The bind address never changes for an app's lifetime, so create_app now canonicalises it and computes the wildcard flag and allowed Host set once instead of on every request. _WILDCARD_HOSTS duplicated what ip_address().is_unspecified already answers (only "" needs a special case), the Sec-Fetch-Site sets become named module constants, and fetch_site is a required argument so no caller can silently skip that check. The 403 message now says what is actually refused (browser requests and foreign Host names) rather than implying every non-local client is. The parametrized proxy test asserted 200-vs-"some 4xx" via a tuple comparison; it now pins status == 200/403 and the exact upstream request count, so a regression to a different status or a leaked forward fails.
304 lines
13 KiB
Python
304 lines
13 KiB
Python
"""HTTP server that forwards OpenAI-compatible requests to a configured upstream.
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A credential-attaching forwarder: request/response bodies are never mediated, logged, or rewritten.
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The one shim: after a *clean* upstream EOF, a ``text/event-stream`` response that carried a terminal
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``finish_reason`` or ``lastOne: true`` but omitted ``data: [DONE]`` gets a single ``[DONE]`` frame.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import ipaddress
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import logging
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import signal
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from typing import Optional
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from urllib.parse import urlsplit
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try:
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import aiohttp
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from aiohttp import web
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AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE = True
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except ImportError:
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aiohttp = None # type: ignore[assignment]
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web = None # type: ignore[assignment]
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AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE = False
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from hermes_cli.proxy.adapters.base import UpstreamAdapter, UpstreamCredential
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from hermes_cli.proxy.sse_done import DONE_SSE_FRAME, SseDoneTracker, content_type_is_sse
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Stripped when forwarding upstream: ``host``/``content-length`` are recomputed by aiohttp,
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# ``authorization`` is replaced with our bearer; everything else passes through.
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_HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS = frozenset({
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"host", "content-length", "connection", "keep-alive", "proxy-authenticate",
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"proxy-authorization", "te", "trailers", "transfer-encoding", "upgrade", "authorization",
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})
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# aiohttp recomputes Content-Encoding/Content-Length on stream — let it.
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_RESPONSE_DROP_HEADERS = _HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS | {"content-encoding", "content-length"}
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DEFAULT_PORT = 8645
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DEFAULT_HOST = "127.0.0.1"
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# Mirrors api_server's MAX_REQUEST_BYTES (10 MB); client_max_size bounds every read path,
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# including chunked bodies.
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MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 10_000_000
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def _require_aiohttp() -> None:
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if not AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE:
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raise RuntimeError("aiohttp is required for `hermes proxy`. Run `hermes setup` to install it.")
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def _json_error(status: int, message: str, code: str = "proxy_error") -> "web.Response":
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"""OpenAI-style error JSON response."""
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body = {"error": {"message": message, "type": code, "code": code}}
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return web.json_response(body, status=status)
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_LOOPBACK_HOSTS = frozenset({"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"})
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# Sec-Fetch-Site values a browser sends for a request no foreign page made (typed URL / own page).
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_UNFORGED_FETCH_SITES = frozenset({"none", "same-origin"})
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# On a wildcard bind a DNS-rebound page is same-origin with its Host, so only "none" is trusted.
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_WILDCARD_FETCH_SITES = frozenset({"none"})
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def _canonical_host(host: str) -> str:
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# ``localhost.`` is the absolute form of ``localhost``, and ``[0:0::1]`` is ``[::1]``;
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# a rebound name stays foreign either way.
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host = host.lower().rstrip(".")
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try:
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return ipaddress.ip_address(host).compressed
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except ValueError:
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return host
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def _parse_authority(authority: str) -> Optional[tuple[str, int]]:
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"""(hostname, port) of a Host header or Origin authority; None when malformed (fails closed)."""
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if not authority or any(c in authority for c in "@/\\?# \t"):
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return None
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try:
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parts = urlsplit("//" + authority)
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port = parts.port or 80 # an Origin omits the default port that a Host may spell out
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except ValueError:
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return None
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return (_canonical_host(parts.hostname), port) if parts.hostname else None
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def _is_wildcard(bound: str) -> bool:
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try:
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return bound == "" or ipaddress.ip_address(bound).is_unspecified
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except ValueError:
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return False
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def _local_request_error(
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host_header: str,
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origin: Optional[str],
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fetch_site: Optional[str],
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*,
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wildcard: bool,
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allowed_hosts: frozenset,
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) -> Optional[str]:
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"""Why a request must be refused, or None. The proxy attaches the operator's subscription
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credential to whatever reaches it, so a web page in the operator's browser must not be able
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to drive it: a loopback/specific-IP bind accepts only its own Host names (a DNS-rebound
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hostname fails), and any Origin other than the proxy's own is a cross-site browser request.
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Browsers omit Origin on GET, but they always send ``Sec-Fetch-Site``, which a page cannot
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forge, so it is judged too. Non-browser clients send neither and are unaffected. A wildcard
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bind is an explicit LAN opt-in, so any Host name may reach it; it therefore has no origin of
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its own to match, and a DNS-rebound page is same-origin with its Host, so every page-made
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browser request is refused there."""
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target = _parse_authority(host_header)
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if target is None or (not wildcard and target[0] not in allowed_hosts):
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return "host_not_allowed"
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if origin is not None:
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scheme, sep, rest = origin.strip().partition("://")
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if wildcard or not sep or scheme.lower() != "http" or _parse_authority(rest) != target:
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return "origin_not_allowed"
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trusted_sites = _WILDCARD_FETCH_SITES if wildcard else _UNFORGED_FETCH_SITES
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if fetch_site is not None and fetch_site.strip().lower() not in trusted_sites:
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return "origin_not_allowed"
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return None
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def _filter_headers(headers, drop: frozenset = _HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS) -> dict:
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"""Strip hop-by-hop (+ auth) headers; ``drop`` widens the set for upstream responses."""
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return {key: value for key, value in headers.items() if key.lower() not in drop}
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async def _open_upstream(request: "web.Request", rel_path: str, body: bytes, cred: UpstreamCredential):
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"""Send the request upstream with ``cred``; returns ``(session, response)`` or
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``(error_response, None)``."""
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upstream_url = f"{cred.base_url.rstrip('/')}{rel_path}"
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if request.query_string: # preserved verbatim
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upstream_url = f"{upstream_url}?{request.query_string}"
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fwd_headers = _filter_headers(request.headers)
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fwd_headers["Authorization"] = f"{cred.token_type} {cred.bearer}"
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logger.debug("proxy: forwarding %s %s -> %s (body=%d bytes)", request.method, rel_path, upstream_url, len(body))
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try:
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session = aiohttp.ClientSession(timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=None, sock_connect=15, sock_read=300))
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except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - aiohttp setup issue
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return _json_error(500, f"proxy session init failed: {exc}"), None
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try:
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upstream_resp = await session.request(
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request.method, upstream_url, data=body if body else None, headers=fwd_headers, allow_redirects=False
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)
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except RuntimeError as exc:
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await session.close()
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return _json_error(500, str(exc)), None
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except aiohttp.ClientError as exc:
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await session.close()
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logger.warning("proxy: upstream connection failed: %s", exc)
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return _json_error(502, f"upstream connection failed: {exc}", code="upstream_unreachable"), None
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except asyncio.TimeoutError:
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await session.close()
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return _json_error(504, "upstream request timed out", code="upstream_timeout"), None
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except Exception:
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await session.close()
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raise
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return session, upstream_resp
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async def _stream_back(request: "web.Request", session, upstream_resp) -> "web.StreamResponse":
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"""Relay status + filtered headers, then the body chunk-by-chunk, appending a missing SSE
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``[DONE]`` only after a clean EOF."""
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resp = web.StreamResponse(
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status=upstream_resp.status, headers=_filter_headers(upstream_resp.headers, _RESPONSE_DROP_HEADERS)
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)
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await resp.prepare(request)
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done_tracker: Optional[SseDoneTracker] = None
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if content_type_is_sse(upstream_resp.headers):
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done_tracker = SseDoneTracker()
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try:
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async for chunk in upstream_resp.content.iter_any():
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if chunk:
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if done_tracker is not None:
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done_tracker.feed(chunk)
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await resp.write(chunk)
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if done_tracker is not None and done_tracker.should_append_done():
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try:
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await resp.write(DONE_SSE_FRAME)
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except Exception as exc: # client hung up at EOF — harmless
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logger.debug("proxy: DONE append skipped: %s", exc)
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except (aiohttp.ClientError, asyncio.CancelledError, OSError) as exc:
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if done_tracker is not None:
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done_tracker.mark_interrupted()
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logger.warning("proxy: streaming interrupted: %s", exc)
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finally:
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upstream_resp.release()
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await session.close()
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await resp.write_eof()
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return resp
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def create_app(adapter: UpstreamAdapter, bound_host: str = DEFAULT_HOST) -> "web.Application":
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"""Build the aiohttp application bound to a specific upstream adapter.
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Every adapter method is synchronous and blocking (the Nous adapter takes the 15s cross-process
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``_auth_store_lock()`` and may POST a token refresh; xAI rotates its key pool under a lock),
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so all three are run via ``asyncio.to_thread`` — a contended lock or refresh must never freeze
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the single loop and every other in-flight streaming completion.
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"""
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_require_aiohttp()
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# The bind address is fixed for the app's lifetime, so derive the Host policy once.
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bound = _canonical_host(bound_host.strip("[]"))
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wildcard = _is_wildcard(bound)
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allowed_hosts = _LOOPBACK_HOSTS | {bound}
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@web.middleware
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async def local_only(request: "web.Request", handler):
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refusal = _local_request_error(
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request.headers.get("Host", ""),
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request.headers.get("Origin"),
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request.headers.get("Sec-Fetch-Site"),
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wildcard=wildcard,
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allowed_hosts=allowed_hosts,
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)
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if refusal:
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return _json_error(
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403,
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"Request refused: browser requests and foreign Host names are not accepted by this proxy.",
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code=refusal,
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)
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return await handler(request)
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app = web.Application(client_max_size=MAX_REQUEST_BYTES, middlewares=[local_only])
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# AppKey: forward-compat with aiohttp versions that strip bare-string keys.
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app[web.AppKey("adapter", UpstreamAdapter)] = adapter
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async def handle_health(request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
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authenticated = await asyncio.to_thread(adapter.is_authenticated)
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return web.json_response({"status": "ok", "upstream": adapter.display_name, "authenticated": authenticated})
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async def handle_proxy(request: "web.Request") -> "web.StreamResponse":
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rel_path = "/" + request.match_info.get("tail", "").lstrip("/")
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if rel_path not in adapter.allowed_paths:
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allowed = ", ".join(sorted(adapter.allowed_paths))
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return _json_error(
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404, f"Path /v1{rel_path} is not forwarded by this proxy. Allowed: {allowed}", code="path_not_allowed"
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)
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try:
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cred = await asyncio.to_thread(adapter.get_credential)
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except Exception as exc:
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logger.warning("proxy: credential resolution failed: %s", exc)
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return _json_error(401, str(exc), code="upstream_auth_failed")
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# Body read into memory once (chat/embeddings payloads are small); switch to streaming
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# if large multipart uploads ever need forwarding.
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body = await request.read()
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session, upstream_resp = await _open_upstream(request, rel_path, body, cred)
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if upstream_resp is None:
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return session
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if upstream_resp.status in {401, 429}:
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# One-shot retry with a refreshed/rotated credential (Nous: unconditional refresh
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# POST under the auth lock; xAI: pool rotation).
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try:
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retry_cred = await asyncio.to_thread(
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adapter.get_retry_credential, failed_credential=cred, status_code=upstream_resp.status
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)
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except Exception as exc:
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logger.warning("proxy: retry credential resolution failed: %s", exc)
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retry_cred = None
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if retry_cred is not None:
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upstream_resp.release()
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await session.close()
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session, upstream_resp = await _open_upstream(request, rel_path, body, retry_cred)
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if upstream_resp is None:
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return session
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return await _stream_back(request, session, upstream_resp)
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app.router.add_get("/health", handle_health) # never goes upstream
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app.router.add_route("*", "/v1/{tail:.*}", handle_proxy) # forwards if the path is allowed
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return app
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async def run_server(
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adapter: UpstreamAdapter,
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host: str = DEFAULT_HOST,
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port: int = DEFAULT_PORT,
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shutdown_event: Optional[asyncio.Event] = None,
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) -> None:
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"""Run the proxy in the current event loop until shutdown_event is set."""
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_require_aiohttp()
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app = create_app(adapter, bound_host=host)
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runner = web.AppRunner(app, access_log=None)
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await runner.setup()
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site = web.TCPSite(runner, host=host, port=port)
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await site.start()
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logger.info("proxy: listening on http://%s:%d/v1 -> %s", host, port, adapter.display_name)
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stop_event = shutdown_event or asyncio.Event()
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if shutdown_event is None: # we own the loop's lifetime → wire signal handlers
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loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
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for sig in (signal.SIGINT, signal.SIGTERM):
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try:
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loop.add_signal_handler(sig, stop_event.set) # windows-footgun: ok
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except NotImplementedError:
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pass # Windows / restricted envs — Ctrl+C still raises KeyboardInterrupt
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try:
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await stop_event.wait()
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finally:
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logger.info("proxy: shutting down")
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await runner.cleanup()
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__all__ = ["create_app", "run_server", "DEFAULT_HOST", "DEFAULT_PORT", "AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE"]
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