Files
hermes-agent/gateway/delivery_ledger.py
teknium1 360b9697ac fix(gateway): a crash no longer re-answers every recently active chat
On an unclean start, suspend_recently_active(120) marked every session
touched in the last 120 s resume_pending/restart_interrupted, so startup
auto-resume ran a fresh model turn for chats whose turn had already
finished and been delivered: one kill re-answered 52 chats in the C12
delivery suite. The durable active-turn markers already name the exact
in-flight turns, so the recency sweep is removed.

That sweep also hid a real window: _handle_message cleared the turn
marker in its finally BEFORE the adapter recorded the delivery
obligation, so a kill in between left neither marker nor ledger row and
the persisted reply was never sent. The adapter now owns the marker for
turns it delivers and clears it right after record_delivery_obligation
(or once nothing more is owed). At unclean startup a marked turn whose
final reply is already in the transcript has that reply adopted into the
delivery ledger (unowned, 'attempting': sent once, marked as a possible
duplicate) instead of being regenerated; a marked turn with no reply
resumes once, as before.
2026-09-23 14:55:08 -07:00

595 lines
33 KiB
Python

"""Durable delivery-obligation ledger for gateway final responses (rows in the shared ``state.db``;
WAL, owner pid + process-start liveness, bounded retention) so a crash between finalize and
platform ACK cannot lose a response silently. Checkpoints: record_obligation() 'pending' before
any send | mark_attempting() 'attempting' right before the await | mark_delivered() 'delivered'
only on SendResult.success | mark_failed() 'failed' on a definitive rejection. Crash semantics
(never silently resend an ambiguous send): pending = never started, redeliver plainly; attempting
= crashed mid-await, platform MAY have it, redeliver WITH a visible recovered marker; failed =
rejected once, restart is a retry boundary, also marked; delivered = prune. Attempts are capped
and stale rows expire, both -> 'abandoned' (kept briefly, then pruned). Everything is
best-effort: ledger failures must never block a send; callers wrap every call in try/except.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import logging
import os
import re
import sqlite3
import threading
import time
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from gateway.dead_targets import classify_dead_error
from hermes_cli.sqlite_util import add_column_if_missing
from hermes_constants import get_process_hermes_home
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_DB_LOCK = threading.Lock()
# Redelivery policy knobs (deliberately not config — the ledger is gated by
# ``gateway.delivery_ledger`` and these only matter in the rare recovery path).
MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3
STALE_AFTER_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60
_RETENTION_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
_MAX_ROWS = 500
# Visible prefixes for redeliveries that might duplicate an already-received message (crash mid-send /
# post-rejection retry) — honest at-least-once. Runtime recovery uses a distinct marker: no restart
# occurred, but a network rejection's acknowledgement can still have been lost independently.
RECOVERED_MARKER = "♻️ Recovered reply — the gateway restarted during delivery, so this may be a duplicate:\n\n"
RECONNECTED_MARKER = ("♻️ Recovered reply — the messaging platform reconnected after the original "
"delivery failed, so this may be a duplicate:\n\n")
# A reply refused by flood control may have gone out as several requests (the adapter chunks long replies,
# and MarkdownV2 escaping alone can push a reply that fits one message into two), and the platform may have
# accepted the first chunk(s) before refusing the rest; the send result does not say which landed. The raw
# length of the stored text says nothing about that, so every flood redelivery carries a marker, and neither
# of the markers above tells the truth here (no restart, no reconnect): the rate limit gets its own.
FLOOD_MARKER = ("♻️ Recovered reply — the messaging platform's rate limit refused the original, so part of "
"it may already have arrived above:\n\n")
# Errors whose send contract proves the platform never saw the request: retried as soon as the adapter
# is back, no backoff. Every other rejection is retried too (#91653: a 5xx or a transient parse error
# used to strand the reply in ``failed`` until the next restart), but only after a backoff that grows
# with the attempts already spent, so a platform-side outage is not hammered by the redelivery timer.
# A whole-chat death (blocked bot, deleted group, deactivated user) is never retried: the target is gone.
_RUNTIME_RETRYABLE_ERRORS = frozenset({"send_path_degraded"})
# One tier per in-process retry; the last budgeted attempt is left to the boot sweep (retry_not_before).
_RETRY_BACKOFF_SECONDS = (30.0, 120.0)
assert len(_RETRY_BACKOFF_SECONDS) == MAX_ATTEMPTS - 1
# A final send the platform refused with flood control is the other transient case: a 429 means the
# refused request was never accepted, and the platform said how long to wait. Adapters fail such sends
# closed as ``flood_control:<seconds>`` on purpose (#91969) so that this ledger owns the wait instead of
# the send coroutine sleeping through it. Before this the row simply sat in ``failed`` until the next
# restart's sweep, which then redelivered it hours late under the "gateway restarted during delivery"
# marker.
FLOOD_ERROR_PREFIX = "flood_control:"
FLOOD_RETRY_DEFAULT_SECONDS = 60.0
FLOOD_RETRY_CAP_SECONDS = 15 * 60.0
FLOOD_RETRY_SLACK_SECONDS = 2.0
# The canonical prefix above is what the adapters produce for a flood they decide not to sleep. It is
# not the only shape that reaches this ledger. PTB raises ``RetryAfter``, whose own text reads
# "Flood control exceeded. Retry in 185 seconds", and that text is what lands in ``last_error``
# whenever a send fails on a path that has not been normalized, or was written by an older build
# before it was. Such a row has to be recognised too: unrecognised, it is treated as an ordinary
# failure, so no redelivery timer is armed for it and a boot sweep claims it immediately instead of
# adopting it until its deadline, spending the one attempt inside the penalty that caused it.
# Matching requires the "flood control" wording as well as the delay, so an unrelated error that
# merely suggests retrying is never mistaken for a flood.
_RAW_FLOOD_RE = re.compile(r"flood control exceeded.*?retry in\s+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)", re.IGNORECASE)
def _raw_flood_wait(text: str) -> Optional[float]:
"""Seconds asked for by a flood error still carrying the platform's own wording, else ``None``."""
match = _RAW_FLOOD_RE.search(text or "")
if not match:
return None
try:
return float(match.group(1))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
def is_reconnect_only(error: Any) -> bool:
"""True for a row that only an adapter reconnect may retry (no timer, no backoff)."""
return str(error or "").strip().lower() in _RUNTIME_RETRYABLE_ERRORS
def is_flood_error(error: Any) -> bool:
"""True for a flood refusal: the adapters' fail-closed ``flood_control:<seconds>`` result, or a
row still carrying the platform's own flood wording (see ``_RAW_FLOOD_RE``)."""
text = str(error or "").strip().lower()
return text.startswith(FLOOD_ERROR_PREFIX) or _raw_flood_wait(text) is not None
def flood_wait_seconds(error: Any, default: float = FLOOD_RETRY_DEFAULT_SECONDS) -> float:
"""The wait the platform asked for, read from ``flood_control:<seconds>``; ``default`` when unreadable."""
text = str(error or "").strip().lower()
wait = default
if text.startswith(FLOOD_ERROR_PREFIX):
try:
wait = float(text[len(FLOOD_ERROR_PREFIX):].strip())
except ValueError:
wait = default
else:
# A row still carrying the platform's own flood wording states its delay just as precisely,
# and the deadline must use it rather than the generic default.
raw = _raw_flood_wait(text)
if raw is not None:
wait = raw
return wait if wait > 0 else default
def flood_retry_delay(seconds: Any) -> float:
"""How long a redelivery timer sleeps for a wait of ``seconds``: capped so a huge or bogus value cannot
park the timer for hours (the row's own deadline, not the timer, decides eligibility when it fires),
plus a little slack so the timer lands after the deadline rather than on it."""
try:
wait = float(seconds)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
wait = FLOOD_RETRY_DEFAULT_SECONDS
return min(max(wait, 0.0), FLOOD_RETRY_CAP_SECONDS) + FLOOD_RETRY_SLACK_SECONDS
def _failed_stamp(updated_at: Any) -> float:
try:
return float(updated_at or 0.0)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return 0.0
def flood_not_before(updated_at: Any, last_error: Any) -> float:
"""Earliest moment a flood-refused row may be resent: the refusal's timestamp (``mark_failed`` sets
``updated_at``) plus the platform's wait. Enforced by the sweeps so neither an early timer nor a
reconnect sweep spends a redelivery attempt inside the penalty window."""
return _failed_stamp(updated_at) + flood_wait_seconds(last_error)
def retry_not_before(updated_at: Any, last_error: Any, attempts: Any) -> Optional[float]:
"""Earliest moment a failed row may be resent, or ``None`` for a row the runtime must leave alone:
a flood refusal keeps the platform's own wait, an allowlisted reconnect error is due at once, a
whole-chat death is final, and any other rejection backs off by the attempts already spent — but
never spends the LAST budgeted attempt. An unclassified outage can outlast any timer, and a row
the timer abandoned would be lost for good; leaving one attempt keeps it recoverable by the boot
sweep after a restart, which is a real recovery signal."""
if is_flood_error(last_error):
return flood_not_before(updated_at, last_error)
text = str(last_error or "").strip().lower()
if is_reconnect_only(text):
return _failed_stamp(updated_at)
if classify_dead_error(text):
return None
spent = int(attempts or 0)
if spent >= MAX_ATTEMPTS - 1:
return None
return _failed_stamp(updated_at) + _RETRY_BACKOFF_SECONDS[spent]
def _db_path():
# Launch home, not get_hermes_home(): a multiplexed gateway records a served profile's replies
# under that profile's home override, but the boot sweep reads from the launch context, so both
# must open the one shared store (adapter_profile tells the bots apart). No get_hermes_home()
# fallback for an unset HERMES_HOME: a default gateway run in the foreground has none.
return get_process_hermes_home() / "state.db"
def _connect() -> sqlite3.Connection:
from hermes_cli.sqlite_util import open_db
# Shared state.db: SessionDB owns the durable PRAGMA set; this opener keeps the plain-tuple rows
# and the 10 s busy timeout it always had.
return open_db(_db_path(), db_label="state.db (delivery_ledger)", busy_timeout_ms=10_000,
row_factory=None, initialize=_initialize_schema)
def _initialize_schema(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
conn.execute(
"""CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS delivery_obligations (
obligation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
session_key TEXT NOT NULL,
platform TEXT NOT NULL,
chat_id TEXT NOT NULL,
thread_id TEXT,
content TEXT NOT NULL,
state TEXT NOT NULL,
attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_at REAL NOT NULL,
updated_at REAL NOT NULL,
owner_pid INTEGER,
owner_started_at INTEGER,
last_error TEXT,
adapter_profile TEXT
)"""
)
if "adapter_profile" not in {row[1] for row in conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(delivery_obligations)")}:
add_column_if_missing(conn, "delivery_obligations", "adapter_profile", "adapter_profile TEXT")
def _transaction():
from hermes_cli.sqlite_util import transaction
return transaction(_connect())
def _start_time(pid: int) -> Optional[int]:
try:
from gateway.status import get_process_start_time # lazy: tests monkeypatch gateway.status
return get_process_start_time(pid)
except Exception:
return None
def _owner_stamp() -> tuple[int, Optional[int]]:
pid = os.getpid()
return pid, _start_time(pid)
def _owner_alive(pid: Any, started_at: Any) -> bool:
"""True when the recorded owning process still exists (pid + start time)."""
if not pid:
return False
try:
pid = int(pid)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return False
current_start = _start_time(pid)
if current_start is None:
# Start time unreadable: alive iff the pid exists. Route through the cross-platform probe — on Windows
# ``os.kill(pid, 0)`` is NOT a no-op (bpo-14484: it maps to ``GenerateConsoleCtrlEvent(0, pid)`` and could
# Ctrl+C the gateway's own console group). ``_pid_exists`` keeps EPERM-means-alive (pid owned by another user).
try:
from gateway.status import _pid_exists
except Exception:
if os.name == "nt":
return False # never fall back to a raw sig-0 probe on Windows
try:
os.kill(pid, 0) # windows-footgun: ok — POSIX-only fallback branch
return True
except OSError as exc: # incl. ProcessLookupError; EPERM means the pid exists
return isinstance(exc, PermissionError)
try:
return bool(_pid_exists(pid))
except Exception:
return False
try:
from gateway.status import start_time_fingerprints_match
return started_at is None or start_time_fingerprints_match(started_at, current_start)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return True
def compute_obligation_id(session_key: str, message_ref: str, content: str) -> str:
"""Stable id: same turn + same content re-records idempotently, while distinct threads/topics on one
chat never collide (session_key carries platform/chat/thread; ``message_ref`` = inbound message id)."""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{session_key}|{message_ref}|{content}".encode("utf-8", "replace")).hexdigest()[:24]
def record_obligation(*, obligation_id: str, session_key: str, platform: str, chat_id: str,
thread_id: Optional[str], content: str, adapter_profile: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
"""Record a final response as owed to the platform (state='pending')."""
now, (pid, started) = time.time(), _owner_stamp()
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
conn.execute(
"""INSERT OR REPLACE INTO delivery_obligations
(obligation_id, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id,
content, state, attempts, created_at, updated_at,
owner_pid, owner_started_at, adapter_profile)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', 0, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)""",
(obligation_id, session_key, platform, str(chat_id), str(thread_id) if thread_id else None,
content, now, now, pid, started, str(adapter_profile).strip() if adapter_profile else "default"))
# Same transaction, same connection: the cron ledgers prune this way too
# (cron/delivery_queue._prune_terminal_unlocked, cron/executions._prune_unlocked).
_prune_unlocked(conn, now)
def record_crash_left_reply(*, obligation_id: str, session_key: str, platform: str, chat_id: str,
thread_id: Optional[str], content: str, since: float,
adapter_profile: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
"""Adopt a reply a killed process persisted but never ledgered. Unowned, so this boot's sweep
claims it, and 'attempting', because a streamed reply may already be on screen: it is
redelivered once, with the recovered marker. A no-op when the same reply was already ledgered
since *since* (the turn start), and idempotent across boots that die before their sweep."""
now = time.time()
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
conn.execute(
"""INSERT OR IGNORE INTO delivery_obligations
(obligation_id, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id,
content, state, attempts, created_at, updated_at,
owner_pid, owner_started_at, adapter_profile)
SELECT ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'attempting', 0, ?, ?, NULL, NULL, ?
WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM delivery_obligations
WHERE session_key = ? AND content = ? AND created_at >= ?)""",
(obligation_id, session_key, platform, str(chat_id), str(thread_id) if thread_id else None,
content, now, now, str(adapter_profile).strip() if adapter_profile else "default",
session_key, content, since))
def mark_attempting(obligation_id: str) -> None:
_update_state(obligation_id, "attempting")
def mark_delivered(obligation_id: str) -> None:
_update_state(obligation_id, "delivered")
def mark_failed(obligation_id: str, error: str = "") -> None:
_update_state(obligation_id, "failed", error=error)
def release_runtime_claim(obligation_id: str, error: str = "") -> bool:
"""Return an unsent runtime claim to ``failed`` without spending an attempt.
Runtime recovery claims before clearing ``resume_pending`` so two reconnect paths cannot send the
same row; if the flag cannot be cleared no send was attempted and the claim must not consume the
redelivery budget. Fail-closed to the exact current process instance and ``attempting`` state."""
pid, started = _owner_stamp()
if started is None:
return False
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
cursor = conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state='failed', attempts=CASE
WHEN attempts > 0 THEN attempts - 1 ELSE 0 END,
updated_at=?, last_error=?
WHERE obligation_id=? AND state='attempting'
AND owner_pid IS ? AND owner_started_at IS ?""",
(time.time(), error[:500] if error else None, obligation_id, pid, started))
return bool(cursor.rowcount)
def _update_state(obligation_id: str, state: str, error: str = "") -> None:
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state=?, updated_at=?, last_error=?
WHERE obligation_id=?""",
(state, time.time(), error[:500] if error else None, obligation_id))
def _claimed_row(oid, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, attempts, profile, *,
needs_marker: bool, runtime: bool = False, flood: bool = False,
last_error: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Claimed-row dict handed back for redelivery. A marked row names its own cause: ``flood`` (a reply
the rate limit refused, possibly after accepting part of it) gets FLOOD_MARKER at boot or at runtime, a
``runtime`` reconnect replay gets RECONNECTED_MARKER, and a boot-recovered crash keeps the runner's
restart marker default. ``last_error`` is the row's pre-claim error, carried so a runtime claim that is
released unsent goes back to ``failed`` with the same error and keeps its retry eligibility."""
marker = FLOOD_MARKER if flood else (RECONNECTED_MARKER if runtime else None)
return {"obligation_id": oid, "session_key": session_key, "platform": platform, "chat_id": chat_id,
"thread_id": thread_id, "content": content, "needs_marker": needs_marker,
**({"marker": marker} if needs_marker and marker else {}), "profile": profile,
**({"runtime_recovery": True} if runtime else {}),
**({"last_error": last_error} if last_error else {}), "attempts": attempts + 1}
def sweep_recoverable(now: Optional[float] = None, *, deliverable_platforms: Optional[set] = None,
deliverable_targets: Optional[set] = None) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Claim undelivered rows owned by dead processes; return them for redelivery.
Claiming atomically re-stamps the owner to THIS process, moves the row to 'attempting' and increments
``attempts`` (the UPDATE is guarded on the previous owner stamp, so a second gateway racing the same
sweep cannot double-claim).
Rows over the attempts cap or stale cutoff become 'abandoned'. ``deliverable_platforms`` restricts
claiming to platforms the caller can send on this boot: ``attempts`` is the redelivery budget and
must only be spent on a real send, else a platform that failed to connect burns one attempt per boot
and hits the cap having never been sent once (the stale cutoff still bounds untouched rows).
``deliverable_targets`` further scopes multiplexed gateways by exact ``(platform, adapter_profile)``
so one connected bot cannot spend another disconnected bot's retry budget.
A flood-refused row still inside its wait is adopted (owner re-stamped, no attempt spent) and
returned flagged ``adopted`` with its ``not_before``: the caller clears its session's resume flag
like any other claimed row, since the answer is in the ledger, but must not send it; the flood
timer does once the wait has passed. A legacy row without ``adapter_profile`` is normalised to
``'default'`` on claim or adoption (the caller only accepts such rows when it is not multiplexed),
because the runtime sweep matches profiles exactly and could otherwise never claim it."""
now, (pid, started) = now if now is not None else time.time(), _owner_stamp()
claimed: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(
"""SELECT obligation_id, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id,
content, state, attempts, created_at,
owner_pid, owner_started_at, adapter_profile, last_error, updated_at
FROM delivery_obligations
WHERE state IN ('pending', 'attempting', 'failed')"""
).fetchall()
for (oid, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, state, attempts, created_at,
owner_pid, owner_started_at, adapter_profile, last_error, updated_at) in rows:
if _owner_alive(owner_pid, owner_started_at):
continue # a live gateway still owns this row
if attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS or (now - created_at) > STALE_AFTER_SECONDS: # exhausted -> abandoned
conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state='abandoned', updated_at=? WHERE obligation_id=?""", (now, oid))
continue
if ((deliverable_platforms is not None and platform not in deliverable_platforms)
or (deliverable_targets is not None and (platform, adapter_profile) not in deliverable_targets)):
continue # no adapter this boot — claiming would spend an attempt on a no-op
flood_row = state == "failed" and is_flood_error(last_error)
if flood_row and now < flood_not_before(updated_at, last_error):
# Still inside the platform's wait: adopt the dead owner's row without spending an attempt
# (state and error kept) so this process's flood timer can claim it once the wait passes.
cursor = conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET owner_pid=?, owner_started_at=?,
adapter_profile=COALESCE(adapter_profile, 'default')
WHERE obligation_id=? AND (owner_pid IS ? OR owner_pid=?)""",
(pid, started, oid, owner_pid, owner_pid))
if cursor.rowcount:
claimed.append({
"obligation_id": oid, "session_key": session_key, "platform": platform,
"chat_id": chat_id, "thread_id": thread_id, "content": content,
"profile": adapter_profile or "default", "attempts": attempts,
"adopted": True, "not_before": flood_not_before(updated_at, last_error)})
continue
# Every claim starts a send, so the row leaves 'pending'/'failed' for 'attempting' in the same
# CAS: a boot killed inside the redelivery then leaves proof the platform may have it (next boot
# marks it), and the runtime sweep, which only takes 'failed', cannot re-claim it mid-send. A
# claimed flood row also drops its stale refusal, so an interrupted resend has no error.
cursor = conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET owner_pid=?, owner_started_at=?, attempts=attempts+1, updated_at=?,
adapter_profile=COALESCE(adapter_profile, 'default'), state='attempting',
last_error=CASE WHEN ? THEN NULL ELSE last_error END
WHERE obligation_id=? AND (owner_pid IS ? OR owner_pid=?)""",
(pid, started, now, 1 if flood_row else 0, oid, owner_pid, owner_pid))
if cursor.rowcount:
# A never-claimed pending row was never sent: redeliver plainly. Anything else (crashed
# mid-await, other rejection, a flood refusal whose earlier chunks the platform may have
# accepted, or a pending row an older build already claimed and may have sent) carries
# the marker.
claimed.append(_claimed_row(oid, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, attempts,
adapter_profile or "default",
needs_marker=state != "pending" or attempts > 0, flood=flood_row))
return claimed
def sweep_failed_for_runtime(platform: str, now: Optional[float] = None, *,
profile: Optional[str] = None) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Claim this process's failed rows that are due for another send, for one adapter.
``profile`` scopes multiplexed gateways to the bot identity that owned the failed send (``None`` =
primary/default adapter); unowned rows and rows owned by another process are left for the
startup/dead-owner sweep. Startup recovery ignores rows owned by a live gateway, so a response
rejected with ``send_path_degraded`` would stay stranded when only the adapter reconnects; this closes
that gap without weakening ownership: only rows stamped to this exact process instance, only rows
past their ``retry_not_before`` deadline, same attempts/staleness bounds, every update guarded by the
prior owner stamp and ``failed`` state. Claimed rows always carry a marker (the failed send's ack is not safe to
infer): the reconnect one, or the rate-limit one for a flood-refused row."""
now, (pid, started) = now if now is not None else time.time(), _owner_stamp()
if started is None: # PID alone cannot distinguish this process from a stale row left after PID
return [] # reuse; runtime replay is optional, so fail closed (startup recovery remains).
expected_profile = "default" if not profile or profile == "default" else str(profile)
claimed: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(
"""SELECT obligation_id, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id,
content, attempts, created_at, owner_pid,
owner_started_at, last_error, adapter_profile, updated_at
FROM delivery_obligations
WHERE state='failed' AND platform=?""", (platform,)).fetchall()
for (oid, session_key, row_platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, attempts, created_at,
owner_pid, owner_started_at, last_error, adapter_profile, updated_at) in rows:
# Exact process-start matching prevents PID reuse from stealing work.
if adapter_profile != expected_profile or owner_pid != pid or owner_started_at != started:
continue
due = retry_not_before(updated_at, last_error, attempts)
if due is None:
continue
owner_guard = (now, oid, owner_pid, owner_started_at)
if attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS or (now - created_at) > STALE_AFTER_SECONDS: # exhausted -> abandoned
conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state='abandoned', updated_at=?
WHERE obligation_id=? AND state='failed'
AND owner_pid IS ? AND owner_started_at IS ?""", owner_guard)
continue
if now < due:
continue # the platform's wait or the backoff has not passed; the timer comes back for it
# The claim clears the stale error: this is a fresh attempt, and if it is interrupted the next
# boot must see 'attempting' with no proof of non-delivery, hence the marker.
cursor = conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state='attempting', attempts=attempts+1, updated_at=?, last_error=NULL
WHERE obligation_id=? AND state='failed'
AND owner_pid IS ? AND owner_started_at IS ?""", owner_guard)
if cursor.rowcount:
# The failed send's ack may have been lost (reconnect) or its earlier chunks accepted
# (flood): every runtime redelivery carries a marker. The pre-claim error rides along so a
# claim released unsent keeps its flood retry eligibility.
claimed.append(_claimed_row(oid, session_key, row_platform, chat_id, thread_id, content,
attempts, adapter_profile, needs_marker=True, runtime=True,
flood=is_flood_error(last_error), last_error=last_error))
return claimed
def pending_retries(now: Optional[float] = None) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""This process's failed rows that still await redelivery, one entry per adapter identity with the
earliest deadline (``not_before``). The runner arms one redelivery timer per entry, so a row adopted
at boot, skipped because its wait had not passed, or rejected again is never stranded. Rows past the
attempts cap or stale cutoff are left for the sweeps to abandon."""
now, (pid, started) = now if now is not None else time.time(), _owner_stamp()
if started is None:
return []
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(
"""SELECT platform, adapter_profile, updated_at, last_error, attempts, created_at
FROM delivery_obligations
WHERE state='failed' AND owner_pid IS ? AND owner_started_at IS ?""", (pid, started)).fetchall()
earliest: Dict[tuple, float] = {}
for platform, adapter_profile, updated_at, last_error, attempts, created_at in rows:
# Reconnect-only rows (a claim released because the adapter was gone) are re-claimed by the
# reconnect sweep; a timer would claim and release them every tick until the adapter is back.
if is_reconnect_only(last_error):
continue
due = retry_not_before(updated_at, last_error, attempts)
if due is None or attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS or (now - created_at) > STALE_AFTER_SECONDS:
continue
key = (platform, adapter_profile or "default")
if key not in earliest or due < earliest[key]:
earliest[key] = due
return [{"platform": platform, "profile": profile, "not_before": due}
for (platform, profile), due in sorted(earliest.items())]
def _prune_unlocked(conn, now: float) -> None:
"""Retention DELETEs on the caller's open connection — must run inside the caller's transaction."""
conn.execute(
"""DELETE FROM delivery_obligations
WHERE state IN ('delivered', 'abandoned') AND updated_at < ?""", (now - _RETENTION_SECONDS,))
total = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM delivery_obligations").fetchone()[0]
if total > _MAX_ROWS:
conn.execute(
"""DELETE FROM delivery_obligations WHERE obligation_id IN (
SELECT obligation_id FROM delivery_obligations
ORDER BY CASE state
WHEN 'delivered' THEN 0
WHEN 'abandoned' THEN 1
ELSE 2
END, updated_at ASC
LIMIT ?)""", (total - _MAX_ROWS,))
def ledger_enabled(config: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> bool:
"""Read the ``gateway.delivery_ledger`` config gate (default on)."""
try:
if config is None:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
config = load_config()
value = (config.get("gateway") or {}).get("delivery_ledger", True)
return value.strip().lower() not in {"false", "0", "no", "off"} if isinstance(value, str) else bool(value)
except Exception:
return True
# ---- BEGIN PLUGIN-COMPAT (revert-scheduled; see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md) ----
# Names external plugins imported from this module before the Sep 2026 decomposition.
# Internal code MUST NOT use these (scripts/check_compat_pointers.py fails CI if it does).
# The whole block is removed by reverting the commit that added it.
import json # noqa: F401,E402
import json # noqa: F401,E402
def debug_rows(limit: int = 20) -> str:
"""Human-readable dump for ad-hoc inspection (sqlite3-free path)."""
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(
"""SELECT obligation_id, session_key, state, attempts,
created_at, updated_at, last_error
FROM delivery_obligations
ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT ?""",
(limit,),
).fetchall()
return json.dumps(
[
{
"id": r[0], "session": r[1], "state": r[2], "attempts": r[3],
"created_at": r[4], "updated_at": r[5], "last_error": r[6],
}
for r in rows
],
indent=2,
)
# ---- END PLUGIN-COMPAT ----