dbede34f6e
The desktop backend ticks EVERY local profile's cron store from one process — its own docstring says "like a multiplex gateway" (hermes_cli/web_server.py) — but never sets the process-global multiplex flag, and cannot: its own chat turns are unscoped and would fail closed. Every isolation in the tree keys on that flag — the guard that keeps a routed `.env` out of the shared `os.environ`, `get_secret`'s fail-closed miss, passthrough resolution, the MCP and kanban subprocess scrubs — so all of it was inert for a sibling profile's fire. Verified: a secondary profile's API keys replaced the launch profile's in `os.environ` with `override=True` and stayed there after the tick, and a scope miss read the launch profile's tokens (#107692). Give multiplex mode a context-local counterpart. `set_multiplex_context` (agent/secret_scope.py) is OR'd into `is_multiplex_active()`. `_profile_cron_scope` only MARKS a fire whose home is not the process's own (`routed_profile_fire`, decided against `get_process_hermes_home()`, the override-immune resolver); `_install_fire_secret_scope` in cron/scheduler.py installs the profile's hydrated secret scope and, for a marked fire, the multiplex context — for exactly that span, dropped again before the scope by `_reset_fire_secret_scope`. Multiplex semantics are therefore never active in cron without a scope to read: `run_one_job`'s restart-safe handoff runs before the body's scope and keeps today's semantics (its own scope is #107413 / #106050's seam, left untouched so this composes with whichever lands). Every existing multiplex-keyed isolation applies inside the routed fire with no per-site patching; the launch profile's own fires and the backend's turns keep single-profile semantics; marker and override both reach the pool worker via `copy_context()`. `get_secret` read the raw global in its miss branch; it now goes through `is_multiplex_active()`. The dotenv guard keeps its pinned flag-only form (#77970). Two consequences of suppressing the write are handled rather than left as regressions: - a `no_agent` script's env is `os.environ.copy()`, which no longer carries the routed `.env`; the runner overlays the installed scope onto the base BEFORE sanitizing, so the same scrub / passthrough rules apply to those values and the parent process is never mutated; - plugin secret sources are discovered on the fire's first agent build, after the scope froze, and the post-discovery reload is hydrate-only under multiplex semantics; the refresh now folds the values into the installed scope in place (`refresh_installed_secret_scope`, the pattern `_publish_env_value` already uses for `.env` writes under multiplex). And the profile's external secret sources are hydrated before the scope is frozen, the order gateway/run.py and the external cron worker already use. Tests pin each direction: the marker without the semantics before the scope, the semantics on and off exactly with it, the marker reaching a copy_context worker; the process's own profile staying single-profile; the restart-safe handoff's child env building without raising under a routed tick with a passthrough key registered; a real child process receiving the routed values while `os.environ` keeps the launch value; a source registered after the freeze reaching the fire through the real PluginManager refresh. Reverting any one direction fails a distinct test. (cherry picked from commit 2f87677425d2cca19286ac83bc45cab23e546669)
3972 lines
184 KiB
Python
3972 lines
184 KiB
Python
"""Cron job scheduler: tick() runs due jobs (gateway calls it every 60s from a background thread).
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A file lock (~/.hermes/cron/.tick.lock) keeps overlapping processes to one tick at a time.
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"""
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import atexit
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import concurrent.futures
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import contextlib
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import contextvars
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import errno
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import json
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import logging
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import os
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import re
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import threading
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import time
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import uuid
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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# fcntl is Unix-only; Windows uses msvcrt
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try:
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import fcntl
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except ImportError:
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fcntl = None
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try:
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import msvcrt
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except ImportError:
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msvcrt = None
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any, Callable, List, Optional, Protocol
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# Must precede repo-level imports: standalone invocations (e.g. module reload after
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# `hermes update`) otherwise fail with ModuleNotFoundError for hermes_time et al.
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sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent))
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from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
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from cron.env_settings import cron_env_setting
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from hermes_cli._subprocess_compat import windows_hide_flags
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from hermes_cli.config import (
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load_config, load_config_readonly, resolve_cron_model_drift_defaults)
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from hermes_cli.fallback_config import get_fallback_chain
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from hermes_time import now as _hermes_now
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from agent.interrupt_compat import request_hard_interrupt
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from agent.delegation_context import (
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enter_non_dispatcher_owned_context, exit_non_dispatcher_owned_context)
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from agent.memory_provider import ctx_bound
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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def _close_late_session_db_result(future: "concurrent.futures.Future") -> None:
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"""Done-callback: close a SessionDB whose constructor finished after run_job's init timeout
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(worker abandoned via ``shutdown(wait=False)``), else its .db/WAL/SHM handles leak to EMFILE.
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If the constructor later completes inside that abandoned worker, the Future's result — an open SessionDB
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holding .db / WAL / SHM file handles — would be orphaned and never closed, leaking descriptors until
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EMFILE (#72782). This callback retrieves and closes that eventual late result.
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"""
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with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
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db = future.result()
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if db is not None:
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from hermes_state_registry import release_or_close
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release_or_close(db)
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def _set_cron_session_title(session_db, session_id, base_title):
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"""Persist a non-blank, unique title for a finished cron session; returns it (None if unset).
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Runs BEFORE end_session()/close() so no write races the close. Duplicate title (unique-index
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ValueError) -> get_next_title_in_lineage(); if unavailable, raise rather than end up untitled.
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Centralizes the title write so the cron finally block can guarantee a non-blank, unique title is
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persisted before end_session()/close() tear the connection down (issues #50535, #50536, #50537):
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- #50535: never leaves the session blank. base_title already carries a cron-id fallback for nameless
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jobs; this also guards a failed write. Recover by appending a #N suffix via get_next_title_in_lineage()
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when supported, instead of swallowing the error and ending up untitled. - #50536: this runs
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synchronously in the cron finally block ahead of the session close, so no in-flight title write can race
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the close.
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"""
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if not session_db or not session_id:
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return None
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title = (base_title or "").strip()
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if not title:
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return None
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try:
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session_db.set_session_title(session_id, title)
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return title
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except ValueError:
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# Unique-title collision: fall back to the next lineage title (base #2, #3, ...).
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next_title_fn = getattr(session_db, "get_next_title_in_lineage", None)
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if next_title_fn is None:
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raise
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deduped = next_title_fn(title)
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if not deduped or deduped == title:
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raise
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session_db.set_session_title(session_id, deduped)
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return deduped
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def _fallback_chain_phrase() -> str:
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"""Fallback-chain clause for a provider-failure message: "exhausted" vs "none configured" (most
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installs). Fails open to the ambiguous wording if config can't be read — never crash delivery.
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"""
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try:
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cfg = load_config() or {}
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chain = get_fallback_chain(cfg)
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except Exception:
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return "Fallback chain was exhausted or unavailable."
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if chain:
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return "Fallback chain was exhausted or unavailable."
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return (
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"No fallback chain configured — add one with `hermes fallback add`, "
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"or set a cron fleet default via `cron.model` + `cron.model_provider` in config.yaml."
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)
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def _failure_streak_nudge(job: dict) -> str:
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"""Review nudge when a recurring job keeps failing, else "". The failure message is delivered
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BEFORE mark_job_run records this run, hence stored ``failure_streak`` + 1. Threshold:
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``cron.failure_nudge_threshold`` (default 3, 0 disables)."""
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schedule_kind = (job.get("schedule") or {}).get("kind")
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if schedule_kind not in {"cron", "interval"}:
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return ""
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try:
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cfg = load_config() or {}
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threshold = int(
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((cfg.get("cron") or {}) if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {}).get(
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"failure_nudge_threshold", 3
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)
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)
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except Exception:
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threshold = 3
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if threshold <= 0:
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return ""
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streak = int(job.get("failure_streak") or 0) + 1 # +1 = this run
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if streak < threshold:
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return ""
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job_ref = job.get("name") or job.get("id") or "this job"
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return (
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f"\nThis job has failed {streak} runs in a row — worth a review. "
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f"Fix its prompt/config, or pause it with `hermes cron pause {job_ref}` "
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"(resume/remove also available) to stop the noise."
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)
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def _detect_gateway_code_skew() -> tuple[str, str] | None:
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"""Boot-vs-disk revision skew for THIS process, or None. Test seam over
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``gateway.code_skew.detect_code_skew``; a broken import must never take delivery down."""
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try:
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from gateway.code_skew import detect_code_skew
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return detect_code_skew()
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except Exception:
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return None
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class CronTickYielded(RuntimeError):
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"""A stale-code ticker yielded this tick to a fresh gateway.
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Raised by ``tick()`` BEFORE the tick lock when boot fingerprint ≠ disk, this process does NOT
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own the runtime lock and a fresh process holds it — the stale process must stay out of the
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dispatch race (contention would starve the fresh ticker). Skew ``None`` never yields (fail
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open). Raised, not returned, so ``record_ticker_error`` sees it and ``hermes cron status``
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isn't green.
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"""
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def __init__(self, boot_rev: str, disk_rev: str) -> None:
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self.boot_rev = boot_rev
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self.disk_rev = disk_rev
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super().__init__(
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f"Cron tick yielded to a fresh gateway process (stale code: "
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f"booted on {boot_rev}, disk is at {disk_rev})"
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)
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# Log the yield at most once per episode (reset when the skew changes) to avoid per-interval spam.
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_YIELD_LOG_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 3600.0
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_last_yield_log: dict[str, object] = {}
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def _should_yield_tick_to_fresh_gateway() -> tuple[str, str] | None:
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"""``(boot_rev, disk_rev)`` when this tick must yield to a fresher gateway, else None. Yields
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only when ALL hold: code skew, we don't own the runtime lock, another process holds it. Every
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probe failure returns None — yielding is a certainty claim, never a guess."""
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skew = _detect_gateway_code_skew()
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if skew is None:
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return None
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try:
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from gateway import status as _gateway_status
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except Exception:
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return None
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try:
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if _gateway_status.owns_gateway_runtime_lock():
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return None
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if not _gateway_status.is_gateway_runtime_lock_active():
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return None
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except Exception:
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return None
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return skew
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def _log_tick_yield_once(reason: str) -> None:
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"""Log the yield at error level once per episode (skew signature)."""
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global _last_yield_log
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now = time.monotonic()
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last_reason = _last_yield_log.get("reason")
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last_at = _last_yield_log.get("at", 0.0)
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if last_reason != reason or (now - float(last_at)) >= _YIELD_LOG_INTERVAL_SECONDS:
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logger.error(
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"Cron tick yielded: this process is running stale code (%s) and a "
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"fresher gateway owns the runtime lock — jobs will fire from that "
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"process. Restart this one to reclaim its ticks.",
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reason)
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_last_yield_log = {"reason": reason, "at": now}
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def _summarize_cron_failure_for_delivery(job: dict, error: str | None) -> str:
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"""Compact one-line failure message for chat delivery (full details stay in cron output)."""
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job_name = job.get("name") or job.get("id") or "cron job"
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text = (error or "unknown error").strip()
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lower = text.lower()
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# no_agent jobs never reach a model, so provider errors are structurally impossible for them.
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# Gate on job MODE before substring matching, or a script's own wording ("timed out", "429")
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# would blame the wrong subsystem; the generic cleaner below reports what actually happened.
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provider_reachable = not job.get("no_agent")
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# Script runner contract ("Script timed out after {n}s: {path}") — also for agent jobs with a
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# context script. Must precede generic timeout matching so it never claims a provider fallback.
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# See #78503, #82460.
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if lower.startswith("script timed out"):
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return (
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f"⚠️ Cron '{job_name}' failed: script timed out. "
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"No model was invoked. Full details saved in cron output."
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)
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# Whole-token 429: substrings in job ids/ports/hashes tripped false rate-limit alerts.
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if provider_reachable and (
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# Provider/API failures are the common noisy path. Keep these short. Match 429 as a whole token
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# (#83188 @cation98): bare substring matching let identifiers containing those digits (job ids,
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# ports, hashes) trip a false "provider rate limit" alert.
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re.search(r"\b429\b", text) or "rate limit" in lower or "usage limit" in lower
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):
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reason = "rate limit"
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if "weekly usage limit" in lower:
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reason = "weekly usage limit"
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elif "quota" in lower:
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reason = "quota limit"
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return (
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f"⚠️ Cron '{job_name}' failed: provider {reason}. "
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f"{_fallback_chain_phrase()} "
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"Full details saved in cron output."
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)
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# Scheduler inactivity watchdog shape ("idle for {n}s (limit {m}s)"). Must precede the generic
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# provider-timeout branch: the job's own tool going quiet involves no provider/fallback chain.
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# The scheduler's own inactivity watchdog (see the TimeoutError raised above at "Cron job '{job_name}'
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# idle for {secs}s (limit {limit}s) — last activity: {desc}") produces a message that contains the
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# substring "timed out"/"timeout" nowhere, but DOES contain "idle for ... (limit ...)" — however
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# older/other call sites can still phrase an inactivity abort using "timed out" wording, so match on the
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# "idle for Ns (limit" shape specifically (case-insensitive) BEFORE the generic provider- timeout branch
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# below. Without this, an inactivity timeout — the job's OWN tool call/turn going quiet, no provider or
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# fallback chain ever involved — gets rewritten into a misleading "provider timeout / fallback chain
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# exhausted" message, sending the operator to debug the wrong system entirely (field-reported: a stuck
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# `terminal` tool call tripped the 600s inactivity limit and was reported as a provider/fallback
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# failure). Mirrors the same reordering fix upstream issue #59549 applied for script timeouts vs
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# provider timeouts — check the more specific, deterministic signature first.
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if re.search(r"idle for \d+s\s*\(limit \d+s\)", lower):
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return (
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f"⚠️ Cron '{job_name}' failed: the job itself stalled — no tool/API "
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"activity for the configured inactivity window. Not a provider or "
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"fallback-chain issue; check what the job was doing when it went "
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"quiet. Full details saved in cron output."
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)
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if provider_reachable and (
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"readtimeout" in lower or "timed out" in lower or "timeout" in lower
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):
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return (
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f"⚠️ Cron '{job_name}' failed: provider timeout. "
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f"{_fallback_chain_phrase()} "
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"Full details saved in cron output."
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)
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# Whole-token 401/403 and auth wording so "oauth", "4015" etc. don't trip a false auth message.
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if provider_reachable and (
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re.search(r"authenticat|authoriz", lower) or re.search(r"\b(401|403)\b", text)
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):
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return (
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f"⚠️ Cron '{job_name}' failed: provider authentication error. "
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"Full details saved in cron output."
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)
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# Strip exception wrappers; bound input first so a multi-KB blob can't slow the regexes.
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cleaned = re.sub(r"^(RuntimeError|Exception|ValueError|HTTPStatusError):\s*", "", text[:2000])
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cleaned = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", cleaned).strip()
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if len(cleaned) > 180:
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cleaned = cleaned[:177].rstrip() + "..."
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message = f"⚠️ Cron '{job_name}' failed: {cleaned}"
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# Import-class failures in a gateway whose checkout changed underneath it (mixed sys.modules)
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# read like code bugs. When boot SHA ≠ disk HEAD, APPEND cause + fix — never replace the raw
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# error, which carries the failing symbol. Fail-safe: skew is None on non-git/no-fingerprint
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# (message unchanged); no_agent jobs excluded via the same mode gate (a fresh subprocess
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# resolves imports against disk, so its ImportError is the script's own problem).
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# Import-class failures (#95294 part 3): a long-lived gateway whose checkout was updated underneath it
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# (interrupted `hermes update`, manual git pull) serves MIXED modules — old entries frozen in
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# sys.modules, new files loaded by lazy imports — and every agent cron job then dies with `cannot import
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# name X` / ModuleNotFoundError. The error itself reads like a code bug, so operators debug the wrong
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# thing (2 days on the reporting incident, 15 missed jobs).
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if provider_reachable and re.search(
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r"cannot import name|modulenotfounderror|importerror", lower
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):
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try:
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skew = _detect_gateway_code_skew()
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except Exception:
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skew = None # delivery must never die on a diagnostics probe
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if skew is not None:
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boot_rev, disk_rev = skew
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message += (
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f" Likely cause: the gateway is running stale code (booted "
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f"on {boot_rev}, disk is at {disk_rev}) — run "
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"`hermes gateway restart` to fix it."
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)
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return message
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|
|
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def _upsert_incident_for_failure(
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job: dict, error: str, *, output_file: Optional[Any] = None
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) -> tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
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"""Record a durable failure incident (grouped by job + error signature). Returns
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``(acked, incident_id)``; acked=True when the signature's incident is already ``closed`` ->
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suppress the per-run ping. Store errors log at debug; the caller delivers as if none existed."""
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try:
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from cron.incidents import get_incident, upsert_incident
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incident_id, _is_new = upsert_incident(
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job["id"], str(error or ""), job_name=job.get("name"), output_file=output_file)
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incident = get_incident(incident_id)
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acked = bool(incident and incident.get("state") == "closed")
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return acked, incident_id
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except Exception as exc:
|
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logger.debug(
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"Incident store unavailable for job %s (delivery unaffected): %s",
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job["id"], exc)
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return False, None
|
|
|
|
|
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def _resolve_incidents_for_recovered_job(job: dict) -> None:
|
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"""Best-effort: a successful run marks the job's open incidents ``resolved`` (never touches an
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operator ``closed`` ack). Store errors log at debug; delivery is unaffected."""
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|
try:
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from cron.incidents import close_incidents_for_recovered_job
|
|
|
|
close_incidents_for_recovered_job(job["id"])
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
logger.debug("Incident store unavailable for job %s (delivery unaffected): %s", job["id"], exc)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _mark_incident_alerted(incident_id: Optional[str]) -> None:
|
|
"""Best-effort: mark incident ``alerted`` (no-op for closed; never resurrects an acked one)."""
|
|
if not incident_id:
|
|
return
|
|
try:
|
|
from cron.incidents import set_incident_state
|
|
|
|
set_incident_state(incident_id, "alerted")
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
logger.debug("Failed marking incident %s alerted: %s", incident_id, exc)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class CronPromptInjectionBlocked(Exception):
|
|
"""Raised by _build_job_prompt when the assembled prompt (incl. runtime-loaded skill content,
|
|
unseen by create-time scanning) trips the injection scanner; run_job turns it into a clean
|
|
"job blocked" delivery.
|
|
|
|
Assembled-prompt scanning (including loaded skill content) plugs the gap from #3968: create-time
|
|
scanning only covers the user-supplied prompt field; skill content loaded at runtime was never scanned,
|
|
so a malicious skill could carry an injection payload that reached the non-interactive (auto-approve)
|
|
cron agent.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_cron_disabled_toolsets(cfg: dict) -> list[str]:
|
|
"""Toolsets a cron-spawned agent must never receive: ``messaging``/``clarify`` always
|
|
(interactive); ``cronjob`` by default (loop prevention, not a security boundary —
|
|
``cron.allow_agent_scheduling: true`` lifts only that); ``agent.disabled_toolsets`` layered on
|
|
top so per-job ``enabled_toolsets`` cannot widen past config.yaml's denylist.
|
|
|
|
See #25752.
|
|
"""
|
|
cron_cfg = (cfg or {}).get("cron") or {}
|
|
if cron_cfg.get("allow_agent_scheduling"):
|
|
disabled = ["messaging", "clarify"]
|
|
else:
|
|
disabled = ["cronjob", "messaging", "clarify"]
|
|
agent_cfg = (cfg or {}).get("agent") or {}
|
|
from agent.skill_utils import parse_config_string_list
|
|
|
|
user_disabled = parse_config_string_list(agent_cfg.get("disabled_toolsets"))
|
|
for name in user_disabled:
|
|
name = str(name).strip()
|
|
if name and name not in disabled:
|
|
disabled.append(name)
|
|
return disabled
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _merge_mcp_into_per_job_toolsets(per_job: list[str], cfg: dict) -> list[str]:
|
|
"""Layer enabled MCP servers onto a per-job ``enabled_toolsets`` allowlist (else a per-job list
|
|
silently drops every MCP server). Mirrors ``_get_platform_tools``: ``no_mcp`` sentinel -> none
|
|
(stripped); any MCP server already listed -> allowlist, add nothing; else union all enabled."""
|
|
result = [t for t in per_job if t != "no_mcp"]
|
|
if "no_mcp" in per_job:
|
|
return result
|
|
# lazy: avoid heavy hermes_cli import at module load; shares MCP-membership with gateway/CLI
|
|
from hermes_cli.tools_config import enabled_mcp_server_names
|
|
enabled_mcp = enabled_mcp_server_names(cfg)
|
|
if set(result) & enabled_mcp:
|
|
return result
|
|
for name in sorted(enabled_mcp):
|
|
if name not in result:
|
|
result.append(name)
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets(job: dict, cfg: dict) -> list[str] | None:
|
|
"""Toolset list for a cron job. Precedence: per-job ``enabled_toolsets`` (+ MCP merge) >
|
|
``cron`` platform config (``_get_platform_tools``, which strips _DEFAULT_OFF_TOOLSETS so fresh
|
|
installs run without ``moa``) > ``None`` on any failure (full default set).
|
|
|
|
1. Per-job ``enabled_toolsets`` (set via ``cronjob`` tool on create/update). Keeps the agent's
|
|
job-scoped toolset override intact — #6130. Enabled MCP servers are layered on per
|
|
``_merge_mcp_into_per_job_toolsets`` so a native-toolset allowlist does not silently strip MCP tools. 2.
|
|
Mirrors gateway behavior (``_get_platform_tools(cfg, platform_key)``) so users can gate cron toolsets
|
|
globally without recreating every job. 3. ``None`` on any lookup failure — AIAgent loads the full
|
|
default set (legacy behavior before this change, preserved as the safety net).
|
|
"""
|
|
per_job = job.get("enabled_toolsets")
|
|
if per_job:
|
|
return _merge_mcp_into_per_job_toolsets(list(per_job), cfg or {})
|
|
try:
|
|
from hermes_cli.tools_config import _get_platform_tools # lazy: avoid heavy import at cron module load
|
|
return sorted(_get_platform_tools(cfg or {}, "cron"))
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Cron toolset resolution failed, falling back to full default toolset: %s",
|
|
exc)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_job_reasoning_config(job: dict, cfg: dict, model: str) -> dict | None:
|
|
"""Effective reasoning config for a cron run. A per-job ``reasoning_effort`` pin beats global
|
|
and per-model config and is model-independent by design (also governs an auth-fallback swap);
|
|
clamping stays with provider transports. An unparseable pin warns and falls back to config."""
|
|
from hermes_constants import parse_reasoning_effort, resolve_reasoning_config
|
|
|
|
pinned = job.get("reasoning_effort")
|
|
if pinned is not None:
|
|
parsed = parse_reasoning_effort(pinned)
|
|
if parsed is not None:
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s': using per-job reasoning_effort '%s'", job.get("id", "?"), pinned)
|
|
return parsed
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s': invalid stored reasoning_effort %r — ignoring the pin "
|
|
"and falling back to config resolution. Fix with `cronjob "
|
|
"action=update job_id=%s reasoning_effort=<level>` (valid: none, "
|
|
"minimal, low, medium, high, xhigh, max, ultra).",
|
|
job.get("id", "?"),
|
|
pinned,
|
|
job.get("id", "?"))
|
|
return resolve_reasoning_config(cfg if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {}, str(model))
|
|
|
|
|
|
from cron.jobs import (
|
|
_ensure_cron_dir, advance_next_runs, claim_dispatch, claim_job_for_fire, fire_claim_fence,
|
|
clear_run_claim, get_due_jobs, heartbeat_fire_claim, heartbeat_run_claim, mark_job_run,
|
|
save_job_output, use_cron_store)
|
|
from cron.executions import (
|
|
_TERMINAL_STATES, HANDOFF_ADOPTION_GRACE_SECONDS, create_execution, finish_execution,
|
|
get_execution, mark_execution_handoff_pending, mark_execution_running,
|
|
recover_interrupted_executions)
|
|
|
|
# Response marker that suppresses delivery (output is still saved locally for audit).
|
|
SILENT_MARKER = "[SILENT]"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _is_cron_silence_response(text: str) -> bool:
|
|
"""True when a cron final response should suppress delivery: ``[SILENT]`` (or SILENT /
|
|
NO_REPLY / NO REPLY) as the whole response OR its own first/last line — NOT mid-sentence.
|
|
Shares the webhook-lane matcher in :mod:`gateway.response_filters` so the two cannot drift.
|
|
|
|
Recognizes the bracketed ``[SILENT]`` sentinel (whole-response, first line, or last line) plus the
|
|
bracketless ``SILENT`` / ``NO_REPLY`` / ``NO REPLY`` variants the model emits when it drops the brackets
|
|
(#51438, #46917). Whitespace-trimmed and case-insensitive. A token buried mid-sentence is treated as
|
|
real content and delivered.
|
|
"""
|
|
from gateway.response_filters import is_autonomous_silence_response
|
|
|
|
return is_autonomous_silence_response(text)
|
|
|
|
# Persistent pool for parallel cron jobs: tick() submits and returns; long jobs never block it.
|
|
_parallel_pool: Optional[concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor] = None
|
|
_parallel_pool_max_workers: Optional[int] = None
|
|
_running_job_ids: set = set()
|
|
_running_fire_owners: dict[str, dict[object, tuple[Optional[str], Path]]] = {}
|
|
# Parent gateway threads synchronously waiting on restart-safe scope workers.
|
|
# Shutdown must not misclassify these as ownerless in-process runs: the tool
|
|
# process sweep cannot reach the worker's transient scope.
|
|
_restart_safe_waiter_job_ids: set[str] = set()
|
|
# job_id -> pid of the restart-safe external worker executing it (absent for in-process runs), so a
|
|
# drain observer can name the process holding the gateway open.
|
|
_running_worker_pids: dict[str, int] = {}
|
|
_running_lock = threading.Lock()
|
|
|
|
# Per in-flight id: time.time() claim instant + the future owning its release (``_FUTURE_PENDING``
|
|
# until pool.submit returns). Past-allowance with no live future = leak; the sweep force-releases.
|
|
_running_since: dict = {}
|
|
_running_futures: dict = {}
|
|
|
|
# Installed in ``_running_futures`` at claim time so a sweep landing before ``pool.submit`` returns
|
|
# never sees ``missing`` and releases a claim about to get its future.
|
|
_FUTURE_PENDING = object()
|
|
|
|
# Forced-release count/history for ``get_inflight_guard_stats()``; mirrored to JSONL for probes.
|
|
_forced_release_count: int = 0
|
|
_forced_releases: list = []
|
|
_FORCED_RELEASE_HISTORY = 20
|
|
|
|
# Stale-allowance floor (minutes); per-job allowance is max(2 * interval, this).
|
|
_INFLIGHT_MIN_ALLOWANCE_MINUTES = 30.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Execution tokens (``_running_fire_owners`` identity keys) force-interrupted at shutdown; see
|
|
# ``mark_running_jobs_interrupted``. ``run_one_job`` checks its OWN token before writing
|
|
# ``last_status`` so a still-running agent thread can't overwrite "interrupted" with a false "ok".
|
|
# Token keying scopes the flag to one execution (recurring jobs reuse IDs); legacy paths without a
|
|
# fire owner fall back to the bare job ID.
|
|
# ``run_one_job``'s own completion path checks its OWN token before writing ``last_status`` so a cron agent
|
|
# thread that keeps running in-process after its tool was killed out from under it — and produces a
|
|
# plausible-looking final response from truncated output — can never overwrite the interrupted status with a
|
|
# false "ok" (#60432). Token keying keeps an interruption scoped to that exact execution: a later run of the
|
|
# same job ID (recurring jobs reuse the ID every fire) must not inherit the stale flag.
|
|
_interrupted_job_ids: set = set()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class _CancelEventLike(Protocol):
|
|
"""Structural type for cancellation sources (``threading.Event``, ``_CombinedCancelEvent``)."""
|
|
|
|
def is_set(self) -> bool: ...
|
|
def set(self) -> None: ...
|
|
|
|
|
|
class _CombinedCancelEvent:
|
|
"""Duck-typed ``threading.Event`` ORing several cancellation sources (fire-claim heartbeat
|
|
``lost_ownership`` + per-transport events). Workers only call is_set()/set(), so no pump thread.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, *events: Optional["_CancelEventLike"]) -> None:
|
|
self._events = [event for event in events if event is not None]
|
|
|
|
def is_set(self) -> bool:
|
|
return any(event.is_set() for event in self._events)
|
|
|
|
def set(self) -> None:
|
|
for event in self._events:
|
|
event.set()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_running_job_ids() -> "frozenset[str]":
|
|
"""Thread-safe snapshot of executing job IDs (dispatch until ``_process_job`` returns). Read by
|
|
the gateway shutdown drain, otherwise blind to cron work (runs outside ``_running_agents``).
|
|
|
|
_drain_active_agents``) reads this to treat in-flight cron work as active the same way it already treats
|
|
in-flight chat sessions via ``_running_agents`` — cron jobs run through their own thread pool here,
|
|
entirely outside that dict, so without this the drain is structurally blind to them (#60432).
|
|
"""
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
return frozenset(_running_job_ids | _running_fire_owners.keys())
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_running_job_details() -> list[dict]:
|
|
"""Per in-flight job: ``{"job_id", "elapsed_s", "worker_pid"}`` (``worker_pid`` None for in-process
|
|
runs). The drain wait publishes this so ``hermes update`` can say WHICH job it is waiting on."""
|
|
now = time.time()
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
return [
|
|
{"job_id": jid, "elapsed_s": round(now - _running_since[jid], 1) if jid in _running_since else None,
|
|
"worker_pid": _running_worker_pids.get(jid)}
|
|
for jid in sorted(_running_job_ids | _running_fire_owners.keys())
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def try_register_running_job(job_id: str) -> bool:
|
|
"""Atomically add ``job_id`` to the in-flight set; False (caller must skip) if already mid-run.
|
|
Single dedupe owner for ticker + manual runs (the fire claim's 300s TTL is outlived by real
|
|
jobs). Callers MUST pair success with ``release_running_job`` in a ``finally``.
|
|
|
|
This is the single dedupe owner shared by the ticker's ``_submit_with_guard`` and manual runs
|
|
(``tools/cronjob_tools``): the fire claim alone cannot prevent a double-fire because its TTL (300s) is
|
|
routinely outlived by real jobs, after which a manual ``cronjob(action='run')`` would claim successfully
|
|
and run the same job concurrently (idea from #53395 by @izumi0uu).
|
|
Registration also makes the run visible to ``get_running_job_ids`` (the gateway shutdown drain, #60432)
|
|
and ``mark_running_jobs_interrupted``.
|
|
"""
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
if job_id in _running_job_ids:
|
|
return False
|
|
_running_job_ids.add(job_id)
|
|
# Same critical section as the add: no window where an in-flight id lacks an age the sweep
|
|
# can bound. Sentinel is replaced by the real future once ``pool.submit`` returns.
|
|
_running_since[job_id] = time.time()
|
|
_running_futures[job_id] = _FUTURE_PENDING
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def release_running_job(job_id: str) -> None:
|
|
"""Remove ``job_id`` from the in-flight running set (idempotent)."""
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
_running_job_ids.discard(job_id)
|
|
_running_since.pop(job_id, None)
|
|
_running_futures.pop(job_id, None)
|
|
_running_worker_pids.pop(job_id, None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _inflight_min_allowance_minutes() -> float:
|
|
"""Stale allowance floor (min): ``cron.inflight_max_minutes``, else env escape hatch/default."""
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
_ucfg = load_config() or {}
|
|
_cfg_val = (
|
|
_ucfg.get("cron", {}) if isinstance(_ucfg, dict) else {}
|
|
).get("inflight_max_minutes")
|
|
if _cfg_val is not None:
|
|
val = float(_cfg_val)
|
|
if val > 0:
|
|
return val
|
|
raw = cron_env_setting("HERMES_CRON_INFLIGHT_MAX_MINUTES").strip()
|
|
if raw:
|
|
try:
|
|
val = float(raw)
|
|
if val > 0:
|
|
return val
|
|
except (ValueError, TypeError):
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Invalid HERMES_CRON_INFLIGHT_MAX_MINUTES=%r; using default %s",
|
|
raw,
|
|
_INFLIGHT_MIN_ALLOWANCE_MINUTES)
|
|
return _INFLIGHT_MIN_ALLOWANCE_MINUTES
|
|
|
|
|
|
# expr -> minutes; cadence never changes, so avoid re-evaluating croniter every tick.
|
|
_cron_interval_cache: dict = {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cron_interval_minutes(expr: str) -> Optional[float]:
|
|
"""Cron expression cadence (gap between next two fires) in minutes; None -> floor allowance."""
|
|
if expr in _cron_interval_cache:
|
|
return _cron_interval_cache[expr]
|
|
result = None
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
from cron.jobs import _ensure_croniter
|
|
|
|
if _ensure_croniter():
|
|
from cron.jobs import croniter as _croniter
|
|
from datetime import datetime
|
|
|
|
base = datetime.now()
|
|
it = _croniter(expr, base)
|
|
first = it.get_next(datetime)
|
|
second = it.get_next(datetime)
|
|
gap = (second - first).total_seconds() / 60.0
|
|
result = gap if gap > 0 else None
|
|
_cron_interval_cache[expr] = result
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _job_interval_minutes(job: dict) -> Optional[float]:
|
|
"""Best-effort job interval in minutes (None if unknown / one-shot -> floor). ``schedule`` is
|
|
persisted as a parsed dict; the string path is only a fallback for programmatic callers."""
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
schedule = job.get("schedule")
|
|
if isinstance(schedule, str) and schedule.strip():
|
|
from cron.jobs import parse_schedule
|
|
|
|
schedule = parse_schedule(schedule) or {}
|
|
if isinstance(schedule, dict):
|
|
kind = schedule.get("kind")
|
|
if kind == "interval":
|
|
minutes = schedule.get("minutes")
|
|
return float(minutes) if minutes else None
|
|
if kind == "cron":
|
|
return _cron_interval_minutes(str(schedule.get("expr") or ""))
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_inflight_guard_stats() -> dict:
|
|
"""Probe-visible snapshot; non-zero ``forced_releases`` means a job wedged and was recovered."""
|
|
now = time.time()
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
return {
|
|
"running": sorted(_running_job_ids),
|
|
"running_ages_seconds": {
|
|
jid: round(now - started, 1)
|
|
for jid, started in _running_since.items()
|
|
},
|
|
"forced_releases": _forced_release_count,
|
|
"recent_forced_releases": list(_forced_releases)}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _record_forced_release(job_id: str, name: str, age_seconds: float, allowance_seconds: float) -> None:
|
|
"""Persist a countable signal for one forced release (best-effort)."""
|
|
entry = {
|
|
"job_id": job_id,
|
|
"name": name,
|
|
"age_seconds": round(age_seconds, 1),
|
|
"allowance_seconds": round(allowance_seconds, 1),
|
|
"at": _hermes_now().isoformat()}
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
_forced_releases.append(entry)
|
|
del _forced_releases[:-_FORCED_RELEASE_HISTORY]
|
|
try:
|
|
path = _get_hermes_home() / "cron" / "inflight_forced_releases.jsonl"
|
|
_ensure_cron_dir(path.parent)
|
|
with open(path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
|
fh.write(json.dumps(entry) + "\n")
|
|
except Exception as e: # never let telemetry break a tick
|
|
logger.debug("Could not append forced-release record: %s", e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _latest_executions_for_releasable_claims() -> dict:
|
|
"""Latest durable execution per releasable-looking claim (missing/pending/done future), one
|
|
indexed query so the healthy path pays no DB work. Snapshot under _running_lock — iterating
|
|
the set while try_register/release mutate it raises RuntimeError."""
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
claim_futures = {job_id: _running_futures.get(job_id) for job_id in _running_job_ids}
|
|
candidates = [
|
|
job_id for job_id, fut in claim_futures.items()
|
|
if fut is None or fut is _FUTURE_PENDING or fut.done()
|
|
]
|
|
if not candidates:
|
|
return {}
|
|
try:
|
|
from cron.executions import latest_executions as _latest_execs
|
|
return _latest_execs(candidates)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _row_belongs_to_claim(row: dict, claim_started: float) -> bool:
|
|
"""True when the ledger row was claimed at/after this in-memory claim. An older terminal row is
|
|
the PREVIOUS run's (try_register->create_execution window); releasing on it would
|
|
double-dispatch. Unparseable timestamps fail closed (the age path still bounds the claim)."""
|
|
claimed_at = row.get("claimed_at")
|
|
if not claimed_at:
|
|
return False
|
|
try:
|
|
from cron.jobs import _ensure_aware as _ensure_aware_ts
|
|
row_ts = _ensure_aware_ts(datetime.fromisoformat(claimed_at))
|
|
return row_ts.timestamp() >= claim_started
|
|
except (ValueError, TypeError, OSError):
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _record_stale_release(job: dict, job_id: str, age: float, allowance: float, fut, reason: str) -> None:
|
|
"""WARNING log + probe record for one forced release, then ``last_error`` unless the ledger
|
|
already holds the run's real outcome or the job has a finite repeat budget."""
|
|
name = job.get("name") or job_id
|
|
future_state = "pending" if fut is _FUTURE_PENDING else "missing" if fut is None else "finished"
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"cron.inflight.forced_release event=forced_release reason=%s job='%s' "
|
|
"id=%s age=%.0fs allowance=%.0fs future=%s — stale in-flight claim "
|
|
"released; the job was skipping every fire with 'already running'",
|
|
reason, name, job_id, age, allowance, future_state)
|
|
_record_forced_release(job_id, name, age, allowance)
|
|
# Ledger already records how the run ended: mark_job_run here would clobber an honest
|
|
# ok status with a synthetic failure or double-write a failure.
|
|
if reason == "ledger-terminal":
|
|
return
|
|
# Age release may lack a ledger row, so last_error is how it surfaces. But a forced release
|
|
# is NOT a real run: never consume a finite repeat budget or let mark_job_run auto-delete.
|
|
repeat = job.get("repeat") or {}
|
|
if isinstance(repeat, dict) and repeat.get("times") is not None:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"cron.inflight.forced_release.job_untouched job='%s' id=%s — "
|
|
"finite-repeat job released without mark_job_run (repeat budget "
|
|
"preserved); row left in place so it re-fires normally",
|
|
name, job_id)
|
|
return
|
|
try:
|
|
mark_job_run(
|
|
job_id, False,
|
|
f"Stale in-flight claim force-released after {age / 60:.1f}m "
|
|
f"(allowance {allowance / 60:.1f}m); previous run never released "
|
|
f"the scheduler in-flight guard")
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.warning("Could not record forced release for job %s: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def sweep_stale_inflight(due_jobs: Optional[list] = None) -> list:
|
|
"""Force-release in-flight claims that can no longer be making progress; returns released ids.
|
|
|
|
Stale = older than ``max(2 * interval, floor)`` AND (no live future — submit path hung before
|
|
``pool.submit`` returned — or finished without discarding the id) — or the claim's OWN ledger
|
|
row is terminal regardless of age. Each release logs WARNING ``event=forced_release``, bumps
|
|
the probe counter, mirrors JSONL, and writes ``last_error``.
|
|
"""
|
|
global _forced_release_count
|
|
|
|
by_id = {j.get("id"): j for j in (due_jobs or []) if isinstance(j, dict)}
|
|
floor_seconds = _inflight_min_allowance_minutes() * 60.0
|
|
now = time.time()
|
|
stale: list = []
|
|
from cron.executions import _TERMINAL_STATES as _terminal_states
|
|
|
|
_latest = _latest_executions_for_releasable_claims()
|
|
# Compute intervals OUTSIDE _running_lock so croniter doesn't block try_register/release.
|
|
_intervals = {jid: _job_interval_minutes(j) for jid, j in by_id.items()}
|
|
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
for job_id in list(_running_job_ids):
|
|
started = _running_since.get(job_id)
|
|
if started is None:
|
|
# Claim predates this guard — adopt it; sweepable one allowance from now.
|
|
_running_since[job_id] = now
|
|
continue
|
|
age = now - started
|
|
interval_minutes = _intervals.get(job_id)
|
|
allowance = floor_seconds
|
|
if interval_minutes:
|
|
allowance = max(allowance, 2.0 * interval_minutes * 60.0)
|
|
fut = _running_futures.get(job_id)
|
|
if fut is _FUTURE_PENDING:
|
|
# Submit path hung before ``pool.submit`` returned — the wedge class; release it.
|
|
pass
|
|
elif fut is not None and not fut.done():
|
|
continue # genuinely still executing
|
|
# Ledger reconciliation: a terminal row belonging to THIS claim proves it stale even
|
|
# inside its age allowance. Row must be this claim's, else a recurring job's previous
|
|
# run would double-dispatch a fresh claim.
|
|
latest = _latest.get(job_id)
|
|
if (
|
|
latest is not None
|
|
and latest.get("status") in _terminal_states
|
|
and _row_belongs_to_claim(latest, started)
|
|
):
|
|
reason = "ledger-terminal"
|
|
elif age >= allowance:
|
|
reason = "age"
|
|
else:
|
|
continue
|
|
_running_job_ids.discard(job_id)
|
|
_running_since.pop(job_id, None)
|
|
_running_futures.pop(job_id, None)
|
|
_forced_release_count += 1
|
|
stale.append((job_id, age, allowance, fut, reason))
|
|
|
|
for job_id, age, allowance, fut, _reason in stale:
|
|
_record_stale_release(by_id.get(job_id) or {}, job_id, age, allowance, fut, _reason)
|
|
return [s[0] for s in stale]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def mark_running_jobs_interrupted(
|
|
reason: str, *, only_owners: Optional[set] = None,
|
|
) -> list:
|
|
"""Best-effort: mark every in-flight cron job interrupted; returns the job IDs marked.
|
|
|
|
Called by gateway shutdown right after ``process_registry.kill_all()``: a job whose tool was
|
|
killed must never report success. ``only_owners`` (``(job_id, fire_owner)`` pairs) restricts
|
|
marking. Tokens go into ``_interrupted_job_ids`` BEFORE ``last_status`` is written so
|
|
``run_one_job`` sees them.
|
|
"""
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
restart_safe_waiters = set(_restart_safe_waiter_job_ids)
|
|
active_fires = [
|
|
(token, job_id, owner, profile_home)
|
|
for job_id, executions in _running_fire_owners.items()
|
|
if job_id not in restart_safe_waiters
|
|
for token, (owner, profile_home) in executions.items()
|
|
]
|
|
if only_owners is not None:
|
|
active_fires = [fire for fire in active_fires if (fire[1], fire[2]) in only_owners]
|
|
registered_ids = {job_id for _t, job_id, _o, _p in active_fires}
|
|
if only_owners is None:
|
|
active_fires.extend(
|
|
(None, job_id, None, _get_hermes_home())
|
|
for job_id in (
|
|
_running_job_ids - registered_ids - restart_safe_waiters
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
_interrupted_job_ids.update(
|
|
token if token is not None else job_id
|
|
for token, job_id, _owner, _profile_home in active_fires
|
|
)
|
|
marked = []
|
|
for _token, job_id, fire_owner, profile_home in active_fires:
|
|
if not fire_owner:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s' interrupted before its durable fire owner was registered; "
|
|
"leaving persisted state untouched",
|
|
job_id)
|
|
# Still report it: shutdown uses the returned IDs for the interrupted-cron notice. The
|
|
# in-memory flag WAS recorded above; only the persisted last_status write is skipped.
|
|
# See #82232.
|
|
marked.append(job_id)
|
|
continue
|
|
try:
|
|
with use_cron_store(profile_home):
|
|
if mark_job_run(
|
|
job_id, False, reason, expected_fire_owner=fire_owner):
|
|
marked.append(job_id)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.warning("Failed to mark job %s interrupted: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
return marked
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _is_interrupted(job_id: str, token: Optional[object] = None) -> bool:
|
|
"""Non-destructive peek: has shutdown marked THIS execution interrupted? Used before deciding
|
|
what to deliver; does not clear the flag (the authoritative pre-``last_status`` check needs it).
|
|
``token`` scopes to one execution so a fresh run reusing the job ID isn't poisoned."""
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
if token is not None and token in _interrupted_job_ids:
|
|
return True
|
|
return job_id in _interrupted_job_ids
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _consume_interrupted_flag(job_id: str, token: Optional[object] = None) -> bool:
|
|
"""Return True and clear the flag if shutdown marked THIS execution interrupted. Called right
|
|
before ``last_status`` is written; consuming stops the flag leaking into a later run."""
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
hit = False
|
|
if token is not None and token in _interrupted_job_ids:
|
|
_interrupted_job_ids.discard(token)
|
|
hit = True
|
|
if job_id in _interrupted_job_ids:
|
|
_interrupted_job_ids.discard(job_id)
|
|
hit = True
|
|
return hit
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _inactivity_watchdog_loop(
|
|
*, get_idle_seconds: Callable[[], float], limit_s: float, poll_s: float, stop: threading.Event,
|
|
future_done: Callable[[], bool],
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""Poll idle time until limit (-> True), stop, or the future completes (-> False). Uses
|
|
``threading.Event.wait``, not asyncio, so a blocked event loop cannot disable the watchdog.
|
|
|
|
Driven by ``threading.Event.wait`` (a kernel timeout), not asyncio, so a blocked event-loop /
|
|
``run_job`` thread cannot disable this watchdog the way ``asyncio.sleep`` / ``wait_for`` would (family A
|
|
of #94285 — the 4118s-idle-on-a-600s-limit cron hang). Returns True when *limit_s* of inactivity was
|
|
observed.
|
|
"""
|
|
while not stop.wait(poll_s):
|
|
if future_done():
|
|
return False
|
|
try:
|
|
idle = float(get_idle_seconds() or 0.0)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
idle = 0.0
|
|
if idle >= limit_s:
|
|
return True
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cron_inactivity_seconds() -> float:
|
|
"""Parse HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT (seconds). 0 = unlimited; bad input = 600. Shared by the
|
|
inactivity monitor and the cwd-lock bound so they can't drift: the lock bound must stay >= the
|
|
inactivity limit or waiters fail while a healthy holder runs."""
|
|
raw = cron_env_setting("HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT").strip()
|
|
if not raw:
|
|
return 600.0
|
|
try:
|
|
return float(raw)
|
|
except (ValueError, TypeError):
|
|
logger.warning("Invalid HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=%r; using default 600s", raw)
|
|
return 600.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _get_parallel_pool(max_workers: Optional[int]) -> concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor:
|
|
"""Return (or create) the persistent parallel pool."""
|
|
global _parallel_pool, _parallel_pool_max_workers
|
|
if _parallel_pool is None or _parallel_pool_max_workers != max_workers:
|
|
if _parallel_pool is not None:
|
|
_parallel_pool.shutdown(wait=False, cancel_futures=False)
|
|
_parallel_pool = concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(
|
|
max_workers=max_workers, thread_name_prefix="cron-parallel")
|
|
_parallel_pool_max_workers = max_workers
|
|
return _parallel_pool
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _shutdown_parallel_pool() -> None:
|
|
"""Shut down the persistent pool on process exit."""
|
|
global _parallel_pool, _parallel_pool_max_workers
|
|
if _parallel_pool is not None:
|
|
_parallel_pool.shutdown(wait=True, cancel_futures=False)
|
|
_parallel_pool = None
|
|
_parallel_pool_max_workers = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
atexit.register(_shutdown_parallel_pool)
|
|
# Per-fire usage audit log; resolves via _get_hermes_home() so profile-scoped paths work.
|
|
def _usage_audit_path() -> Path:
|
|
return _get_hermes_home() / "cron" / "usage_audit.jsonl"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _utcnow_iso_ms() -> str:
|
|
"""RFC3339 UTC timestamp with millisecond precision and 'Z' suffix."""
|
|
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
|
return now.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S.") + f"{now.microsecond // 1000:03d}Z"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _write_usage_audit(record: dict) -> None:
|
|
"""Append one JSONL line to cron/usage_audit.jsonl. NEVER raises — a logger bug must not
|
|
break cron jobs (the whole write is inside one try)."""
|
|
try:
|
|
path = _usage_audit_path()
|
|
_ensure_cron_dir(path.parent)
|
|
line = json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=False)
|
|
with open(path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
|
f.write(line + "\n")
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.warning("usage_audit write failed: %s", e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _interpreter_shutting_down(exc: Optional[BaseException] = None) -> bool:
|
|
"""True when the interpreter is finalizing (tick fired during gateway teardown): concurrent.
|
|
futures/asyncio refuse new work, so delivery attempts only pollute errors.log — callers skip
|
|
with a warning. ``exc`` lets an already-raised scheduling error count as a shutdown signal.
|
|
|
|
A cron tick can fire while the gateway is tearing down — SIGTERM from ``hermes update`` / ``hermes
|
|
gateway stop`` / systemd restart, or an OOM-kill. Once finalization starts, ``concurrent.futures``
|
|
refuses new work with ``RuntimeError: cannot schedule new futures after interpreter shutdown`` and
|
|
asyncio's default executor is gone, so *any* attempt to schedule delivery (live-adapter,
|
|
``asyncio.run``, or a fresh pool) is doomed and only pollutes ``errors.log`` with a traceback. See
|
|
#55924, #58720.
|
|
"""
|
|
from tools.interpreter_shutdown import interpreter_shutting_down
|
|
|
|
return interpreter_shutting_down(exc)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Module override hook for tests / emergency monkeypatches.
|
|
_hermes_home: Path | None = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _get_hermes_home() -> Path:
|
|
"""Hermes home at call time (honouring the test override). Cron is per-profile: never freeze
|
|
this at import or anchor it at the shared default root — either breaks profile isolation.
|
|
|
|
Cron is per-profile by design (#4707): the in-process ticker runs inside a profile-scoped gateway, so
|
|
resolving the active HERMES_HOME at call time means a profile's jobs are stored AND executed under that
|
|
profile's home (its .env, config.yaml, scripts, skills).
|
|
"""
|
|
return _hermes_home or get_hermes_home()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _get_lock_paths() -> tuple[Path, Path]:
|
|
"""Resolve cron lock paths at call time so profile/env changes are honored."""
|
|
hermes_home = _get_hermes_home()
|
|
lock_dir = hermes_home / "cron"
|
|
return lock_dir, lock_dir / ".tick.lock"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Errnos that mean "another ticker (or manual tick) holds the tick lock", as opposed to a real failure
|
|
# opening/locking the file. Everything else — most importantly EMFILE/ENFILE (fd exhaustion, #87644) and
|
|
# EACCES on open() — must be surfaced, never swallowed as lock contention.
|
|
def _is_lock_contention_errno(err: OSError) -> bool:
|
|
"""True when *err* from the lock syscall means another ticker holds the lock (POSIX flock:
|
|
EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN, EACCES on some NFS; msvcrt.locking: EACCES/EDEADLK). Everything else —
|
|
notably EMFILE/ENFILE and EACCES on open() — must be surfaced, never swallowed as contention."""
|
|
if err.errno is None:
|
|
return False
|
|
if fcntl is not None:
|
|
return err.errno in (errno.EWOULDBLOCK, errno.EAGAIN, errno.EACCES)
|
|
if msvcrt is not None:
|
|
return err.errno in (errno.EACCES, errno.EDEADLK)
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _is_fd_exhaustion_text(text: str) -> bool:
|
|
"""Text half of _is_fd_exhaustion (shared with the CLI hint)."""
|
|
lowered = text.lower()
|
|
return "too many open files" in lowered or "emfile" in lowered
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _is_fd_exhaustion(exc: BaseException) -> bool:
|
|
"""True when *exc* indicates fd exhaustion: EMFILE/ENFILE errno, or the "Too many open files"
|
|
wording for wrapped exceptions (load_jobs wraps the OSError in a RuntimeError).
|
|
|
|
See #87644.
|
|
"""
|
|
if isinstance(exc, OSError) and exc.errno in (errno.EMFILE, errno.ENFILE):
|
|
return True
|
|
return _is_fd_exhaustion_text(str(exc))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _reclaim_fds_best_effort() -> None:
|
|
"""Best-effort fd reclamation: gc.collect() closes file objects stuck in reference cycles;
|
|
apply_nofile_soft_limit() raises the RLIMIT_NOFILE soft limit for headroom. Never raises.
|
|
|
|
The cron FD-leak family (#60859, #79742, #80792) leaks descriptors from abandoned workers/sessions. Two
|
|
safe, idempotent levers:
|
|
"""
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
import gc
|
|
|
|
gc.collect()
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
from hermes_cli.resource_limits import apply_nofile_soft_limit
|
|
|
|
apply_nofile_soft_limit(None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def drain_delivery_queue(adapters, loop) -> int:
|
|
"""Send queued worker results through this gateway's live adapters."""
|
|
from cron.delivery_queue import _path, drain
|
|
|
|
# Only restart-safe workers create the queue file. Every gateway (macOS,
|
|
# Windows, launchd, Docker) runs this housekeeping tick, so skip the sqlite
|
|
# open/create entirely until a worker has actually queued something.
|
|
if not _path().exists():
|
|
return 0
|
|
return drain(
|
|
lambda queued_job, queued_content, queued_for_failure: _deliver_result(
|
|
queued_job,
|
|
queued_content,
|
|
adapters=adapters,
|
|
loop=loop,
|
|
for_failure=queued_for_failure,
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
_DEFAULT_SCRIPT_TIMEOUT = 3600 # seconds (1 hour)
|
|
# Backward-compatible module override used by tests and emergency monkeypatches.
|
|
_SCRIPT_TIMEOUT = _DEFAULT_SCRIPT_TIMEOUT
|
|
_RUN_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS = 60.0
|
|
_FIRE_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_GRACE_SECONDS = _RUN_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS * 3
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cron_cleanup_timeout_seconds() -> float:
|
|
"""Return the wall-clock bound for cron post-run cleanup."""
|
|
default = 10.0
|
|
try:
|
|
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
|
|
|
|
cfg = load_config() or {}
|
|
cron_cfg = cfg.get("cron", {}) if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {}
|
|
configured = cron_cfg.get("cleanup_timeout_seconds")
|
|
if configured is not None:
|
|
timeout = float(configured)
|
|
if timeout >= 0:
|
|
return timeout
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
logger.debug("Failed to load cron cleanup timeout from config: %s", exc)
|
|
return default
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _run_cron_cleanup_with_timeout(
|
|
cleanup, *, job_id: str, label: str, timeout_seconds: Optional[float] = None,
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""Run fallible post-run cleanup without permanently wedging a cron ID."""
|
|
timeout = (_cron_cleanup_timeout_seconds() if timeout_seconds is None else float(timeout_seconds))
|
|
if timeout <= 0:
|
|
try:
|
|
cleanup()
|
|
return True
|
|
except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as exc:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': %s failed: %s", job_id, label, exc)
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
done = threading.Event()
|
|
error: list[BaseException] = []
|
|
|
|
def _runner() -> None:
|
|
try:
|
|
cleanup()
|
|
except BaseException as exc:
|
|
error.append(exc)
|
|
finally:
|
|
done.set()
|
|
|
|
# Daemon thread is deliberate: unlike ThreadPoolExecutor workers it is not joined at interpreter
|
|
# exit if cleanup never returns, so the gateway can still shut down.
|
|
worker = threading.Thread(
|
|
target=ctx_bound(_runner), name=f"cron-cleanup-{job_id}", daemon=True)
|
|
worker.start()
|
|
if not done.wait(timeout):
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
"Job '%s': %s exceeded %.1fs; abandoning cleanup so future runs remain dispatchable",
|
|
job_id,
|
|
label,
|
|
timeout)
|
|
return False
|
|
if error:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': %s failed: %s", job_id, label, error[0])
|
|
return False
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
|
|
class _BoundedCronSessionDB:
|
|
"""Proxy SessionDB cleanup calls through the cron cleanup timeout; after the first failure or
|
|
timeout all later calls fail immediately (a damaged connection leaks at most one worker)."""
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, session_db, job_id: str):
|
|
self._session_db = session_db
|
|
self._job_id = job_id
|
|
self._disabled = False
|
|
|
|
def __getattr__(self, name):
|
|
target = getattr(self._session_db, name)
|
|
if not callable(target):
|
|
return target
|
|
|
|
def _bounded(*args, **kwargs):
|
|
if self._disabled:
|
|
raise RuntimeError("session finalization disabled after prior cleanup failure")
|
|
|
|
result = {}
|
|
|
|
def _call():
|
|
try:
|
|
result["value"] = target(*args, **kwargs)
|
|
except BaseException as exc:
|
|
result["error"] = exc
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
ok = _run_cron_cleanup_with_timeout(
|
|
_call, job_id=self._job_id, label=f"session finalization ({name})")
|
|
if not ok:
|
|
error = result.get("error")
|
|
if error is not None:
|
|
raise error
|
|
# No error yet not complete == timeout: disable so later steps fail fast.
|
|
self._disabled = True
|
|
raise TimeoutError(f"session finalization method {name} timed out")
|
|
return result.get("value")
|
|
|
|
return _bounded
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _job_doc_header(job_name: str, job_id: str, now_iso: str, mode: str) -> str:
|
|
"""Common markdown header for the short-circuit run docs (no_agent / monitor)."""
|
|
return (
|
|
f"# Cron Job: {job_name}\n\n"
|
|
f"**Job ID:** {job_id}\n"
|
|
f"**Run Time:** {now_iso}\n"
|
|
f"**Mode:** {mode}\n"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_job_workdir(job: dict, job_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""Configured job workdir, or None when unset / no longer a directory (logged)."""
|
|
workdir = (job.get("workdir") or "").strip() or None
|
|
if workdir and not Path(workdir).is_dir():
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s': configured workdir %r no longer exists — running without it",
|
|
job_id, workdir)
|
|
return None
|
|
return workdir
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _run_no_agent_job(
|
|
job: dict, job_id: str, job_name: str, cancel_event,
|
|
) -> tuple[bool, str, str, Optional[str]]:
|
|
"""no_agent short-circuit — the script IS the job (no AIAgent, no tokens). stdout → delivered
|
|
verbatim; empty stdout or wakeAgent=false → silent success; non-zero exit/timeout → error alert.
|
|
"""
|
|
# Load .env first so auto-delivery can resolve *_HOME_CHANNEL: the agent path's per-run dotenv
|
|
# reload never runs for no_agent jobs. Does not override existing values.
|
|
try:
|
|
from hermes_cli.env_loader import load_hermes_dotenv
|
|
|
|
load_hermes_dotenv(hermes_home=_get_hermes_home())
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': no_agent .env reload failed", job_id, exc_info=True)
|
|
|
|
script_path = job.get("script")
|
|
# Legacy/hand-edited no_agent job without a script: pause it, or it re-fires every tick.
|
|
if not str(script_path or "").strip():
|
|
from cron.jobs import NO_AGENT_WITHOUT_SCRIPT_ERROR
|
|
|
|
return _block_and_pause_job(job_id, job_name, NO_AGENT_WITHOUT_SCRIPT_ERROR)
|
|
|
|
# Pass workdir as subprocess cwd; never os.chdir() (leaks into concurrent gateway sessions).
|
|
_job_workdir = _resolve_job_workdir(job, job_id)
|
|
try:
|
|
ok, output = _run_job_script_with_claim_heartbeat(
|
|
job, script_path, workdir=_job_workdir, cancel_event=cancel_event)
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
logger.exception("Job '%s': script execution raised unexpectedly", job_id)
|
|
ok, output = False, f"Script execution failed: {exc}"
|
|
|
|
now_iso = _hermes_now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
|
|
header = _job_doc_header(job_name, job_id, now_iso, "no_agent (script)")
|
|
|
|
if not ok:
|
|
# Deliver the error: a silently broken watchdog is the worst-case outcome.
|
|
alert = (
|
|
f"⚠ Cron watchdog '{job_name}' script failed\n\n"
|
|
f"{output}\n\n"
|
|
f"Time: {now_iso}"
|
|
)
|
|
return False, f"{header}**Status:** script failed\n\n{output}\n", alert, output
|
|
|
|
# wakeAgent=false is a silent signal, same as empty stdout.
|
|
if not _parse_wake_gate(output):
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s' (no_agent): wakeAgent=false gate — silent run", job_id)
|
|
return True, f"{header}**Status:** silent (wakeAgent=false)\n", SILENT_MARKER, None
|
|
|
|
if not output.strip():
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s' (no_agent): empty stdout — silent run", job_id)
|
|
return True, f"{header}**Status:** silent (empty output)\n", SILENT_MARKER, None
|
|
|
|
return True, f"{header}\n---\n\n{output}\n", output, None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _apply_monitor_gate(
|
|
job: dict, job_id: str, job_name: str, extra_prompt: Optional[str],
|
|
) -> tuple[Optional[tuple], Optional[str]]:
|
|
"""Monitor gate (hash-suppressed change detection). Must run BEFORE any agent machinery so an
|
|
unchanged tick costs no LLM/delivery. Returns ``(early_result | None, extra_prompt)``; when
|
|
early_result is None, extra_prompt may carry the injected monitor context.
|
|
"""
|
|
from cron.monitor import check_monitor, job_has_monitor
|
|
|
|
if not job_has_monitor(job):
|
|
return None, extra_prompt
|
|
_mon = check_monitor(job)
|
|
_mon_now = _hermes_now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
|
|
header = _job_doc_header(job_name, job_id, _mon_now, "monitor")
|
|
if not _mon.ok:
|
|
# Source failure is an ERROR, never a change: alert so a broken monitor can't silently
|
|
# stop watching. Stored hash untouched.
|
|
logger.error("Job '%s': monitor source failed: %s", job_id, _mon.error)
|
|
_mon_alert = (
|
|
f"⚠ Cron monitor '{job_name}' source failed\n\n"
|
|
f"{_mon.error}\n\n"
|
|
f"Time: {_mon_now}"
|
|
)
|
|
return (
|
|
False, f"{header}**Status:** monitor source failed\n\n{_mon.error}\n", _mon_alert, _mon.error,
|
|
), extra_prompt
|
|
if not _mon.changed:
|
|
# Unchanged: silent no_change tick (ledger doc kept; SILENT_MARKER blocks delivery).
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s': monitor output unchanged — suppressing agent run", job_id)
|
|
return (
|
|
True, f"{header}**Status:** no_change (agent run suppressed)\n", SILENT_MARKER, None,
|
|
), extra_prompt
|
|
# Changed (or first run): inject monitor context via the per-run seam, then normal agent run.
|
|
if _mon.context_block:
|
|
extra_prompt = (
|
|
f"{_mon.context_block}\n\n{extra_prompt}" if extra_prompt else _mon.context_block
|
|
)
|
|
return None, extra_prompt
|
|
|
|
|
|
@dataclass
|
|
class _CronJobConfig:
|
|
"""Config-derived inputs for one agent-backed cron run."""
|
|
|
|
cfg: dict
|
|
model: str
|
|
model_cfg: Any
|
|
cron_default_provider: str
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _snapshot_pin(job: dict, axis: str, current: str, job_id: str) -> str:
|
|
"""The creation snapshot is an unpinned axis's effective pin: return it, logging once when it
|
|
differs from *current* (the live global default); ``""`` for legacy jobs without one, which keep
|
|
following the global default. A global model/provider change must never stop a cron job; a job
|
|
keeps running on what it was created under until the operator pins it or sets a cron.* fleet
|
|
default (#44585)."""
|
|
snapshot = str(job.get(f"{axis}_snapshot") or "").strip()
|
|
if snapshot and current and snapshot.lower() != current.lower():
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Job '%s': running on creation-snapshot %s %r (global default is now %r); "
|
|
"`hermes cron resnap %s` adopts the new default (stays unpinned), "
|
|
"`hermes cron edit %s --%s <value>` or cron.%s in config.yaml pins it.",
|
|
job_id, axis, snapshot, current, job_id, job_id, axis,
|
|
"model" if axis == "model" else "model_provider")
|
|
return snapshot
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _load_cron_job_config(job: dict, job_id: str, job_name: str) -> _CronJobConfig:
|
|
"""Load config.yaml and resolve the run's model: per-job override > cron.model (fleet default) >
|
|
creation snapshot > HERMES_MODEL > config ``model:``. Re-read every tick (no cache) so
|
|
``hermes cron edit --model`` applies next tick."""
|
|
model = job.get("model") or cron_env_setting("HERMES_MODEL") or ""
|
|
_cron_default_provider = ""
|
|
_cfg: dict = {}
|
|
_model_cfg: Any = {}
|
|
try:
|
|
from hermes_cli.config_effective import load_user_config_effective
|
|
_cfg_path = str(_get_hermes_home() / "config.yaml")
|
|
if os.path.exists(_cfg_path):
|
|
_cfg = load_user_config_effective(Path(_cfg_path))
|
|
# Coerce null to {} so a falsy default never clobbers a resolved env value.
|
|
_model_cfg = _cfg.get("model") or {}
|
|
_cron_cfg_for_model = _cfg.get("cron") or {}
|
|
_cron_default_model = ""
|
|
if isinstance(_cron_cfg_for_model, dict):
|
|
_cron_default_model = str(_cron_cfg_for_model.get("model") or "").strip()
|
|
_cron_default_provider = str(_cron_cfg_for_model.get("model_provider") or "").strip()
|
|
if not job.get("model"):
|
|
if _cron_default_model:
|
|
model = _cron_default_model
|
|
else:
|
|
_, _global_model = resolve_cron_model_drift_defaults(
|
|
_cfg, environ={"HERMES_MODEL": cron_env_setting("HERMES_MODEL")})
|
|
model = _snapshot_pin(job, "model", _global_model, job_id) or _global_model or model
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.warning("Job '%s': failed to load config.yaml, using defaults: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
|
|
# Fail fast: an empty model otherwise reaches the provider as an opaque 400.
|
|
# See #23979.
|
|
if not (isinstance(model, str) and model.strip()):
|
|
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
f"Cron job '{job_name}' has no model configured "
|
|
f"(job.model={job.get('model')!r}, "
|
|
f"HERMES_MODEL={cron_env_setting('HERMES_MODEL')!r}, "
|
|
"config.yaml model.default missing or empty). "
|
|
f"Set a per-job model via "
|
|
f"`hermes cron edit {job_id} --model <name>` or set a "
|
|
"default with `hermes model <name>`."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
from hermes_constants import apply_ipv4_preference
|
|
_net_cfg = _cfg.get("network", {})
|
|
if isinstance(_net_cfg, dict) and _net_cfg.get("force_ipv4"):
|
|
apply_ipv4_preference(force=True)
|
|
return _CronJobConfig(_cfg, model, _model_cfg, _cron_default_provider)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _load_prefill_messages(cfg: dict, job_id: str) -> Optional[list]:
|
|
"""Prefill messages from env or config.yaml (top-level key canonical; agent.* is legacy)."""
|
|
agent_cfg = cfg.get("agent", {}) if isinstance(cfg.get("agent", {}), dict) else {}
|
|
prefill_file = (
|
|
cron_env_setting("HERMES_PREFILL_MESSAGES_FILE")
|
|
or cfg.get("prefill_messages_file", "")
|
|
or agent_cfg.get("prefill_messages_file", "")
|
|
)
|
|
if not prefill_file:
|
|
return None
|
|
pfpath = Path(prefill_file).expanduser()
|
|
if not pfpath.is_absolute():
|
|
pfpath = _get_hermes_home() / pfpath
|
|
if not pfpath.exists():
|
|
return None
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(pfpath, "r", encoding="utf-8") as _pf:
|
|
prefill_messages = json.load(_pf)
|
|
return prefill_messages if isinstance(prefill_messages, list) else None
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.warning("Job '%s': failed to parse prefill messages file '%s': %s", job_id, pfpath, e)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _preflight_or_block(job: dict, job_id: str, job_name: str, cfg: dict) -> Optional[tuple]:
|
|
"""Pre-dispatch config validation: refuse unrunnable jobs (missing key, unready skill,
|
|
unconfigured delivery) BEFORE AIAgent is built. run_one_job keys off BLOCKED_CONFIG_MARKER to
|
|
record blocked_config and alert once (`preflight_alerted` bit). Must run after the wake gate so
|
|
silent ticks stay silent. Opt-out: `cron.preflight: false`. Returns failure tuple or None.
|
|
"""
|
|
# --------------------------------------------------------------- Pre-dispatch configuration validation
|
|
# (T1-26). A job whose configuration cannot possibly produce a successful run — missing provider API key
|
|
# (no fallback chain), unready attached skill, unconfigured delivery platform — is refused HERE, before
|
|
# AIAgent is constructed and before the resolution below can feed a doomed runtime into it, so a
|
|
# misconfigured job never burns an LLM call. run_one_job keys off the BLOCKED_CONFIG_MARKER in the
|
|
# returned error to record last_status='blocked_config' and alert exactly once (dedup persisted via the
|
|
# job's `preflight_alerted` bit — the #73506 alert-once shape).
|
|
_pf_reason = None
|
|
try:
|
|
if _cron_preflight_enabled(cfg):
|
|
_pf_reason = _preflight_job_config(job, cfg)
|
|
if not _pf_reason and job.get("preflight_alerted"):
|
|
# Config healthy again: clear alert-once marker so a future break re-alerts.
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
from cron.jobs import clear_preflight_alerted
|
|
clear_preflight_alerted(job_id)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
# Fail open: the validator must never take down a runnable job.
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': preflight validation errored — failing open", job_id, exc_info=True)
|
|
_pf_reason = None
|
|
if not _pf_reason:
|
|
return None
|
|
return _blocked_config_result(job_id, job_name, _pf_reason)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _blocked_config_result(job_id: str, job_name: str, _pf_reason: str) -> tuple:
|
|
"""The ``blocked_config`` failure tuple for *_pf_reason*, alerting once per job."""
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s' (ID: %s): BLOCKED by pre-dispatch config validation — %s (no LLM call was made)",
|
|
job_name, job_id, _pf_reason)
|
|
already_alerted = False
|
|
try:
|
|
from cron.jobs import mark_preflight_alerted
|
|
already_alerted = mark_preflight_alerted(job_id)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': could not persist preflight alert marker", job_id, exc_info=True)
|
|
marker = BLOCKED_CONFIG_SILENT_MARKER if already_alerted else BLOCKED_CONFIG_MARKER
|
|
blocked_doc = (
|
|
f"# Cron Job: {job_name}\n\n"
|
|
f"**Job ID:** {job_id}\n"
|
|
f"**Run Time:** {_hermes_now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')}\n"
|
|
f"**Status:** BLOCKED (configuration)\n\n"
|
|
"Pre-dispatch validation found a configuration problem and "
|
|
"the agent was NOT run (no tokens spent).\n\n"
|
|
f"**Reason:** {_pf_reason}\n\n"
|
|
"The job will stay blocked (without re-alerting) until the "
|
|
"configuration is fixed; the next healthy run clears this "
|
|
"state. Set `cron.preflight: false` in config.yaml to disable this validation."
|
|
)
|
|
return False, blocked_doc, "", f"{marker} {_pf_reason}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_job_runtime(job: dict, job_id: str, jc: _CronJobConfig) -> tuple[dict, str]:
|
|
"""Resolve the runtime, walking the fallback chain on auth/transient-network errors. Returns
|
|
``(runtime, model)``; provider+model swap atomically (never swap only the provider while keeping
|
|
a paid primary model). Provider precedence: per-job pin > cron.model_provider > creation
|
|
snapshot > persisted global config."""
|
|
from hermes_cli.runtime_provider import (
|
|
resolve_runtime_provider, format_runtime_provider_error)
|
|
from hermes_cli.auth import AuthError
|
|
|
|
model = jc.model
|
|
requested = job.get("provider") or jc.cron_default_provider or None
|
|
if not requested:
|
|
global_provider = (
|
|
str(jc.model_cfg.get("provider") or "").strip() if isinstance(jc.model_cfg, dict) else "")
|
|
# None (not the config provider) keeps the legacy no-snapshot path resolving from persisted
|
|
# config exactly as before.
|
|
requested = _snapshot_pin(job, "provider", global_provider, job_id) or None
|
|
try:
|
|
# Do NOT pass HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER as `requested`: it would override persisted config
|
|
# and resurrect stale providers for unpinned jobs.
|
|
runtime_kwargs = {
|
|
"requested": requested,
|
|
# api_mode must derive from the model actually run, not the stale persisted default.
|
|
"target_model": model,
|
|
}
|
|
if job.get("base_url"):
|
|
runtime_kwargs["explicit_base_url"] = job.get("base_url")
|
|
return resolve_runtime_provider(**runtime_kwargs), model
|
|
except Exception as resolve_exc:
|
|
# Walk the fallback chain on AuthError AND transient network/DNS failures (e.g. during
|
|
# OAuth refresh); anything else re-raises.
|
|
is_auth = isinstance(resolve_exc, AuthError)
|
|
is_transient_net = _is_transient_provider_resolve_error(resolve_exc)
|
|
if not (is_auth or is_transient_net):
|
|
raise RuntimeError(format_runtime_provider_error(resolve_exc)) from resolve_exc
|
|
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s': primary provider resolve failed (%s: %s), trying fallback",
|
|
job_id, "auth" if is_auth else "transient network", resolve_exc)
|
|
for entry in get_fallback_chain(jc.cfg):
|
|
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
|
|
continue
|
|
fb_provider = str(entry.get("provider") or "").strip()
|
|
fb_model = str(entry.get("model") or "").strip()
|
|
if not fb_provider or not fb_model:
|
|
continue
|
|
try:
|
|
from hermes_cli.fallback_config import effective_runtime_provider, resolve_entry_api_key
|
|
|
|
fb_kwargs = {"requested": fb_provider, "target_model": fb_model}
|
|
if entry.get("base_url"):
|
|
fb_kwargs["explicit_base_url"] = entry["base_url"]
|
|
fb_api_key = resolve_entry_api_key(entry)
|
|
if fb_api_key:
|
|
fb_kwargs["explicit_api_key"] = fb_api_key
|
|
runtime = resolve_runtime_provider(**fb_kwargs)
|
|
# Named custom entries resolve to the bare "custom" billing class; keep the configured
|
|
# identity so job sessions record the provider name (#98739).
|
|
runtime["provider"] = effective_runtime_provider(entry, runtime)
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Job '%s': fallback resolved to %s model %s",
|
|
job_id, runtime.get("provider"), fb_model)
|
|
return runtime, fb_model
|
|
except Exception as fb_exc:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': fallback %s failed: %s", job_id, fb_provider, fb_exc)
|
|
raise RuntimeError(format_runtime_provider_error(resolve_exc)) from resolve_exc
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _load_credential_pool(runtime: dict, job_id: str):
|
|
runtime_provider = str(runtime.get("provider") or "").strip().lower()
|
|
if not runtime_provider:
|
|
return None
|
|
try:
|
|
from agent.credential_pool import load_pool
|
|
pool = load_pool(runtime_provider)
|
|
if pool.has_credentials():
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Job '%s': loaded credential pool for provider %s with %d entries",
|
|
job_id, runtime_provider, len(pool.entries()))
|
|
return pool
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': failed to load credential pool for %s: %s", job_id, runtime_provider, e)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _init_cron_mcp_tools(job_id: str) -> None:
|
|
"""Register MCP servers for the agent's tool registry. Idempotent across ticks; non-fatal so a
|
|
broken MCP server never kills a working job."""
|
|
try:
|
|
# Initialize MCP servers so configured mcp_servers are available to the agent's tool registry before
|
|
# AIAgent is constructed. Without this, cron jobs never saw any MCP tools — only the gateway / CLI
|
|
# paths called discover_mcp_tools() at startup. Idempotent: subsequent ticks short-circuit on
|
|
# already-connected servers inside register_mcp_servers(). Non-fatal on failure: a broken MCP server
|
|
# shouldn't kill an otherwise-working cron job. See #4219.
|
|
from tools.mcp_tool_discovery import discover_mcp_tools
|
|
_mcp_tools = discover_mcp_tools()
|
|
if _mcp_tools:
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s': %d MCP tool(s) available", job_id, len(_mcp_tools))
|
|
except Exception as _mcp_exc:
|
|
logger.warning("Job '%s': MCP initialization failed (non-fatal): %s", job_id, _mcp_exc)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _open_cron_session_db(job: dict):
|
|
"""Open the SQLite session store under its own timeout (HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT only watches
|
|
run_conversation). A wedged sqlite3.connect returns None (no session store) instead of
|
|
wedging the worker thread."""
|
|
# Initialize the SQLite session store so cron job messages are persisted and discoverable via
|
|
# session_search (same pattern as gateway/run.py) — only now, after every early-return path (wake-gate,
|
|
# prompt validation, drift skip) has passed, so a gated run never opens state.db just to abandon the
|
|
# handle (#96290). Bounded with its own timeout (separate from HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, which only watches
|
|
# the agent's run_conversation below): SessionDB.__init__ opens/migrates state.db synchronously and has
|
|
# no timeout of its own against a wedged sqlite3.connect (e.g. a stale flock left by a crashed sibling
|
|
# process). An unbounded hang here would wedge the job's worker thread, so the init is bounded and a
|
|
# timeout proceeds without a session store instead of blocking the run forever.
|
|
_session_db_timeout = _get_session_db_timeout()
|
|
try:
|
|
from hermes_state_registry import acquire
|
|
|
|
if _session_db_timeout <= 0:
|
|
return acquire()
|
|
_session_db_pool = concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1)
|
|
# Copy the context so a profile run resolves ITS OWN home/state.db on the worker thread
|
|
# instead of the process-global default.
|
|
_session_db_context = contextvars.copy_context()
|
|
_session_db_future = _session_db_pool.submit(_session_db_context.run, acquire)
|
|
try:
|
|
return _session_db_future.result(timeout=_session_db_timeout)
|
|
except concurrent.futures.TimeoutError:
|
|
# The abandoned worker may still finish; close its late result or its SQLite FDs leak.
|
|
# The worker is abandoned (shutdown below doesn't wait for it). If SessionDB() later completes
|
|
# inside it, the future's result would be orphaned and its SQLite FDs (.db, WAL, SHM) leak until
|
|
# process exit. Register a done-callback that retrieves and closes any eventual late result
|
|
# (#72782).
|
|
_session_db_future.add_done_callback(_close_late_session_db_result)
|
|
raise
|
|
finally:
|
|
# Abandon a wedged connect() rather than blocking shutdown on it.
|
|
_session_db_pool.shutdown(wait=False)
|
|
except concurrent.futures.TimeoutError:
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
"Job '%s': SessionDB init did not return within %.0fs — proceeding "
|
|
"without a session store for this run instead of blocking it forever",
|
|
job.get("id", "?"), _session_db_timeout)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': SQLite session store not available: %s", job.get("id", "?"), e)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _raise_inactivity_timeout(agent, job_name: str, limit_s: float) -> None:
|
|
"""Log the agent's last activity, hard-interrupt it and raise TimeoutError."""
|
|
_activity = {}
|
|
if hasattr(agent, "get_activity_summary"):
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
_activity = agent.get_activity_summary()
|
|
_last_desc = _activity.get("last_activity_desc", "unknown")
|
|
_secs_ago = _activity.get("seconds_since_activity", 0)
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
"Job '%s' idle for %.0fs (inactivity limit %.0fs) "
|
|
"| last_activity=%s | iteration=%s/%s | tool=%s",
|
|
job_name, _secs_ago, limit_s,
|
|
_last_desc, _activity.get("api_call_count", 0), _activity.get("max_iterations", 0),
|
|
_activity.get("current_tool") or "none")
|
|
request_hard_interrupt(agent, "Cron job timed out (inactivity)")
|
|
raise TimeoutError(
|
|
f"Cron job '{job_name}' idle for "
|
|
f"{int(_secs_ago)}s (limit {int(limit_s)}s) "
|
|
f"— last activity: {_last_desc}")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _run_agent_with_watchdog(
|
|
agent, prompt: str, job: dict, job_id: str, job_name: str, task_id: str, cancel_event,
|
|
worker_state: Optional[dict] = None,
|
|
) -> dict:
|
|
"""Run ``agent.run_conversation`` on a worker thread under the inactivity (not wall-clock)
|
|
watchdog: default 600s, override HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, 0 = unlimited."""
|
|
_cron_timeout = _cron_inactivity_seconds()
|
|
_cron_inactivity_limit = _cron_timeout if _cron_timeout > 0 else None
|
|
_POLL_INTERVAL = 5.0
|
|
# Heartbeat the one-shot run_claim while alive: without it a long run looks like a dead owner
|
|
# and gets re-dispatched / stale-removed out from under the live run.
|
|
# Keep the one-shot run_claim fresh while the run is alive (#62002): the claim TTL is a dead-owner
|
|
# detector, but without a heartbeat a run that legitimately outlives it (stream stall, laptop asleep
|
|
# mid-run) is indistinguishable from a dead tick — another process re-dispatches it and get_due_jobs
|
|
# stale-removes the job record out from under the live run. Refreshing the claim from this monitor keeps
|
|
# "expired claim" meaning "owner died".
|
|
_job_schedule = job.get("schedule")
|
|
_is_oneshot = isinstance(_job_schedule, dict) and _job_schedule.get("kind") == "once"
|
|
_run_claim = job.get("run_claim")
|
|
_run_claim_owner = str(_run_claim.get("by") or "") if isinstance(_run_claim, dict) else ""
|
|
_last_claim_heartbeat = time.monotonic()
|
|
|
|
def _abort_if_fire_claim_lost() -> None:
|
|
if cancel_event is None or not cancel_event.is_set():
|
|
return
|
|
if agent is not None and hasattr(agent, "interrupt"):
|
|
agent.interrupt("Cron fire claim ownership was lost")
|
|
raise RuntimeError(f"Cron job '{job_name}' lost its durable fire claim ownership")
|
|
|
|
def _heartbeat_run_claim_if_due():
|
|
nonlocal _last_claim_heartbeat
|
|
if not _is_oneshot or not _run_claim_owner:
|
|
return
|
|
_mono = time.monotonic()
|
|
if _mono - _last_claim_heartbeat < _RUN_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS:
|
|
return
|
|
_last_claim_heartbeat = _mono
|
|
try:
|
|
heartbeat_run_claim(job_id, expected_owner=_run_claim_owner)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': run_claim heartbeat failed", job_name, exc_info=True)
|
|
|
|
_cron_pool = concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1)
|
|
# Carry scheduler-scoped ContextVar state (e.g. env passthrough) into the worker thread.
|
|
_cron_context = contextvars.copy_context()
|
|
_cron_future = _cron_pool.submit(
|
|
_cron_context.run, agent.run_conversation, prompt, task_id=task_id)
|
|
if worker_state is not None:
|
|
worker_state["future"] = _cron_future
|
|
_inactivity_timeout = False
|
|
_watch_stop = threading.Event()
|
|
|
|
def _idle_seconds() -> float:
|
|
if not hasattr(agent, "get_activity_summary"):
|
|
return 0.0
|
|
try:
|
|
_act = agent.get_activity_summary()
|
|
return float(_act.get("seconds_since_activity", 0.0) or 0.0)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return 0.0
|
|
|
|
def _watch_inactivity() -> None:
|
|
nonlocal _inactivity_timeout
|
|
if _cron_inactivity_limit is None:
|
|
return
|
|
if _inactivity_watchdog_loop(
|
|
get_idle_seconds=_idle_seconds, limit_s=_cron_inactivity_limit, poll_s=_POLL_INTERVAL,
|
|
stop=_watch_stop, future_done=_cron_future.done):
|
|
_inactivity_timeout = True
|
|
|
|
_watch_thread = threading.Thread(
|
|
target=_watch_inactivity, name=f"cron-inactivity-{str(job_id)[:8]}", daemon=True)
|
|
try:
|
|
if _cron_inactivity_limit is not None:
|
|
# Separate daemon thread so a hung get_activity_summary can't stop the limit firing.
|
|
# Daemon thread: kernel ``Event.wait`` timeout, independent of the ``run_job`` thread. A blocked
|
|
# loop / hung ``get_activity_summary`` on this thread can no longer keep the 600s inactivity
|
|
# limit from firing (#94285).
|
|
_watch_thread.start()
|
|
if _cron_inactivity_limit is None and not _is_oneshot and cancel_event is None:
|
|
result = _cron_future.result()
|
|
else:
|
|
result = None
|
|
while True:
|
|
done, _ = concurrent.futures.wait({_cron_future}, timeout=_POLL_INTERVAL)
|
|
if done:
|
|
_abort_if_fire_claim_lost()
|
|
result = _cron_future.result()
|
|
break
|
|
if _inactivity_timeout:
|
|
break
|
|
_abort_if_fire_claim_lost()
|
|
_heartbeat_run_claim_if_due()
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
_cron_pool.shutdown(wait=False, cancel_futures=True)
|
|
raise
|
|
finally:
|
|
_watch_stop.set()
|
|
_cron_pool.shutdown(wait=False, cancel_futures=True)
|
|
|
|
if _inactivity_timeout:
|
|
_raise_inactivity_timeout(agent, job_name, _cron_inactivity_limit)
|
|
|
|
if not isinstance(result, dict):
|
|
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
f"agent.run_conversation returned {type(result).__name__} instead of dict: {result!r}"
|
|
)
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _final_response_from_result(result: dict, job_id: str, job_name: str, AIAgent) -> str:
|
|
"""Deliverable final response from a ``run_conversation`` result. Raises RuntimeError on
|
|
`failed=True`/`completed=False`: the error text may sit in `final_response` and would otherwise
|
|
be delivered as the reply with the job marked ok."""
|
|
# If the agent itself reported failure (e.g. all retries exhausted on API errors, model abort, mid-run
|
|
# interrupt), do not silently mark the job as successful. run_agent populates
|
|
# `failed=True`/`completed=False` on these paths and may put the error into `final_response`, which
|
|
# would otherwise be delivered as if it were the agent's reply and the job's `last_status` set to "ok".
|
|
# Raise so the except handler below builds the proper failure tuple. (issue #17855)
|
|
turn_exit_reason = str(result.get("turn_exit_reason") or "")
|
|
final_response_text = (result.get("final_response") or "").strip()
|
|
max_iteration_summary = (
|
|
result.get("failed") is not True
|
|
and result.get("completed") is False
|
|
and turn_exit_reason.startswith("max_iterations_reached(")
|
|
and bool(final_response_text)
|
|
)
|
|
if result.get("failed") is True or (result.get("completed") is False and not max_iteration_summary):
|
|
raise RuntimeError(result.get("error") or final_response_text or "agent reported failure")
|
|
if max_iteration_summary:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s' reached the iteration limit but produced a final fallback response; "
|
|
"delivering the response instead of failing the cron run",
|
|
job_name)
|
|
|
|
final_response = result.get("final_response", "") or ""
|
|
# Repair model-mangled computer_use media paths before delivery (fail-open, as in gateway).
|
|
if final_response:
|
|
from gateway.media_repair import repair_explicit_computer_use_media_paths
|
|
|
|
final_response = repair_explicit_computer_use_media_paths(
|
|
final_response, result.get("messages", []))
|
|
if final_response.strip() == "(No response generated)":
|
|
final_response = ""
|
|
# The "⚠️ No reply" turn-completion explainer would be delivered as a cron warning; detect it
|
|
# via the same formatter and treat as empty so cron stays silent on abnormal empty turns.
|
|
if final_response.strip() and turn_exit_reason:
|
|
# Render every persistence-cause variant or cause-refined text slips through.
|
|
_explainer_variants = []
|
|
try:
|
|
from hermes_state_errors import PERSISTENCE_ERROR_CAUSES as _causes
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
_causes = ("locked", "disk", "unknown")
|
|
for _cause in (None, *_causes):
|
|
try:
|
|
_variant = AIAgent._format_turn_completion_explanation(turn_exit_reason, _cause)
|
|
except TypeError:
|
|
try:
|
|
_variant = AIAgent._format_turn_completion_explanation(turn_exit_reason)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
_variant = ""
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
_variant = ""
|
|
if _variant:
|
|
_explainer_variants.append(_variant.strip())
|
|
if final_response.strip() in _explainer_variants:
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Job '%s': abnormal empty turn (%s) — suppressing explainer for cron delivery",
|
|
job_id, turn_exit_reason)
|
|
final_response = ""
|
|
return final_response
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _finalize_cron_session(session_db, agent, job_id: str, job_name: str, cron_session_id: str) -> None:
|
|
"""Title, classify, end and release the cron session after the agent turn has returned."""
|
|
# Bound every DB op so storage failure cannot hold the dispatch guard.
|
|
_session_db = _BoundedCronSessionDB(session_db, job_id)
|
|
# Compression may have rotated the run onto a continuation: finalize that, not the stale cron
|
|
# id. SessionDB lineage is authoritative; agent.session_id is only a fail-safe.
|
|
_final_cron_session_id = cron_session_id
|
|
try:
|
|
_compression_tip = _session_db.get_compression_tip(cron_session_id)
|
|
if _compression_tip:
|
|
_final_cron_session_id = _compression_tip
|
|
except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as e:
|
|
with contextlib.suppress((Exception, KeyboardInterrupt)):
|
|
_agent_session_id = getattr(agent, "session_id", None)
|
|
# CLI (single-process) path: the approval contextvar is only bound during gateway/TUI turns and
|
|
# HERMES_SESSION_KEY is not in the CLI environment, so the key resolves empty here. Since #64240
|
|
# the CLI drains completions through a positive-ownership filter keyed on the durable
|
|
# AIAgent.session_id — an empty session_key would fail closed and the CLI could never claim its
|
|
# own completions, while a restored foreign event with an empty key could leak into any
|
|
# unfiltered consumer (#64484). Stamp the parent's durable session id instead; compression
|
|
# rotations are handled on the drain side via resolve_resume_session_id lineage resolution.
|
|
if _agent_session_id:
|
|
_final_cron_session_id = _agent_session_id
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': failed to resolve cron compression tip: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
# Title must persist BEFORE end_session()/close(). Run-time suffix keeps it unique against the
|
|
# sessions.title index; the fallbacks below guarantee a non-blank title.
|
|
try:
|
|
# Title the cron session from the job (name -> id) and PERSIST it BEFORE end_session()/close() tear
|
|
# the connection down, so the close can never run over an in-flight title write (#50536).
|
|
_title_base = " ".join(job_name.split())[:60].strip() or f"cron {job_id}"
|
|
_cron_title = f"{_title_base} · {_hermes_now().strftime('%b %d %H:%M')}"
|
|
if not _set_cron_session_title(_session_db, _final_cron_session_id, _cron_title):
|
|
_set_cron_session_title(_session_db, _final_cron_session_id, f"cron {job_id}")
|
|
except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as e:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': failed to set cron session title: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
# Never leave the session untitled.
|
|
# Try the next free title in the lineage, then a bare id-stamped title. See #50535.
|
|
for _fallback in (
|
|
getattr(_session_db, "get_next_title_in_lineage", lambda b: b)(f"cron {job_id}"),
|
|
f"cron {job_id} {_final_cron_session_id[-6:]}"):
|
|
try:
|
|
if _set_cron_session_title(_session_db, _final_cron_session_id, _fallback):
|
|
break
|
|
except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt):
|
|
continue
|
|
# Book cron_complete only when the last row is a real assistant reply ([SILENT] counts). Only a
|
|
# POSITIVELY recognized bad status downgrades (keep tuple in sync with
|
|
# session_lifecycle_statuses); unknown values / probe failures fail OPEN.
|
|
# Verified completion booking (#93820): the run may only be recorded as cron_complete when the session's
|
|
# LAST message row is a real assistant reply — a plain answer or the [SILENT] sentinel (both are
|
|
# assistant-text rows, so both classify as 'complete'). A turn that died after a tool call,
|
|
# mid-API-wait, or without any assistant text leaves the last row as a tool result / pending call / user
|
|
# prompt and must not surface as a healthy run. session_lifecycle_statuses is the existing cost-bounded
|
|
# classifier for exactly this shape. Only a POSITIVELY recognized pathological status (see the status
|
|
# vocabulary in hermes_state's session_lifecycle_statuses docstring — keep the tuple below in sync when
|
|
# it grows) downgrades the booking: an unknown value (newer classifier shape, test doubles) keeps the
|
|
# historical reason, and so does a failed probe — the booking itself is FAIL-OPEN on probe errors,
|
|
# because classification is best-effort metadata and must not mislabel a healthy run.
|
|
_end_reason = "cron_complete"
|
|
try:
|
|
_statuses = _session_db.session_lifecycle_statuses([_final_cron_session_id])
|
|
_lifecycle = _statuses.get(_final_cron_session_id)
|
|
if _lifecycle in ("interrupted", "error", "empty"):
|
|
_end_reason = "cron_incomplete_no_output"
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s': session ended without a final assistant "
|
|
"message (lifecycle=%s) — booking run as %s",
|
|
job_id, _lifecycle, _end_reason)
|
|
except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as e:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': session lifecycle classification failed: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
try:
|
|
_session_db.end_session(_final_cron_session_id, _end_reason)
|
|
# The scheduler owns cron-session finalization. AIAgent.close() also
|
|
# finalizes owned session rows by default; once the shared SessionDB is
|
|
# released below, that second end_session() would reopen the just-closed
|
|
# SQLite handle (#94736). The reason is durably booked, so disarm only the
|
|
# agent's redundant row-finalization; its resource teardown still runs in
|
|
# _teardown_cron_agent.
|
|
if agent is not None:
|
|
agent._end_session_on_close = False
|
|
except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as e:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': failed to end session: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
try:
|
|
from hermes_state_registry import release_or_close
|
|
release_or_close(_session_db)
|
|
except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as e:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': failed to close SQLite session store: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _run_doc_header(job: dict, title: str, job_id: str, prompt: str) -> str:
|
|
"""Header of the persisted run document (title, ids, schedule, prompt)."""
|
|
return (
|
|
f"# Cron Job: {title}\n\n"
|
|
f"**Job ID:** {job_id}\n"
|
|
f"**Run Time:** {_hermes_now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')}\n"
|
|
f"**Schedule:** {job.get('schedule_display', 'N/A')}\n\n"
|
|
f"## Prompt\n\n{prompt}\n\n"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
_RunResult = tuple[bool, str, str, Optional[str]]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _prepare_job_prompt(
|
|
job: dict, job_id: str, job_name: str, extra_prompt: Optional[str], cancel_event,
|
|
) -> tuple[Optional[_RunResult], Optional[str]]:
|
|
"""Run every pre-agent gate and build the prompt. Returns ``(early_result, prompt)``: an early
|
|
result short-circuits ``run_job`` (no_agent job, empty payload, monitor gate, wake gate,
|
|
injection block, empty prompt); otherwise ``prompt`` is set."""
|
|
# Fail closed on a corrupt config.yaml: defaults would let auto-detection bill a provider the
|
|
# user never chose. no_agent jobs are exempt. Escape hatch: HERMES_IGNORE_USER_CONFIG=1.
|
|
if not job.get("no_agent"):
|
|
from hermes_cli.config import InvalidUserConfigError, require_parseable_user_config
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
require_parseable_user_config()
|
|
except InvalidUserConfigError as exc:
|
|
logger.error("Job '%s': refusing to run — %s", job_id, exc)
|
|
return (False, f"# Cron Job: {job_name}\n\nError: {exc}\n", "", str(exc)), None
|
|
|
|
# no_agent short-circuits BEFORE importing run_agent / opening SessionDB.
|
|
if job.get("no_agent"):
|
|
return _run_no_agent_job(job, job_id, job_name, cancel_event), None
|
|
|
|
# Legacy / hand-edited job with nothing to run: pause it instead of waking the LLM every fire.
|
|
from cron.jobs import EMPTY_PAYLOAD_ERROR, job_payload_is_empty
|
|
|
|
if job_payload_is_empty(job):
|
|
return _block_and_pause_job(job_id, job_name, EMPTY_PAYLOAD_ERROR), None
|
|
|
|
_early, extra_prompt = _apply_monitor_gate(job, job_id, job_name, extra_prompt)
|
|
if _early is not None:
|
|
return _early, None
|
|
|
|
# Wake-gate: run the pre-check script BEFORE building the prompt; its result is passed into
|
|
# _build_job_prompt so the script runs only once.
|
|
# NOTE: the SQLite session store used to be initialized here, BEFORE the wake-gate and prompt-validation
|
|
# early returns below. Every gated run (``wakeAgent: false``, blocked prompt) opened state.db and
|
|
# returned without reaching the finally that closes it, relying on GC to release the handle. Init now
|
|
# happens inside the main try, right before the agent is constructed — after every early-return path
|
|
# (#96290).
|
|
prerun_script = None
|
|
script_path = job.get("script")
|
|
if script_path:
|
|
prerun_script = _run_job_script_with_claim_heartbeat(
|
|
job,
|
|
script_path,
|
|
workdir=_resolve_job_workdir(job, job_id),
|
|
cancel_event=cancel_event,
|
|
)
|
|
_ran_ok, _script_output = prerun_script
|
|
if _ran_ok and not _parse_wake_gate(_script_output):
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s' (ID: %s): wakeAgent=false, skipping agent run", job_name, job_id)
|
|
silent_doc = (
|
|
f"# Cron Job: {job_name}\n\n"
|
|
f"**Job ID:** {job_id}\n"
|
|
f"**Run Time:** {_hermes_now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')}\n\n"
|
|
"Script gate returned `wakeAgent=false` — agent skipped.\n"
|
|
)
|
|
return (True, silent_doc, SILENT_MARKER, None), None
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
prompt = _build_job_prompt(job, prerun_script=prerun_script, extra_prompt=extra_prompt)
|
|
except CronPromptInjectionBlocked as block_exc:
|
|
# Injection scanner tripped: refuse this tick and tell the operator WHY.
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s' (ID: %s): blocked by prompt-injection scanner — %s", job_name, job_id, block_exc,
|
|
)
|
|
blocked_doc = (
|
|
f"# Cron Job: {job_name}\n\n"
|
|
f"**Job ID:** {job_id}\n"
|
|
f"**Run Time:** {_hermes_now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')}\n"
|
|
f"**Status:** BLOCKED\n\n"
|
|
"The assembled prompt (user prompt + loaded skill content) tripped "
|
|
"the cron injection scanner and the agent was NOT run.\n\n"
|
|
f"**Scanner result:** {block_exc}\n\n"
|
|
"Audit the skill(s) attached to this job for prompt-injection "
|
|
"payloads or invisible-unicode markers. If the skill is legitimate "
|
|
"and the match is a false positive, rephrase the content to avoid "
|
|
"the threat pattern (`tools/cronjob_tools.py::_CRON_THREAT_PATTERNS`)."
|
|
)
|
|
return (False, blocked_doc, "", str(block_exc)), None
|
|
if prompt is None:
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s': script produced no output, skipping AI call.", job_name)
|
|
return (True, "", SILENT_MARKER, None), None
|
|
return None, prompt
|
|
|
|
|
|
_CRON_DELIVERY_VARS = (
|
|
"HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_PLATFORM",
|
|
"HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_CHAT_ID",
|
|
"HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_THREAD_ID")
|
|
|
|
|
|
class _CronRunScope:
|
|
"""Per-run ContextVar / tool-cwd scope for ``run_job`` (ContextVars, not os.environ, so
|
|
parallel jobs don't clobber each other). Construct before the try, ``enter()`` as its first
|
|
statement, ``exit()`` in the finally — every setter here has a matching reset there.
|
|
|
|
HERMES_SESSION_* are deliberately NOT seeded from job["origin"]: it is delivery metadata, not
|
|
a sender, and terminal/tts/skills/send_message tools would act as if the origin user were
|
|
driving the agent. Delivery reads job["origin"] / HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_* directly.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, job: dict, job_id: str, execution_id: Optional[str]):
|
|
from gateway.session_context import set_session_vars, _VAR_MAP
|
|
from tools.terminal_tool import record_session_cwd
|
|
|
|
self._var_map = _VAR_MAP
|
|
# Resolve workdir BEFORE set_session_vars so it owns the _SESSION_CWD set/clear.
|
|
self.workdir = _resolve_job_workdir(job, job_id)
|
|
self._ctx_tokens = set_session_vars(
|
|
platform="",
|
|
chat_id="",
|
|
chat_name="",
|
|
# Cron can't receive completions after its turn; async delegation output could
|
|
# otherwise route to an unrelated chat via the ambient session key => inline delegation.
|
|
# We clear the HERMES_SESSION_* routing keys just below, so an async delegation's completion
|
|
# event carries session_key="" — _enrich_async_delegation_routing cannot resolve it and
|
|
# _inject_watch_notification drops it ("no routing metadata"). And by the time a child finishes,
|
|
# run_job has already shipped the job's final response via _deliver_result; there is no turn
|
|
# left to re-enter. (Worse, get_current_session_key() can fall back to the ambient os.environ
|
|
# HERMES_SESSION_KEY, which risks routing a cron subagent's output into an unrelated user chat.)
|
|
# Declaring the channel stateless routes delegate_task to its existing inline/synchronous path,
|
|
# so results return within the job's own turn. See declare_stateless_channel(). Upstream:
|
|
# #53027, #63142.
|
|
async_delivery=False,
|
|
cwd=self.workdir or "",
|
|
)
|
|
for name in _CRON_DELIVERY_VARS:
|
|
_VAR_MAP[name].set("")
|
|
# Workdir binds to the per-run task id (tool-layer cwd authority) instead of mutating
|
|
# global TERMINAL_CWD; _SESSION_CWD above remains the prompt/context-file authority.
|
|
self.task_id = f"cron:{job_id}:{execution_id or job.get('execution_id') or uuid.uuid4().hex}"
|
|
if self.workdir:
|
|
record_session_cwd(self.task_id, self.workdir)
|
|
self._cron_session_var = _VAR_MAP["HERMES_CRON_SESSION"]
|
|
self._cron_session_token = None
|
|
self._non_dispatcher_token = None
|
|
|
|
def enter(self) -> None:
|
|
# Scope cron approval policy; exit() RESETS via token (pinning "" would suppress the legacy
|
|
# os.environ fallback used by standalone entrypoints/tests).
|
|
self._cron_session_token = self._cron_session_var.set("1")
|
|
# Mark NOT the kanban worker: a worker's cronjob(action="run") lands here with
|
|
# HERMES_KANBAN_TASK in env, and an unrelated job could close the worker's task. Must be a
|
|
# ContextVar, NOT an os.environ clear (env is shared with the worker heartbeat and
|
|
# concurrent jobs); copy_context() carries it into the agent thread.
|
|
self._non_dispatcher_token = enter_non_dispatcher_owned_context()
|
|
|
|
def exit(self) -> None:
|
|
from gateway.session_context import clear_session_vars
|
|
from tools.terminal_tool import clear_session_cwd
|
|
|
|
clear_session_cwd(self.task_id)
|
|
clear_session_vars(self._ctx_tokens) # also clears _SESSION_CWD
|
|
if self._cron_session_token is not None:
|
|
self._cron_session_var.reset(self._cron_session_token)
|
|
if self._non_dispatcher_token is not None:
|
|
exit_non_dispatcher_owned_context(self._non_dispatcher_token)
|
|
for name in _CRON_DELIVERY_VARS:
|
|
self._var_map[name].set("")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _reload_dotenv_and_publish_delivery_target(job: dict) -> None:
|
|
"""Re-read .env for this run and publish the auto-deliver target into the session ContextVars."""
|
|
# Reset the secret-source cache FIRST or a Bitwarden/BSM-backed secret is never re-resolved
|
|
# (only the placeholder reloads -> 401s).
|
|
from hermes_cli.env_loader import load_hermes_dotenv, reset_secret_source_cache
|
|
from gateway.session_context import _VAR_MAP
|
|
|
|
reset_secret_source_cache(_get_hermes_home())
|
|
load_hermes_dotenv(hermes_home=_get_hermes_home())
|
|
|
|
delivery_target = _resolve_delivery_target(job)
|
|
if delivery_target:
|
|
_VAR_MAP["HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_PLATFORM"].set(delivery_target["platform"])
|
|
_VAR_MAP["HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_CHAT_ID"].set(str(delivery_target["chat_id"]))
|
|
_VAR_MAP["HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_THREAD_ID"].set(
|
|
"" if delivery_target.get("thread_id") is None else str(delivery_target["thread_id"])
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@dataclass
|
|
class _CronAgentSetup:
|
|
"""Everything ``AIAgent(...)`` needs that is resolved from job + config (or a preflight block)."""
|
|
blocked: Optional[_RunResult] = None
|
|
model: str = ""
|
|
runtime: dict = None
|
|
prefill_messages: Any = None
|
|
max_iterations: Any = None
|
|
reasoning_config: Any = None
|
|
fallback_model: Any = None
|
|
credential_pool: Any = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_cron_agent_setup(job: dict, job_id: str, job_name: str, jc) -> _CronAgentSetup:
|
|
"""Resolve model/runtime/reasoning/pool for the run, in the original gate order: exfil guard ->
|
|
preflight (may block) -> runtime (+ fallback chain) -> credential pool -> MCP."""
|
|
_cfg = jc.cfg
|
|
setup = _CronAgentSetup(model=jc.model)
|
|
setup.prefill_messages = _load_prefill_messages(_cfg, job_id)
|
|
|
|
# resolve_turn_limit() honors none/unlimited (sys.maxsize) and explicit 0 / null.
|
|
from hermes_cli.config import resolve_turn_limit as _resolve_turn_limit
|
|
_mt = _cfg.get("agent", {}).get("max_turns")
|
|
if _mt is None:
|
|
_mt = _cfg.get("max_turns")
|
|
setup.max_iterations = _resolve_turn_limit(_mt)
|
|
|
|
# Runtime backstop (CWE-200/522): fail closed BEFORE resolution on a provider/base_url pair
|
|
# that would ship a stored credential off-host; hand-written jobs bypass create-time checks.
|
|
_guard_job_credential_exfil(job)
|
|
|
|
setup.blocked = _preflight_or_block(job, job_id, job_name, _cfg)
|
|
if setup.blocked is not None:
|
|
return setup
|
|
|
|
setup.runtime, setup.model = _resolve_job_runtime(job, job_id, jc)
|
|
setup.reasoning_config = _resolve_job_reasoning_config(
|
|
job, _cfg if isinstance(_cfg, dict) else {}, str(setup.model)
|
|
)
|
|
setup.fallback_model = get_fallback_chain(_cfg) or None
|
|
setup.credential_pool = _load_credential_pool(setup.runtime, job_id)
|
|
# MCP servers must be registered before AIAgent is constructed.
|
|
_init_cron_mcp_tools(job_id)
|
|
# Only now can a requested MCP toolset be judged: its alias is process-global but its tools live
|
|
# in this profile's registry overlay, and quiet_mode hides the empty resolution (#109050).
|
|
if _cron_preflight_enabled(_cfg):
|
|
_mcp_reason = _empty_requested_mcp_toolsets(job, _cfg)
|
|
if _mcp_reason:
|
|
setup.blocked = _blocked_config_result(job_id, job_name, _mcp_reason)
|
|
return setup
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _construct_cron_agent(AIAgent, job: dict, _cfg: dict, setup: _CronAgentSetup, *, workdir, session_id, session_db):
|
|
runtime = setup.runtime
|
|
pr = _cfg.get("provider_routing") or {}
|
|
return AIAgent(
|
|
model=setup.model,
|
|
api_key=runtime.get("api_key"),
|
|
base_url=runtime.get("base_url"),
|
|
provider=runtime.get("provider"),
|
|
requested_provider=runtime.get("requested_provider"),
|
|
api_mode=runtime.get("api_mode"),
|
|
request_overrides=runtime.get("request_overrides"),
|
|
acp_command=runtime.get("command"),
|
|
acp_args=runtime.get("args"),
|
|
max_iterations=setup.max_iterations,
|
|
reasoning_config=setup.reasoning_config,
|
|
prefill_messages=setup.prefill_messages,
|
|
fallback_model=setup.fallback_model,
|
|
credential_pool=setup.credential_pool,
|
|
providers_allowed=pr.get("only"),
|
|
providers_ignored=pr.get("ignore"),
|
|
providers_order=pr.get("order"),
|
|
provider_sort=pr.get("sort"),
|
|
openrouter_min_coding_score=(_cfg.get("openrouter") or {}).get("min_coding_score"),
|
|
enabled_toolsets=_resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets(job, _cfg),
|
|
disabled_toolsets=_resolve_cron_disabled_toolsets(_cfg),
|
|
quiet_mode=True,
|
|
# Project context files only with a configured workdir; SOUL.md always.
|
|
skip_context_files=not bool(workdir),
|
|
load_soul_identity=True,
|
|
skip_memory=False,
|
|
skip_background_review=True, # Cron has no human-in-the-loop need for skill/memory review forks (~30K tok/event)
|
|
platform="cron",
|
|
session_id=session_id,
|
|
session_db=session_db,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class _FireAudit:
|
|
"""One usage_audit.jsonl line per fire (created once the agent exists; fire id + start clock)."""
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, job: dict, job_id: str, model: str):
|
|
self.job, self.job_id, self.model = job, job_id, model
|
|
self.fire_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
|
|
self.t_start = time.monotonic()
|
|
|
|
def write(self, result: dict, error: Optional[str]) -> None:
|
|
_write_usage_audit({
|
|
"ts": _utcnow_iso_ms(),
|
|
"job_id": self.job_id,
|
|
"fire_id": self.fire_id,
|
|
"prompt_tokens": result.get("prompt_tokens"),
|
|
"completion_tokens": result.get("completion_tokens"),
|
|
"total_tokens": result.get("total_tokens"),
|
|
"response_silent": bool(result.get("response_silent")),
|
|
"deliver_target": self.job.get("deliver"),
|
|
"model": self.model or None,
|
|
"duration_ms": int((time.monotonic() - self.t_start) * 1000),
|
|
"error": error})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def run_job(
|
|
job: dict, *, defer_agent_teardown: Optional[list] = None, extra_prompt: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
cancel_event: Optional[_CancelEventLike] = None, execution_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
) -> tuple[bool, str, str, Optional[str]]:
|
|
"""Execute a single cron job. Returns (success, full_output_doc, final_response, error).
|
|
``defer_agent_teardown``: if a list, the live agent is appended instead of torn down; the caller
|
|
MUST call ``_teardown_cron_agent(agent)`` AFTER delivery (a torn-down async client can't
|
|
deliver). ``extra_prompt``: per-fire context, never persisted.
|
|
|
|
``defer_agent_teardown``: when a caller passes a list, ``run_job`` skips the agent's async-resource
|
|
teardown (``agent.close()`` + ``cleanup_stale_async_clients()``) in its ``finally`` block and instead
|
|
appends the live agent to that list. The caller is then responsible for calling
|
|
``_teardown_cron_agent(agent)`` AFTER it has delivered the result. This closes the ordering window in
|
|
#58720 where delivery ran against a torn-down async client (defense-in-depth alongside the
|
|
interpreter-shutdown guard). When ``None`` (the default) teardown happens inline as before, so every
|
|
existing caller is unchanged.
|
|
``extra_prompt``: optional per-run context from ``cronjob(action='run', prompt=...)`` (#57331). Appended
|
|
to the stored prompt for this fire only — never persisted to the job definition.
|
|
"""
|
|
job_id = job["id"]
|
|
job_name = str(job.get("name") or job.get("prompt") or job_id or "cron job")
|
|
|
|
early, prompt = _prepare_job_prompt(job, job_id, job_name, extra_prompt, cancel_event)
|
|
if early is not None:
|
|
return early
|
|
from run_agent import AIAgent
|
|
|
|
_cron_session_id = f"cron_{job_id}_{_hermes_now().strftime('%Y%m%d_%H%M%S')}"
|
|
logger.info("Running job '%s' (ID: %s)", job_name, job_id)
|
|
logger.info("Prompt: %s", prompt[:100])
|
|
|
|
agent = None
|
|
model = ""
|
|
_session_db = None
|
|
_audit: Optional[_FireAudit] = None
|
|
_worker_state: dict = {}
|
|
scope = _CronRunScope(job, job_id, execution_id)
|
|
try:
|
|
scope.enter()
|
|
if scope.workdir:
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s': using task-scoped workdir %s", job_id, scope.workdir)
|
|
_reload_dotenv_and_publish_delivery_target(job)
|
|
|
|
jc = _load_cron_job_config(job, job_id, job_name)
|
|
_cfg = jc.cfg
|
|
model = jc.model
|
|
setup = _resolve_cron_agent_setup(job, job_id, job_name, jc)
|
|
if setup.blocked is not None:
|
|
return setup.blocked
|
|
model = setup.model
|
|
|
|
# Open state.db only after every early-return gate has passed.
|
|
_session_db = _open_cron_session_db(job)
|
|
agent = _construct_cron_agent(
|
|
AIAgent, job, _cfg, setup, workdir=scope.workdir, session_id=_cron_session_id,
|
|
session_db=_session_db)
|
|
_audit = _FireAudit(job, job_id, model)
|
|
|
|
result = _run_agent_with_watchdog(
|
|
agent, prompt, job, job_id, job_name, scope.task_id, cancel_event,
|
|
worker_state=_worker_state)
|
|
final_response = _final_response_from_result(result, job_id, job_name, AIAgent)
|
|
# Keep final_response clean for delivery logic (empty = no delivery).
|
|
logged_response = final_response if final_response else "(No response generated)"
|
|
output = _run_doc_header(job, job_name, job_id, prompt) + f"## Response\n\n{logged_response}\n"
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s' completed successfully", job_name)
|
|
_audit.write(dict(result, response_silent=_is_cron_silence_response(final_response or "")), None)
|
|
return True, output, final_response, None
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
error_msg = f"{type(e).__name__}: {str(e)}"
|
|
logger.exception("Job '%s' failed: %s", job_name, error_msg)
|
|
# Cowork-style unreachable-model re-run (cron/unreachable_retry.py): flag failures where
|
|
# the model was never reached (transient network/DNS, zero API calls) so the bookkeeping
|
|
# tail can schedule a bounded automatic re-run instead of waiting a full period.
|
|
try:
|
|
from cron.unreachable_retry import is_model_unreachable_failure
|
|
if is_model_unreachable_failure(e, agent):
|
|
job["_model_unreachable"] = True
|
|
except Exception: # classification must never mask the real failure
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': unreachable-failure classification failed", job_id)
|
|
# No audit row when we failed before the agent existed; the audit write must never raise.
|
|
if _audit is not None:
|
|
_audit.write({}, error_msg)
|
|
from cron.scheduler_diagnostics import format_run_error
|
|
output = (
|
|
_run_doc_header(job, f"{job_name} (FAILED)", job_id, prompt)
|
|
+ format_run_error(e)
|
|
)
|
|
return False, output, "", error_msg
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
from cron.scheduler_detached_worker import defer_teardown_to_running_worker
|
|
_worker_teardown_deferred = defer_teardown_to_running_worker(
|
|
_worker_state.get("future"), _session_db, agent, job_id, job_name, _cron_session_id)
|
|
scope.exit()
|
|
if _session_db and not _worker_teardown_deferred:
|
|
_finalize_cron_session(_session_db, agent, job_id, job_name, _cron_session_id)
|
|
# Tear down the ephemeral agent or the gateway leaks fds per tick (EMFILE). With deferred
|
|
# teardown, hand the live agent back: delivery needs a live async client.
|
|
# Release subprocesses, terminal sandboxes, browser daemons, and the main OpenAI/httpx client held
|
|
# by this ephemeral cron agent. Without this, a gateway that ticks cron every N minutes leaks fds
|
|
# per job until it hits EMFILE (#10200 / "too many open files"). When the caller opted to defer
|
|
# teardown (passed a list), hand the live agent back instead of closing it here — delivery must run
|
|
# against a live async client, and the caller tears down afterwards (#58720).
|
|
if not _worker_teardown_deferred:
|
|
if defer_agent_teardown is not None:
|
|
if agent is not None:
|
|
defer_agent_teardown.append(agent)
|
|
else:
|
|
_teardown_cron_agent(agent, job_id)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _teardown_cron_agent(
|
|
agent, job_id: str, *, timeout_seconds: Optional[float] = None
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
"""Release an ephemeral cron agent's async resources within a hard bound (this runs outside the
|
|
inactivity watchdog). Shared by ``run_job``'s finally and deferred post-delivery teardown.
|
|
|
|
Split out of ``run_job``'s ``finally`` so a caller that defers teardown (to deliver first — #58720) can
|
|
invoke the identical cleanup AFTER delivery. The timeout matters because this executes after
|
|
``run_conversation`` has returned, outside the agent inactivity watchdog.
|
|
"""
|
|
def _cleanup_agent() -> None:
|
|
try:
|
|
if agent is not None:
|
|
agent.close()
|
|
except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as e:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': failed to close agent resources: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
# Worker-thread event loop dies with the executor; reap httpx clients cached under it.
|
|
try:
|
|
from agent.auxiliary_client import cleanup_stale_async_clients
|
|
cleanup_stale_async_clients()
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': failed to reap stale auxiliary clients: %s", job_id, e)
|
|
|
|
_run_cron_cleanup_with_timeout(
|
|
_cleanup_agent, job_id=job_id, label="agent resource teardown",
|
|
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _run_with_fire_claim_heartbeat(job: dict, run) -> bool:
|
|
"""Run ``run`` while keeping this job's owned durable fire claim fresh."""
|
|
claim = job.get("fire_claim")
|
|
owner = str(claim.get("by") or "") if isinstance(claim, dict) else ""
|
|
if not owner:
|
|
return run(None)
|
|
|
|
job_id = str(job.get("id") or "")
|
|
stop = threading.Event()
|
|
lost_ownership = threading.Event()
|
|
|
|
def _finish_unstarted(error: str) -> None:
|
|
execution_id = job.get("execution_id")
|
|
if not execution_id:
|
|
return
|
|
try:
|
|
finish_execution(execution_id, success=False, error=error)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s': failed to close unstarted execution ledger row",
|
|
job_id,
|
|
exc_info=True)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
owns_fire_claim = heartbeat_fire_claim(job_id, expected_owner=owner)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.warning("Job '%s': initial fire_claim validation failed", job_id, exc_info=True)
|
|
_finish_unstarted("Fire claim ownership could not be validated before execution started.")
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
if owns_fire_claim is False:
|
|
logger.warning("Job '%s': fire claim ownership was already lost before execution", job_id)
|
|
_finish_unstarted("Fire claim ownership lost before execution started.")
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
def _heartbeat_loop() -> None:
|
|
last_confirmed = time.monotonic()
|
|
while not stop.wait(_RUN_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS):
|
|
try:
|
|
if not heartbeat_fire_claim(job_id, expected_owner=owner):
|
|
lost_ownership.set()
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s': fire claim ownership lost; interrupting stale run",
|
|
job_id)
|
|
return
|
|
last_confirmed = time.monotonic()
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug("Job '%s': fire_claim heartbeat failed", job_id, exc_info=True)
|
|
if (
|
|
time.monotonic() - last_confirmed
|
|
>= _FIRE_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_GRACE_SECONDS
|
|
):
|
|
lost_ownership.set()
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s': fire_claim could not be renewed within %.1fs; "
|
|
"interrupting uncertain run",
|
|
job_id,
|
|
_FIRE_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_GRACE_SECONDS)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
heartbeat_thread = _start_heartbeat_thread(
|
|
_heartbeat_loop, "cron-fire-claim-heartbeat",
|
|
lambda: logger.warning(
|
|
"Job '%s': could not start fire_claim heartbeat", job_id, exc_info=True))
|
|
if heartbeat_thread is None:
|
|
_finish_unstarted("Fire claim heartbeat could not be started; execution was not run.")
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
return run(lost_ownership)
|
|
finally:
|
|
stop.set()
|
|
heartbeat_thread.join(timeout=1.0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def run_one_job(
|
|
job: dict, *, adapters=None, loop=None, verbose: bool = False,
|
|
extra_prompt: Optional[str] = None, cancel_event: Optional[_CancelEventLike] = None,
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""Run ONE due job end-to-end: execute → save output → deliver → mark. Shared by the built-in
|
|
ticker and external providers' ``fire_due``; does NOT decide due-ness or acquire the initial
|
|
claim (callers use the store CAS) but keeps it alive. True if processed (a job failure is
|
|
recorded via ``mark_job_run``), False only if processing raised. ``cancel_event``: optional
|
|
transport-level cancel (dashboard drain)."""
|
|
# Every gateway path (built-in scheduler, external providers, and direct
|
|
# API fires) crosses this seam. Ensure the detached worker has a durable
|
|
# attempt to adopt before any launch can occur.
|
|
if not job.get("execution_id"):
|
|
execution = create_execution(
|
|
job["id"], source="direct", scheduled_instant=job.get("_scheduled_instant"))
|
|
job["execution_id"] = execution["id"]
|
|
|
|
execution_id = str(job["execution_id"])
|
|
external_owner = os.environ.get("_HERMES_CRON_EXTERNAL_WORKER") == execution_id
|
|
if not external_owner:
|
|
try:
|
|
if _launch_external_cron_worker(job):
|
|
return True
|
|
except Exception as handoff_error:
|
|
error = f"Restart-safe cron worker dispatch failed: {handoff_error}"
|
|
logger.error("Job '%s': %s", job["id"], error)
|
|
claim = job.get("fire_claim")
|
|
owner = str(claim.get("by") or "") if isinstance(claim, dict) else ""
|
|
try:
|
|
mark_job_run(
|
|
job["id"],
|
|
False,
|
|
error,
|
|
**({"expected_fire_owner": owner} if owner else {}),
|
|
)
|
|
finally:
|
|
finish_execution(execution_id, success=False, error=error)
|
|
return True
|
|
if extra_prompt is None:
|
|
# Gateway-forwarded manual run stamps its prompt on the job via trigger_job; the fire that
|
|
# consumes the manual occurrence picks it up here. Single-fire: mark_job_run clears it.
|
|
_stamped = job.get("manual_run_prompt")
|
|
if _stamped and job.get("manual_run_at"):
|
|
extra_prompt = str(_stamped)
|
|
claim = job.get("fire_claim")
|
|
fire_owner = str(claim.get("by") or "") if isinstance(claim, dict) else ""
|
|
execution_token = object()
|
|
profile_home = _get_hermes_home().resolve()
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
_running_fire_owners.setdefault(job["id"], {})[execution_token] = (
|
|
fire_owner or None, profile_home)
|
|
try:
|
|
return _run_with_fire_claim_heartbeat(
|
|
job,
|
|
lambda lost_ownership: _run_one_job_body(
|
|
job,
|
|
adapters=adapters,
|
|
loop=loop,
|
|
verbose=verbose,
|
|
extra_prompt=extra_prompt,
|
|
fire_claim_lost=(
|
|
_CombinedCancelEvent(lost_ownership, cancel_event)
|
|
if cancel_event is not None
|
|
else lost_ownership
|
|
),
|
|
execution_token=execution_token))
|
|
finally:
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
executions = _running_fire_owners.get(job["id"])
|
|
if executions is not None:
|
|
executions.pop(execution_token, None)
|
|
if not executions:
|
|
_running_fire_owners.pop(job["id"], None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
_OWNERSHIP_LOST_INTERRUPTED = "Interrupted by shutdown before terminal completion."
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _record_fire_ownership_lost(job_id: str, fire_owner: Optional[str], execution_id: str) -> None:
|
|
"""Bookkeeping after fire-claim ownership loss. A transport-level cancel (dashboard drain) is
|
|
not a real loss — we still own the claim, so record the interruption via the owner-fenced
|
|
terminal write instead of leaving fire_claim/last_status stale; otherwise discard."""
|
|
if fire_owner is not None and heartbeat_fire_claim(job_id, expected_owner=fire_owner):
|
|
mark_job_run(job_id, False, _OWNERSHIP_LOST_INTERRUPTED, expected_fire_owner=fire_owner)
|
|
finish_execution(execution_id, success=False, error=_OWNERSHIP_LOST_INTERRUPTED)
|
|
else:
|
|
finish_execution(
|
|
execution_id, success=False,
|
|
error="Fire claim ownership lost; stale result was discarded.")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _classify_delivery_outcome(
|
|
*, delivery_error, should_deliver: bool, unresolved_origin: bool,
|
|
normalized_deliver: str, incident_acked: bool, success: bool,
|
|
delivery_queued=None,
|
|
) -> str:
|
|
if delivery_error:
|
|
return "failed"
|
|
if should_deliver and delivery_queued:
|
|
return "queued"
|
|
if should_deliver and unresolved_origin:
|
|
return "not_configured"
|
|
if should_deliver and normalized_deliver != "local":
|
|
return "delivered"
|
|
if incident_acked and not success:
|
|
# Failure ping withheld: operator acked this exact signature (vs. plain "suppressed").
|
|
return "suppressed_acked"
|
|
return "suppressed"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _compose_run_delivery(
|
|
job: dict, *, success: bool, error, final_response: str, output_file,
|
|
) -> tuple[str, bool, bool, bool, Optional[str]]:
|
|
"""Text to deliver for a finished run. Returns ``(deliver_content, blocked_config,
|
|
silent_alert, incident_acked, failure_incident_id)``; ``silent_alert``: an alert-once marker
|
|
says the operator was already told, deliver nothing."""
|
|
err = str(error) if error else ""
|
|
# Failed jobs always deliver, except blocked-config runs, which alert exactly ONCE.
|
|
blocked_config_silent = BLOCKED_CONFIG_SILENT_MARKER in err
|
|
blocked_config = blocked_config_silent or BLOCKED_CONFIG_MARKER in err
|
|
incident_acked = False
|
|
failure_incident_id = None
|
|
if blocked_config and not success:
|
|
# Bypass the generic failure summarizer (its auth/timeout heuristics would mislabel this).
|
|
_pf_text = re.sub(r"\[blocked_config[^\]]*\]\s*", "", err).strip()
|
|
deliver_content = (
|
|
f"⛔ Cron '{job.get('name') or job['id']}' blocked by "
|
|
f"configuration validation (no LLM call was made): "
|
|
f"{_pf_text} "
|
|
"This alert is sent once; the job stays blocked until the configuration is fixed."
|
|
)
|
|
elif success:
|
|
deliver_content = final_response
|
|
_resolve_incidents_for_recovered_job(job)
|
|
else:
|
|
# Record the job+error signature once; if already acked by the operator, suppress the
|
|
# per-run ping. Best-effort: a ledger failure never breaks delivery.
|
|
incident_acked, failure_incident_id = _upsert_incident_for_failure(
|
|
job, error or "", output_file=output_file
|
|
)
|
|
if incident_acked:
|
|
deliver_content = ""
|
|
else:
|
|
deliver_content = (
|
|
_summarize_cron_failure_for_delivery(job, error) + _failure_streak_nudge(job)
|
|
)
|
|
return deliver_content, blocked_config, blocked_config_silent, incident_acked, failure_incident_id
|
|
|
|
|
|
class _FireClaimLostDuringSideEffect(Exception):
|
|
"""Raised inside a side-effect fence when the durable fire claim is no longer ours."""
|
|
|
|
|
|
class _FireOwnership:
|
|
"""Fire-claim ownership checks for one run (``owner`` is None when the job carries no claim)."""
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, job: dict, fire_claim_lost: Optional[_CancelEventLike]):
|
|
self.job = job
|
|
self.fire_claim_lost = fire_claim_lost
|
|
claim = job.get("fire_claim")
|
|
self.owner = str(claim.get("by") or "") if isinstance(claim, dict) else None
|
|
|
|
def side_effect_fence(self):
|
|
if self.owner is None:
|
|
return contextlib.nullcontext(True)
|
|
return fire_claim_fence(self.job["id"], expected_owner=self.owner)
|
|
|
|
def lost(self) -> bool:
|
|
if self.fire_claim_lost is not None and self.fire_claim_lost.is_set():
|
|
return True
|
|
if self.owner is None:
|
|
return False
|
|
try:
|
|
if heartbeat_fire_claim(self.job["id"], expected_owner=self.owner):
|
|
return False
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug(
|
|
"Job '%s': fire_claim ownership validation failed", self.job["id"], exc_info=True)
|
|
return False
|
|
if self.fire_claim_lost is not None:
|
|
self.fire_claim_lost.set()
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
|
|
@dataclass
|
|
class _RunDelivery:
|
|
"""Mutable outcome of the save/compose/deliver phase, read back by the bookkeeping tail."""
|
|
job: dict
|
|
success: bool
|
|
error: Optional[str]
|
|
delivery_attempted: bool = False
|
|
delivery_error: Optional[str] = None
|
|
should_deliver: bool = False
|
|
unresolved_origin: bool = False
|
|
blocked_config: bool = False
|
|
incident_acked: bool = False
|
|
failure_incident_id: Optional[str] = None
|
|
side_effect_ownership_lost: bool = False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _save_compose_deliver(
|
|
d: _RunDelivery, fence: _FireOwnership, final_response: str, output: str, *,
|
|
adapters, loop, verbose: bool, execution_token,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
"""Save output, compose the notice and deliver it (both side effects run under the fire-claim
|
|
fence; a lost claim raises ``_FireClaimLostDuringSideEffect`` for the caller)."""
|
|
job = d.job
|
|
with fence.side_effect_fence() as owns_output:
|
|
if not owns_output:
|
|
raise _FireClaimLostDuringSideEffect
|
|
output_file = save_job_output(job["id"], output)
|
|
if verbose:
|
|
logger.info("Output saved to: %s", output_file)
|
|
|
|
# A shutdown-killed tool subprocess can leave a plausible final_response from truncated
|
|
# output; force the honest "interrupted" failure path. Peek-only (consumed later).
|
|
if d.success and _is_interrupted(job["id"], execution_token):
|
|
d.success = False
|
|
d.error = (
|
|
"Interrupted by gateway shutdown before the run finished "
|
|
"(tool subprocess was killed mid-flight)."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
deliver_content, d.blocked_config, _silent_alert, d.incident_acked, d.failure_incident_id,
|
|
) = _compose_run_delivery(
|
|
job, success=d.success, error=d.error, final_response=final_response,
|
|
output_file=output_file)
|
|
# Whitespace-only == empty: skip delivery; the guard below marks it a soft failure.
|
|
d.should_deliver = bool(deliver_content.strip()) and not _silent_alert
|
|
if d.should_deliver and not d.success and job.get("_model_unreachable"):
|
|
# The model was never reached and a bounded automatic re-run will be scheduled
|
|
# (cron/unreachable_retry.py): hold the failure notice — the re-run either
|
|
# delivers the real result or, once the ladder is exhausted, the next failure
|
|
# alerts normally. Mirrors Cowork's silent 5/15/30-minute re-runs.
|
|
from cron.unreachable_retry import will_retry
|
|
if will_retry(job):
|
|
d.should_deliver = False
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Job '%s': suppressing failure notice — automatic re-run pending", job["id"])
|
|
# Not a substring check: bare "SILENT"/"NO_REPLY" or a report quoting "[SILENT]" must
|
|
# not be swallowed; bracketed-prefix / trailing-line tolerance is kept.
|
|
if d.should_deliver and d.success and _is_cron_silence_response(deliver_content):
|
|
# Cron silence suppression — see _is_cron_silence_response. Replaces the old `SILENT_MARKER in
|
|
# ...upper()` substring check, which both leaked bracketless near-markers ("SILENT" / "NO_REPLY")
|
|
# and wrongly swallowed a real report that merely quoted "[SILENT]" mid-sentence (#51438, #46917).
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s': agent returned %s — skipping delivery", job["id"], SILENT_MARKER)
|
|
d.should_deliver = False
|
|
|
|
if d.should_deliver and fence.lost():
|
|
d.should_deliver = False
|
|
logger.warning("Job '%s': skipping delivery after fire claim ownership loss", job["id"])
|
|
|
|
if not d.should_deliver:
|
|
return
|
|
d.unresolved_origin = (
|
|
_normalize_deliver_value(_delivery_lane_value(job, for_failure=not d.success)) == "origin"
|
|
and not _resolve_delivery_targets(job, for_failure=not d.success)
|
|
)
|
|
try:
|
|
with fence.side_effect_fence() as owns_delivery:
|
|
if not owns_delivery:
|
|
raise _FireClaimLostDuringSideEffect
|
|
d.delivery_attempted = True
|
|
d.delivery_error = _deliver_result(
|
|
job,
|
|
deliver_content,
|
|
adapters=adapters,
|
|
loop=loop,
|
|
# Failure summaries (and drift/blocked-config alerts composed into deliver_content
|
|
# on the failure path) honor the job's failure_deliver override (NS-788).
|
|
for_failure=not d.success,
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception as de:
|
|
if isinstance(de, _FireClaimLostDuringSideEffect):
|
|
raise
|
|
d.delivery_error = str(de)
|
|
logger.error("Delivery failed for job %s: %s", job["id"], de)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _finish_interrupted_run(job: dict, execution_id: str, delivery_error: Optional[str]) -> None:
|
|
"""Shutdown already wrote last_status, so mark_job_run is skipped (a second call would skip a
|
|
fire or auto-delete the job); an unsent notice is recorded via update_job instead."""
|
|
if delivery_error:
|
|
try:
|
|
# The gateway shutdown already wrote last_status for this run, so mark_job_run is skipped below
|
|
# — but it could not know that the notice we just tried to send never left the process (the
|
|
# adapters were torn down first, #82232). Record the delivery failure on its own via update_job:
|
|
# mark_job_run also advances next_run_at and the repeat counter, and running that a second time
|
|
# for one run would skip a fire or auto-delete the job early.
|
|
from cron.jobs import update_job
|
|
update_job(job["id"], {"last_delivery_error": delivery_error})
|
|
except Exception as _rec_err:
|
|
logger.debug(
|
|
"Failed recording delivery_error for interrupted job %s: %s", job["id"], _rec_err)
|
|
finish_execution(
|
|
execution_id, success=False,
|
|
error="Interrupted by gateway shutdown before terminal completion.")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _finish_completed_run(d: _RunDelivery, fire_owner: Optional[str], execution_id: str) -> bool:
|
|
"""mark_job_run (owner-fenced) + execution ledger row for a run that reached delivery."""
|
|
job = d.job
|
|
if not d.should_deliver and job.get("last_delivery_queued"):
|
|
from cron.jobs import update_job
|
|
update_job(job["id"], {"last_delivery_queued": None})
|
|
job["last_delivery_queued"] = None
|
|
mark_kwargs: dict = {"delivery_error": d.delivery_error}
|
|
if not d.success and job.pop("_model_unreachable", False):
|
|
# Never-reached-the-model failure: schedule the Cowork-style bounded re-run
|
|
# (cron/unreachable_retry.py) inside the same fenced store write.
|
|
mark_kwargs["model_unreachable"] = True
|
|
if d.success and not d.delivery_error and d.should_deliver and job.get("last_delivery_queued"):
|
|
mark_kwargs["status"] = "delivery_queued"
|
|
if fire_owner is not None:
|
|
mark_kwargs["expected_fire_owner"] = fire_owner
|
|
if d.blocked_config:
|
|
mark_kwargs["status"] = "blocked_config"
|
|
marked = mark_job_run(job["id"], d.success, d.error, **mark_kwargs)
|
|
if fire_owner is not None and not marked:
|
|
finish_execution(
|
|
execution_id, success=False,
|
|
error="Fire claim ownership lost before terminal completion.")
|
|
return True
|
|
delivery_outcome = _classify_delivery_outcome(
|
|
delivery_error=d.delivery_error,
|
|
delivery_queued=job.get("last_delivery_queued"),
|
|
should_deliver=d.should_deliver,
|
|
unresolved_origin=d.unresolved_origin,
|
|
# Read the lane the notice was actually routed through (failure_deliver on failure).
|
|
normalized_deliver=_normalize_deliver_value(_delivery_lane_value(job, for_failure=not d.success)),
|
|
incident_acked=d.incident_acked,
|
|
success=d.success,
|
|
)
|
|
if delivery_outcome in ("delivered", "not_configured") and not d.success:
|
|
# Failure ping left the process (or had a configured target): mark the incident alerted.
|
|
_mark_incident_alerted(d.failure_incident_id)
|
|
finish_execution(
|
|
execution_id, success=d.success, error=d.error, delivery_outcome=delivery_outcome)
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _deliver_crash_failure(
|
|
job: dict, err_text: str, *, adapters, loop,
|
|
) -> tuple[Optional[str], str]:
|
|
"""Failure notice for a run that raised out of run_job. Returns (delivery_error, outcome)."""
|
|
normalized_deliver = _normalize_deliver_value(_delivery_lane_value(job, for_failure=True))
|
|
# Same ack gate as the normal failure delivery: acked signatures stay silent here too.
|
|
incident_acked, failure_incident_id = _upsert_incident_for_failure(job, err_text)
|
|
if incident_acked:
|
|
return None, "suppressed_acked"
|
|
delivery_error = None
|
|
try:
|
|
delivery_error = _deliver_result(
|
|
job,
|
|
# Same text as the normal failure delivery: this run also counts toward
|
|
# failure_streak, so the nudge must leave through here too.
|
|
_summarize_cron_failure_for_delivery(job, err_text) + _failure_streak_nudge(job),
|
|
adapters=adapters,
|
|
loop=loop,
|
|
for_failure=True,
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception as delivery_exc:
|
|
delivery_error = str(delivery_exc)
|
|
logger.error("Delivery failed for job %s: %s", job["id"], delivery_exc)
|
|
unresolved_origin = bool(
|
|
not delivery_error
|
|
and normalized_deliver == "origin"
|
|
and not _resolve_delivery_targets(job, for_failure=True)
|
|
)
|
|
delivery_outcome = _classify_delivery_outcome(
|
|
delivery_error=delivery_error, should_deliver=True, unresolved_origin=unresolved_origin,
|
|
normalized_deliver=normalized_deliver, incident_acked=False, success=False,
|
|
delivery_queued=job.get("last_delivery_queued"))
|
|
if delivery_outcome in ("delivered", "not_configured"):
|
|
_mark_incident_alerted(failure_incident_id)
|
|
return delivery_error, delivery_outcome
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _install_fire_secret_scope() -> "tuple[contextvars.Token, Optional[contextvars.Token]]":
|
|
"""Install the firing profile's secret scope for the span ``_run_one_job_body`` runs, delivery
|
|
included, and return the tokens ``_reset_fire_secret_scope`` needs.
|
|
|
|
Hydrate the profile's external secret sources BEFORE freezing the scope — the order
|
|
gateway/run.py and the external cron worker already use: ``build_profile_secret_scope`` only
|
|
READS the per-home source map, so a scope frozen first would carry no vault-backed value.
|
|
|
|
For a fire routed to a profile other than the process's own (marked by
|
|
``cron.scheduler_provider._profile_cron_scope``) also run under multiplex semantics — for
|
|
exactly this span and no wider. The desktop backend ticks every local profile from a process
|
|
that is not a multiplexer, so nothing else isolates that fire; and switching the context on
|
|
here rather than at the tick means no read is ever fail-closed without a scope to read — the
|
|
restart-safe handoff in ``run_one_job`` runs before this and keeps today's semantics (#107692).
|
|
"""
|
|
from agent.secret_scope import (
|
|
build_profile_secret_scope, set_multiplex_context, set_secret_scope)
|
|
from cron.scheduler_provider import routed_profile_fire
|
|
from hermes_cli.env_loader import hydrate_profile_secret_sources
|
|
|
|
home = Path(_get_hermes_home())
|
|
hydrate_profile_secret_sources(home)
|
|
scope_token = set_secret_scope(build_profile_secret_scope(home))
|
|
context_token = set_multiplex_context(True) if routed_profile_fire() else None
|
|
return scope_token, context_token
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _reset_fire_secret_scope(tokens: "tuple[contextvars.Token, Optional[contextvars.Token]]") -> None:
|
|
"""Undo ``_install_fire_secret_scope`` — the context first, so multiplex semantics never
|
|
outlive the scope they depend on."""
|
|
from agent.secret_scope import reset_multiplex_context, reset_secret_scope
|
|
|
|
scope_token, context_token = tokens
|
|
if context_token is not None:
|
|
reset_multiplex_context(context_token)
|
|
reset_secret_scope(scope_token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _run_one_job_body(
|
|
job: dict, *, adapters=None, loop=None, verbose: bool = False,
|
|
extra_prompt: Optional[str] = None, fire_claim_lost: Optional[_CancelEventLike] = None,
|
|
execution_token: Optional[object] = None,
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
fence = _FireOwnership(job, fire_claim_lost)
|
|
fire_owner = fence.owner
|
|
_side_effect_fence = fence.side_effect_fence
|
|
_fire_claim_ownership_lost = fence.lost
|
|
|
|
execution_id = job.get("execution_id")
|
|
if not execution_id:
|
|
execution_id = create_execution(
|
|
job["id"], source="direct", scheduled_instant=job.get("_scheduled_instant"))["id"]
|
|
delivery_attempted = False
|
|
delivery_error = None
|
|
|
|
_scope_token = None
|
|
_terminal_scope_token = None
|
|
try:
|
|
# Commit a finite one-shot's dispatch BEFORE its side effect so a tick dying mid-run cannot
|
|
# re-fire it forever on restart. No-op for recurring/infinite jobs (at-most-times).
|
|
# This lives here in the shared body so BOTH the built-in ticker and the external provider (Chronos
|
|
# fire_due) get at-most-times semantics. See #38758.
|
|
if not claim_dispatch(job["id"]):
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Job '%s': one-shot dispatch limit reached — skipping",
|
|
job.get("name", job["id"]))
|
|
finish_execution(
|
|
execution_id, success=False,
|
|
error="Dispatch claim rejected; execution was not started.")
|
|
return True # not an error — already handled/removed
|
|
|
|
# Claimed durably before dispatch; becomes running only right before the actual run.
|
|
# Detached workers transition to running while adopting; in-process paths must win the
|
|
# claimed->running CAS here before any user script or agent side effect may begin.
|
|
external_owner = os.environ.get("_HERMES_CRON_EXTERNAL_WORKER") == execution_id
|
|
if not external_owner and mark_execution_running(execution_id) is None:
|
|
logger.warning("Cron job %s lost execution ownership before start; skipping", job["id"])
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
# get_secret() fails closed outside a scope; the ticker thread has none. Delivery adapters
|
|
# resolve credentials, so the scope must span delivery too (reset in the outer finally).
|
|
_scope_token = _install_fire_secret_scope()
|
|
# Same for terminal policy (gateway/run.py _profile_runtime_scope): else the ticker reads
|
|
# process-global TERMINAL_* env a concurrent profile pinned. Resolution failure installs a
|
|
# refusal scope — terminal execution raises instead of using the launch process's policy.
|
|
# Same isolation for terminal settings (third profile seam; see gateway/run.py
|
|
# _profile_runtime_scope): installs the firing profile's COMPLETE terminal policy for this fire —
|
|
# run, delivery, and bookkeeping — resetting in this function's finally alongside the secret scope.
|
|
# See #68559.
|
|
# Bind the profile's COMPLETE terminal policy for the agent build (fail-closed: malformed policy →
|
|
# refusal scope) so _make_agent's terminal probing / cwd hints resolve the routed profile, never the
|
|
# launch process (#98581 class).
|
|
# Same authoritative terminal policy the gateway binds per turn (#68559): a docker-configured
|
|
# dashboard profile must never resolve the launch process's pinned env.
|
|
# Fourth profile seam: bind the session profile's COMPLETE terminal policy for this turn
|
|
# (dashboard/TUI analogue of the gateway's per-turn scope). #98581's unified-desktop reproduction
|
|
# ran a docker-configured profile on the host because terminal_tool read the launch process's pinned
|
|
# env.
|
|
from tools.terminal_scope import (
|
|
install_profile_terminal_scope)
|
|
|
|
_terminal_scope_token = install_profile_terminal_scope(_get_hermes_home())
|
|
# Defer agent teardown until AFTER delivery; closing first races the live send against a
|
|
# torn-down async client. run_job hands the agent back via this list.
|
|
# Defer the cron agent's async-resource teardown until AFTER delivery. run_job normally closes the
|
|
# agent (and reaps stale async clients) in its finally block; doing that before _deliver_result runs
|
|
# means the live send races a torn-down async client (#58720). Passing a holder list makes run_job
|
|
# hand the agent back instead, and we tear it down below once delivery is done. Defense-in-depth
|
|
# alongside the interpreter-shutdown guard in _deliver_result.
|
|
_deferred_agents: list = []
|
|
|
|
def _teardown_deferred() -> None:
|
|
# run_job's finally still hands back the agent when it raises; tear it down here so a failed run
|
|
# never leaks its async resources (#10200), then re-raise into the outer handler. BaseException
|
|
# (not just Exception) so a KeyboardInterrupt/SystemExit mid-run still triggers teardown before
|
|
# propagating.
|
|
# Tear down the deferred agent(s) now that save + delivery have run (or raised). Must happen on
|
|
# every path so cron agents never leak their subprocesses/clients (#10200).
|
|
for _deferred_agent in _deferred_agents:
|
|
_teardown_cron_agent(_deferred_agent, job["id"])
|
|
|
|
_run_kwargs = {
|
|
"defer_agent_teardown": _deferred_agents,
|
|
"extra_prompt": extra_prompt,
|
|
"execution_id": execution_id}
|
|
if fire_claim_lost is not None:
|
|
_run_kwargs["cancel_event"] = fire_claim_lost
|
|
try:
|
|
success, output, final_response, error = run_job(job, **_run_kwargs)
|
|
except BaseException:
|
|
# run_job hands back the agent even when raising; tear down so a failed run never leaks.
|
|
# BaseException so KeyboardInterrupt/SystemExit mid-run still trigger teardown.
|
|
_teardown_deferred()
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
if _fire_claim_ownership_lost():
|
|
_teardown_deferred()
|
|
_record_fire_ownership_lost(job["id"], fire_owner, execution_id)
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
# Agent is still live through delivery; wrap ALL of save/compose/deliver in try/finally so a
|
|
# raise anywhere still tears the deferred agent down.
|
|
d = _RunDelivery(job=job, success=success, error=error)
|
|
try:
|
|
_save_compose_deliver(
|
|
d, fence, final_response, output, adapters=adapters, loop=loop, verbose=verbose,
|
|
execution_token=execution_token)
|
|
except _FireClaimLostDuringSideEffect:
|
|
d.side_effect_ownership_lost = True
|
|
finally:
|
|
delivery_attempted, delivery_error = d.delivery_attempted, d.delivery_error
|
|
# Every path must tear down deferred agent(s) so they never leak subprocesses/clients.
|
|
_teardown_deferred()
|
|
|
|
if d.side_effect_ownership_lost or _fire_claim_ownership_lost():
|
|
_record_fire_ownership_lost(job["id"], fire_owner, execution_id)
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
# Empty final_response is a soft failure so last_status is not "ok".
|
|
if d.success and not final_response.strip():
|
|
d.success = False
|
|
d.error = "Agent completed but produced empty response (model error, timeout, or misconfiguration)"
|
|
|
|
if _consume_interrupted_flag(job["id"], execution_token):
|
|
_finish_interrupted_run(job, execution_id, delivery_error)
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
return _finish_completed_run(d, fire_owner, execution_id)
|
|
|
|
except BaseException as e: # noqa: BLE001 — deliberate: see below
|
|
# BaseException, not Exception: CancelledError/KeyboardInterrupt/SystemExit propagate here.
|
|
# Without mark_job_run(False) a finite one-shot is wedged: claim_dispatch consumed
|
|
# repeat.completed but last_run_at is never written. Record first, then re-raise
|
|
# non-Exception. Owner fencing still applies.
|
|
# BaseException, not Exception (#73973): the inner run_job handler re-raises CancelledError /
|
|
# KeyboardInterrupt / SystemExit after agent teardown, and none of those are Exception subclasses.
|
|
# If they escape without mark_job_run(False), a finite one-shot is left wedged — claim_dispatch()
|
|
# already consumed repeat.completed, but last_run_at is never written, so the job sits in state
|
|
# "scheduled" until the run-claim TTL expires and the dispatch-limit guard removes it with no output
|
|
# and no error. Owner fencing still applies: a stale worker must not record over a replacement claim
|
|
# owner.
|
|
_err_text = str(e) or type(e).__name__
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
"Error processing job %s: %s",
|
|
job["id"],
|
|
_err_text,
|
|
exc_info=(type(e), e, e.__traceback__))
|
|
delivery_outcome = "suppressed"
|
|
# Owner fencing: a stale worker whose claim was taken over (or transport-cancelled) must not
|
|
# send a failure alert on top of the replacement run's; fall through to fenced bookkeeping.
|
|
if (
|
|
isinstance(e, Exception)
|
|
and not delivery_attempted
|
|
and not isinstance(e, _FireClaimLostDuringSideEffect)
|
|
and not _fire_claim_ownership_lost()
|
|
):
|
|
delivery_error, delivery_outcome = _deliver_crash_failure(
|
|
job, _err_text, adapters=adapters, loop=loop)
|
|
try:
|
|
if not _consume_interrupted_flag(job["id"], execution_token):
|
|
mark_kwargs = {}
|
|
if fire_owner is not None:
|
|
mark_kwargs["expected_fire_owner"] = fire_owner
|
|
if isinstance(e, Exception):
|
|
mark_kwargs["delivery_error"] = delivery_error
|
|
mark_job_run(job["id"], False, _err_text, **mark_kwargs)
|
|
except Exception as record_err:
|
|
# Never let bookkeeping mask the original interruption.
|
|
logger.error("Failed to record interrupted run for job %s: %s", job["id"], record_err)
|
|
try:
|
|
finish_execution(
|
|
execution_id, success=False, error=_err_text, delivery_outcome=delivery_outcome)
|
|
except Exception as record_err:
|
|
logger.error("Failed to finish execution record for job %s: %s", job["id"], record_err)
|
|
if not isinstance(e, Exception):
|
|
raise
|
|
return False
|
|
finally:
|
|
# Function-level on purpose: must scope delivery, deferred teardown, claim-loss handling and
|
|
# bookkeeping — not just run_job. Do not move into the run block's finally.
|
|
if _scope_token is not None:
|
|
_reset_fire_secret_scope(_scope_token)
|
|
if _terminal_scope_token is not None:
|
|
from tools.terminal_scope import reset_terminal_scope
|
|
|
|
reset_terminal_scope(_terminal_scope_token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _wait_for_external_cron_worker_body(
|
|
process: subprocess.Popen,
|
|
*,
|
|
execution_id: str,
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""Preserve ``run_one_job``'s synchronous contract after handoff.
|
|
|
|
The worker owns the durable execution and survives this gateway process.
|
|
The caller nevertheless waits while it remains alive so manual/background
|
|
callers do not release their in-process guard or report stale job state.
|
|
A gateway replacement may kill this waiter; it does not kill the scoped
|
|
worker or change its ledger ownership.
|
|
"""
|
|
def _is_terminal() -> bool:
|
|
current = get_execution(execution_id)
|
|
return bool(current and current.get("status") in _TERMINAL_STATES)
|
|
|
|
# The worker commits its terminal row before its process exits, so exit is
|
|
# the correct wakeup. Each ledger read opens a connection and re-runs
|
|
# schema init; polling it at 50ms for an hours-long agent run is ~72k
|
|
# opens/hour of pure contention with the worker's own writes.
|
|
while True:
|
|
try:
|
|
returncode = process.wait(timeout=1.0)
|
|
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
|
|
if _is_terminal():
|
|
return True
|
|
continue
|
|
# The worker can commit its terminal row and exit between the first
|
|
# read and wait(). Re-read the exact attempt before declaring that
|
|
# it died without terminalizing.
|
|
if _is_terminal():
|
|
return True
|
|
# If the adopted worker died without terminalizing, its owner is
|
|
# now provably gone. Recover to ``unknown`` rather than routing the
|
|
# exception through the pre-handoff dispatch-failure path, which
|
|
# would falsely assert that no side effect could have happened.
|
|
recover_interrupted_executions()
|
|
if _is_terminal():
|
|
return True
|
|
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
"cron external worker exited before durable recovery could "
|
|
f"terminalize its execution state (exit {returncode})"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _wait_for_external_cron_worker(
|
|
process: subprocess.Popen,
|
|
*,
|
|
execution_id: str,
|
|
job_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
handoff_files: tuple[Path, ...] = (),
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
try:
|
|
return _wait_for_external_cron_worker_body(
|
|
process, execution_id=execution_id
|
|
)
|
|
finally:
|
|
if job_id is not None:
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
_restart_safe_waiter_job_ids.discard(job_id)
|
|
# The execution is terminal or its worker is dead: nobody will read a
|
|
# payload or acknowledgement left behind by a late/unread handoff.
|
|
for stale in handoff_files:
|
|
try:
|
|
stale.unlink(missing_ok=True)
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _launch_external_cron_worker(job: dict) -> bool:
|
|
"""Launch *job* outside the managed gateway process when required.
|
|
|
|
Returns ``False`` outside a managed systemd gateway (in-process path). In
|
|
managed topology the job always goes to an external worker with the #101940
|
|
ownership handoff: in a transient user scope, or — when no user D-Bus
|
|
session exists and ``cron.require_restart_safe_scope`` is false — as a
|
|
direct subprocess (process separation kept, cgroup isolation lost).
|
|
"""
|
|
execution_id = str(job["execution_id"])
|
|
job_id = str(job["id"])
|
|
handoff_dir = _get_hermes_home() / "cron" / "external-workers"
|
|
payload_path = handoff_dir / f"{execution_id}.json"
|
|
ack_path = handoff_dir / f"{execution_id}.ready"
|
|
command = [
|
|
sys.executable,
|
|
"-m",
|
|
"cron.scheduler",
|
|
"--external-worker-file",
|
|
str(payload_path),
|
|
"--ack-file",
|
|
str(ack_path),
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
from agent.secret_scope import (
|
|
build_profile_secret_scope,
|
|
is_multiplex_active,
|
|
reset_secret_scope,
|
|
set_secret_scope,
|
|
)
|
|
from hermes_cli.env_loader import hydrate_profile_secret_sources
|
|
from tools.environments.local import build_subprocess_env, strip_launch_profile_env
|
|
from tools.process_registry import (
|
|
restart_safe_gateway_child_argv,
|
|
systemd_user_bus_env,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
require_restart_safe_scope = bool(
|
|
(load_config_readonly().get("cron") or {}).get("require_restart_safe_scope", False)
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
require_restart_safe_scope = False
|
|
multiplex_active = is_multiplex_active()
|
|
dispatch = restart_safe_gateway_child_argv(
|
|
command,
|
|
unit_suffix=f"cron-{job_id}-exec-{execution_id}",
|
|
require_restart_safe_scope=require_restart_safe_scope,
|
|
)
|
|
if dispatch.mode == "in_process":
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
if mark_execution_handoff_pending(execution_id) is None:
|
|
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
"cron execution claim changed before external worker handoff"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
_ensure_cron_dir(handoff_dir)
|
|
try:
|
|
handoff_dir.chmod(0o700)
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pass
|
|
fd = os.open(payload_path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
|
|
try:
|
|
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as payload_file:
|
|
json.dump(
|
|
{
|
|
"job": job,
|
|
"profile_home": str(_get_hermes_home().resolve()),
|
|
"multiplex_active": multiplex_active,
|
|
},
|
|
payload_file,
|
|
)
|
|
payload_file.flush()
|
|
os.fsync(payload_file.fileno())
|
|
except BaseException:
|
|
payload_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
profile_home = _get_hermes_home().resolve()
|
|
hydrate_profile_secret_sources(profile_home)
|
|
secret_token = set_secret_scope(build_profile_secret_scope(profile_home))
|
|
try:
|
|
worker_env = strip_launch_profile_env(build_subprocess_env(
|
|
scrub_secrets=multiplex_active,
|
|
inherit_profile_home=True,
|
|
extra={"HERMES_HOME": str(profile_home)},
|
|
))
|
|
finally:
|
|
reset_secret_scope(secret_token)
|
|
worker_env = systemd_user_bus_env(worker_env)
|
|
try:
|
|
process = subprocess.Popen(
|
|
dispatch.argv,
|
|
cwd=str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent),
|
|
env=worker_env,
|
|
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
|
|
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
|
|
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
|
|
start_new_session=True,
|
|
creationflags=windows_hide_flags(),
|
|
)
|
|
except BaseException:
|
|
payload_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
_restart_safe_waiter_job_ids.add(job_id)
|
|
|
|
# Same window the dead-owner recovery ledger grants a pending handoff: a cold
|
|
# worker start (imports + secret hydration) measures ~10-12s in the field, and
|
|
# a dispatch deadline shorter than the adoption grace made the two guards
|
|
# around one handoff disagree.
|
|
deadline = time.monotonic() + HANDOFF_ADOPTION_GRACE_SECONDS
|
|
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
|
|
if ack_path.exists():
|
|
try:
|
|
acknowledgement = json.loads(ack_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception(
|
|
"Cron external worker %s published an unreadable acknowledgement; "
|
|
"treating handoff as ownership-uncertain",
|
|
execution_id,
|
|
)
|
|
return _wait_for_external_cron_worker(
|
|
process,
|
|
execution_id=execution_id,
|
|
job_id=job_id,
|
|
handoff_files=(payload_path,),
|
|
)
|
|
finally:
|
|
ack_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
|
|
if (
|
|
not isinstance(acknowledgement, dict)
|
|
or acknowledgement.get("execution_id") != execution_id
|
|
):
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
"Cron external worker acknowledgement mismatch for %s; "
|
|
"treating handoff as ownership-uncertain",
|
|
execution_id,
|
|
)
|
|
return _wait_for_external_cron_worker(
|
|
process,
|
|
execution_id=execution_id,
|
|
job_id=job_id,
|
|
handoff_files=(payload_path,),
|
|
)
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Cron job '%s' handed to restart-safe worker pid=%s execution=%s",
|
|
job_id,
|
|
acknowledgement.get("pid"),
|
|
execution_id,
|
|
)
|
|
with _running_lock, contextlib.suppress(TypeError, ValueError):
|
|
_running_worker_pids[job_id] = int(acknowledgement.get("pid") or process.pid)
|
|
return _wait_for_external_cron_worker(
|
|
process,
|
|
execution_id=execution_id,
|
|
job_id=job_id,
|
|
handoff_files=(payload_path,),
|
|
)
|
|
returncode = process.poll()
|
|
if returncode is not None:
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
_restart_safe_waiter_job_ids.discard(job_id)
|
|
payload_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
|
|
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
f"cron external worker exited before ownership acknowledgement "
|
|
f"(exit {returncode})"
|
|
)
|
|
time.sleep(0.05)
|
|
|
|
# The child may have adopted the durable row just before publishing its
|
|
# acknowledgement. Never fall back to in-process execution on an uncertain
|
|
# handoff: that could duplicate side effects. The execution owner/dead-owner
|
|
# recovery ledger remains the authority.
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Cron external worker for job '%s' did not acknowledge within %.0fs; "
|
|
"leaving the durable execution claim untouched",
|
|
job_id,
|
|
HANDOFF_ADOPTION_GRACE_SECONDS,
|
|
)
|
|
return _wait_for_external_cron_worker(
|
|
process,
|
|
execution_id=execution_id,
|
|
job_id=job_id,
|
|
handoff_files=(payload_path, ack_path),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _run_external_worker_payload(payload_path: Path, ack_path: Path) -> bool:
|
|
"""Adopt and execute one gateway-dispatched cron payload.
|
|
|
|
The execution row is created by the gateway before spawn, then transferred
|
|
here before the ready acknowledgement is published. No side effect runs
|
|
unless that durable ownership transfer succeeds.
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
payload = json.loads(payload_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
|
|
job = payload["job"]
|
|
profile_home = Path(payload["profile_home"]).resolve()
|
|
execution_id = str(job["execution_id"])
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Cron external worker could not load payload %s", payload_path)
|
|
return False
|
|
finally:
|
|
try:
|
|
payload_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
from agent.secret_scope import (
|
|
build_profile_secret_scope,
|
|
is_multiplex_active,
|
|
reset_secret_scope,
|
|
set_multiplex_active,
|
|
set_secret_scope,
|
|
)
|
|
from cron.executions import adopt_claimed_execution
|
|
from hermes_cli.env_loader import hydrate_profile_secret_sources
|
|
from hermes_constants import (
|
|
reset_hermes_home_override,
|
|
set_hermes_home_override,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
home_token = set_hermes_home_override(profile_home)
|
|
previous_multiplex = is_multiplex_active()
|
|
multiplex_active = bool(payload.get("multiplex_active", False))
|
|
set_multiplex_active(multiplex_active)
|
|
hydrate_profile_secret_sources(profile_home)
|
|
secret_token = set_secret_scope(build_profile_secret_scope(profile_home))
|
|
try:
|
|
with use_cron_store(profile_home):
|
|
if adopt_claimed_execution(execution_id) is None:
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
"Cron external worker refused execution %s: durable ownership "
|
|
"could not be established",
|
|
execution_id,
|
|
)
|
|
return False
|
|
try:
|
|
ack_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
|
fd = os.open(ack_path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
|
|
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as ack_file:
|
|
json.dump({"pid": os.getpid(), "execution_id": execution_id}, ack_file)
|
|
ack_file.flush()
|
|
os.fsync(ack_file.fileno())
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception(
|
|
"Cron external worker could not publish ready acknowledgement for %s",
|
|
execution_id,
|
|
)
|
|
return False
|
|
old_external_execution = os.environ.get("_HERMES_CRON_EXTERNAL_WORKER")
|
|
os.environ["_HERMES_CRON_EXTERNAL_WORKER"] = execution_id
|
|
try:
|
|
return run_one_job(job, adapters=None, loop=None, verbose=False)
|
|
finally:
|
|
if old_external_execution is None:
|
|
os.environ.pop("_HERMES_CRON_EXTERNAL_WORKER", None)
|
|
else:
|
|
os.environ["_HERMES_CRON_EXTERNAL_WORKER"] = old_external_execution
|
|
finally:
|
|
reset_secret_scope(secret_token)
|
|
set_multiplex_active(previous_multiplex)
|
|
reset_hermes_home_override(home_token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _notify_provider_jobs_changed() -> None:
|
|
"""Best-effort: tell the active scheduler provider the job set changed. Call AFTER a successful
|
|
store mutation so an external provider can re-provision/cancel the one-shot; no-op for the
|
|
built-in. Kept out of cron/jobs.py (import cycle). Never raises."""
|
|
try:
|
|
from cron.scheduler_provider import resolve_cron_scheduler
|
|
resolve_cron_scheduler().on_jobs_changed()
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.debug("on_jobs_changed notify failed: %s", e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class CronSchedulerRegistrationError(RuntimeError):
|
|
"""A job was persisted but its first external trigger was not registered."""
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, job: dict, cause: Exception) -> None:
|
|
self.job = job
|
|
self.cause = cause
|
|
super().__init__(
|
|
f"Cron job '{job['id']}' was saved, but its first scheduler "
|
|
f"registration failed ({type(cause).__name__}). Do not create a "
|
|
"duplicate. Pause/resume or update the job to retry registration."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
def user_message(self) -> str:
|
|
"""Human-facing variant for chat/CLI surfaces (no exception class name)."""
|
|
label = self.job.get("name") or self.job["id"]
|
|
return (
|
|
f"Saved cron job '{label}', but couldn't register it with the "
|
|
"external scheduler yet. The job is kept — don't re-create it; "
|
|
"pause/resume or edit it (e.g. via /cron) to retry registration."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
def to_dict(self) -> dict:
|
|
"""Return the public partial-failure contract without provider details."""
|
|
return {
|
|
"error": str(self),
|
|
"job_id": self.job["id"],
|
|
"job_saved": True,
|
|
"scheduler_registered": False,
|
|
"retry_create": False}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def create_job_with_scheduler_registration(**kwargs) -> dict:
|
|
"""Persist one job and register its first trigger with the active provider."""
|
|
from cron.jobs import create_job
|
|
from cron.scheduler_provider import resolve_cron_scheduler
|
|
|
|
job = create_job(**kwargs)
|
|
if not job.get("enabled", True):
|
|
return job
|
|
try:
|
|
resolve_cron_scheduler().register_job(job)
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
raise CronSchedulerRegistrationError(job, exc) from exc
|
|
return job
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Dead-owner reap is throttled (opens the executions ledger). Tests may reset
|
|
# _last_dead_owner_reap_at to None to force a reap next tick.
|
|
# Dead-owner claim reclaim throttle (#86721): recover_interrupted_executions opens the executions ledger, so
|
|
# the per-tick reap is rate-limited rather than run on every idle 60s cycle.
|
|
_DEAD_OWNER_REAP_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 300.0
|
|
_last_dead_owner_reap_at: Optional[float] = None
|
|
|
|
# Worktree prune throttle: the cron tick is the only reliably periodic process on gateway boxes.
|
|
_WORKTREE_MAINTENANCE_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 6 * 3600.0
|
|
_last_worktree_maintenance_at: Optional[float] = None
|
|
_worktree_maintenance_lock = threading.Lock()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _worktree_maintenance_repos() -> List[str]:
|
|
"""Repos whose ``.worktrees/`` to keep pruned: the hermes checkout plus job workdir repo roots,
|
|
filtered to those that actually have a ``.worktrees/`` dir."""
|
|
repos: set = set()
|
|
|
|
# Hermes source checkout (git installs only; wheel installs have no .git).
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
install_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
|
|
if (install_root / ".git").exists():
|
|
repos.add(str(install_root))
|
|
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
from cron.jobs import load_jobs
|
|
|
|
for job in load_jobs():
|
|
workdir = str(job.get("workdir") or "").strip()
|
|
if not workdir or not Path(workdir).is_dir():
|
|
continue
|
|
try:
|
|
probe = subprocess.run(
|
|
["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"],
|
|
capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8",
|
|
errors="replace", timeout=5, cwd=workdir)
|
|
if probe.returncode == 0 and probe.stdout.strip():
|
|
repos.add(probe.stdout.strip())
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
return [r for r in sorted(repos) if (Path(r) / ".worktrees").is_dir()]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _maybe_run_worktree_maintenance() -> None:
|
|
"""Throttled worktree prune from the cron tick, on a daemon thread so the tick never waits on
|
|
git. Same conservative pruner as ``hermes -w`` startup (dirty/unpushed/locked trees untouched).
|
|
Errors never propagate: GC is hygiene, not scheduling."""
|
|
global _last_worktree_maintenance_at
|
|
now = time.monotonic()
|
|
with _worktree_maintenance_lock:
|
|
if (
|
|
_last_worktree_maintenance_at is not None
|
|
and now - _last_worktree_maintenance_at
|
|
< _WORKTREE_MAINTENANCE_INTERVAL_SECONDS
|
|
):
|
|
return
|
|
_last_worktree_maintenance_at = now
|
|
|
|
def _run() -> None:
|
|
try:
|
|
repos = _worktree_maintenance_repos()
|
|
if not repos:
|
|
return
|
|
from cli import _prune_stale_worktrees
|
|
|
|
for repo in repos:
|
|
try:
|
|
_prune_stale_worktrees(repo)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug("Cron worktree maintenance failed for %s", repo, exc_info=True)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug("Cron worktree maintenance skipped", exc_info=True)
|
|
|
|
threading.Thread(target=_run, name="cron-worktree-prune", daemon=True).start()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _acquire_tick_lock(lock_file):
|
|
"""Open + non-blocking lock the tick file (fcntl / msvcrt). Returns the fd, or None on genuine
|
|
contention. A real OSError (esp. EMFILE/ENFILE) must NOT pass as contention — the scheduler
|
|
would look healthy while no job runs — so it is re-raised for the ticker to record a FAILED
|
|
tick."""
|
|
lock_fd = None
|
|
try:
|
|
# Cross-platform file locking: fcntl on Unix, msvcrt on Windows. Only genuine lock contention
|
|
# (another ticker holds the lock) skips the tick silently. A real OSError — most importantly
|
|
# EMFILE/ENFILE from fd exhaustion — must NOT be swallowed as "another instance holds the lock":
|
|
# that previously made the scheduler appear healthy (tick returned 0, heartbeat recorded success)
|
|
# while no job ever ran again (#87644).
|
|
lock_fd = open(lock_file, "w", encoding="utf-8")
|
|
if fcntl:
|
|
fcntl.flock(lock_fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
|
|
elif msvcrt:
|
|
msvcrt.locking(lock_fd.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_NBLCK, 1)
|
|
return lock_fd
|
|
except OSError as exc:
|
|
if lock_fd is not None:
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
|
|
lock_fd.close()
|
|
if _is_lock_contention_errno(exc):
|
|
logger.debug("Tick skipped — another instance holds the lock")
|
|
return None
|
|
if _is_fd_exhaustion(exc):
|
|
# fd reclamation is the ticker loop's job (scheduler_provider.py); here would double it.
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
"Cron tick could not acquire tick lock: %s — scheduler will "
|
|
"attempt fd reclamation and retry with backoff",
|
|
exc)
|
|
else:
|
|
logger.error("Cron tick could not acquire tick lock: %s", exc)
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _release_tick_lock(lock_fd) -> None:
|
|
if fcntl:
|
|
with contextlib.suppress((OSError, IOError)):
|
|
fcntl.flock(lock_fd, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
|
|
elif msvcrt:
|
|
with contextlib.suppress((OSError, IOError)):
|
|
msvcrt.locking(lock_fd.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_UNLCK, 1)
|
|
lock_fd.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _maybe_reap_dead_owners() -> None:
|
|
"""Dead-owner reclaim: a run that died mid-flight would leave its row 'claimed' forever. Only
|
|
rows whose owner process is proved gone are touched (_owner_is_live). Throttled."""
|
|
# Dead-owner claim reclaim (#86721): execution rows carry their owner pid + process start time, but
|
|
# recovery previously ran only at scheduler STARTUP. A one-shot `hermes cron run` that claimed a job and
|
|
# died mid-run (its runner thread lived in the exiting CLI process) left the row 'claimed' forever while
|
|
# the long-lived gateway ticker kept running — blocking every future run of that job. Reap provably-dead
|
|
# owners periodically so stale claims auto-clear without a gateway restart. Throttled so idle 60s ticks
|
|
# don't pay a ledger connection every cycle (#33612).
|
|
global _last_dead_owner_reap_at
|
|
_reap_now = time.monotonic()
|
|
if (
|
|
_last_dead_owner_reap_at is not None
|
|
and _reap_now - _last_dead_owner_reap_at < _DEAD_OWNER_REAP_INTERVAL_SECONDS
|
|
):
|
|
return
|
|
_last_dead_owner_reap_at = _reap_now
|
|
try:
|
|
from cron.executions import recover_interrupted_executions
|
|
|
|
_reclaimed = recover_interrupted_executions()
|
|
if _reclaimed:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Reclaimed %d cron execution(s) whose owner process died "
|
|
"before reaching a terminal state (marked unknown)",
|
|
_reclaimed)
|
|
except Exception as _reap_exc:
|
|
logger.debug("Dead-owner execution reclaim failed: %s", _reap_exc)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _sweep_stale_inflight_for_tick(due_jobs: list) -> None:
|
|
"""Bound the in-flight set BEFORE the dedup guard so a leaked claim is force-released now
|
|
rather than eating every later fire until restart. Skipped when nothing is in flight."""
|
|
if not _running_job_ids:
|
|
return
|
|
_sweep_jobs = due_jobs
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
_inflight_ids = set(_running_job_ids)
|
|
_due_ids = {j.get("id") for j in due_jobs if isinstance(j, dict)}
|
|
if not _inflight_ids <= _due_ids:
|
|
from cron.jobs import load_jobs as _load_all_jobs
|
|
|
|
_sweep_jobs = _load_all_jobs()
|
|
try:
|
|
sweep_stale_inflight(_sweep_jobs)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.warning("Stale in-flight sweep failed: %s", e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_max_parallel_workers() -> Optional[int]:
|
|
"""Max workers: env > config.yaml > unbounded (HERMES_CRON_MAX_PARALLEL=1 restores serial)."""
|
|
try:
|
|
_env_par = cron_env_setting("HERMES_CRON_MAX_PARALLEL").strip()
|
|
if _env_par:
|
|
return int(_env_par) or None
|
|
except (ValueError, TypeError):
|
|
logger.warning("Invalid HERMES_CRON_MAX_PARALLEL value; defaulting to unbounded")
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
_ucfg = load_config() or {}
|
|
_cfg_par = (_ucfg.get("cron", {}) if isinstance(_ucfg, dict) else {}).get("max_parallel_jobs")
|
|
if _cfg_par is not None:
|
|
return int(_cfg_par) or None
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _sweep_mcp_orphans() -> None:
|
|
"""Reap MCP stdio orphans (only PIDs flagged by tools.mcp_tool._run_stdio's finally block);
|
|
run AFTER jobs finish so live sessions are never touched."""
|
|
try:
|
|
from tools.mcp_tool_lifecycle import _kill_orphaned_mcp_children
|
|
_kill_orphaned_mcp_children()
|
|
except Exception as _e:
|
|
logger.debug("Post-tick MCP orphan cleanup failed: %s", _e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _process_due_job(job: dict, adapters, loop, verbose: bool) -> bool:
|
|
"""Run one due job via the shared ``run_one_job`` body."""
|
|
# Claim only when the worker actually starts, so a queued lease can't expire first.
|
|
claimed = claim_job_for_fire(job["id"], return_job=True)
|
|
if not claimed:
|
|
finish_execution(
|
|
job["execution_id"], success=False, error="Fire claim lost; execution was not started.")
|
|
return True
|
|
# CAS returns the persisted record; bool fallback only for older test doubles.
|
|
claimed_job = dict(claimed) if isinstance(claimed, dict) else dict(job)
|
|
claimed_job["execution_id"] = job["execution_id"]
|
|
claimed_job["_scheduled_instant"] = job.get("_scheduled_instant")
|
|
return run_one_job(claimed_job, adapters=adapters, loop=loop, verbose=verbose)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _submit_with_guard(job: dict, pool: concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor, process_job):
|
|
"""Submit with the in-flight dedup guard; None if a prior tick's run is still in flight.
|
|
Running-set membership is released in the worker's finally."""
|
|
job_id = job["id"]
|
|
job_label = job.get("name", job_id)
|
|
|
|
def _clear_run_claim_best_effort() -> None:
|
|
"""Best-effort claim cleanup on dispatch-failure paths. Only one-shots carry a run_claim;
|
|
clear_run_claim takes _jobs_lock + full load/save and can raise on degraded paths
|
|
(shutdown, EMFILE) — a claim expiring at TTL beats crashing the tick.
|
|
|
|
Only one-shot jobs carry a ``run_claim`` (stamped by get_due_jobs, #59229), so recurring jobs skip
|
|
the call entirely — clear_run_claim acquires _jobs_lock (blocking cross-process flock) and does a
|
|
full load_jobs read, and the dispatch-failure paths fire exactly when the process can least afford N
|
|
pointless lock/read round-trips (interpreter shutdown, EMFILE). clear_run_claim itself does
|
|
load_jobs/save_jobs file I/O; on those degraded paths it can raise, and these early-exits exist
|
|
precisely to skip cleanly — a stale claim expiring at the TTL is a better outcome than crashing the
|
|
tick (#86522).
|
|
"""
|
|
_schedule = job.get("schedule")
|
|
if not (isinstance(_schedule, dict) and _schedule.get("kind") == "once"):
|
|
return
|
|
try:
|
|
clear_run_claim(job_id)
|
|
except Exception as claim_err:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Could not clear run_claim for job '%s' after dispatch "
|
|
"failure: %s (claim will expire at TTL)",
|
|
job_label, claim_err)
|
|
|
|
def _not_dispatched_shutdown() -> None:
|
|
logger.warning("Job '%s' not dispatched — interpreter is shutting down", job_label)
|
|
|
|
# During interpreter shutdown pool.submit raises; skip — the job fires on the next tick.
|
|
# If the interpreter is finalizing (gateway SIGTERM / restart / OOM), scheduling any new delivery is
|
|
# futile — asyncio.run and a fresh ThreadPoolExecutor both raise "cannot schedule new futures after
|
|
# interpreter shutdown". Skip gracefully with a warning rather than emitting an ERROR traceback on every
|
|
# restart-race (#58720, #55924).
|
|
# A tick can race gateway teardown: once the interpreter is finalizing, ``pool.submit`` raises "cannot
|
|
# schedule new futures after interpreter shutdown" and crashes the tick. Skip cleanly — the job stays
|
|
# due and will fire on the next healthy tick (#58720, #55924).
|
|
if _interpreter_shutting_down():
|
|
_not_dispatched_shutdown()
|
|
_clear_run_claim_best_effort()
|
|
return None
|
|
if not try_register_running_job(job_id):
|
|
logger.info("Job '%s' already running — skipping", job_label)
|
|
return None
|
|
# Record the attempt before dispatch; recovery marks abandoned rows unknown (no retry).
|
|
try:
|
|
execution = create_execution(
|
|
job_id, source="builtin", scheduled_instant=job.get("_scheduled_instant"))
|
|
dispatched_job = dict(job, execution_id=execution["id"])
|
|
_ctx = contextvars.copy_context()
|
|
except Exception as execution_err:
|
|
# Release the claim so the next tick retries instead of wedging "already running".
|
|
release_running_job(job_id)
|
|
_clear_run_claim_best_effort()
|
|
logger.exception(
|
|
"Job '%s' not dispatched: execution creation failed: %s", job_label, execution_err)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
def _run_and_release(j=dispatched_job, ctx=_ctx):
|
|
try:
|
|
return ctx.run(process_job, j)
|
|
finally:
|
|
release_running_job(j["id"])
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
fut = pool.submit(_run_and_release)
|
|
except Exception as submit_err:
|
|
release_running_job(job_id)
|
|
_clear_run_claim_best_effort()
|
|
finish_execution(
|
|
execution["id"], success=False, error=f"Executor dispatch failed: {submit_err}")
|
|
if isinstance(submit_err, RuntimeError) and _interpreter_shutting_down(submit_err):
|
|
_not_dispatched_shutdown()
|
|
else:
|
|
logger.error("Job '%s' not dispatched: %s", job_label, submit_err)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
with _running_lock:
|
|
if job_id in _running_job_ids:
|
|
_running_futures[job_id] = fut
|
|
return fut
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _sweep_mcp_orphans_when_all_done(futures: list) -> None:
|
|
"""Async (gateway ticker) mode: sweep via a done-callback after the LAST job completes; sweep
|
|
inline when nothing was dispatched (all skipped / no due jobs)."""
|
|
if not futures:
|
|
_sweep_mcp_orphans()
|
|
return
|
|
_remaining = [len(futures)]
|
|
|
|
def _on_done(_f: concurrent.futures.Future) -> None:
|
|
_remaining[0] -= 1
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
|
|
_exc = _f.exception()
|
|
if _exc is not None:
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
"Cron job future failed in async mode: %s", _exc,
|
|
exc_info=(type(_exc), _exc, _exc.__traceback__))
|
|
if _remaining[0] <= 0:
|
|
_sweep_mcp_orphans()
|
|
|
|
for _f in futures:
|
|
_f.add_done_callback(_on_done)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def tick(
|
|
verbose: bool = True, adapters=None, loop=None, sync: bool = True, *, can_dispatch=None):
|
|
"""Check and run all due jobs. File-locked so only one tick runs at a time (gateway ticker vs
|
|
standalone daemon / manual tick). ``can_dispatch``: optional gate; false leaves due jobs for the
|
|
next allowed tick. Returns the number of jobs executed (0 if another tick holds the lock)."""
|
|
# Stale-code yield gate — BEFORE the lock race. A process whose checkout was updated under it
|
|
# serves mixed sys.modules (jobs die on ImportErrors); if a fresher gateway holds the runtime
|
|
# lock, ITS ticker dispatches. With no fresh holder (desktop-standalone) the tick proceeds.
|
|
_skew = _should_yield_tick_to_fresh_gateway()
|
|
if _skew is not None:
|
|
_log_tick_yield_once(f"boot={_skew[0]} disk={_skew[1]}")
|
|
raise CronTickYielded(_skew[0], _skew[1])
|
|
|
|
lock_dir, lock_file = _get_lock_paths()
|
|
_ensure_cron_dir(lock_dir)
|
|
lock_fd = _acquire_tick_lock(lock_file)
|
|
if lock_fd is None:
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
# `hermes pause` ESTOP: skip dispatch, never touch in-flight runs; check_paused logs once.
|
|
with contextlib.suppress(ImportError):
|
|
from agent.estop import check_paused as _estop_check_paused
|
|
if _estop_check_paused("cron", logger):
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
if can_dispatch is not None and not can_dispatch():
|
|
logger.debug("Cron dispatch paused while gateway drains existing work")
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
from cron.bot_chat_delivery import drain, drain_in_background
|
|
if sync:
|
|
drain()
|
|
else:
|
|
drain_in_background()
|
|
_maybe_reap_dead_owners()
|
|
# Periodic worktree GC (6h, threaded) — the only sweep gateway-only boxes get.
|
|
try:
|
|
_maybe_run_worktree_maintenance()
|
|
except Exception as _wt_exc:
|
|
logger.debug("Worktree maintenance dispatch failed: %s", _wt_exc)
|
|
|
|
due_jobs = get_due_jobs()
|
|
_sweep_stale_inflight_for_tick(due_jobs)
|
|
|
|
if not due_jobs:
|
|
# Idle tick: skip config load + pool setup, but still reap crashed jobs' MCP orphans.
|
|
if verbose:
|
|
# Idle tick: skip config load + pool partitioning entirely (#33612 — the gateway ticker
|
|
# calls tick(verbose=False) every 60s, so idle ticks previously fell through to
|
|
# load_config()). Still run the post-tick MCP orphan sweep: main intentionally sweeps on
|
|
# idle ticks so orphaned stdio children from crashed jobs are reaped even when nothing is
|
|
# due.
|
|
logger.info("%s - No jobs due", _hermes_now().strftime('%H:%M:%S'))
|
|
_sweep_mcp_orphans()
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
if verbose:
|
|
logger.info("%s - %s job(s) due", _hermes_now().strftime('%H:%M:%S'), len(due_jobs))
|
|
|
|
# Advance next_run_at for recurring jobs FIRST, under the lock, before any execution
|
|
# (at-most-once). Re-advancing running jobs keeps the grace window alive; mark_job_run
|
|
# overwrites it on completion. Composes with the claim-time advance in claim_job_for_fire.
|
|
advance_next_runs([job["id"] for job in due_jobs])
|
|
|
|
_max_workers = _resolve_max_parallel_workers()
|
|
if verbose:
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Running %d job(s) in parallel (max_workers=%s)",
|
|
len(due_jobs),
|
|
_max_workers if _max_workers else "unbounded")
|
|
|
|
def _process_job(job: dict) -> bool:
|
|
return _process_due_job(job, adapters, loop, verbose)
|
|
|
|
# Persistent pool, non-blocking dispatch. Already-running jobs are skipped; mark_job_run
|
|
# re-arms next_run_at on completion, so no catch-up queue is needed.
|
|
_results: list = []
|
|
_all_futures: list = []
|
|
pool = _get_parallel_pool(_max_workers)
|
|
for job in due_jobs:
|
|
fut = _submit_with_guard(job, pool, _process_job)
|
|
if fut is None:
|
|
continue
|
|
_all_futures.append(fut)
|
|
if not sync:
|
|
_results.append(True) # optimistically counted
|
|
|
|
if sync:
|
|
for f in concurrent.futures.as_completed(_all_futures):
|
|
try:
|
|
_results.append(f.result())
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
logger.error("Cron job future failed: %s", exc)
|
|
_results.append(False)
|
|
_sweep_mcp_orphans()
|
|
return sum(_results)
|
|
|
|
_sweep_mcp_orphans_when_all_done(_all_futures)
|
|
return sum(_results)
|
|
finally:
|
|
_release_tick_lock(lock_fd)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Split modules. Imported at the bottom (import cycle: they late-bind ``cron.scheduler`` as
|
|
# ``_sched``). Only names this module itself calls; everything else lives in the split module.
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
from cron.scheduler_delivery import ( # noqa: E402
|
|
_deliver_result, _delivery_lane_value, _normalize_deliver_value, _resolve_delivery_target,
|
|
_resolve_delivery_targets,
|
|
)
|
|
from cron.scheduler_script import ( # noqa: E402
|
|
_get_session_db_timeout, _run_job_script_with_claim_heartbeat, _start_heartbeat_thread,
|
|
)
|
|
from cron.scheduler_prompt import ( # noqa: E402
|
|
_block_and_pause_job, _build_job_prompt, _guard_job_credential_exfil, _parse_wake_gate,
|
|
)
|
|
from cron.scheduler_preflight import ( # noqa: E402
|
|
BLOCKED_CONFIG_MARKER, BLOCKED_CONFIG_SILENT_MARKER, _cron_preflight_enabled,
|
|
_empty_requested_mcp_toolsets, _is_transient_provider_resolve_error, _preflight_job_config,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# `python -m cron.scheduler` entry: MUST stay below the split-module imports so the worker /
|
|
# tick paths see every name they need.
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
if "--external-worker-file" in sys.argv:
|
|
import argparse
|
|
|
|
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(add_help=False)
|
|
parser.add_argument("--external-worker-file", type=Path, required=True)
|
|
parser.add_argument("--ack-file", type=Path, required=True)
|
|
args = parser.parse_args()
|
|
# The gateway spawns this worker with stdout/stderr on DEVNULL; without
|
|
# a handler every adoption/ack failure below would be invisible.
|
|
try:
|
|
from hermes_logging import setup_logging
|
|
|
|
setup_logging(hermes_home=_get_hermes_home(), mode="cron")
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
pass
|
|
raise SystemExit(
|
|
0 if _run_external_worker_payload(args.external_worker_file, args.ack_file) else 1
|
|
)
|
|
tick(verbose=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---- BEGIN PLUGIN-COMPAT (revert-scheduled; see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md) ----
|
|
# Names external plugins imported from this module before the Sep 2026 decomposition.
|
|
# Internal code MUST NOT use these (scripts/check_compat_pointers.py fails CI if it does).
|
|
# The whole block is removed by reverting the commit that added it.
|
|
import asyncio # noqa: F401,E402
|
|
import shutil # noqa: F401,E402
|
|
import signal # noqa: F401,E402
|
|
|
|
|
|
_PLUGIN_COMPAT_LAZY = {
|
|
'BOT_CHAT_PLATFORM': ('cron.scheduler_delivery', 'BOT_CHAT_PLATFORM'),
|
|
'SharedRouteAdapters': ('cron.scheduler_preflight', 'SharedRouteAdapters'),
|
|
'cron_delivery_targets': ('cron.scheduler_delivery', 'cron_delivery_targets'),
|
|
'parse_bot_chat_deliver_token': ('cron.scheduler_delivery', 'parse_bot_chat_deliver_token'),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def __getattr__(name): # PEP 562 — lazy so no import cycles
|
|
target = _PLUGIN_COMPAT_LAZY.get(name)
|
|
if target is None:
|
|
raise AttributeError(f"module {__name__!r} has no attribute {name!r}")
|
|
import importlib
|
|
from hermes_cli.plugin_compat import warn_once
|
|
warn_once(__name__, name, *target)
|
|
return getattr(importlib.import_module(target[0]), target[1])
|
|
# ---- END PLUGIN-COMPAT ----
|