66fa864f19
An unauthenticated password-login copied the whole provider string into dashboard-auth.log, on the unknown-provider path and on the rate-limited path alike, so one request could write an arbitrarily large entry to disk. provider is now limited to 128 characters (rejected with 422 before the handler runs), and audit_log caps every string value at 256 characters so a future field cannot reintroduce the same write. Reported-by: Tenable Research
83 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
83 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
"""Audit log for dashboard-auth events.
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Profile-aware location: ``$HERMES_HOME/logs/dashboard-auth.log``.
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Format: one JSON object per line. Token-like kwargs are dropped before
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serialisation so we never leak refresh tokens or JWTs to disk.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.audit import audit_log, AuditEvent
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@pytest.fixture
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def profile_home(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Redirect $HERMES_HOME and ~ to a tmp dir for the duration of the test."""
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home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(home))
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# Some code paths fall back to Path.home() — patch that too.
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monkeypatch.setattr("pathlib.Path.home", lambda: tmp_path)
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return home
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("non_native", [False, True])
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def test_audit_bounds_string_values(profile_home: Path, non_native: bool) -> None:
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oversized = 'value"\n' * 1000
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_FAILURE, provider=oversized,
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details={"values": [oversized]}, extra=Path(oversized) if non_native else oversized,
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reason="invalid_credentials", attempts=3, allowed=False,
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access_token=oversized,
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)
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lines = (profile_home / "logs" / "dashboard-auth.log").read_text().splitlines()
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assert len(lines) == 1
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entry = json.loads(lines[0])
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for value in (entry["provider"], entry["details"]["values"][0], entry["extra"]):
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assert len(value) <= 256
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assert value.endswith("...[truncated]")
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assert oversized.startswith(entry["provider"].removesuffix("...[truncated]"))
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assert entry["reason"] == "invalid_credentials"
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assert entry["attempts"] == 3
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assert entry["allowed"] is False
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assert "access_token" not in entry
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def test_audit_writes_jsonlines(profile_home):
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audit_log(AuditEvent.LOGIN_START, provider="nous", ip="1.2.3.4")
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_SUCCESS,
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provider="nous", user_id="u1",
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email="a@b.com", ip="1.2.3.4",
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)
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path = profile_home / "logs" / "dashboard-auth.log"
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assert path.exists(), f"audit log not created at {path}"
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lines = path.read_text().strip().splitlines()
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assert len(lines) == 2
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second = json.loads(lines[1])
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assert second["event"] == "login_success"
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assert second["provider"] == "nous"
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assert second["user_id"] == "u1"
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assert second["email"] == "a@b.com"
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assert "ts" in second # ISO-8601 timestamp
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def test_audit_redacts_token_like_fields(profile_home):
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_SUCCESS,
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provider="nous", access_token="should-not-appear",
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refresh_token="also-not", code="not-this", state="nope",
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)
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raw = (profile_home / "logs" / "dashboard-auth.log").read_text()
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for forbidden in ("should-not-appear", "also-not", "not-this", "nope"):
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assert forbidden not in raw, f"token-like value leaked into audit log: {forbidden}"
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