40b623849a
Fold2 PROFX finding 2 (quality): `_DOT_DIRS` hand-copied six of the eight HOME_CREDENTIAL_DIRS entries. Build it from the shared constant so a dir added there is seeded as a directory store without editing the test. `.config/gh` and `.config/gcloud` were already seeded as directories by the dotless-name rule, so the seeded tree is unchanged.
287 lines
15 KiB
Python
287 lines
15 KiB
Python
"""Tests for credential exclusion + secret scrubbing during profile export.
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Profile exports should NEVER include auth.json or .env — these contain
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API keys, OAuth tokens, and credential pool data. Users share exported
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profiles; leaking credentials in the archive is a security issue.
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Secret-shaped strings that sneak into skills / persona / memory text are
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force-redacted in the staged archive (same pass as sessions --redact).
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The live profile on disk must stay untouched.
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"""
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import tarfile
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import pytest
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from agent.file_safety import HOME_CREDENTIAL_DIRS
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from hermes_cli.profiles import export_profile
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from plugins.teams_pipeline.store import DEFAULT_TEAMS_PIPELINE_STORE_FILENAME
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# Long enough to match agent.redact prefix patterns (sk- + 10+ chars).
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_LEAKED_KEY = "sk-or-v1-reallyLongSecretKeyValue12345678"
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def _patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir):
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monkeypatch.setattr("hermes_cli.profiles._get_profiles_root", lambda: profiles_root)
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monkeypatch.setattr("hermes_cli.profiles.get_profile_dir", lambda n: profile_dir)
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monkeypatch.setattr("hermes_cli.profiles.validate_profile_name", lambda n: None)
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# Stores named here as well as in PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS, so dropping one from the list fails a test:
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# the loaders' and writers' own file names (.op.env and npmrc have no suffix the scrub edits).
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_EXTRA_STORES = {
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".op.env", "npmrc", "honcho.json", "google_chat_user_token.json", "google_chat_user_oauth_pending",
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"workspace/meetings/node_token.json", "weixin/accounts", ".copilot_jwt.json", "proxy", "chrome-debug",
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"home/.git-credentials", "home/.config/gh/hosts.yml", "backups", "state-snapshots",
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DEFAULT_TEAMS_PIPELINE_STORE_FILENAME, "mem0.json",
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"browser-profiles/live/Default/Cookies", "browser_profiles/default/Default/Login Data",
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"mcp-tokens/srv.json", "vault/vault.key", "platforms/pairing/approved.json", "slack_tokens.json",
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"webhook_subscriptions.json", ".ssh/id_rsa", ".aws/credentials", ".gnupg/x", ".kube/config", ".envrc",
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}
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# Single-file stores whose name has no dot; every other dotless store is a token directory.
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_DOTLESS_FILES = {"npmrc"}
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# Dot-named stores that are directories: the OS credential dirs shared with file_safety.
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_DOT_DIRS = set(HOME_CREDENTIAL_DIRS)
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def _seed_stores(root):
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"""Lay every credential store into a profile-shaped tree at *root*; returns their paths."""
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from hermes_cli.profiles import PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS
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stores = _EXTRA_STORES | PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS
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(root / "platforms").mkdir(parents=True)
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(root / "config.yaml").write_text("model: gpt-4\n")
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(root / "platforms" / "keep.json").write_text("{}")
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for rel in stores:
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is_dir = rel in _DOT_DIRS or ("." not in rel.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] and rel not in _DOTLESS_FILES)
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target = root / rel / "store" if is_dir else root / rel
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target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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target.write_text("fake-credential")
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return stores
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class TestCredentialExclusion:
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def test_named_profile_export_excludes_auth(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Named profile export must not contain auth.json or .env."""
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profiles_root = tmp_path / "profiles"
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profile_dir = profiles_root / "testprofile"
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profile_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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# Create a profile with credentials
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(profile_dir / "config.yaml").write_text("model: gpt-4\n")
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(profile_dir / "auth.json").write_text('{"tokens": {"access": "sk-secret"}}')
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(profile_dir / ".env").write_text("OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-secret-key\n")
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(profile_dir / "SOUL.md").write_text("I am helpful.\n")
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(profile_dir / "memories").mkdir()
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(profile_dir / "memories" / "MEMORY.md").write_text("# Memories\n")
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_patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir)
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output = tmp_path / "export.tar.gz"
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result = export_profile("testprofile", str(output))
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# Check archive contents
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with tarfile.open(result, "r:gz") as tf:
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names = tf.getnames()
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assert any("config.yaml" in n for n in names), "config.yaml should be in export"
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assert any("SOUL.md" in n for n in names), "SOUL.md should be in export"
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assert not any("auth.json" in n for n in names), "auth.json must NOT be in export"
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assert not any(".env" in n for n in names), ".env must NOT be in export"
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def test_named_export_ships_no_credential_store_or_copy_of_one(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""No credential store (any case spelling) and no copy Hermes' own writers leave of one
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(pre-update zip, update snapshot, config backup, migration .bak, corrupt auth.json) reaches a
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named-profile export. .op.env, npmrc, home/ CLI stores and the .bak copies have no suffix the
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scrub edits, so exclusion is their only guard; a hand-named config copy is the user's and
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ships scrubbed."""
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from hermes_cli.auth import _load_auth_store
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from hermes_cli.backup import create_pre_update_backup, create_quick_snapshot
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from hermes_cli.config_backups import backup_config
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from hermes_cli.post_update import _backup_existing
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from hermes_cli.profiles import PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS
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profiles_root = tmp_path / "profiles"
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profile_dir = profiles_root / "testprofile"
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_seed_stores(profile_dir)
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(profile_dir / "config.yaml").write_text(f"model:\n api_key: {_LEAKED_KEY}\n")
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(profile_dir / "config.yaml.bak-my-note").write_text(f"model:\n api_key: {_LEAKED_KEY}\n")
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(profile_dir / "GOOGLE_CHAT_USER_TOKENS").mkdir(exist_ok=True)
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(profile_dir / "GOOGLE_CHAT_USER_TOKENS" / "upper.json").write_text("fake-credential")
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nested = [f"skills/s/{r}" for r in (".ssh/id_rsa", ".aws/credentials", ".gnupg/x", ".kube/config", ".envrc",
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".docker/config.json", ".azure/accessTokens.json",
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".config/gh/hosts.yml", ".config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json")]
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for rel in [*nested, "skills/s/.config/other/settings.json"]:
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(profile_dir / rel).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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(profile_dir / rel).write_text("fake-credential")
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(profile_dir))
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copies = [
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create_pre_update_backup(hermes_home=profile_dir),
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profile_dir / "state-snapshots" / create_quick_snapshot(hermes_home=profile_dir),
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backup_config(profile_dir / "config.yaml", "setup"),
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*_backup_existing((profile_dir / ".env", profile_dir / "config.yaml")).values(),
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]
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_load_auth_store(profile_dir / "auth.json") # "fake-credential" is not JSON: quarantined
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copies.append(profile_dir / "auth.json.corrupt")
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assert all(c and c.exists() for c in copies), copies
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_patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir)
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with tarfile.open(export_profile("testprofile", str(tmp_path / "export.tar.gz")), "r:gz") as tf:
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members = {m.name: m for m in tf.getmembers()}
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note = tf.extractfile("testprofile/config.yaml.bak-my-note").read().decode()
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# The default profile's root allow-list keeps skills/, so its nested copies need the same drop.
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with tarfile.open(export_profile("default", str(tmp_path / "default.tar.gz")), "r:gz") as tf:
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default_members = set(tf.getnames())
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assert {"testprofile/config.yaml", "testprofile/platforms/keep.json"} <= set(members)
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assert "default/config.yaml" in default_members
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assert "default/skills/s/.config/other/settings.json" in default_members
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assert "testprofile/skills/s/.config/other/settings.json" in members
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assert _LEAKED_KEY not in note
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rels = {*_EXTRA_STORES, *PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS, "google_chat_user_tokens/upper.json", *nested,
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*(c.relative_to(profile_dir).as_posix() for c in copies)}
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folded = {n.casefold() for n in (*members, *default_members)}
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leaked = sorted(f"{p}/{r}" for p in ("testprofile", "default") for r in rels if any(
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n == f"{p}/{r}".casefold() or n.startswith(f"{p}/{r}/".casefold()) for n in folded))
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assert not leaked, leaked
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("declare_owned", [False, True])
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def test_distribution_can_neither_plant_nor_replace_a_store(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch, declare_owned):
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"""A distribution never installs a credential store or a recovery copy of one, nested ones
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included, whether it ships the whole payload or names each store in ``distribution_owned``,
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while a sibling such as ``platforms/keep.json`` still installs. An update that ships a FILE
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where the profile has a directory holding stores is refused before anything is written."""
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from pathlib import Path
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from hermes_cli.profile_distribution import (
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DistributionError, DistributionManifest, install_distribution, write_manifest,
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "home", lambda: tmp_path)
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(tmp_path / ".hermes").mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / ".hermes"))
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stores = _seed_stores(tmp_path / "v1") | {"auth.json.corrupt", ".env.bak-20260928T084018Z",
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"config.yaml.bak-20260928T084018Z"}
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for copy in ("auth.json.corrupt", ".env.bak-20260928T084018Z", "config.yaml.bak-20260928T084018Z"):
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(tmp_path / "v1" / copy).write_text("fake-credential")
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# PLATFORMS/PAIRING: on a case-insensitive filesystem that spelling IS the pairing store.
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owned = sorted(stores | {r.split("/")[0] for r in stores} | {"SOUL.md", "PLATFORMS/PAIRING"}) if declare_owned else []
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def stage(label, soul):
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staged = tmp_path / label
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staged.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
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(staged / "SOUL.md").write_text(soul)
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write_manifest(staged, DistributionManifest(name="dist", version="0.1.0", distribution_owned=owned))
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return staged
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installed = install_distribution(str(stage("v1", "v1")), name="dist").target_dir
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assert (installed / "platforms" / "keep.json").exists()
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planted = sorted(r for r in stores if any(
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f.is_file() and f.read_text() == "fake-credential"
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for f in ((installed / r), *((installed / r).rglob("*") if (installed / r).is_dir() else ()))))
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assert not planted, planted
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live = [installed / "platforms" / "pairing" / "approved.json",
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installed / "platforms" / "whatsapp" / "session" / "creds.json"]
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for store in live:
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store.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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store.write_text("installer-credential")
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for shipped_file in ("platforms", "platforms/whatsapp"):
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update = stage(f"v2-{shipped_file.count('/')}", "v2")
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(update / shipped_file).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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(update / shipped_file).write_text("not a directory")
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with pytest.raises(DistributionError):
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install_distribution(str(update), name="dist", force=True)
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assert [s.read_text() for s in live] == ["installer-credential"] * 2
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assert (installed / "SOUL.md").read_text() == "v1"
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# A store's ancestor shipped as a directory is merged, not replaced whole: the installer's
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# platforms/whatsapp/session survives an update that ships platforms/whatsapp/config.json.
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update = stage("v2-dir", "v2")
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(update / "platforms" / "whatsapp").mkdir(parents=True)
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(update / "platforms" / "whatsapp" / "config.json").write_text("{}")
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install_distribution(str(update), name="dist", force=True)
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assert (installed / "platforms" / "whatsapp" / "config.json").exists()
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assert [s.read_text() for s in live] == ["installer-credential"] * 2
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class TestExportSecretScrub:
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def test_named_profile_export_redacts_secrets_in_text(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Leaked keys in skills / SOUL / memories must not leave the archive."""
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profiles_root = tmp_path / "profiles"
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profile_dir = profiles_root / "scrubme"
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profile_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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soul = profile_dir / "SOUL.md"
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soul.write_text(f"My key is {_LEAKED_KEY}\n")
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skill_dir = profile_dir / "skills" / "demo"
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skill_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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skill = skill_dir / "SKILL.md"
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skill.write_text(
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"---\nname: demo\ndescription: Demo.\n---\n"
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f"Use OPENROUTER_API_KEY={_LEAKED_KEY}\n"
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)
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memories = profile_dir / "memories"
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memories.mkdir()
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memory = memories / "MEMORY.md"
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memory.write_text(f"token {_LEAKED_KEY}\n")
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(profile_dir / "config.yaml").write_text("model: gpt-4\n")
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_patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir)
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result = export_profile("scrubme", str(tmp_path / "scrubme.tar.gz"))
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with tarfile.open(result, "r:gz") as tf:
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members = {
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name: tf.extractfile(name).read().decode("utf-8")
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for name in tf.getnames()
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if name.endswith((".md", ".yaml"))
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}
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blob = "\n".join(members.values())
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assert _LEAKED_KEY not in blob
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assert any("SOUL.md" in n for n in members)
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assert any("SKILL.md" in n for n in members)
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assert any("MEMORY.md" in n for n in members)
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# Live profile must keep the original plaintext.
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assert _LEAKED_KEY in soul.read_text()
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assert _LEAKED_KEY in skill.read_text()
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assert _LEAKED_KEY in memory.read_text()
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@pytest.mark.require_symlinks
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def test_export_redacts_through_symlink_without_touching_source(
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self, tmp_path, monkeypatch
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):
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"""Symlinked skill text is redacted in the archive, source file stays put."""
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profiles_root = tmp_path / "profiles"
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profile_dir = profiles_root / "linkme"
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profile_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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outside = tmp_path / "outside-skill.md"
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outside.write_text(f"secret {_LEAKED_KEY}\n")
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skill_dir = profile_dir / "skills" / "linked"
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skill_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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link = skill_dir / "SKILL.md"
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link.symlink_to(outside)
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(profile_dir / "config.yaml").write_text("model: gpt-4\n")
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_patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir)
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result = export_profile("linkme", str(tmp_path / "linkme.tar.gz"))
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with tarfile.open(result, "r:gz") as tf:
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skill_members = [n for n in tf.getnames() if n.endswith("SKILL.md")]
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assert skill_members
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archived = tf.extractfile(skill_members[0]).read().decode("utf-8")
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assert _LEAKED_KEY not in archived
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assert _LEAKED_KEY in outside.read_text()
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assert link.is_symlink()
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