213 lines
8.2 KiB
Python
213 lines
8.2 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Plugin Guard — security scanner for externally-installed plugins.
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Reuses the ``tools/skills_guard.py`` engine for ``hermes plugins install``/``update``.
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Plugins run Python in-process but are *expected* to read their own env keys, call
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provider HTTP APIs and spawn subprocesses, so: full pattern set on docs/config files
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(where prompt-injection lives); the "reads own secret"/"HTTP call with key" family is
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exempt on *code* files; plugin-sized structural limits; VCS/venv noise skipped.
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Verdict policy: ``safe`` installs; ``caution`` needs confirmation; ``dangerous`` is
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blocked and ``--force`` does NOT override.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Iterator, List, Optional, Tuple
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from tools.skills_guard import (
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Finding,
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ScanResult,
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SUSPICIOUS_BINARY_EXTENSIONS,
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_determine_verdict,
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format_scan_report,
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scan_file,
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)
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PLUGIN_SCANNER_VERSION = "plugin-guard-v1"
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# Never scanned: VCS internals, caches, vendored envs.
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EXCLUDED_DIRS = {
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".git", "__pycache__", "node_modules", ".venv", "venv",
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".mypy_cache", ".pytest_cache", ".ruff_cache", ".tox",
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}
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# Code files, where "reads an env secret" / "HTTP call with a key" is the normal
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# documented plugin pattern (requires_env).
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CODE_FILE_EXTENSIONS = {".py", ".js", ".ts", ".sh", ".bash", ".rb", ".pl", ".php"}
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# skills_guard pattern ids exempt on code files (every legitimate provider plugin
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# exhibits them); they still apply in full to docs/config files.
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CODE_EXEMPT_PATTERN_IDS = {
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"python_environ_get_secret",
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"python_getenv_secret",
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"python_os_environ",
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"node_process_env",
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"ruby_env_secret",
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"env_exfil_httpx",
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"env_exfil_requests",
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"env_exfil_fetch",
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"env_exfil_curl",
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"env_exfil_wget",
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# Agent-facing instruction patterns are meaningless inside code (docstrings
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# about prompts trip them constantly).
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"context_exfil",
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"send_to_url",
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"fake_policy",
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# Plugins legitimately write their settings into config.yaml during post_setup
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# and base64-encode credentials (HTTP Basic auth).
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"agent_config_mod",
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"agent_config_contract",
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"encoded_exfil",
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}
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# Plugin severity remaps: a bundled binary is warn-tier (repos occasionally vendor
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# one legitimately); a mere ``~/.hermes/.env`` mention is how READMEs tell users where
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# keys go (READING it still trips ``read_secrets_file``, critical); ``curl | sh``
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# install instructions are common in READMEs — caution, not an unoverridable block.
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SEVERITY_REMAP = {
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"binary_file": "high",
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"hermes_env_access": "medium",
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"curl_pipe_shell": "high",
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}
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# Structural limits — plugins are real codebases, far larger than skills.
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MAX_PLUGIN_FILE_COUNT = 400
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MAX_PLUGIN_TOTAL_SIZE_KB = 10 * 1024 # 10MB of scannable tree
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MAX_PLUGIN_SINGLE_FILE_KB = 1024 # 1MB single file
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def _walk(plugin_dir: Path) -> Iterator[Tuple[Path, str]]:
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"""Yield (path, "a/b/c" relative path) for every non-excluded entry under plugin_dir."""
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for f in plugin_dir.rglob("*"):
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try:
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rel_parts = f.relative_to(plugin_dir).parts
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except ValueError:
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continue
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if not any(part in EXCLUDED_DIRS for part in rel_parts):
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yield f, "/".join(rel_parts)
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def _finding(pattern_id: str, severity: str, category: str, file: str, match: str, description: str) -> Finding:
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return Finding(pattern_id=pattern_id, severity=severity, category=category,
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file=file, line=0, match=match, description=description)
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def _filter_findings(findings: List[Finding], rel_path: str) -> List[Finding]:
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"""Apply plugin-specific exemptions and severity remaps to raw findings."""
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is_code = Path(rel_path).suffix.lower() in CODE_FILE_EXTENSIONS
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out: List[Finding] = []
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for f in findings:
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if is_code and f.pattern_id in CODE_EXEMPT_PATTERN_IDS:
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continue
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f.severity = SEVERITY_REMAP.get(f.pattern_id) or f.severity
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out.append(f)
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return out
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def _check_plugin_structure(plugin_dir: Path) -> List[Finding]:
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"""Structural checks sized for plugin repositories."""
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findings: List[Finding] = []
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file_count = 0
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total_size = 0
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resolved_root = plugin_dir.resolve()
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for f, rel in _walk(plugin_dir):
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if f.is_symlink():
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file_count += 1
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try:
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resolved = f.resolve()
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except OSError:
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findings.append(_finding("broken_symlink", "medium", "traversal", rel,
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"broken symlink", "broken or circular symlink"))
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continue
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if not resolved.is_relative_to(resolved_root):
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findings.append(_finding("symlink_escape", "critical", "traversal", rel,
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f"symlink -> {resolved}", "symlink points outside the plugin directory"))
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continue
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if not f.is_file():
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continue
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file_count += 1
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try:
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size = f.stat().st_size
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except OSError:
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continue
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total_size += size
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if size > MAX_PLUGIN_SINGLE_FILE_KB * 1024:
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findings.append(_finding("oversized_file", "medium", "structural", rel, f"{size // 1024}KB",
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f"file is {size // 1024}KB (limit: {MAX_PLUGIN_SINGLE_FILE_KB}KB)"))
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ext = f.suffix.lower()
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if ext in SUSPICIOUS_BINARY_EXTENSIONS:
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findings.append(_finding("binary_file", SEVERITY_REMAP["binary_file"], "structural", rel,
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f"binary: {ext}", f"binary/executable file ({ext}) bundled in plugin (cannot be scanned)"))
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if file_count > MAX_PLUGIN_FILE_COUNT:
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findings.append(_finding("too_many_files", "medium", "structural", "(directory)", f"{file_count} files",
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f"plugin has {file_count} files (limit: {MAX_PLUGIN_FILE_COUNT})"))
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if total_size > MAX_PLUGIN_TOTAL_SIZE_KB * 1024:
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findings.append(_finding("oversized_bundle", "medium", "structural", "(directory)", f"{total_size // 1024}KB",
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f"plugin is {total_size // 1024}KB total (limit: {MAX_PLUGIN_TOTAL_SIZE_KB}KB)"))
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return findings
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def scan_plugin(plugin_dir: Path, source: str = "") -> ScanResult:
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"""Scan a plugin directory (typically the temp clone); every external plugin is ``community`` trust."""
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all_findings: List[Finding] = []
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if plugin_dir.is_dir():
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all_findings.extend(_check_plugin_structure(plugin_dir))
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for f, rel in sorted(_walk(plugin_dir)):
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if f.is_file() and not f.is_symlink():
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all_findings.extend(_filter_findings(scan_file(f, rel_path=rel), rel))
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verdict = _determine_verdict(all_findings)
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if all_findings:
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categories = sorted({f.category for f in all_findings})
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summary = f"{plugin_dir.name}: {verdict} — {len(all_findings)} finding(s) in {', '.join(categories)}"
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else:
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summary = f"{plugin_dir.name}: clean scan, no threats detected"
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result = ScanResult(
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skill_name=plugin_dir.name,
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source=source or plugin_dir.name,
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trust_level="community",
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verdict=verdict,
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findings=all_findings,
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scanned_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
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summary=summary,
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)
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result.scan_provenance = {
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"scanner_version": PLUGIN_SCANNER_VERSION,
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"verdict": verdict,
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"source": result.source,
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}
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return result
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def should_allow_plugin_install(result: ScanResult, force: bool = False) -> Tuple[Optional[bool], str]:
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"""Map a verdict to ``(allowed, reason)``: True installs, None needs confirmation, False is blocked."""
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n = len(result.findings)
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if result.verdict == "safe":
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return True, "Allowed (clean scan)"
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if result.verdict == "caution":
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if force:
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return True, f"Force-installed despite caution verdict ({n} findings)"
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return None, f"Requires confirmation (caution verdict, {n} findings)"
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return False, (
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f"Blocked (dangerous verdict, {n} findings). "
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f"--force does not override a dangerous verdict."
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)
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__all__ = [
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"scan_plugin",
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"should_allow_plugin_install",
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"format_scan_report",
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"PLUGIN_SCANNER_VERSION",
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]
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