A session asked to clean up older Pythons removed the uv-managed base
interpreter its own venv depended on; the next boot died with 'uv
trampoline failed to spawn Python child process' and no agent tool could
repair it, because the agent itself no longer started (#58748). Prior
uninstall detection (85ce25687e) only flagged package-manager commands.
Add agent/runtime_self_protection.py and wire it into both layers:
- The approval floor (_floor_block) now blocks shell commands that
delete the running interpreter, its own venv, the pyvenv.cfg base, or
the uv-managed install directory — rm/rmdir/rd/del/erase/Remove-Item
with any flags, find <root> -delete, and uv python uninstall of the
running version (including --all). The floor runs before yolo /
approvals.mode=off / cron approve mode, so no session setting can
bypass it.
- The file-safety write classifier denies write/patch/move/delete to the
same paths, so the file tools cannot overwrite the interpreter either.
Only the runtime the process itself boots from is protected; every other
venv and interpreter on the machine stays manageable.
Fixes#58748
Conflicts resolved toward the PM model: main's lazy_deps/update_cmd_deps/npm
stamp machinery stays deleted (PM + scripts/build/node-deps.mjs own it), the
systemd ExecStop stop-mark rides the installation launcher, legacy
linux_only/macos_only/windows_only markers are rewritten to platforms(), and
finalize_update_receipt carries pending manual-serve obligations forward
again (lost when the ContextVar receipt rewrite crossed c0aa3ce354).
Test harness: the real-home I/O guard exempts /proc/<pid>/fd metadata reads
(deleted-WAL holder scans) and run_tests.sh drops ~/.hermes PATH entries so
shutil.which() cannot trip the tripwire.
Reconcile plugin declarations and validation through PM's atomic generation publication; preserve external runtimes, target markers, and conflict refusal. Keep one source-update completion owner and port upstream lifecycle changes to the PM desktop/runtime paths.
Why: for an old WebSocket client that never advertised server→client requests,
send_async already failed fast (on_result(None)) but _emit_approval_request ignored
it, so the approval wait — owned by tools.approval's queue, not server_requests —
still idled for the whole approvals.timeout (300s) with no prompt anywhere. The
same held for a -32601 error frame. on_result(None) now withdraws the queue entry
(withdraw_gateway_approval: cancelled cause, never a user deny) so
_await_gateway_decision returns at once; the agent sees a withdrawn prompt.
resolve_gateway_approval committed entry.result/reason/event.set() AFTER
releasing _lock, so _drop_entry (which reads result and leaves the queue under
the lock) could still pop-and-lose a choice the client was acked for. Every
committer (resolve, clear_session, unregister_gateway_notify) now commits inside
the same critical section that pops the entry, which is what _drop_entry's
docstring promised.
_drop_entry mapped a withdrawn wait to settle("set") — the raw poll-state token
went out as the request.cancel reason. It is now session_closed, and a choice
from another surface is resolved (both RequestCancelReason values).
Tests: restore test_server_request_error_response_fails_fast (an error frame
settles send() to None promptly); the approval fail-fast probe from the review
(silent WS peer, timeout 3 -> was 3.2s, now immediate); a lock-instrumented
resolve test; a settle-reason test. The test_protocol `server` fixture imports
server_requests before its sys.modules patch window so the module server.py binds
its sinks on is the one tests import — the PR's fail-fast test only passed in a
full-file run before (order dependency).
Part of #112548
The Desktop pool caps local `hermes serve` children and holds each child's
slot lease for its lifetime. Its renderer refreshes lastActiveAt every 60s
for every open socket, so a bot-tile-pinned resident is keepalive-fresh
forever: occupied is not busy, and the pool cannot tell the difference. The
renderer's own turn bookkeeping cannot see cron fires (HERMES_DESKTOP=1 runs
the in-process ticker), messaging turns served by a pooled backend, or a
session blocked on an approval, so it is not a safe proof either.
Add `GET /api/health/idle` (token-gated; whether a turn is running is
activity recon, unlike the public liveness route) returning
`idle: true|false|null` from `hermes_cli/web_server_idle_proof.py`. It
reuses the SSH idle-exit primitive `turn_in_flight()` (running gateway
sessions + running cron jobs) and adds the human-input ledgers: open
server->client requests (`server_requests.open_request_count`) and queued
gateway approvals (`approval.pending_gateway_approval_count`). Any ledger
that cannot be read yields `null`, which the Desktop treats as busy.
Tests: unit invariants over the fail-closed table and the real ledgers, and
a live test that boots three desktop-shaped children (HERMES_DESKTOP=1,
per-child HERMES_HOME, port 0), holds one busy in the cron running-job
ledger, and probes all three over HTTP. RED on base: every child 404s.
_should_skip_container_guards documented fail-soft (unknown or raising
backend keeps the guards on) but only provider_flag's inner lookups were
covered: a raising registry.get_provider propagated out of the approval
predicate instead of defaulting to guards-on. Wrap the lookup so any
exception means "not isolated enough" and the dangerous-command prompts
stay in place.
Review follow-up on #113257.
Keep tools/approval.py free of a module-level import from agent/ (every other
agent import in this module is late, and the sibling provider_flag callers in
tools/env_probe.py and tools/skills_tool_setup.py import inside the function),
and coerce the provider attribute to bool so a truthy non-bool declaration
cannot leak into the approval decision.
When the CLI approval callback raises, when no callback is registered on the
thread while prompt_toolkit owns the terminal, or when the input() read is
interrupted, prompt_dangerous_approval returned "deny" and the command gate
rendered "BLOCKED: User denied this command" — attributing a refusal to a
user who was never asked (#22992). #112308 fixed the gateway half of the
class (withdrawn prompts -> outcome "cancelled" with a cause); this closes
the CLI residual on the same shape.
- tools/approval_prompt.py: those three paths return an Unanswered("cancelled")
sentinel carrying the cause; MCP elicitation consent maps it to "cancel".
- tools/approval.py: the CLI gate renders "BLOCKED: <noun> was not approved: the
approval prompt could not be delivered or was not answered (<cause>)" with
outcome "cancelled" — still fail-closed, "Silence is not consent".
- tools/file_tools_write_guards.py: the protected-instruction write gate
reports the undelivered prompt instead of "was denied by the user".
- Shared metrics: "cancelled" is a counted approval outcome (contract + v2
schema) instead of falling into "unknown".
- Docs: hook `choice="cancelled"` now covers the CLI causes.
Fixes#22992
clear_session (/new, /reset, auto-reset boundary) stamped entry.result="deny"
before waking the wait, and an interrupted coalesced leader published the
same deny to its followers, so both still rendered outcome="denied" /
"denied by user". Carry the cause on the entry (entry.cancelled) and let
_cancel_cause map a result-less wake to a withdrawn prompt; the wait still
unwinds fail-closed and the leader's own decision is unchanged.
When a gateway approval wait ends without anyone answering — the parent's
delegate_task finishing and tearing the child down, a /stop, or the turn's
notifier being unregistered at turn end — the tool result said
"BLOCKED: Command denied by user" (outcome="denied", user_summary "You denied
this command"). The user never saw or answered the prompt, so the parent agent
went on reasoning about a refusal that never happened (#112026, #22992).
The action stays fail-closed (the command does not run, the model still gets
the NOT-consented stop text), but the attribution is now truthful:
- tools/approval_gateway_wait.py: `_cancel_cause()` reads the existing
per-thread interrupt-cause channel (`get_interrupt_reason()`, a trusted fixed
category — no string matching) for the interrupted state and marks a
notifier-unregister wake (event set, result None) as "the turn ended before
the prompt was answered". Both the direct and the coalesced-follower wait
return `cancelled=<cause>`; the post_approval_response hook fires
choice="cancelled" instead of "deny"/"timeout".
- tools/approval.py: a cancelled decision renders
"BLOCKED: Command approval was withdrawn before the user answered (<cause>)."
with outcome="cancelled" and its own user_summary; an explicit /deny is
untouched.
- tools/delegate_tool_child_run.py: `_signal_child_stop` publishes a fixed
tool_reason ("parent delegation ended"; the late-child mirror forwards the
parent's own category) so a child's pending approval can tell teardown from a
user /stop — previously it rode the default "explicit stop requested".
- tools/file_tools_write_guards.py / tools/approval_prompt.py: the protected
instruction-file gate and MCP elicitation consume the same key instead of
reporting "denied by the user" / "decline".
Co-authored-by: zccyman <16263913+zccyman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: KoNit-K <124019182+KoNit-K@users.noreply.github.com>
Squashed integration of the user-facing message audit for this surface set.
Full per-finding receipts: /tmp/ux-audit/lanes/*-receipt.md (campaign artifacts).
Widening the _presence() clearing from single-query to every unattended
context also cleared is_ask for platform=api_server. That surface answers
approvals through the /v1/runs bridge (approval.request ->
POST /v1/runs/{id}/approval), so a dangerous command that used to park in
waiting_for_approval became an instant BLOCK with no approval.request.
Restrict the clearing to single-query + cron, where nobody can answer.
Stripping HERMES_INTERACTIVE/HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION/HERMES_EXEC_ASK from
the external worker env also made check_cronjob_requirements() False, so
the cronjob toolset vanished for every job on a managed-systemd gateway
even with cron.allow_agent_scheduling: true. Accept the existing
HERMES_CRON_SESSION marker (set by run_one_job's context) as well.
Review finding: _presence() over-widening broke the /v1/runs approval bridge; env strip hid the cronjob toolset in external workers.
Widen the cron-only clearing to `_unattended_contexts()`: a webhook /
api_server session running inside a gateway inherits HERMES_EXEC_ASK=1
exactly like an external cron worker does, and `_presence()` returning
is_ask=True sent it to the gateway-decision branch with no notifier — a
pending card nobody can answer — instead of `approvals.unattended_mode`.
Same class as #110932, one predicate.
Test trimmed to two invariants (cron / webhook leak → cleared; interactive
keeps presence); the launch-path comment in cron/scheduler.py names the
env-fallback consumers instead of an internal incident log.
_presence() cleared is_cli/is_gateway/is_ask for single-query sessions but
not for cron, so a cron worker that inherited HERMES_INTERACTIVE /
HERMES_EXEC_ASK from its launching gateway resolved as an interactive CLI
and blocked on an approval card nobody could answer (measured: 31
pending_approval hangs/hour, 6 stranded claims — #110932).
Mirror the single-query clearing for _is_cron_approval_context(), matching
the cron exclusion already inside _is_gateway_approval_context(). Layer 1
(#110942) strips the vars at the launch path; this makes the gate robust
to any other leak route.
The backend never sent a JSON-RPC request; when it needed an answer from the
renderer it hand-correlated a `*.request` notification with a later `*.respond`
method through four module-level dicts, a timeout thread and 13 derived
`*.expire` names, plus a separate reconnect snapshot per prompt kind. That is a
second request/response layer built on a protocol that already has one.
`tui_gateway/server_requests.py` sends `{id: "srq-…", method, params}` and
blocks on the response frame with that id (string ids never collide with the
clients' integer ids). One `request.cancel {id, method, reason}` notification
withdraws a request on timeout / interrupt / session close. `open_requests` on
`session.resume` / `session.activate` / `session.events.since` re-delivers
unanswered requests after a reconnect; the shared TypeScript channel does that
itself before the caller sees the result. Batch clarify keeps its per-question
locks as a normal `clarify.lock` RPC (the last lock resolves the request).
Approvals stay queue-backed (`tools.approval` owns the timeout, `/approve all`,
coalescing): the request resolves the queue entry and the entry's own
resolution withdraws the request through `register_gateway_settle`.
Deleted: `_block`, `_respond`, `_pending`, `_answers`,
`_pending_prompt_payloads`, `_batch_clarify`, `_EXPIRING_REQUESTS`, the
`*.respond` methods, every `*.request` / `*.expire` event, `pending_clarify`.
Compute-host (turn isolation) mirrors the child's open request and relays the
response frame / lock to it. Desktop, TUI and shared clients register
`onRequest` handlers where they used to switch on `*.request` events; answers
are response frames over the socket the request arrived on, so #91684's
owner-routing class cannot recur for prompts.
The Desktop "Approvals: off" toggle persists approvals.mode: off. The shell
guards (check_all_command_guards / execute_code) honour it as a bypass, but
_run_approval_gate, the shared gate that computer_use, plugin approval rules,
SSH-config writes and the dangerous-pattern prompt all route through, only
checked _yolo_active() (process --yolo / session /yolo). So with approvals
off, every destructive computer_use action still prompted.
Regressed when 3e066dfedd moved computer_use onto the shared gate: its old
private gate never consulted mode at all, and the shared gate had never been
given the third bypass source. Gate now mirrors the shell guards:
yolo OR approvals.mode == "off" -> approved. Hardline blocks and deny rules
still run before it.
Review follow-up. Two of the three items taken as written; the third declined
with a reason.
1. Taken. The reconcile semantics mean `patterns` may only ADD -- an entry left
out of it is not removed, because the on-disk list wins for anything this
process did not approve itself. Every caller in the tree is additive today,
so nothing breaks, but the signature does not say so. Stated in the
docstring, and pinned by
`test_a_caller_that_passes_a_smaller_set_does_not_remove` so a future
`allowlist remove` finds out here instead of in production.
NOT taken: the `reconcile: bool = True` opt-out. There is no caller that
wants it, and AGENTS.md:98-101 names exactly this -- "Speculative
infrastructure. Hooks, callbacks, or extension points with no concrete
consumer." The removal path is editing config.yaml, which the docstring now
says.
2. Taken. website/docs/user-guide/security.md, next to the existing
`hermes config edit` tip, which is where an operator reads about removing a
pattern: the list is read at startup, a pattern removed while a session is
running stays approved in that session until the next write or a restart,
and if it was removed for safety reasons, restart.
3. Taken. `test_save_failure_is_logged_not_raised` asserted non-raising but
never asserted the log its name promises. Now asserts
"Could not save allowlist" via caplog.
scripts/run_tests.sh tests/tools/test_permanent_allowlist_reconcile.py
=== Summary: 1 files, 9 tests passed, 0 failed (100% complete) in 0.4s
`load_permanent_allowlist()` runs exactly once, at module import
(tools/approval.py, the call at the bottom of the module), and
`load_permanent()` only unions into `_permanent_approved` (:2866-2869) --
nothing ever removes. `save_permanent_allowlist()` then wrote that in-memory
set straight back over `config["command_allowlist"]`, at eight call sites.
`command_allowlist` is a file the operator edits, and deleting a line from it
is the documented way to withdraw a standing approval. Any hand edit made
while a Hermes process is live was undone by that process's next `[a]lways`,
in both directions at once.
Reproduced on this tree with a temp HERMES_HOME:
BEFORE (tools/approval.py at fcbd107)
on disk before this process starts : ['git status', 'ls *']
operator edits config.yaml by hand : ['ls *', 'npm test']
(revoked 'git status', added 'npm test')
after ONE [a]lways : ['docker *', 'git status', 'ls *']
is_approved still honours revoked? : True
AFTER
after ONE [a]lways : ['docker *', 'ls *', 'npm test']
is_approved still honours revoked? : False
`npm test` was silently deleted from the operator's own config file, and
`git status` -- a standing approval they had just withdrawn -- was written
back and kept auto-approving. Neither prints anything.
The same shape loses writes between two live Hermes processes: whichever
saves second overwrites the other's entry.
The fix reconciles at write time. The file is re-read and the result is what
is on disk now, plus what this process approved since its own baseline, where
the baseline is what `command_allowlist` held the last time this process
synchronised with the file. That difference is what separates "the operator
granted this here" from "this was on disk at import and may since have been
revoked". Revoked entries are also dropped from `_permanent_approved` so
`is_approved()` stops honouring them for the rest of the process.
It does NOT make a revocation take effect the instant the file changes --
nothing re-reads the file on the approval hot path, and adding a stat there is
a separate change with its own cost. It makes the next write stop undoing the
operator's edit.
`_lock` is `threading.Lock` and not reentrant; all eight call sites were
checked and none holds it across the call, so the added critical section
cannot deadlock. The failure path still logs and returns rather than raising,
as before.
Searched open and merged PRs and issues for `command_allowlist revoke`,
`permanent allowlist reload`, `approval allowlist clobber` and
`save_permanent_allowlist` -- nothing covers this.
Tests: tests/tools/test_permanent_allowlist_reconcile.py, 8 cases -- both
halves of the bug, the two-process race, idempotence, the unedited round trip,
and the existing contract that a config write failure is logged rather than
raised.
scripts/run_tests.sh tests/tools/test_permanent_allowlist_reconcile.py
=== Summary: 1 files, 8 tests passed, 0 failed (100% complete) in 0.5s
No regression across the 29 test files in tests/ that touch the allowlist or
the approval module: 25 failed before and after, byte-identical failure set
(pre-existing missing-dependency failures in my local venv).
Under gateway.multiplex_profiles a secondary profile's turn ran with the LAUNCH
profile's working directory, command allowlist, redact_secrets switch, credential
file mounts, browser engine/headed flags, LSP service, auxiliary-provider health
marks and MCP stderr log, and several TERMINAL_ENV consumers read the process env
instead of the routed profile's terminal scope. A standalone `hermes -p X gateway
run` never behaved that way.
- tools/terminal_scope.py: resolve the terminal.cwd placeholder inside the
profile scope with the same rule gateway/run.py applies at import (local ->
$HOME, sandbox default otherwise) so the system prompt, context files and the
terminal of a routed turn start where the profile's standalone gateway would.
- tools/image_source.py, credential_files.py, image_generation_tool.py,
skills_tool.py, delegate_tool_progress.py, agent/tool_executor.py: read
TERMINAL_ENV / TERMINAL_CWD through the terminal scope.
- tools/approval.py (+ approval_floors.py): one permanent allowlist per routed
profile home; the unscoped module set stays for single-profile processes.
- agent/redact.py: `_redact_enabled()` resolves security.redact_secrets for the
routed profile (scope .env, then config); launch snapshot kept when unscoped.
- tools/credential_files.py, agent/auxiliary_health.py, agent/lsp/__init__.py,
tools/browser_tool_cloud.py, tools/mcp_tool_config.py,
tools/tool_result_storage.py: key process caches by profile home (or bypass
the slot under an override).
Tests: tests/tools/test_multiplex_turn_parity.py (4, red on base).
Docs: multi-profile-gateways.md isolation table.
Activation reaches plugin discovery before the application dependencies
exist. Give PM its own locked Python project and runtime so it can install
or repair the application without importing that dependency tree.
Keep PM outside the application workspace. A shared uv workspace resolves
the application graph and cannot provide this isolation. Route mutations
through an isolated worker and preserve transaction callbacks, cancellation,
custom package registrations, and correlated receipts.
Use the same runtime builder for source installs and packaged payloads.
Keep offline wheelhouse support in that builder. Nix builds the independent
PM lock as a separate derivation. Refuse lazy-disabled bootstrap before
installing tools or dependencies.
Move first-party YAML readers and writers to ruamel. Keep the application
lock's transitive PyYAML requirements for third-party packages.
Verification:
- Focused canonical Python suite: 177 passed, 1 host-gated skip.
- Electron backend probes: 12 passed. Electron typecheck passed.
- Both uv locks, scoped lint, Bash syntax, and whitespace checks passed.
- Cold activation, corrupt-app repair, offline staging, and relocation ran.
- Built and exercised the Nix PM runtime and standalone YAML merge script.
Six broader caller test files retain the same 24 failing test IDs as an
archive of HEAD. The existing real-home guard blocks those tests before
they can exercise the affected paths. No full-suite pass is claimed.
Native Windows signing and full Bionic package execution remain unverified.
Recover legacy stringified lists with a warning. Reject malformed shapes and nonstring members without admitting approvals or rewriting user config on read.
Fixes#104779
Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <sunsky.lau@gmail.com>
Both shell-command guard entry points returned approval from the isolated-container fast
path before the operator's approvals.deny rules were evaluated, so a Docker sandbox with
no host mounts (or singularity/modal/daytona/vercel) skipped the entire user deny list.
The deny list is documented as never bypassable: it states what the agent may DO, not
what it can reach. Evaluate it before the container skip; the built-in dangerous-command
heuristics keep skipping there. hermes approvals test mirrors the new order.
Salvaged from #91029 by @fangliquanflq.
Every PLUGIN-COMPAT __getattr__ now calls hermes_cli.plugin_compat.warn_once(facade, name, target) before
resolving, emitting a HermesPluginCompatWarning (FutureWarning) once per process per name: old path, new
path, removal target. Importing a facade for its live API stays silent; only resolving a moved name warns.
COMPAT_MANIFEST.md documents the warning and how to silence it during migration.
Verified the runtime never routes through a pointer: every entry point (run_agent, cli, hermes_cli.main,
gateway.run, tui_gateway.server, web_server, model_tools + tool discovery, hermes_state, cron.scheduler,
browser_tool, mcp_tool, kanban, auth) imports clean and `hermes doctor` runs end to end with the warning
promoted to an error.
Also restores the check_compat_pointers CI step to .github/workflows/lint.yml, which a0be177aac dropped
when the compat layer was regenerated (the lint script itself was present; the workflow step was not).
hermes_cli/plugin_compat.py, tests/test_plugin_compat_warning.py and the two-line insert per facade are
part of the compat layer and go away with it.
The Sep 2026 decomposition (PR #102117) makes internal import paths a non-API: names now live in
the focused modules that define them. This commit is the ONLY thing keeping the old paths alive,
so external plugins have time to update. It is deliberately a single, unsquashed commit:
git revert <this sha>
removes every shim, stub and manifest at once on the announced date. Nothing in-tree may depend on
these pointers: scripts/check_compat_pointers.py (wired into lint.yml) fails CI if it does.
What it adds (see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md, compat_manifest.json):
- 332 facade modules get one delimited `PLUGIN-COMPAT` block appended at the end of the file
- 1,172 moved names resolved lazily via a module `__getattr__` (PEP 562) — never a top-level import,
so no import cycles; facades that already had `__getattr__` get a chained one
- 592 third-party/stdlib names the old modules used to expose, with their original import statements
- 266 public definitions that had been deleted as unused, restored byte-for-byte from the pre-decomposition
tree (+40 private helpers and 16 imports pulled in only because a restored definition needs them)
- 3 deleted modules recreated as re-export stubs (gateway/startup_watchdog, hermes_cli/observability/
relay_runtime, tools/environments/modal_utils)
- private names (`_x`) get no pointer: they were never API (3,792 skipped)
Verified: all 335 touched modules import under a fresh HERMES_HOME and every manifest name resolves;
the lint reports zero in-tree uses; ruff clean; targeted suites unchanged.
tools/approval.py no longer re-exports sibling names (approval_context/prompt/floors/detection/
human_wait/smart/gateway_wait); it imports only what it uses. Siblings reference sibling-defined
names directly (module-attribute reads on tools.approval_context so patching the defining module
still works); only facade-owned state (_lock, _gateway_queues, _permanent_approved, _denied,
_denial_breaker_addendum, _gateway_notify_cb) is still read back through tools.approval.
approval_detection calls its own _command_detection_variants instead of late-binding through the facade.
For each issue anchor present in BASE 63279301bc non-test .py and absent on HEAD, the BASE comment/docstring block was re-attached at the HEAD location of the code it explained (matched by the distinctive code line / enclosing def). Sentences already covered by an existing HEAD comment were deduped; the issue number always survives. Insert-only: no code lines changed.
