via host.onEvent) instead of
sleeping a fixed 2s between session.resume reads; 5s timer kept as backstop.
That is a pure latency fix with no change to room semantics.
Live A/B (real tui_gateway over WS, 4 members, one serial round):
2s poll 32.5s -> push-woken 22.5s. The remaining time is model latency.
Refs #92760
_record_timezone_migration_catchup was a line-for-line clone of
_record_persisted_error_recovery (counter bump, bounded recent list,
best-effort jsonl append). Extract _append_telemetry_record and route
both through it; one shared history cap replaces the two per-counter
constants. Also correct the "distinct from catch_up_occurrences" comment:
a migrated row that is also past its grace window increments both.
No behavior change; both recorders write the same entries to the same
files.
Upgrading from a UTC-scheduling build to one that honours the profile
timezone (Europe/Brussels) left daily cron jobs sitting in jobs.json with
pre-migration instants — e.g. next_run_at "2026-09-02T04:00:00+00:00" for
expr "0 4 * * *". _ensure_aware normalizes that to 06:00+02, which the
expression excludes, so the stale-expression guard (#93049) read it as a
direct jobs.json edit, logged exactly that, and re-anchored to tomorrow
without firing. The due occurrence disappeared with no error anywhere.
The guard only asked "is the stored instant an occurrence of the current
expr?", never "why not?" — and the two possible answers demand opposite
actions. Add _classify_stale_cron_next_run, which distinguishes them by
whether normalization itself moved the wall clock:
* expr_edit — wall clock unchanged (or the stored wall clock is
not an occurrence either): the instant is genuinely
excluded by the current expression. Re-anchor
without firing, exactly as before.
* timezone_migration — the stored value's own wall clock IS a legal
occurrence and it only left the lattice because
_ensure_aware converted it to a different offset.
Fall through and fire the overdue run once.
Because every value written by this build carries the configured offset, a
real expr edit leaves the wall clock untouched and can never be reclassified
as a migration, so the #93049 protection is intact. At-most-once is
unchanged: the fire flows through the normal due path and the usual
advance_next_run / mark_job_run re-anchor rewrites next_run_at in the
current offset, so the legacy instant is never read again. Future local
wall-clock occurrences are untouched — not-yet-due rows never reach the
guard, and the #28934 offset-repair branch still runs first for a
still-future stored wall clock.
The migration case is classified explicitly rather than retried broadly: it
logs cron.timezone_migration.catch_up with the stored and normalized
instants plus both offsets, and increments a probe-visible counter
(get_timezone_migration_catchup_stats, timezone_migration_catchups.jsonl)
kept separate from catch_up_occurrences so an operator can tell "the upgrade
backlog is draining" from "runs are missing their grace window".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bot Mode group rooms were slow by construction: the round engine ran every
member's turn one after another, and each turn found out its bot had finished
by re-reading session.resume on a fixed 2s timer. A 4-bot room paid
4 x (model latency + up to 2s) per round, serially.
- group-rounds: members of a round now take their turns concurrently
(Promise.all). Rounds stay serial so bots still build on each other's
replies. Each member's delta is computed at its own turn start and its
watermark advances only to the pre-turn log length, so sibling replies
that land while it thinks are delivered next round exactly once; a
member's own replies are excluded from its delta by author (they are
already in its session). Message cap enforced per round; stop path
interrupts every member mid-turn (room.turn -> room.turns map).
- group-turns: the poll wakes on the member session's terminal frame
(message.complete / error via host.onEvent), then re-checks at 250ms
until session.running clears. The timer poll stays as a 5s backstop for
hosts without the event tap. Feature-detected; node test harness unaffected.
- group-chat-view: "X is thinking..." lists every member mid-turn.
- docs: bot-mode.md describes concurrent rounds + push-woken replies.
Live A/B (real tui_gateway over WS, 4 members, one round, same model):
serial+2s poll 35.0s -> concurrent+push 8.6s; every turn woke on the event.
Refs #92760
De-risking for the #48820 behaviour change: before this branch, credentials
in the environment force-enabled twelve platforms regardless of an explicit
enabled: false in config.yaml. Now that the explicit disable wins, users who
relied on the old override would see the platform go dark with no trace.
_enable_from_env (and Slack's inline copy) now emit ONE WARNING per platform
per process when the platform is explicitly disabled AND its env credentials
are present, naming the platform, the winning key
(platforms.<x>.enabled: false), the env var(s) being ignored, and the remedy.
A plain disable with no credentials, an enabled platform, and the env-only
(no YAML opinion) path stay silent; repeated config reloads do not repeat it.
_ENV_ENABLE_CREDENTIALS maps every _enable_from_env platform to its
triggering env var(s); a test pins that the map covers every routed branch.
Docs: messaging/index.md gains a 'Disabling a platform whose credentials are
still in .env' section with the exact warning text.
Live repro (real load_gateway_config on a temp HERMES_HOME with
platforms.weixin/telegram.enabled: false + WEIXIN_TOKEN/TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN in
env): before — both stayed disabled with zero log output; after — one
WARNING each ('Platform 'weixin' is explicitly disabled by
platforms.weixin.enabled: false ... (WEIXIN_TOKEN, WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID) will
NOT start its adapter ...'), none for the enabled homeassistant, none on the
second load.
Twelve credential-presence branches in _apply_env_overrides (weixin,
whatsapp_cloud, homeassistant, email, sms, dingtalk, feishu, wecom,
wecom_callback, bluebubbles, qqbot, yuanbao) force-set enabled = True
unconditionally, so a user's explicit `platforms.<x>.enabled: false` in
config.yaml was silently overridden whenever the platform's token/secret
lived in .env. Telegram/Discord/Slack/Signal/Matrix already routed through
_enable_from_env, which honors the `_enabled_explicit` marker written by
load_gateway_config.
Route all twelve sites through the same helper. Credentials are still wired
into the (disabled) PlatformConfig so send-only tooling keeps working —
the same contract Slack and api_server already follow.
Live repro (real load_gateway_config against a temp HERMES_HOME, yaml
`enabled: false` + creds in env): 12/13 platforms flipped to enabled=True
on main; 0/13 after the fix (telegram control unchanged).
Bug 2 of #48820. Fix direction from @JoaoMarcos44 in #48852 (surgically
reapplied on current main — the June branch no longer applies).
Co-authored-by: JoaoMarcos44 <joaomarcosdias444@gmail.com>
Manual /compress on a compute-host (turn_isolation) session blocked its RPC
waiter for a hard-coded 120s, answered error 5019, and then DROPPED the
host's late `control.ack`: HostSupervisor.control() popped the pending
queue in `finally`, so `_handle_host_frame` had nothing to deliver to. The
host kept compressing, succeeded minutes later, rotated the session — and
the gateway session never mirrored the new session_key/history_version and
the desktop never refreshed its transcript.
- host_supervisor: `control(..., on_late_ack=)` leaves a one-shot handler
registered when the waiter times out; control.ack/control.error/error
frames for that request_id fire it (bounded: 30min TTL, cap 64). A host
crash fails outstanding handlers with a synthetic control.error.
- server: `_compute_host_compress_wait_seconds()` derives the wait from
`compression.context_total_ceiling_seconds` (+30s slack, floor 120s,
cap 630s) instead of the literal 120. `_adopt_late_compute_host_compress_ack`
applies the metadata mirror and emits the same `session.info` a normal
compress does plus the existing `status.update kind=compacted` edge; a
late error goes out through the existing `error` event.
- session.compress / slash.compress (methods_tools + _mirror_slash_side_effects):
on waiter timeout answer `status: pending` (not 5019) and register the
late-ack handler.
- desktop: SESSION_COMPRESS_TIMEOUT_MS 120s -> 660s (above the gateway cap);
`status: 'pending'` renders as an info notice, not `error:`; the
`compacted` status edge rehydrates an idle active session's transcript
(mid-turn compaction still defers to the turn settle path).
Minimal extraction of the design in #99630 by @vsd2807 (design trace by
@andrexibiza and @JoaoMarcos44 in the #97948 thread); no new DB tables,
modules, or polling protocol.
Refs #97948
Co-authored-by: VVV <vaibhavdahiya28@gmail.com>
Follow-up on top of the salvaged #94095 commit:
- maybe_auto_prune_and_vacuum() now returns 'closed' (stale open state-owned
sessions marked ended) alongside 'pruned', so entrypoints can report the
reconciliation without parsing logs.
- Docstring explains the two-window lifecycle (close now, delete after a
further retention window).
- Regression test: cron/kanban/subagent rows with ended_at NULL are closed on
pass 1 and deleted on pass 2; a telegram row is never touched.
- website/docs sessions.md documents the automatic stale-open sweep.
NousDashboardAuthProvider._verify_jwt (and the identical hunk in the
self-hosted OIDC provider) folded EVERY PyJWKClient failure into
ProviderError, which the gate translates to HTTP 503
{"detail":"Auth provider 'nous' unreachable"}. That branch fires for
jwt.DecodeError('Not enough segments') — i.e. the bearer is not a JWT at all
(an opaque peer key, a legacy token, garbage) — and for PyJWKSetError (JWKS
fetched fine, foreign kid). Neither involves reaching Portal, which is why
the hosted sjc agents in #94558 returned a fast, well-formed 503 that
survived token re-mint and instance restart while Portal was healthy.
Add one shared classifier, hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.classify_jwks_lookup_error:
only PyJWKClientConnectionError (transport) and an unexpected bare
PyJWKClientError stay ProviderError; DecodeError / PyJWKSetError /
InvalidTokenError become InvalidCodeError so verify_session() returns None
and the middleware proceeds to the next provider / refresh / 401 exactly as
the protocol documents. Both providers now use it.
Live repro (real NousDashboardAuthProvider against a local reachable JWKS
server; and the real gated web_server app): before — opaque bearer ->
ProviderError "JWKS lookup failed: DecodeError('Not enough segments')" ->
503 unreachable; after — verify_session() -> None, gated GET /api/auth/me
with the opaque bearer -> 401; a real JWT against an unreachable JWKS still
-> ProviderError (503).
This does not add /api/v1/message to the public-path allowlist (#94579):
that route has no verifier in this repo, so bypassing the gate would leave a
state-changing ingress fail-open. The correct fix is classification, which
also covers every other opaque-bearer surface.
Refs #94558
Concurrent or nested delegation batches (a parent's 9-way fan-out plus a
child's own 3-way fan-out) printed interleaved `✓ [3/3]` / `✓ [3/9]` lines
with nothing identifying which batch each belongs to.
- CLI: batch header `🔀 [6a66] delegating 9 tasks`; completion lines and
child tree-view lines become `[6a66 3/9]`; spinner remaining-count tagged.
- Relay: `delegation_id` rides on every `subagent.*` event (TUI gateway
payload, api_server SSE subagent.start/complete).
- TUI: `[6a66 3/9]` prefix on /agents rows; Desktop Agents pane groups
workers by exact delegation_id (heuristic shape/time grouping kept for
older backends) and shows the tag on the group header.
- Tag = last 4 hex of the deleg_xxxxxxxx id (format_batch_tag), same id
returned by the dispatch and used for cache/delegation/live/<id>/.
Move the structural clone from the four call sites (auto review, codex
runtime, CLI /refine, gateway /refine) into AIAgent._spawn_background_review,
which every review path — immediate, idle-queue deferred, requeued — passes
through. Callers can no longer forget it, and the private helper is no longer
imported across hermes_cli/ and gateway/ package boundaries.
Tests now bind the real chokepoint (capturing at _spawn_background_review_now)
so they still fail if the clone is removed.
Widen #100802 to the two explicit review entry points. The CLI and gateway
/refine handlers built their own snapshot with a shallow list(), which
aliases the nested tool_calls/content containers of the live history. The
review fork sanitizes its transcript in place (sanitize_tool_call_arguments
rewrites function["arguments"]), so a /refine could rewrite the parent's
persisted transcript exactly like the automatic review could (#100795).
Both sites now use _clone_background_review_messages, the same structural
clone the automatic review uses. Regression tests drive the real handlers
and assert the snapshot shares no containers with the live transcript.
The clone-strip and root-write-through in the previous commit stop NEW forks
but leave installs that forked before upgrading in the broken state: each
profile keeps its own copy of the root grant, whichever profile rotated last
holds the only live refresh token, and root plus every sibling still hit
invalid_grant on their next refresh. The PR body asked those users to
re-auth at root and hand-edit profiles/*/auth.json; this makes it automatic.
`heal_forked_single_use_oauth_grants(provider)` (hermes_cli/auth.py) runs at
the top of a profile's `load_pool()` for SINGLE_USE_REFRESH_POOL_PROVIDERS.
Under the profile lock then the root lock it matches each profile OAuth row
to its root counterpart by lineage — same pool id (preserved by both fork
paths), same JWT account identity, same token material, else same provider +
same client (Anthropic pkce grants carry no claims) — keeps the copy with the
freshest rotation (`expires_at_ms` / `last_refresh` / JWT exp), writes it into
ROOT when root's is older, and strips the profile copy (pool rows, the
`providers.<id>` device-code block for Codex/xAI, and a profile-local
`.anthropic_oauth.json`) so the profile borrows root from then on. Root's
singleton and its hermes_pkce row are kept in step so root's own re-seed
cannot resurrect the spent pair.
Guarantees: idempotent (mtime-keyed clean mark skips the locked scan on the
per-call hot path); one INFO line per healed profile; API-key rows untouched;
a row with no root counterpart (root lost its grant, or an independent
account whose claims differ) is never deleted; only the two auth.json files
the root fallback already reads are touched — no environ/secret-scope reads.
`hermes auth list` / `hermes auth status <provider>` print the heal note.
Live repro (real imports, temp root + forge/atlas each holding a pre-fix
verbatim copy, forge already rotated RT0->RT1 into its own file, fake
single-use token endpoint): before — atlas None, forge AT2 (only in forge),
root None; server log 4x REUSE of spent RT0. After — forge's load heals to
root and rotates there, atlas and root select AT2, profiles/*/auth.json hold
no anthropic rows, server log exactly one ROTATE and zero REUSE.
Anthropic / Codex / xAI OAuth refresh tokens are single-use: a grant copied
into a second auth.json is one credential with two owners, and the first
profile to refresh it revokes the pair for every sibling (invalid_grant /
refresh_token_reused). Two code paths forked grants that way:
1. `hermes profile create --clone-all` and the dashboard/TUI
`mirror_credentials` flow copied auth.json (+ .anthropic_oauth.json)
verbatim. Both now run `strip_cloned_single_use_oauth_grants()`, which
drops OAuth rows for SINGLE_USE_REFRESH_POOL_PROVIDERS, the matching
`providers.<id>` device-code blocks, and the PKCE singleton file; API
keys are still copied. The clone reads the root grant through the
existing credential-pool root fallback.
2. A named profile with no local rows BORROWS the root grant via
`read_credential_pool()`'s fallback, but every persist
(`CredentialPool._persist`, `load_pool` reseed, `remove_index`) wrote the
rows into the profile's own auth.json — materializing a fork on the first
rotation. `persist_pool_entries()` now routes borrowed single-use rows
back to the root store (update-only, under the root lock; never falls
back to a local copy). A borrowed `hermes_pkce` rotation commits its
singleton to the root `.anthropic_oauth.json`, the borrower never prunes
root-seeded rows it cannot see the backing file for, and
`hermes -p <profile> auth add` persists only the profile's own rows.
Live repro (real imports, temp root + profiles, fake single-use token
endpoint): before — first profile rotation RT0->RT1 in profile only; root
and sibling then hit `invalid_grant`, `resolve_anthropic_token()` -> None.
After — rotation lands in root; root and both siblings select AT1, no reuse.
Direction per Teknium: stop cloning OAuth into profiles (ONE grant at root,
children inherit via context) rather than making clones survive. Supersedes
the clone-strip/root-write-through half of #100389 and the init-refresh idea
in #100703 (an expired-but-refreshable row already refreshes on select()).
Closes#100339
Co-authored-by: HexLab98 <liruixinch@outlook.com>
De-risking for the notify=True UX change: the marker is now driven by
cron.delivery.notify (config.yaml, default true = current behaviour), read
once per delivery and applied to both the text and media routes; a missing or
malformed section keeps the default.
An evidence-free live-adapter ack (bare SendResult(success=True) from
Slack/Matrix/Mattermost) is still accepted, but the target is recorded on the
job as last_delivery_unverified (cleared by the next evidenced delivery) so
the state shows up in 'hermes cron list' (⚠ Delivery UNVERIFIED), 'hermes cron
doctor', and the cronjob tool listing — not only in a WARNING log line.
Live repro (real _deliver_result + real 'hermes cron list' against a temp
HERMES_HOME, Slack target, SendResult(success=True)): before — list showed
nothing beyond the Deliver line and route metadata always carried
notify=true; after — list prints the UNVERIFIED line, and
cron.delivery.notify: false yields notify=false in the route metadata.
The #58262 assertion lived in test_scheduler.py against a harness that has
since moved; re-home it in the delivery-confirmation suite alongside the
positive-evidence tests, and widen it to the forum-topic route and the media
route so the marker cannot drift out of any lane.
The filter guards against bot-to-bot mirror loops of model chatter. Cron
output is an artifact: a job whose brief is legitimately terse ("...", a
single emoji from a script) has no loop partner, and dropping it while
returning {"success": True} is how a cron was logged as delivered with
nothing on the wire (#77763). Cron sends carry job_id in metadata; every
other caller keeps the filter unchanged.
A cron job fired, the scheduler logged "delivered to telegram:<chat> via
live adapter", and nothing reached Telegram (#77763). The log line was not
evidence of a send:
* the silence-narration filter returns {"success": True, "delivered": False}
(a successful *drop*), and the dict-normalization branch read only
"success", so a filtered message counted as delivered;
* an empty payload (no text, no media) skipped the send entirely and still
fell into the "delivered" branch;
* the log line named the chat but not the lane, so a wrong-thread delivery
and a phantom one are indistinguishable after the fact.
_confirm_adapter_delivery now inspects both result shapes: an explicit
`delivered: False` is a rejection even with a truthy `success`, and a
success with no message_id and no raw_response is accepted but logged as
UNVERIFIED. The empty-payload case fails closed into the existing
standalone/warn handling, and the delivered log carries thread= and
message_id=.
Failing closed on the live lane is only half the fix on a native target:
the standalone fallback sent the same empty payload, and the Telegram
adapter returns SendResult(success=True) for empty content without an API
call — a phantom live delivery became a phantom standalone one. Both
_send_to_platform call sites now sit behind one skip guard, so "empty
payload fails closed" holds on every lane (#77763).
The one-shot reasoning-off retry changes a request parameter that is part
of the provider cache key on config-sensitive providers (Anthropic renders
thinking/effort into the prompt; OpenAI lists reasoning.effort as
prefix-affecting), so that request is a deliberate single cache miss.
Pin the bound: the request AFTER it must carry the configured reasoning
again and the system prompt must be byte-identical across the whole retry
sequence. Sabotage-verified (sticky flag -> test fails on request 3).
Docstring on _consume_ephemeral_reasoning_off states the cost honestly.
Follow-up to the #99622 salvage:
- agent/transports/chat_completions.py: the legacy (no provider profile)
chat_completions path always re-emitted extra_body.reasoning with
enabled=True, so both reasoning_effort: none and the one-shot
length-continuation override went out as {enabled: true, effort: none}.
Honor enabled=False / effort=none the way the profile path does.
- agent/conversation_loop.py: reset agent._ephemeral_reasoning_off at
turn start so a flag armed by an interrupted/errored turn can never
strip thinking from the next turn's first request.
- User-facing hints now name the real slash command (/reasoning); the
/thinkon//thinkoff commands do not exist.
- tests: wire-level regression (continuation request carries
reasoning.enabled=false) and a stale-flag turn-scope test.
GLM-5.3-flash on ollama-cloud with reasoning_effort=high can spend the ENTIRE
output cap on reasoning delivered in a separate field and return
finish_reason=length with no visible content (verified live: max_tokens=4096,
completion_tokens=4096, content empty).
The length-continuation path handled that shape badly:
1. the empty response was appended as an interim assistant fragment,
poisoning the transcript until the pre-call sanitizer healed it
(observed 3+ healings per turn on the reporting user's session);
2. every continuation re-ran with thinking ON, re-deriving the whole
thinking budget against a growing context, so 4 attempts still produced
nothing and the turn died with 'Response remains truncated after 4
continuation attempts'.
Now:
- interim assistant fragments with no visible content are never appended
(whichever way they got empty);
- a thinking-only truncation sets a one-shot reasoning-off override that
build_api_kwargs consumes for the next request, so the continuation
writes the answer instead of re-thinking it;
- the ceiling exit clears a pending override and, when every fragment was
empty, returns an actionable final_response instead of an invisible None.
Audit of every last_status reader outside the scheduler (rg last_status across
web/, apps/desktop/, hermes_cli/, tui_gateway/, tools/, scripts/, website/):
- web dashboard CronPage: last_status was never rendered at all — a
delivery_failed job showed a green 'scheduled' badge and only a small red
'delivery: ...' line. New pure cronLastResult() helper maps the closed
literal set to tones (ok=success, delivery_failed/blocked_config=warning,
error/unknown=destructive) and the card now shows an amber
'delivery_failed' badge (title = last_delivery_error).
- Desktop hermes-bots routine inspector: 'Last result' printed the raw
literal; routineLastResult() spells out each one ('Ran, but delivery
failed', 'Blocked by configuration (not run)', ...), unknown passes through.
- /cron list (cli_commands_mixin): 'Last run: <ts> (delivery_failed)' now
appends the delivery reason, since last_error is None for those runs.
- hermes cron list/doctor and the cronjob tool already handled the literal
on this branch; no consumer compared == 'ok' for success apart from the
cronjob manual-run path, which the branch already fixed.
- developer-guide/cron-internals.md: table of last_status literals + which
detail field carries the reason.
Live repro (real 'hermes dashboard' on a temp HERMES_HOME with a
delivery_failed job, CronPage rendered against the live /api/cron/jobs):
before — badges [scheduled, default, telegram:123]; after — badges
[scheduled, delivery_failed (warning tone, title 'telegram: 502 Bad
Gateway'), default, telegram:123].
A manual cronjob(action='run') derived success from last_status == 'ok'
and read the error from last_error — so a run that now records
delivery_failed came back as success=False with error=None, an unexplained
failure. Surface last_delivery_error as the error in that case (the
#84006 direction, re-applied on the delivery_failed status), and pin the
manual-run completion summary to say 'Result: FAILED' over an undelivered
run. Document the status in the cron user guide.
Co-authored-by: webtecnica <webtecnica@gmail.com>
Main grew claim_job_for_fire(job_id, return_job=True) — a claimed
snapshot dict instead of a bool — while this branch sat on an older
base. The merge-ref CI ran the hybrid: the wiring tests still mocked
return_value=True, which fails isinstance(claimed_job, dict) and fell
into the 'already being fired' branch, so every dispatch assert failed.
Mock the claim to return the job snapshot (the API's success shape),
read the summary's deliver from the claimed snapshot the run actually
executes, and keep the dispatch-result failure renderer. Rebased onto
current main; cron suite 710 passed.
Review follow-up on the #83993 fix: a stored falsy deliver ("", JSON
null) fell through the local check and produced 'output was delivered
there by the job itself' for a target that does not exist — the exact
false-delivery-claim class the PR removes. Fire time already normalizes
falsy deliver to local (no delivery, output persisted in last_output,
no delivery error), so the summary now canonicalizes with the
scheduler's own _normalize_deliver_value and reads saved-locally.
Whitespace-only deliver is deliberately not folded in: fire time
records 'no delivery target resolved' for it, and the error-driven
FAILED wording must stay visible.
The _execute_job_now completion notice unconditionally claimed
"(output was delivered there by the job itself)" for non-local
delivery targets, even when the job record's last_delivery_error
showed the delivery failed (#83993). Derive the note from the
refreshed job record so a failed delivery is reported honestly to
the calling agent.
A successful agent run whose delivery failed used to persist
last_status=ok and bury the failure in last_delivery_error. CLI list
painted that as green and the run looked identical to a quiet success.
Record last_status=delivery_failed instead, keep last_delivery_error,
do not increment failure_streak, and teach cron list/doctor not to
treat it as ok.
Fixes#83993
`Start-UiServer` printed the -SelfTestUi URL (and opened the browser window)
as soon as the TcpListener was bound, but the runspace that answers /progress
starts asynchronously — BeginInvoke returns before the pipeline is open and
the script block is JIT'd, which is seconds on a loaded runner. The kernel
accepted connections into the backlog during that gap and nobody answered
them. The self-test hit it three times (#90371 and two follow-ups each
widened a timeout instead of removing the race) and it just failed an
unrelated hermes_state.py PR (run 33591547099, two 5s stale-backlog
timeouts = red).
- windows.ps1: readiness handshake after BeginInvoke — one /progress
round-trip must succeed (≤15s) before the server is returned; on failure
tear the listener down and continue without UI. The URL now means
"serving", not "bound". Also fixes the browser opening to a page that never
loads on a slow machine.
- test: 1s per-attempt probe timeout so a single dead backlog socket cannot
consume half the readiness budget.
- CI: new `desktop_updater` classifier lane. tests/test_desktop_update_windows_*.py
spawn the real PowerShell script; the Windows-only job now runs them only
when scripts/desktop-update/**, the Electron updater launcher, conftest,
pyproject, or those tests change (push/dispatch fail open). A PR that
never touched that surface cannot be failed by its process timing.
