Files
hermes-agent/tests/acp_adapter/test_edit_approval.py
teknium1 f3e1ec6c76 test(acp): trim the V4A per-path tests to two invariants
One unit test covers the hidden .env, the hidden out-of-workspace path and the
all-safe control; the e2e test keeps driving handle_function_call so the prompt
is proven on the production path. The conditional Move File test asserted only
when the proposal parsed, which is not an invariant.
2026-09-20 10:26:06 -07:00

173 lines
5.6 KiB
Python

"""Tests for ACP pre-edit approval gating."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from acp_adapter.edit_approval import (
EditProposal,
build_acp_edit_tool_call,
build_edit_proposal,
set_edit_approval_requester,
should_auto_approve_edit,
)
from model_tools import handle_function_call
def teardown_function() -> None:
set_edit_approval_requester(None)
def test_acp_permission_tool_call_uses_edit_kind_and_diff_content():
proposal = EditProposal(
tool_name="write_file",
path="demo.txt",
old_text="old\n",
new_text="new\n",
arguments={"path": "demo.txt", "content": "new\n"},
)
tool_call = build_acp_edit_tool_call(proposal)
assert tool_call.kind == "edit"
assert tool_call.status == "pending"
assert tool_call.rawInput == {"tool": "write_file", "arguments": proposal.arguments}
assert len(tool_call.content) == 1
diff = tool_call.content[0]
assert diff.path == "demo.txt"
assert diff.oldText == "old\n"
assert diff.newText == "new\n"
def test_requester_exception_denies_and_does_not_mutate(tmp_path):
target = tmp_path / "sample.txt"
target.write_text("before\n", encoding="utf-8")
def boom(_proposal):
raise RuntimeError("zed disconnected")
set_edit_approval_requester(boom)
result = json.loads(
handle_function_call(
"write_file",
{"path": str(target), "content": "after\n"},
task_id="acp-edit-exception",
)
)
assert "error" in result
assert "Edit approval denied" in result["error"]
assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "before\n"
def test_patch_replace_rejection_does_not_mutate(tmp_path):
target = tmp_path / "sample.txt"
target.write_text("alpha\nbeta\n", encoding="utf-8")
set_edit_approval_requester(lambda _proposal: False)
result = json.loads(
handle_function_call(
"patch",
{
"mode": "replace",
"path": str(target),
"old_string": "beta\n",
"new_string": "gamma\n",
},
task_id="acp-patch-reject",
)
)
assert "error" in result
assert "Edit approval denied" in result["error"]
assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "alpha\nbeta\n"
def test_workspace_auto_approval_allows_workspace_and_tmp_but_not_sensitive(tmp_path):
workspace_file = tmp_path / "src.py"
# Use tempfile.gettempdir() so this test exercises the same code path on
# Linux (`/tmp`), macOS (`/private/var/folders/...`) and Windows
# (`%LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp`). Before the fix this branch only worked on Linux.
tmp_file = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "hermes-acp-auto-approve-test.txt"
env_file = tmp_path / ".env"
assert should_auto_approve_edit(
EditProposal("write_file", str(workspace_file), None, "x", {}),
"workspace_session",
str(tmp_path),
)
assert should_auto_approve_edit(
EditProposal("write_file", str(tmp_file), None, "x", {}),
"workspace_session",
str(tmp_path),
)
assert not should_auto_approve_edit(
EditProposal("write_file", str(env_file), None, "SECRET=x", {}),
"session",
str(tmp_path),
)
def test_multifile_v4a_patch_checks_every_real_path_not_the_joined_display_string(tmp_path):
"""Multi-file V4A proposals carry a comma-joined ``path`` for the dialog; the auto-approve
checks must run per real target so a sensitive or escaping file cannot hide in the join (#115213)."""
hidden_env = "*** Update File: .env\n@@\n+SECRET=x\n*** Update File: src/ok.py\n@@\n+ok\n"
proposal = build_edit_proposal("patch", {"mode": "patch", "patch": hidden_env})
assert not should_auto_approve_edit(proposal, "session", str(tmp_path))
assert not should_auto_approve_edit(proposal, "workspace_session", str(tmp_path))
# Escape target sits outside BOTH allowed roots (tempdir + session cwd).
escape = Path.home() / ".hermes-acp-escape-test.txt"
hidden_escape = f"*** Update File: {tmp_path}/src/ok.py\n@@\n+ok\n*** Update File: {escape}\n@@\n+evil\n"
proposal = build_edit_proposal("patch", {"mode": "patch", "patch": hidden_escape})
assert not should_auto_approve_edit(proposal, "workspace_session", str(tmp_path))
# Control: every target inside the workspace still auto-approves.
all_safe = f"*** Update File: {tmp_path}/a.py\n@@\n+a\n*** Update File: {tmp_path}/b.py\n@@\n+b\n"
proposal = build_edit_proposal("patch", {"mode": "patch", "patch": all_safe})
assert should_auto_approve_edit(proposal, "workspace_session", str(tmp_path))
def test_multifile_v4a_env_write_reaches_permission_prompt_e2e(tmp_path):
"""Pre-fix, ``session`` policy auto-approved the ``.env`` hidden in the join."""
env_target = tmp_path / ".env"
ok_target = tmp_path / "ok.py"
patch = (
f"*** Update File: {env_target}\n@@\n+SECRET=x\n"
f"*** Update File: {ok_target}\n@@\n+ok\n"
)
prompted = []
def requester(proposal):
if should_auto_approve_edit(proposal, "session", str(tmp_path)):
return True
prompted.append(proposal.path)
return False
set_edit_approval_requester(requester)
result = json.loads(
handle_function_call("patch", {"mode": "patch", "patch": patch}, task_id="acp-v4a-e2e")
)
assert prompted, "multi-file .env patch must reach the prompt, not auto-approve"
assert "denied" in result["error"].lower()
assert not env_target.exists()
assert not ok_target.exists()