Files
hermes-agent/agent/secret_scope.py
kshitijk4poor cedf4a3d78 fix(secret-scope): compose the managed .env into every profile secret scope
Answers the P1 review on #111187: build_profile_secret_scope() held only
<profile>/.env plus that profile's external-source snapshot, never the
administrator-managed .env. The launch process applies that file LAST with
override (_apply_managed_env), so a managed key beats the user's own value in
os.environ. Under multiplex semantics get_secret() stops falling back to
os.environ on a scope miss, so inside a routed cron fire (and equally inside a
real multiplex gateway turn, which builds its scope through the same function
via gateway/run.py::_load_profile_secret_scope) a managed-only credential
resolved as absent and a managed-vs-user collision resolved to the USER value:
reversed precedence.

Fix at the source: build_profile_secret_scope() overlays load_managed_env()
last, after the profile .env and external sources, skipping process-global
names exactly as it does for the other two layers. Every multiplex-authoritative
scope (gateway turn, routed desktop fire, external worker env build) is built
here, so managed authority is composed once instead of restored per consumer.
No generic ambient-env fallback is reintroduced: only the managed file's own
keys enter the scope, and only with the managed file's values.

Regression (parametrized, two invariants): inside a routed fire a managed-only
key resolves through get_secret(); a managed-vs-user collision yields the
managed value.
2026-09-15 11:03:39 +05:30

284 lines
13 KiB
Python

"""Profile-scoped credential resolution for multi-profile gateway multiplexing.
The multiplexing gateway serves many profiles from one process; each profile's
``.env`` keys **cannot** be unioned into ``os.environ`` (profile A's keys would
leak into profile B's turns and subprocesses). This module is a fail-closed,
context-local secret scope: ``set_secret_scope(mapping)`` installs the active
profile's secrets for the current task (a contextvar, so it propagates into the
agent's worker thread via ``copy_context()``); ``get_secret(name)`` reads from
it and, when multiplexing is active with no scope set, RAISES rather than
falling back to ``os.environ``. Design: ``website/docs/developer-guide/multiplexing-gateway.md``.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import codecs
import os
import re
from contextvars import ContextVar, Token
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Dict, Mapping, Optional
# Process-global (describes the deployment mode, not a per-task value): set once
# at gateway startup when gateway.multiplex_profiles is true.
_MULTIPLEX_ACTIVE: bool = False
# Context-local counterpart: a task serving a profile OTHER than the process's own, inside a
# process that is not a multiplexer as a whole — the desktop backend's cron ticker firing a
# sibling profile's job. Every isolation keyed on ``is_multiplex_active()`` (the routed-dotenv
# guard, ``get_secret``'s fail-closed miss, subprocess scrubbing, passthrough) applies inside
# it while the process's own turns keep single-profile semantics. A contextvar, so it reaches
# the pool worker together with the home override via ``copy_context()``.
_MULTIPLEX_CONTEXT: ContextVar[bool] = ContextVar("_MULTIPLEX_CONTEXT", default=False)
def set_multiplex_active(active: bool) -> None:
"""Mark whether the process is a profile multiplexer (get_secret fails closed)."""
global _MULTIPLEX_ACTIVE
_MULTIPLEX_ACTIVE = bool(active)
def set_multiplex_context(active: bool) -> Token:
"""Run the current task under multiplex semantics regardless of the process flag.
Returns a reset token; pair with :func:`reset_multiplex_context` in a ``finally``."""
return _MULTIPLEX_CONTEXT.set(bool(active))
def reset_multiplex_context(token: Token) -> None:
_MULTIPLEX_CONTEXT.reset(token)
def is_multiplex_active() -> bool:
"""True in a multiplexing process, or for a task running under multiplex semantics."""
return _MULTIPLEX_ACTIVE or _MULTIPLEX_CONTEXT.get()
_SECRET_SCOPE: ContextVar[Optional[Mapping[str, str]]] = ContextVar("_SECRET_SCOPE", default=None)
class UnscopedSecretError(RuntimeError):
"""A secret was read in multiplex mode with no scope installed.
The fix is to wrap the call path in ``set_secret_scope(...)`` (the per-turn
/ per-adapter profile scope), not to widen the global allowlist.
"""
def set_secret_scope(secrets: Optional[Mapping[str, str]]) -> Token:
"""Install the active profile's secret mapping; ``None`` clears. Returns a reset token."""
return _SECRET_SCOPE.set(secrets)
def reset_secret_scope(token: Token) -> None:
_SECRET_SCOPE.reset(token)
def current_secret_scope() -> Optional[Mapping[str, str]]:
"""The active secret mapping, or None when no scope is installed."""
return _SECRET_SCOPE.get()
# Genuinely-global env vars: process/deployment settings, NOT profile secrets.
# They keep reading os.environ even in multiplex mode (routing them through the
# fail-closed path would wrongly crash). Keep this tight — when in doubt a
# value is a profile secret. Membership is exact name OR prefix.
_GLOBAL_ENV_EXACT = frozenset({
# Hermes runtime / deployment
"HERMES_HOME", "HERMES_PROFILE", "HERMES_GATEWAY_LOCK_DIR",
"HERMES_MAX_ITERATIONS", "HERMES_API_TIMEOUT",
"HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS", "HERMES_NOUS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS",
"_HERMES_GATEWAY",
# OS / interpreter
"PATH", "HOME", "USER", "LANG", "LC_ALL", "TZ", "PWD", "SHELL", "TMPDIR",
"VIRTUAL_ENV", "PYTHONPATH", "SSL_CERT_FILE",
# Kanban paths (per-board, not per-profile-secret)
"HERMES_KANBAN_DB", "HERMES_KANBAN_WORKSPACES_ROOT", "HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD",
# API-server LISTENER settings — deployment config (compose/systemd env),
# which the scoped runner reload must keep seeing or containers silently
# lose the api_server platform. API_SERVER_KEY is a credential: NOT here.
# See #64674, #69379.
"API_SERVER_ENABLED", "API_SERVER_HOST", "API_SERVER_PORT",
"API_SERVER_CORS_ORIGINS",
# Relay-connector ROUTING stamps injected by managed deploys. Every reader
# (gateway.config, relay_url()/registration/self-provision) must resolve
# the SAME value or the adapter registers while the platform is absent
# from config. GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET/_ID/_DELIVERY_KEY and IDP_* are auth
# material and deliberately stay profile-scoped.
"GATEWAY_RELAY_URL", "GATEWAY_RELAY_ENDPOINT",
"GATEWAY_RELAY_ALLOW_DIRECT_PLATFORMS",
"GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORMS", "GATEWAY_RELAY_BOT_IDS",
"GATEWAY_RELAY_ROUTE_KEYS", "GATEWAY_RELAY_INSTANCE_ID",
"GATEWAY_RELAY_WAKE_URL", "GATEWAY_RELAY_DISPLAY_NAME",
})
_GLOBAL_ENV_PREFIXES = (
"HERMES_KANBAN_",
"HERMES_TELEGRAM_", # tuning knobs (batch delays, fallback toggles) — NOT the token
"TERMINAL_", # terminal/sandbox backend settings
)
def _is_global_env(name: str) -> bool:
"""True for genuinely process-global (non-profile-secret) env vars."""
return name in _GLOBAL_ENV_EXACT or name.startswith(_GLOBAL_ENV_PREFIXES)
def _environ_or(name: str, default: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
val = os.environ.get(name)
return val if val is not None else default
def get_secret(name: str, default: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[str]:
"""Resolve a credential by env-var name, honoring the active profile scope.
Global vars always read ``os.environ``. With a scope installed, a miss returns
``default`` under multiplexing (never another profile's ``os.environ`` value)
but falls through to ``os.environ`` otherwise — single-profile deployments
inject credentials via the process env (systemd, ``op run``), so the scope
must stay a ``.env`` overlay, not a blindfold (otherwise cron 401s). With no
scope: multiplex INACTIVE reads ``os.environ``; ACTIVE raises (fail closed).
"""
if _is_global_env(name):
return _environ_or(name, default)
scope = _SECRET_SCOPE.get()
if scope is not None:
val = scope.get(name)
if val is not None:
return val
return default if is_multiplex_active() else _environ_or(name, default)
if is_multiplex_active():
raise UnscopedSecretError(
f"get_secret({name!r}) called with no profile secret scope active "
f"while multiplexing is on. This credential read must run inside a "
f"set_secret_scope(...) block (the per-turn / per-adapter profile "
f"scope). Reading os.environ here would risk leaking another "
f"profile's value. See website/docs/developer-guide/multiplexing-gateway.md "
f"(Workstream A)."
)
return _environ_or(name, default)
def get_secret_str(name: str, default: str = "") -> str:
"""``get_secret`` for callers that want a ``str``: ``default`` only when the secret is genuinely
unset. Still raises ``UnscopedSecretError`` — swallowing it hides a spawn-site bug."""
val = get_secret(name, default)
return default if val is None else val
def _strip_inline_comment(value: str) -> str:
"""Strip a dotenv-style inline comment (python-dotenv semantics): quoted values
scan to the matching close quote (backslash-aware for double quotes) and drop a
trailing ``# ...``, else stay untouched; unquoted values truncate only at a
``#`` PRECEDED BY WHITESPACE (``foo#bar`` survives, ``value # c`` → ``value``)."""
value = value.strip()
if not value:
return value
quote = value[0]
if quote in ("'", '"'):
i = 1
while i < len(value):
ch = value[i]
if quote == '"' and ch == "\\":
i += 2 # skip the escaped character
continue
if ch == quote:
return value[: i + 1] if value[i + 1:].lstrip().startswith("#") else value
i += 1
return value # unterminated quote: leave as-is
return re.split(r"\s+#", value, maxsplit=1)[0].strip()
def _parse_env_value(raw_value: str) -> str:
"""Parse the small .env value subset Hermes writes itself (bare, 'single', or "double" with
``\\"`` / ``\\\\`` escapes)."""
value = raw_value.strip()
if len(value) >= 2 and value[0] == value[-1] == '"':
quoted = value[1:-1]
parsed: list[str] = []
i = 0
while i < len(quoted):
escaped = quoted[i] == "\\" and quoted[i + 1:i + 2] in ('"', "\\")
parsed.append(quoted[i + 1] if escaped else quoted[i])
i += 2 if escaped else 1
return "".join(parsed)
if len(value) >= 2 and value[0] == value[-1] == "'":
return value[1:-1]
return value
def load_env_file(env_path: Path) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""THE ``.env`` tokenizer: every reader (profile scope, ``hermes_cli.config.load_env``, the dashboard
scrub, skill secret capture, managed .env, setup prompts) parses through here so no two boundaries
disagree on which keys/values a file defines. Dict only — never touches ``os.environ``. ``export``
prefix, ``#`` comments, quote escapes reversed; ``utf-8-sig`` so a BOM doesn't prefix the first key.
Invalid UTF-8 decodes as latin-1, exactly like ``env_loader._load_dotenv_with_fallback`` installs it
into ``os.environ``. Absent/unreadable → ``{}``."""
secrets: Dict[str, str] = {}
try:
raw = env_path.read_bytes()
except OSError:
return secrets
if raw.startswith(codecs.BOM_UTF8):
raw = raw[len(codecs.BOM_UTF8):]
try:
text = raw.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
text = raw.decode("latin-1")
for raw in text.splitlines():
line = raw.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#"):
continue
if line.startswith("export "):
line = line[len("export "):].lstrip()
key, sep, value = line.partition("=")
key = key.strip()
if sep and key:
secrets[key] = _parse_env_value(_strip_inline_comment(value))
return secrets
def build_profile_secret_scope(hermes_home: Path) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Build a profile's secret mapping from ``<home>/.env`` plus its external
secret sources. Global vars are NOT copied in — ``get_secret`` reads those
from ``os.environ`` — so the scope holds only profile secrets."""
secrets = load_env_file(Path(hermes_home) / ".env")
try:
from hermes_cli.env_loader import get_secret_source_values
external_secrets = get_secret_source_values(Path(hermes_home))
except Exception:
external_secrets = {}
secrets.update((k, v) for k, v in external_secrets.items() if not _is_global_env(k))
# Administrator-managed ``.env`` LAST, with override: the launch process applies it that way
# (``env_loader._apply_managed_env``) so policy beats a user's own value. Under multiplex
# semantics ``get_secret`` never reads ``os.environ`` on a scope miss, so a scope built from
# the profile files alone would drop a managed-only credential and let the user's value win a
# managed-vs-user collision (#111187 review). Every multiplex-authoritative scope — gateway
# turn, routed cron fire, external worker — is built here, so managed authority is composed
# once, not restored by each consumer.
from hermes_cli.managed_scope import load_managed_env # fail-open: {} when no managed scope
secrets.update((k, v) for k, v in load_managed_env().items() if not _is_global_env(k))
return secrets
def refresh_installed_secret_scope(hermes_home: Path) -> bool:
"""Fold a fresh build of *hermes_home*'s secrets into the INSTALLED scope, in place.
A scope is frozen when installed, but a fire can learn of new values afterwards: a routed cron
fire's first agent build discovers plugin secret sources, and under multiplex semantics the
reload that follows is hydrate-only (never ``os.environ``), so nothing else would carry those
values into the scope this fire already holds. The caller names the home the installed scope
was built for. True when a scope was updated; False when none is installed."""
scope = _SECRET_SCOPE.get()
if not isinstance(scope, dict):
return False
# REPLACE, don't merge: the rebuild is the profile's current truth, so a name a source has
# stopped supplying (rotated, revoked, source removed) must disappear from the fire's scope
# rather than survive as the stale value dict.update() would keep.
rebuilt = build_profile_secret_scope(hermes_home)
# Update first, then drop what is gone: a concurrent reader never sees an emptied scope.
scope.update(rebuilt)
for name in [n for n in scope if n not in rebuilt]:
scope.pop(name, None)
return True