The adapter auth check is synchronous and runs on the adapter's event loop:
once per inline-button tap, and once per keystroke for Telegram inline
queries. Entering `_profile_runtime_scope` with its default
`hydrate_secrets=True` there calls `hydrate_profile_secret_sources`, which
takes the process-global secret-source lock and may resolve external secret
backends. That lock contention is the heartbeat-starvation class #99519
moved off the loop.
Startup and the per-profile message path already hydrate this profile's
sources off-loop, so the callback now binds the scope with
`hydrate_secrets=False` (the reconnect-retry precedent in the same module):
`build_profile_secret_scope` still re-reads the profile's `.env` per call,
so allowlist edits keep reaching the next tap.
The regression test also seeds the default profile's allowlist (file and
live os.environ) with a different user and asserts the secondary's bot
refuses them; on main that user was admitted on the secondary's buttons.
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