adaa6643b9
The Sep-2026 facade decomposition moved _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes and _normalize_to_supported_image into tools/vision_tools_image_prep.py; import from the defining module per repo convention (compat pointers are off limits in-tree).
628 lines
29 KiB
Python
628 lines
29 KiB
Python
"""Tests for tools/image_source.py — the unified vision image-source resolver.
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Covers the delivery contract (data:/http/file/local/container source handling,
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size cap, magic-byte sniff) AND the terminal-backend confinement security model
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(GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq): under a non-local backend, host reads are confined to the
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media caches and every other path is read inside the sandbox via exec-read.
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"""
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import base64
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import importlib
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from pathlib import Path
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from types import SimpleNamespace
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from unittest.mock import patch
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import pytest
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# Minimal valid 1x1 PNG bytes. Resolver validation requires a decodable fixture.
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PNG = base64.b64decode(
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b"iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII="
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)
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JPEG = b"\xff\xd8\xff" + b"\x00" * 64
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CORRUPT_PNG = base64.b64decode(
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b"iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAoAAAAKCAIAAAACUFjqAAAAFElEQVR4nGP8z8Dwn4EIwESJ5gAAVQ4CH1evYJQAAAAASUVORK5CYII="
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)
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def _reload(monkeypatch, hermes_home: Path):
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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import hermes_constants
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importlib.reload(hermes_constants)
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import tools.image_source as isrc
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importlib.reload(isrc)
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return isrc
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def _no_real_sandbox_bringup(monkeypatch):
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"""Neutralize the resolver's lazy sandbox bring-up (issue #62825) so unit
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tests never spawn a real ssh/docker env. Patched on terminal_tool (which
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_reload does not touch) and resolved at call time, so it survives the
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per-test image_source reload. The bring-up tests override it."""
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import tools.terminal_tool as tt
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monkeypatch.setattr(tt, "ensure_task_env", lambda *a, **k: None)
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class TestDataUrl:
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_valid_data_url_resolves_to_bytes(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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f"data:image/png;base64,{b64}", isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert res.mime == "image/png"
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assert res.origin == "data"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_non_image_data_url_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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b64 = base64.b64encode(b"not an image").decode()
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with pytest.raises(isrc.NotAnImage):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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f"data:text/plain;base64,{b64}", isrc.ResolveContext())
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_corrupt_png_rejected_at_resolver_boundary(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A PNG-shaped but undecodable payload never becomes a resolved image."""
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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img = tmp_path / "corrupt.png"
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img.write_bytes(CORRUPT_PNG)
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with pytest.raises(isrc.NotAnImage):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(img), isrc.ResolveContext())
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class TestLocalBackend:
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_local_backend_reads_any_host_path(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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img = tmp_path / "outside" / "pic.png"
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img.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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img.write_bytes(PNG)
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(img), isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert res.origin == "file"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_bare_relative_path_resolves(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A cwd-relative bare filename ('pic.png') is a valid local source —
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main accepted it; the resolver must not regress it (PR review)."""
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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img = tmp_path / "pic.png"
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img.write_bytes(PNG)
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monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source("pic.png", isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert res.origin == "file"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_svg_passes_through_for_rasterization(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""SVG has no raster magic bytes but is passed through with mime
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image/svg+xml so the vision call sites can rasterize it to PNG."""
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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svg = tmp_path / "art.svg"
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svg_bytes = b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"></svg>'
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svg.write_bytes(svg_bytes)
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(svg), isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.mime == "image/svg+xml"
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assert res.data == svg_bytes
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class TestNonLocalBackendConfinement:
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"""The security model: under a sandbox backend, host reads are confined to
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the media caches; every other path is read inside the sandbox."""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_media_cache_path_host_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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cached = home / "cache" / "images" / "inbound.png"
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cached.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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cached.write_bytes(PNG)
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# No sandbox env needed — a cache path is host-read directly.
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(cached), isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert res.origin == "file"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_desktop_upload_images_dir_host_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Desktop/clipboard uploads under ``HERMES_HOME/images`` are host-read.
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Regression for #69575: uploads land in the flat top-level ``images/``
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dir (not ``cache/images``). Under a sandbox backend the vision resolver
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must permit reading them host-side — otherwise it falls through to the
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task-id-less sandbox reader and fails with "not reachable inside the
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sandbox".
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"""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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upload = home / "images" / "upload_20260722_181019_1.png"
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upload.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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upload.write_bytes(PNG)
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# No sandbox env: an uploads path must be host-read directly, not routed
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# to the in-sandbox exec-read.
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(upload), isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert res.origin == "file"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_host_secret_outside_cache_routes_to_sandbox_not_host(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A non-cache host path (e.g. /etc/passwd) must NOT be host-read — it
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routes to the in-sandbox exec-read, which reads the CONTAINER's file."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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# A real host file outside the caches, holding a "secret".
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secret = tmp_path / "id_rsa"
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secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK")
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# Fake sandbox env: its exec-read returns a *different* (container) image,
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# proving we read the container filesystem, not the host secret.
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container_png_b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
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calls = {}
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def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
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calls["cmd"] = cmd
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return {"returncode": 0, "output": container_png_b64}
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(secret), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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# Read came from the sandbox exec-read, returning the container image —
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# the host secret bytes never appear.
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assert res.origin == "container"
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY" not in res.data
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assert "head -c" in calls["cmd"] and "< " in calls["cmd"] # bounded, redirect-safe form
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_non_cache_path_fails_closed_without_sandbox(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""No active sandbox env -> refuse rather than fall back to a host read."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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secret = tmp_path / "id_rsa"
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secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env", return_value=None):
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with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(secret), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_symlink_in_cache_pointing_outside_is_not_host_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A symlink planted inside a cache dir that points at a host secret must
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not be host-read (resolve() escapes the cache) — it routes to sandbox."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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secret = tmp_path / "outside" / "id_rsa"
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secret.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
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cache_dir = home / "cache" / "images"
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cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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link = cache_dir / "sneaky.png"
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try:
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link.symlink_to(secret)
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except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
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pytest.skip("symlinks unsupported")
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# Fails closed (no sandbox) rather than host-reading the symlink target.
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env", return_value=None):
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with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(link), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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class TestExecReadSafety:
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_exec_read_is_bounded_and_redirect_safe(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Leading-dash paths go through an input redirect (no argv exposure)
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and the read is size-bounded via head -c."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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captured = {}
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def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
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captured["cmd"] = cmd
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return {"returncode": 0, "output": base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()}
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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"/workspace/-i-etc-shadow.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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assert f"head -c {isrc._MAX_INGEST_BYTES + 1} < " in captured["cmd"]
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assert "'-i-etc-shadow.png'" in captured["cmd"] or "-i-etc-shadow.png" in captured["cmd"]
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_exec_read_nonzero_returncode_raises(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
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return {"returncode": 1, "output": ""}
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
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with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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"/workspace/nope.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_exec_read_retries_cold_start_then_succeeds(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""#76566: under Docker, vision's first exec-read can fail (cold
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container / pipe setup) and an identical retry succeeds. The
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resolver must transparently retry before raising, so users don't
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see 'could not read inside the sandbox' on a file that is fully
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readable on the second attempt."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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calls = {"n": 0}
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b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
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def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
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calls["n"] += 1
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if calls["n"] == 1:
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# First call: cold start — empty pipe, exit non-zero.
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return {"returncode": 1, "output": ""}
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return {"returncode": 0, "output": b64}
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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"/workspace/cold.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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assert res.origin == "container"
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert calls["n"] == 2
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_exec_read_retries_exhausted_includes_diagnostic(
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self, tmp_path, monkeypatch
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):
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"""#76566: when every retry still fails, the error must carry the
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container's stderr/stdout so the user can tell 'no such file'
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from 'permission denied' from 'cold start never came up'."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
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return {"returncode": 1, "output": "head: can't open '/x': No such file or directory"}
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
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with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound) as excinfo:
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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"/workspace/missing.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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# Diagnostic surfaced — the user can act on it.
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assert "No such file or directory" in str(excinfo.value)
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class TestSvgNormalization:
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"""SVG resolves end-to-end: the resolver passes it through as
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image/svg+xml and the vision call sites rasterize it to PNG via
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_normalize_to_supported_image (PR #52688, folded in)."""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_svg_rasterized_when_converter_available(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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from tools import vision_tools_image_prep as vt
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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svg = tmp_path / "art.svg"
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svg.write_bytes(b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="4" height="4"/>')
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def fake_rasterize(svg_path, out_path):
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out_path.write_bytes(PNG)
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return True
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with patch.object(vt, "_rasterize_svg_to_png", side_effect=fake_rasterize):
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(svg), isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.mime == "image/svg+xml"
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path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(svg, "image/svg+xml")
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assert err is None
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assert mime == "image/png"
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assert path.read_bytes() == PNG
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path.unlink()
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def test_svg_actionable_error_when_no_converter(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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from tools import vision_tools_image_prep as vt
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_reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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svg = tmp_path / "art.svg"
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svg.write_bytes(b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"/>')
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with patch.object(vt, "_rasterize_svg_to_png", return_value=False):
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path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(svg, "image/svg+xml")
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assert path is None
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assert "rasterizer" in err
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class TestLazySandboxBringUp:
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"""Issue #62825: under a non-local backend, the FIRST vision_analyze of a
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session (before any terminal command) must bring the sandbox up itself
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instead of failing with 'no active sandbox session'."""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_first_read_brings_up_sandbox_then_reads(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "ssh")
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brought_up = []
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fake_env = SimpleNamespace(
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execute=lambda cmd, **kw: {"returncode": 0, "output": base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()}
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)
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def fake_ensure(task_id):
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brought_up.append(task_id)
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# Env is absent until the lazy bring-up runs, then available — exactly
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# the SSH-handshake ordering the bug was about.
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def fake_get_active(task_id):
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return fake_env if brought_up else None
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import tools.terminal_tool as tt
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monkeypatch.setattr(tt, "ensure_task_env", fake_ensure)
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monkeypatch.setattr(isrc, "_get_active_env", fake_get_active)
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source("/tmp/test.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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assert brought_up == ["t1"] # bring-up was triggered before the read
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assert res.origin == "container"
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assert res.data == PNG
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_bringup_that_yields_no_env_still_fails_closed(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""If the bring-up can't produce an env, the resolver still refuses
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rather than falling back to a host read."""
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "ssh")
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secret = tmp_path / "id_rsa"
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secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
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import tools.terminal_tool as tt
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monkeypatch.setattr(tt, "ensure_task_env", lambda *_a, **_k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(isrc, "_get_active_env", lambda *_a, **_k: None)
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with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(secret), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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# HEIF/HEIC/AVIF ISO-BMFF headers: 'ftyp' box at bytes 4-8, major brand at 8-12,
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# minor version at 12-16, then a list of 4-byte compatible brands.
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# 0x18-byte box length prefix mirrors a real iPhone HEIC (\x00\x00\x00\x18 ftyp...).
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HEIC_HEADER = b"\x00\x00\x00\x18ftypheic\x00\x00\x00\x00mif1heic" + b"\x00" * 32
|
|
AVIF_HEADER = b"\x00\x00\x00\x1cftypavif\x00\x00\x00\x00avifmif1" + b"\x00" * 32
|
|
MIF1_HEADER = b"\x00\x00\x00\x18ftypmif1\x00\x00\x00\x00mif1heic" + b"\x00" * 32
|
|
# AVIF encoders routinely stamp the generic still-image brand 'mif1' as the
|
|
# MAJOR brand and declare the AV1 codec only in the compatible-brand list, so a
|
|
# major-brand-only sniff mislabels these as HEVC-coded HEIC.
|
|
MIF1_MAJOR_AVIF_COMPATIBLE = (
|
|
b"\x00\x00\x00\x1cftypmif1\x00\x00\x00\x00mif1avif" + b"\x00" * 32
|
|
)
|
|
MIF1_MAJOR_AV01_COMPATIBLE = (
|
|
b"\x00\x00\x00 ftypmif1\x00\x00\x00\x00mif1av01avif" + b"\x00" * 32
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestHeicDetection:
|
|
"""iPhone HEIC/HEIF (and AVIF) are sniffed from the ISO-BMFF ftyp brand so
|
|
they reach _normalize_to_supported_image instead of being rejected as
|
|
'not a recognized image' (the pre-fix behavior for iPhone photos)."""
|
|
|
|
def test_heic_brand_detected(self):
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(HEIC_HEADER) == "image/heic"
|
|
|
|
def test_generic_mif1_brand_detected_as_heic(self):
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(MIF1_HEADER) == "image/heic"
|
|
|
|
def test_avif_brand_detected(self):
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(AVIF_HEADER) == "image/avif"
|
|
|
|
def test_mif1_major_with_avif_compatible_brand_is_avif(self):
|
|
"""Regression: a 'mif1'-major file that lists 'avif' among its
|
|
compatible brands is AV1-coded and must be reported as AVIF. Sniffing
|
|
only the major brand labeled every mif1 file HEIC, which routes an AVIF
|
|
to the HEVC error text and mis-reports the format to the caller."""
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(
|
|
MIF1_MAJOR_AVIF_COMPATIBLE) == "image/avif"
|
|
|
|
def test_mif1_major_with_av01_compatible_brand_is_avif(self):
|
|
"""Same as above for the 'av01' codec brand, deeper in the list."""
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(
|
|
MIF1_MAJOR_AV01_COMPATIBLE) == "image/avif"
|
|
|
|
def test_mif1_major_with_heic_compatible_stays_heic(self):
|
|
"""The compatible-brand scan must not over-trigger: a genuine HEVC-coded
|
|
HEIF (mif1 major, heic compatible, no AV1 brand) is still HEIC."""
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(MIF1_HEADER) == "image/heic"
|
|
|
|
def test_brand_scan_does_not_read_past_the_ftyp_box(self):
|
|
"""The scan is bounded by the declared ftyp box size, so an 'avif' token
|
|
sitting in a FOLLOWING box must not upgrade a HEIC to AVIF."""
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
# ftyp box is exactly 0x18 bytes (major mif1 + one compatible 'heic');
|
|
# the next box then contains the literal bytes 'avif'.
|
|
hdr = (
|
|
b"\x00\x00\x00\x18ftypmif1\x00\x00\x00\x00heic"
|
|
b"\x00\x00\x00\x10metaavif" + b"\x00" * 32
|
|
)
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(hdr) == "image/heic"
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("declared_size", [0, 1, 4, 8, 12, 15])
|
|
def test_malformed_box_size_fails_closed(self, declared_size):
|
|
"""A malformed declared size must NOT widen the brand scan.
|
|
|
|
Regression: the bound previously fell back to the whole 64-byte sniff
|
|
window whenever the declared size was outside ``16 <= size <= len``. That
|
|
failed OPEN in precisely the attacker-controlled case — a declared size
|
|
of 0/4/8/12 on a genuine HEIC let the literal bytes ``avif`` in a LATER
|
|
box upgrade it to AVIF, defeating the box bound this code exists to
|
|
enforce. Every malformed size must still report HEIC.
|
|
"""
|
|
import struct
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
hdr = (
|
|
struct.pack(">I", declared_size)
|
|
+ b"ftyp" + b"mif1" + b"\x00" * 4 + b"heic"
|
|
+ b"\x00\x00\x00\x10" + b"meta" + b"avif" + b"\x00" * 24
|
|
)
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(hdr) == "image/heic", (
|
|
f"declared size {declared_size} widened the scan and leaked an "
|
|
f"'avif' token from a following box"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
def test_honest_oversized_box_still_scans_what_arrived(self):
|
|
"""A size >= 16 that overruns the sniff window is a truncated read, not
|
|
an attack: clamp to the available bytes rather than failing closed, so a
|
|
genuine AVIF whose ftyp box is larger than 64 bytes is still detected."""
|
|
import struct
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
hdr = (
|
|
struct.pack(">I", 9999)
|
|
+ b"ftyp" + b"mif1" + b"\x00" * 4 + b"mif1avif"
|
|
)
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(hdr) == "image/avif"
|
|
|
|
def test_misaligned_box_size_does_not_crash_or_misdetect(self):
|
|
"""A size that is not a multiple of 4 must not misalign the brand loop
|
|
into reading a partial brand."""
|
|
import struct
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
for size in (17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23):
|
|
hdr = (
|
|
struct.pack(">I", size)
|
|
+ b"ftyp" + b"mif1" + b"\x00" * 4 + b"heic"
|
|
+ b"\x00\x00\x00\x10" + b"meta" + b"avif" + b"\x00" * 24
|
|
)
|
|
got = _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(hdr)
|
|
assert got == "image/heic", f"size {size} -> {got}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_truncated_ftyp_header_does_not_crash(self):
|
|
"""A short/garbage read must return a value, not raise."""
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(b"\x00\x00\x00\x18ftyp") is None
|
|
# Bogus (huge) declared box size must fall back to the sniffed window.
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(
|
|
b"\xff\xff\xff\xffftypmif1\x00\x00\x00\x00mif1avif") == "image/avif"
|
|
|
|
def test_ftyp_with_unknown_brand_not_misdetected(self):
|
|
"""An ISO-BMFF ftyp box that isn't an image brand (e.g. mp4) stays
|
|
unrecognized — we must not claim every ftyp container is an image."""
|
|
from tools.vision_tools_image_prep import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
|
|
mp4 = b"\x00\x00\x00\x18ftypmp42\x00\x00\x00\x00mp42isom" + b"\x00" * 32
|
|
assert _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(mp4) is None
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
async def test_heic_resolves_and_normalizes_to_png(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
|
"""End-to-end: a real HEIC file resolves (mime image/heic) and
|
|
_normalize_to_supported_image re-encodes it to PNG via pillow-heif."""
|
|
pillow_heif = pytest.importorskip("pillow_heif")
|
|
pillow_heif.register_heif_opener()
|
|
from PIL import Image
|
|
from tools import vision_tools_image_prep as vt
|
|
isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
|
|
|
|
heic = tmp_path / "photo.heic"
|
|
Image.new("RGB", (8, 8), (120, 60, 200)).save(str(heic), format="HEIF")
|
|
|
|
res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(heic), isrc.ResolveContext())
|
|
assert res.mime == "image/heic"
|
|
|
|
path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(heic, "image/heic")
|
|
assert err is None
|
|
assert mime == "image/png"
|
|
assert path.read_bytes().startswith(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n")
|
|
path.unlink()
|
|
|
|
def test_heic_actionable_error_when_decoder_missing(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
|
"""With pillow-heif unavailable, a HEIC image gets an actionable error
|
|
(install pillow-heif) rather than a generic conversion failure — the
|
|
same soft-dependency posture as SVG-without-rasterizer."""
|
|
from tools import vision_tools_image_prep as vt
|
|
_reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
|
|
heic = tmp_path / "photo.heic"
|
|
heic.write_bytes(HEIC_HEADER)
|
|
|
|
import builtins
|
|
real_import = builtins.__import__
|
|
|
|
def _no_heif(name, *args, **kwargs):
|
|
if name == "pillow_heif":
|
|
raise ImportError("pillow_heif not installed")
|
|
return real_import(name, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
|
|
with patch.object(builtins, "__import__", side_effect=_no_heif):
|
|
path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(heic, "image/heic")
|
|
assert path is None
|
|
assert "pillow-heif" in err
|
|
|
|
def test_avif_converts_without_pillow_heif(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
|
"""Regression: AVIF must NOT be gated on pillow-heif.
|
|
|
|
Pillow >= 11.3 bundles a native AvifImagePlugin, while pillow-heif
|
|
wheels are commonly built with no AV1 codec at all (libheif_info()
|
|
reports ``AVIF: ''``). Gating AVIF on a pillow-heif import therefore
|
|
rejected files Pillow could already decode and told the user to install
|
|
a library that cannot decode them. With pillow-heif absent, a real AVIF
|
|
must still normalize to PNG.
|
|
"""
|
|
pytest.importorskip("PIL")
|
|
from PIL import Image, features
|
|
if not features.check("avif"):
|
|
pytest.skip("this Pillow build has no native AVIF codec")
|
|
from tools import vision_tools_image_prep as vt
|
|
_reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
|
|
|
|
avif = tmp_path / "photo.avif"
|
|
Image.new("RGB", (8, 8), (10, 180, 90)).save(str(avif), format="AVIF")
|
|
|
|
import builtins
|
|
real_import = builtins.__import__
|
|
|
|
def _no_heif(name, *args, **kwargs):
|
|
if name == "pillow_heif":
|
|
raise ImportError("pillow_heif not installed")
|
|
return real_import(name, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
|
|
with patch.object(builtins, "__import__", side_effect=_no_heif):
|
|
path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(avif, "image/avif")
|
|
|
|
assert err is None, f"AVIF was rejected without pillow-heif: {err}"
|
|
assert mime == "image/png"
|
|
assert path.read_bytes().startswith(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n")
|
|
path.unlink()
|
|
|
|
def test_avif_error_names_av1_not_just_pillow_heif(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
|
"""When an AVIF genuinely cannot be decoded, the guidance must mention
|
|
the AV1/Pillow path — not blame pillow-heif alone, which frequently
|
|
ships without any AV1 codec."""
|
|
from tools import vision_tools_image_prep as vt
|
|
_reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
|
|
# Valid AVIF brand, but the payload is not decodable by anything.
|
|
broken = tmp_path / "broken.avif"
|
|
broken.write_bytes(AVIF_HEADER)
|
|
|
|
path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(broken, "image/avif")
|
|
assert path is None
|
|
assert "AV1" in err or "Pillow" in err
|