1c0d95badb
Narrow the fix to secret material and stop reverting #45947. The earlier revision added every read-denied name to the write denylist, which re-blocked auth.json and webhook_subscriptions.json and rewrote the test guarding them. #45947 freed those control files deliberately: containment belongs in Docker/remote backends and OS permissions, not an expanding hardcoded denylist. What #45947 kept blocked is secret material, and that list had drifted: auth/google_oauth.json (OAuth token store), the plaintext Bitwarden cache, vault/ (key + ciphertext side by side) and browser-profile/ (copied cookies / Login Data) were writable via write_file / patch. - Write-deny those four; control files stay writable and read-denied. - _WRITE_DENIED_SECRET_DIRS is its own tuple rather than _READ_DENIED_DIRS, so a future read-only convenience deny cannot silently become a write deny. - tests/tools/test_write_deny.py is restored unchanged from main. - New tests pin both halves: secrets denied, control files writable, and write denies stay a subset of read denies. Fixes #110464
96 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
96 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
"""Tests for _is_write_denied() — verifies deny list blocks sensitive paths on all platforms."""
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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from unittest.mock import patch
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from agent.file_safety import is_write_denied as _is_write_denied
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class TestWriteDenyExactPaths:
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def test_etc_shadow(self):
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assert _is_write_denied("/etc/shadow") is True
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def test_ssh_authorized_keys(self):
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assert _is_write_denied("~/.ssh/authorized_keys") is True
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def test_ssh_id_ed25519(self):
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path = os.path.join(str(Path.home()), ".ssh", "id_ed25519")
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assert _is_write_denied(path) is True
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def test_hermes_root_env_when_running_under_profile(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Top-level ``<root>/.env`` stays write-denied even when running under
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a profile (#15981).
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Before the fix, ``build_write_denied_paths`` only added
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``<active_profile>/.env`` to the deny list, so the global
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``~/.hermes/.env`` (whose credentials are inherited by every profile)
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could be silently overwritten by ``write_file`` while a profile was
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active.
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"""
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root = tmp_path / "hermes_root"
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profile_home = root / "profiles" / "coder"
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profile_home.mkdir(parents=True)
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global_env = root / ".env"
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global_env.write_text("OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-real\n")
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(profile_home))
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# Sanity check: HERMES_HOME does point to the profile dir, not the root.
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from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home, get_default_hermes_root
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assert get_hermes_home() == profile_home
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assert get_default_hermes_root() == root
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assert _is_write_denied(str(global_env)) is True
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def test_shell_profiles_are_writable(self):
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home = str(Path.home())
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for name in [".bashrc", ".zshrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile", ".zprofile"]:
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assert _is_write_denied(os.path.join(home, name)) is False, f"{name} should be writable"
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def test_credential_config_files_denied(self):
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home = str(Path.home())
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for name in [".netrc", ".pgpass", ".npmrc", ".pypirc"]:
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assert _is_write_denied(os.path.join(home, name)) is True, f"{name} should be denied"
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class TestWriteDenyPrefixes:
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def test_ssh_prefix(self):
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path = os.path.join(str(Path.home()), ".ssh", "some_key")
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assert _is_write_denied(path) is True
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def test_systemd_prefix(self, tmp_path):
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# On NixOS, /etc/systemd is a symlink into /nix/store, so
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# realpath() resolves it to a store path that doesn't match
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# the /etc/systemd/ prefix. Build a real directory tree so
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# realpath is a no-op and prefix matching works.
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fake_etc = tmp_path / "etc" / "systemd" / "system"
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fake_etc.mkdir(parents=True)
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target = str(fake_etc / "evil.service")
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# Patch the prefix builder to include our tmp_path prefix
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import agent.file_safety as _fs
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_orig = _fs.build_write_denied_prefixes
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_extra_prefix = str(tmp_path / "etc" / "systemd") + os.sep
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def _patched(home):
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return _orig(home) + [_extra_prefix]
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with patch.object(_fs, "build_write_denied_prefixes", _patched):
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assert _is_write_denied(target) is True
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class TestWriteAllowed:
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def test_tmp_file(self):
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assert _is_write_denied("/tmp/safe_file.txt") is False
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def test_hermes_control_files_requested_writable(self):
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from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
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home = get_hermes_home()
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for name in ["auth.json", "config.yaml", "webhook_subscriptions.json"]:
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assert _is_write_denied(str(home / name)) is False, f"{name} should be writable"
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