Files
hermes-agent/hermes_cli/web_routers/_common.py
teknium1 2e497bead8 fix(dashboard): close the indirection holes and the unnamed-profile 400s
Round 2 of the REST profile-scope pass. A call-graph audit (AST over every
router plus their imported helpers, following functools.partial bindings,
closures and callbacks handed to to_thread/_spawn_job) found the writes a
signature grep cannot see, and the SPA/Desktop callers that never named a
profile at all.

Handlers that reached a config write through indirection:
* PUT /api/dashboard/plugin-providers wrote memory.provider + context.engine
  through functools.partial(_write_config_value, ...) — the SAME key
  PUT /api/memory/provider scopes — into the launch profile's config.yaml.
* POST /api/local-models/quickstart is `activate` plus a download; only
  `activate` had been scoped, so _set_runtime_enabled/_assign_default landed
  in the launch profile.
* POST /api/local-models/runtime/install regenerates launch presets under
  get_hermes_home().
* GET /api/model/recommended-default lazily PERSISTS discovered custom-provider
  models via build_models_payload -> _save_discovered_models_to_config.

Policy gaps:
* POST /api/ops/hooks is now gated like DELETE: writing an arbitrary command
  into `hooks:` and, with approve, into the consent allowlist is strictly more
  privileged than removing one.
* POST /api/sessions/prune (non-dry-run), DELETE /api/sessions/empty and
  POST /api/sessions/bulk-delete join the same destructive class.
* PUT /api/memory/provider ran its readiness check OUTSIDE the scope, so it
  judged the launch profile and could write a broken setting into another.

Callers:
* /api/credentials was missing from the SPA's PROFILE_SCOPED_PREFIXES, so the
  credential-pool delete button 400'd unconditionally; so were
  /api/dashboard/plugin-providers, /api/local-models and the model route above.
* The management scope was empty until the switcher resolved, so every
  destructive route 400'd in working UI on any host with a second profile
  directory. The backend now injects the profile it itself serves
  (__HERMES_DASHBOARD_PROFILE__) — and only when that name provably resolves
  back to its own home, so the fallback can never retarget another profile.
* authedFetch went around the scope entirely; the Desktop /api/ops callers
  (doctor, security-audit, backup, debug-share) sent no profile while Electron
  pins that family to the shared primary backend.
2026-09-21 09:59:11 -07:00

155 lines
6.4 KiB
Python

"""Shared plumbing for the extracted dashboard routers — thin wrappers over the
late-binding seam in :mod:`hermes_cli.web_deps` (web_server owns helpers/state;
every access resolves at call time so ``monkeypatch.setattr(<owning module>, ...)`` wins)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import contextlib
import logging
import sqlite3
import time
from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, Optional
from fastapi import HTTPException
from hermes_cli.web_deps import LateState, late
from hermes_cli.web_server_profiles import _profile_cli_args
# Same logger the handlers used before extraction (identical logger object).
log = logging.getLogger("hermes_cli.web_server")
_profile_scope = late("_profile_scope", "hermes_cli.web_server_profiles")
_config_profile_scope = late("_config_profile_scope", "hermes_cli.web_server_profiles")
_spawn_hermes_action = late("_spawn_hermes_action", "hermes_cli.web_server_gateway")
# Config read-modify-write serialization for off-loop handlers (live lock —
# LateState supports ``with``-blocks).
_CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK = LateState("_CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK")
@contextlib.contextmanager
def config_write_scope(profile: Optional[str]):
"""Profile scope, then the config mutation lock — the write-path nesting
every config-mutating handler uses."""
with _profile_scope(profile):
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
yield
async def scoped_to_thread(profile: Optional[str], fn: Callable[[], Any]) -> Any:
"""Run ``fn()`` inside ``_profile_scope(profile)`` on a worker thread."""
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
return fn()
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
async def config_scoped_to_thread(profile: Optional[str], fn: Callable[[], Any]) -> Any:
"""Run ``fn()`` inside ``_config_profile_scope(profile)`` on a worker thread —
home + secret scope without the process-global skills-module swap."""
def _run():
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
return fn()
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
def destructive_profile(profile: Optional[str], route: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""The profile a DESTRUCTIVE or PRIVILEGED route acts on, or 400 when it is ambiguous.
One backend serves every profile, so an omitted ``profile`` on a route that deletes,
overwrites or privileges profile-owned data is not a default — it silently meant
"whichever home this process launched with". Named profile: honoured. Omitted:
rejected as soon as the process hosts more than one profile
(``is_multiplex_active()``, decided once at boot by
``activate_multi_profile_hosting_eagerly``). A genuinely single-profile host has
nothing to confuse, so there an omitted profile keeps meaning the launch profile
and `curl` against a plain ``hermes serve`` is unchanged.
"Privileged" is the same class as "destructive": arming an auto-approved shell hook
in the wrong profile is at least as bad as removing one from it.
"""
if (profile or "").strip():
return profile
from agent.secret_scope import is_multiplex_active
if is_multiplex_active():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{route} requires an explicit profile: this backend serves several profiles, "
"so an unnamed target would act on the wrong profile's data.")
return profile
@contextlib.contextmanager
def http_failure(log_msg: str, status: int, prefix: Optional[str] = None, *, detail: Optional[str] = None):
"""Map unexpected exceptions to an ``HTTPException``.
``HTTPException`` passes through; anything else is logged with ``log_msg`` (traceback),
then re-raised as ``HTTPException(status, f"{prefix}: {exc}")`` — or ``detail`` when given
(fixed message, exception text only in the log).
"""
try:
yield
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
log.exception(log_msg)
raise HTTPException(status_code=status, detail=detail if detail is not None else f"{prefix}: {exc}")
def spawn_profile_action(
profile: Optional[str], argv: list, name: str, *, log_msg: str, prefix: str
) -> dict:
"""Spawn a background ``hermes -p <profile> <argv>`` action; a spawn
failure is logged and becomes ``500 "<prefix>: <exc>"``."""
with http_failure(log_msg, 500, prefix):
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(_profile_cli_args(profile) + argv, name)
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": name}
def require(value: Optional[str], detail: str) -> str:
"""Strip ``value``; 400 with ``detail`` when empty."""
stripped = (value or "").strip()
if not stripped:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=detail)
return stripped
# Corrupt-store reporting for polled read endpoints. The dashboard polls analytics every few
# seconds; a persistently malformed state.db once produced ~520K identical tracebacks in 24 h
# (#96591). One WARNING per store per interval, then debug; the caller gets an explicit status
# instead of a 500. The file is never quarantined or renamed from here — that is `hermes doctor`'s job.
_CORRUPT_STORE_WARN_INTERVAL_S = 300.0
_corrupt_store_warned_at: Dict[str, float] = {} # {db path: monotonic}
CORRUPT_STORE_DETAIL = {
"error": "state_db_corrupt",
"message": "state.db corrupt — run `hermes doctor` (then `hermes doctor --fix` or `hermes sessions repair`).",
}
@contextlib.contextmanager
def corrupt_store_as_status(db_path):
"""Map a corrupt-image ``sqlite3.DatabaseError`` from a state.db read to a 503 status
payload, warning once per store per :data:`_CORRUPT_STORE_WARN_INTERVAL_S`.
Busy/locked and every other error propagate unchanged."""
from hermes_state_errors import is_malformed_db_error
try:
yield
except sqlite3.DatabaseError as exc:
if not is_malformed_db_error(exc):
raise
key, now = str(db_path), time.monotonic()
last = _corrupt_store_warned_at.get(key)
if last is None or now - last >= _CORRUPT_STORE_WARN_INTERVAL_S:
_corrupt_store_warned_at[key] = now
log.warning("state.db at %s is corrupt (%s); dashboard reads return a status payload until it is "
"repaired — run `hermes doctor`", db_path, exc)
else:
log.debug("state.db at %s still corrupt: %s", db_path, exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail={**CORRUPT_STORE_DETAIL, "path": key}) from exc