Files
hermes-agent/hermes_state_gateway.py
beardthelion 1e12c22d3c fix(state): fence recovery boundary and orphan donors to the owning profile
The peer-tuple recovery fallback already filtered candidate sessions by
profile_name, but the NOT EXISTS reset-boundary subquery matched peer
fields only, so in a shared legacy store a sibling profile's newer
session_reset row suppressed this profile's otherwise recoverable
session and the gateway minted a new one, leaving the old transcript
unreachable.

The orphan-repair path had the same scope gap in the other direction:
find_orphaned_gateway_sessions named a keyed donor by lineage or
contiguity with no profile predicate, so a sibling profile's row could
stamp its agent:<ns>: routing identity onto this profile's orphan, and
adopt_orphaned_gateway_session re-verified the pair without checking
profile compatibility.

Boundary rows now carry the same owner predicate as candidates, donors
must share the orphan's effective profile (NULL reads as the store's
own), and the adoption re-verify refuses a cross-profile pair. Stores
outside the profile tree derive no owner and keep the historical
unfenced behavior.
2026-09-28 04:34:30 -07:00

963 lines
54 KiB
Python

"""Gateway-facing SessionDB persistence: routing index, peers, orphans, heartbeats, handoffs.
Mixin bound onto ``SessionDB`` via the MRO; built on its ``_read_ctx`` /
``_execute_write`` / ``_write_sql`` / ``_read_all`` primitives."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import sys
import time
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
from hermes_state_common import (
_RECOVERABLE_END_REASONS_SQL, _RESET_CHILD_SQL, _RESET_END_REASONS_SQL, _sql_json_extract,
_sql_session_last_active)
# Log-record parity with the origin module (caplog tests pin "hermes_state").
logger = logging.getLogger("hermes_state")
# Recursive CTE naming a session plus its compression ancestors (rows a
# resume must keep on one routing peer); branch/delegate/tool/reset rows stop it
# (same membership rule as get_compression_lineage / _CHAIN_STEP_SQL, #114271).
_COMPRESSION_LINEAGE_CTE = f"""
WITH RECURSIVE compression_lineage(id) AS (
SELECT ?
UNION
SELECT parent.id
FROM compression_lineage lineage
JOIN sessions child ON child.id = lineage.id
JOIN sessions parent ON parent.id = child.parent_session_id
WHERE parent.end_reason = 'compression'
AND {_sql_json_extract('child.model_config', '$._branched_from')} IS NULL
AND {_sql_json_extract('child.model_config', '$._delegate_from')} IS NULL
AND NOT ({_RESET_CHILD_SQL.format(a='child')})
AND COALESCE(child.source, '') != 'tool'
)
"""
# Projection shared by both peer-recovery queries (exact key, then peer tuple).
_PEER_SELECT_HEAD = """
SELECT s.*,
COALESCE(sp.prompt, s.system_prompt)
AS _system_prompt_resolved,
(COALESCE(s.message_count, 0) > 0 OR EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM messages WHERE messages.session_id = s.id LIMIT 1
)) AS _has_messages
FROM sessions s
LEFT JOIN system_prompts sp ON sp.hash = s.system_prompt_hash
"""
# A row a *completed handoff* owns stays recoverable whatever end_reason it carries: the source
# interface's teardown runs AFTER ownership moved to the destination and can stamp a terminal reason
# (``cli_close``) before the destination's first reply — the row must survive that race or the
# handed-off leg is orphaned and a fresh empty session is minted in its place. A later DELIBERATE
# close is still fenced the ordinary way: a reset-boundary row ended after this row's last activity
# blocks recovery (the NOT EXISTS below). ``pending``/``failed``/NULL handoffs are untouched, so this
# is strictly "ownership was transferred", never "a handoff was attempted".
_HANDOFF_OWNED_ROW_SQL = "(s.handoff_state = 'completed')"
_PEER_BY_KEY_SQL = f"""{_PEER_SELECT_HEAD} WHERE s.session_key = ?
AND s.source = ?
AND (s.ended_at IS NULL OR s.end_reason IN ({_RECOVERABLE_END_REASONS_SQL})
OR {_HANDOFF_OWNED_ROW_SQL})
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM sessions b
WHERE b.session_key = s.session_key
AND b.source = s.source
AND b.ended_at IS NOT NULL
AND b.end_reason IN ({_RESET_END_REASONS_SQL})
AND b.ended_at
> COALESCE(s.last_activity_at, s.started_at)
)
ORDER BY _has_messages DESC,
COALESCE(s.last_activity_at, s.started_at) DESC
LIMIT 1
"""
_PEER_BY_TUPLE_SQL = f"""{_PEER_SELECT_HEAD} WHERE s.source = ?
AND COALESCE(s.user_id, '') = COALESCE(?, '')
AND COALESCE(s.chat_id, '') = COALESCE(?, '')
AND COALESCE(s.chat_type, '') = COALESCE(?, '')
AND COALESCE(s.thread_id, '') = COALESCE(?, '')
AND (? IS NULL OR COALESCE(s.profile_name, ?) = ?)
AND (s.ended_at IS NULL OR s.end_reason IN ({_RECOVERABLE_END_REASONS_SQL})
OR {_HANDOFF_OWNED_ROW_SQL})
AND (COALESCE(s.message_count, 0) > 0 OR EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM messages WHERE messages.session_id = s.id LIMIT 1
))
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM sessions b
WHERE b.source = s.source
AND COALESCE(b.user_id, '') = COALESCE(s.user_id, '')
AND COALESCE(b.chat_id, '') = COALESCE(s.chat_id, '')
AND COALESCE(b.chat_type, '') = COALESCE(s.chat_type, '')
AND COALESCE(b.thread_id, '') = COALESCE(s.thread_id, '')
AND (? IS NULL OR COALESCE(b.profile_name, ?) = ?)
AND b.ended_at IS NOT NULL
AND b.end_reason IN ({_RESET_END_REASONS_SQL})
AND b.ended_at
> COALESCE(s.last_activity_at, s.started_at)
)
ORDER BY COALESCE(s.last_activity_at, s.started_at) DESC
LIMIT 1
"""
_ORPHAN_DONOR_COLUMNS = (
"d.id, d.session_key, d.chat_id, d.chat_type, d.thread_id, "
"d.user_id, d.origin_json, d.display_name, d.end_reason"
)
_ORPHANS_SQL = f"""
SELECT o.id, o.source, o.user_id, o.started_at,
o.parent_session_id, o.profile_name,
{_sql_session_last_active("o")} AS last_active,
(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM messages m
WHERE m.session_id = o.id) AS message_count
FROM sessions o
WHERE o.session_key IS NULL
AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages m
WHERE m.session_id = o.id)
AND COALESCE(o.source, '') != 'tool'
AND {_sql_json_extract('o.model_config', '$._branched_from')} IS NULL
AND {_sql_json_extract('o.model_config', '$._delegate_from')} IS NULL
ORDER BY o.started_at ASC
"""
# Donor profile fence: the donor's effective profile (NULL reads as the store's own, the same convention
# the peer-tuple recovery predicate uses) must equal the orphan's. A sibling profile's keyed row in a
# shared legacy store would otherwise stamp its ``agent:<other>:`` routing identity onto this profile's
# orphan. Stores outside the profile tree derive no owner and keep the historical unfenced behavior.
_ORPHAN_DONOR_PROFILE_FENCE_SQL = "AND (? IS NULL OR COALESCE(d.profile_name, ?) = ?)"
_ORPHAN_LINEAGE_DONOR_SQL = f"""
SELECT {_ORPHAN_DONOR_COLUMNS}
FROM sessions d
WHERE d.id = ?
AND d.session_key IS NOT NULL
AND COALESCE(d.source, '') = COALESCE(?, '')
{_ORPHAN_DONOR_PROFILE_FENCE_SQL}
"""
_ORPHAN_CONTIGUITY_DONORS_SQL = f"""
SELECT {_ORPHAN_DONOR_COLUMNS}, {_sql_session_last_active("d")} AS last_active
FROM sessions d
WHERE d.session_key IS NOT NULL
AND d.id != ?
AND COALESCE(d.source, '') = COALESCE(?, '')
AND (COALESCE(d.user_id, '') = ''
OR COALESCE(?, '') = ''
OR d.user_id = ?)
AND {_sql_session_last_active("d")} BETWEEN ? AND ?
AND {_sql_session_last_active("d")} < ?
{_ORPHAN_DONOR_PROFILE_FENCE_SQL}
ORDER BY last_active DESC
LIMIT 2
"""
_OPTIONAL_TABLE_NAMES = (
"telegram_dm_topic_mode", "telegram_dm_topic_bindings", "delivery_obligations")
def _optional_table_columns(conn) -> Dict[str, Set[str]]:
"""Live column sets of the lazily-created tables that exist (``{}`` when none do).
``apply_telegram_topic_migration`` runs only on explicit ``/topic`` opt-in, so a store
can hold supported v1/v2 tables without ``profile_name`` for its whole life; likewise the
delivery ledger adds ``delivery_obligations.adapter_profile`` only when a gateway opens
it. Identity settlement must gate its column SQL on the column actually being there
rather than on table existence, and must not force those migrations (#113757).
"""
existing = {row[0] for row in conn.execute(
"SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name IN (?, ?, ?)",
_OPTIONAL_TABLE_NAMES)}
return {
table: {row[1] for row in conn.execute(f"PRAGMA table_info('{table}')")}
for table in _OPTIONAL_TABLE_NAMES if table in existing
}
_HANDOFF_FAIL_SQL = "UPDATE sessions SET handoff_state = 'failed', handoff_error = ? WHERE "
class SessionGatewayMixin:
"""Routing index, session peers/orphans, hygiene streaks, heartbeats, handoffs."""
def _reap_inactive_orphan_desktop_holders(
self, holders: List[Tuple[int, str]], *, min_age_seconds: float) -> List[int]:
"""Terminate old PPID-1 Desktop ephemeral backends with no client.
Fails closed: anything whose parent, age, argv, or network connections
cannot be proved safe remains a repair-blocking holder."""
from hermes_state import psutil
from hermes_state_dbfile import _concrete_state_db_holder_pids, _is_inactive_orphan_desktop_holder
if not sys.platform.startswith("linux") or psutil is None:
return []
try:
from hermes_cli.dashboard_procs import _is_ephemeral_port_zero_backend
except Exception:
return []
now = time.time()
candidates = []
for pid in _concrete_state_db_holder_pids(self.db_path, holders):
try:
process = psutil.Process(pid)
statuses = [conn.status for conn in process.net_connections(kind="inet")]
if not _is_inactive_orphan_desktop_holder(
ppid=process.ppid(), age_seconds=now - process.create_time(),
min_age_seconds=min_age_seconds,
ephemeral_backend=_is_ephemeral_port_zero_backend(process.cmdline()),
connection_statuses=statuses):
continue
except Exception:
continue
candidates.append(process)
signalled: List[int] = []
for process in candidates:
try:
process.terminate()
signalled.append(process.pid)
except (psutil.Error, OSError):
continue
if not signalled:
return []
try:
_gone, alive = psutil.wait_procs(candidates, timeout=1.5)
except Exception:
alive = []
for process in alive:
try:
process.kill()
except (psutil.Error, OSError):
continue
if alive:
try:
psutil.wait_procs(alive, timeout=1.5)
except Exception:
pass
return signalled
def record_gateway_session_peer(
self, session_id: str, *, source: str, user_id: str = None, session_key: str = None,
chat_id: str = None, chat_type: str = None, thread_id: str = None, display_name: str = None,
origin_json: str = None, include_compression_ancestors: bool = False,
transport_profile: str = None) -> None:
"""Persist the gateway routing peer for an existing session row. ``display_name`` / ``origin_json``:
``None`` leaves the stored value untouched (consumers read routing data from state.db, not
sessions.json). ``include_compression_ancestors`` keeps a compression lineage on one routing peer
when an explicit resume moves its tip to another lane; per-turn refreshes update only the supplied
row. Self-healing: a missing target row (deferred ``create_session`` write, or crash between routing
publication and row creation) is INSERTed with full identity rather than no-opped, so a gateway row
is never first-created by the identity-less lazy writer (``update_token_counts``) and left
unroutable forever.
See #9006.
"""
if not session_id or not session_key:
return
identity = (
session_key, source, user_id, chat_id, chat_type, thread_id, display_name, origin_json,
transport_profile)
ancestors = include_compression_ancestors
query_params = [session_id, *identity] if ancestors else [*identity, session_id]
def _do(conn):
conn.execute(
f"""{_COMPRESSION_LINEAGE_CTE if ancestors else ""}
UPDATE sessions
SET session_key = ?, source = ?, user_id = ?, chat_id = ?,
chat_type = ?, thread_id = ?,
display_name = COALESCE(?, display_name),
origin_json = COALESCE(?, origin_json),
transport_profile = COALESCE(?, transport_profile)
{"WHERE id IN (SELECT id FROM compression_lineage)" if ancestors else "WHERE id = ?"}""",
query_params,
)
if ancestors:
return
# The UPDATE silently no-ops on a missing row — insert it with full identity.
if conn.execute("SELECT 1 FROM sessions WHERE id = ? LIMIT 1", (session_id,)).fetchone() is None:
conn.execute(
"""INSERT INTO sessions (
id, source, created_source, user_id, session_key, chat_id,
chat_type, thread_id, display_name, origin_json,
profile_name, transport_profile, started_at
)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(id) DO UPDATE SET
session_key = COALESCE(sessions.session_key, excluded.session_key),
chat_id = COALESCE(sessions.chat_id, excluded.chat_id),
chat_type = COALESCE(sessions.chat_type, excluded.chat_type),
thread_id = COALESCE(sessions.thread_id, excluded.thread_id),
display_name = COALESCE(sessions.display_name, excluded.display_name),
origin_json = COALESCE(sessions.origin_json, excluded.origin_json),
transport_profile = COALESCE(sessions.transport_profile, excluded.transport_profile),
created_source = COALESCE(sessions.created_source, excluded.created_source)""",
# Same ownership stamp as _insert_session_row: an unowned (NULL) row
# vanishes from profile-keyed consumers.
(session_id, source, source, user_id, session_key, chat_id, chat_type, thread_id, display_name,
origin_json, self._own_profile_name(), transport_profile, time.time()),
)
self._execute_write(_do)
def save_gateway_routing_entry(self, session_key: str, entry_json: str, *, scope: str = "") -> None:
"""Upsert one gateway routing entry (session_key -> SessionEntry JSON); ``scope``
namespaces the index per sessions_dir so two stores never share routing state."""
if not session_key or not entry_json:
return
self._write_sql(
"""INSERT INTO gateway_routing (scope, session_key, entry_json, updated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(scope, session_key) DO UPDATE SET
entry_json = excluded.entry_json,
updated_at = excluded.updated_at""",
(scope, session_key, entry_json, time.time()),
)
def replace_gateway_routing_entries(self, entries: Dict[str, str], *, scope: str = "") -> None:
"""Atomically replace the routing index for *scope* (keys absent from *entries*
are removed); other scopes untouched."""
now = time.time()
def _do(conn):
conn.execute("DELETE FROM gateway_routing WHERE scope = ?", (scope,))
if entries:
conn.executemany(
"INSERT INTO gateway_routing (scope, session_key, entry_json, updated_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
[(scope, k, v, now) for k, v in entries.items() if k and v])
self._execute_write(_do)
def load_gateway_routing_entries(self, *, scope: str = "") -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Load routing entries for *scope* as {session_key: entry_json}."""
rows = self._read_all("SELECT session_key, entry_json FROM gateway_routing WHERE scope = ?", (scope,))
return {r["session_key"]: r["entry_json"] for r in rows}
def list_never_active_keyed_sessions(self, *, older_than_days: float) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Keyed, still-open rows with no evidence of a single turn (no messages, tokens, tool/API calls,
activity, or title): leaked fixtures or chats routed but never answered. Safe to drop — the gateway
mints a fresh session on the next message. Needs its own selector because ``bulk prune``/``archive``
are pinned to ``ended_at IS NOT NULL``. ``pinned``/``archived`` = explicit keep intent.
That is exactly the shape of a leaked test fixture (#82770) — and also of a chat that was routed but
never answered.
"""
if older_than_days < 0:
raise ValueError(
f"older_than_days must be >= 0, got {older_than_days!r}: a negative "
"retention builds a future cutoff that matches every never-active keyed row.")
cutoff = time.time() - (float(older_than_days) * 86400.0)
rows = self._read_all(
"""
SELECT s.id, s.session_key, s.source, s.chat_id,
s.chat_type, s.user_id, s.started_at
FROM sessions s
WHERE s.session_key IS NOT NULL
AND s.ended_at IS NULL
AND s.title IS NULL
AND s.last_activity_at IS NULL
AND COALESCE(s.message_count, 0) = 0
AND COALESCE(s.tool_call_count, 0) = 0
AND COALESCE(s.api_call_count, 0) = 0
AND COALESCE(s.input_tokens, 0) = 0
AND COALESCE(s.output_tokens, 0) = 0
AND COALESCE(s.pinned, 0) = 0
AND COALESCE(s.archived, 0) = 0
AND s.started_at IS NOT NULL
AND s.started_at < ?
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM messages m WHERE m.session_id = s.id
)
ORDER BY s.started_at
""",
(cutoff,),
)
return [dict(r) for r in rows]
def gateway_routing_entry_for_session(self, session_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""The routing entry (any scope) whose current owner is *session_id*, or None. The id lives
only inside ``entry_json``, so matching is done in Python; an archived/rotated row has none."""
for row in self._read_all("SELECT entry_json FROM gateway_routing"):
try:
entry = json.loads(row["entry_json"] or "{}")
except Exception:
continue
if isinstance(entry, dict) and entry.get("session_id") == session_id:
return entry
return None
def _delete_routing_entries_for_sessions(self, session_ids: Set[str]) -> int:
"""Drop ``gateway_routing`` rows pointing at any of *session_ids*; the target id
lives only inside ``entry_json``, so matching is done in Python over all scopes."""
if not session_ids:
return 0
doomed: List[Tuple[str, str]] = []
for row in self._read_all("SELECT scope, session_key, entry_json FROM gateway_routing"):
try:
entry = json.loads(row["entry_json"] or "{}")
except Exception:
continue
if isinstance(entry, dict) and entry.get("session_id") in session_ids:
doomed.append((row["scope"], row["session_key"]))
if not doomed:
return 0
self._write_sql("DELETE FROM gateway_routing WHERE scope = ? AND session_key = ?", doomed, many=True)
return len(doomed)
def prune_never_active_keyed_sessions(
self, *, older_than_days: float, sessions_dir: Optional[Path] = None) -> Tuple[int, int]:
"""Delete never-active keyed rows and the routing entries naming them; returns
``(sessions_deleted, routing_entries_deleted)``. Routing entries go first: a stale
entry outliving its target would have the gateway resume a nonexistent id.
Deletion goes through :meth:`delete_session` (delegate cascade, FTS, transcripts)."""
candidates = self.list_never_active_keyed_sessions(older_than_days=older_than_days)
if not candidates:
return (0, 0)
ids = {str(row["id"]) for row in candidates}
routing_deleted = self._delete_routing_entries_for_sessions(ids)
deleted = sum(1 for sid in ids if self.delete_session(sid, sessions_dir=sessions_dir))
return (deleted, routing_deleted)
def list_gateway_sessions(
self, *, platform: Optional[str] = None, active_only: bool = True) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""List gateway sessions (rows with a session_key): newest row per key, one live
mapping per routing key. ``platform`` filters on ``source``."""
# Full rows carry token/cost totals — drain queued async accounting deltas first.
self.flush_token_counts()
query = f"""
SELECT sessions.*,
COALESCE(sp.prompt, sessions.system_prompt)
AS _system_prompt_resolved,
{_sql_session_last_active("sessions")} AS last_active
FROM sessions
LEFT JOIN system_prompts sp
ON sp.hash = sessions.system_prompt_hash
WHERE session_key IS NOT NULL
AND started_at = (
SELECT MAX(s2.started_at) FROM sessions s2
WHERE s2.session_key = sessions.session_key
)
"""
params: list = [platform] if platform else []
query += (" AND LOWER(source) = LOWER(?)" if platform else "") + (
" AND ended_at IS NULL" if active_only else "") + " ORDER BY last_active DESC"
return [self._session_row_dict(r) for r in self._read_all(query, params)]
def find_latest_gateway_session_for_peer(
self, *, source: str, user_id: Optional[str] = None, session_key: Optional[str] = None,
chat_id: Optional[str] = None, chat_type: Optional[str] = None, thread_id: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Find the latest recoverable gateway session for a routing peer. The durable ``session_key`` on the row rebuilds a missing/pruned ``sessions.json`` mapping. Rows
ended only by the old ``agent_close`` bug or a mistaken TUI ``ws_orphan_reap`` are recoverable;
explicit boundaries (/new, /resume switches, compression splits) are not. Ranked by
``last_activity_at`` (fallback ``started_at`` — alone it resurrected days-old zombies); rows with
messages win, but an empty keyed row still beats ``None`` (which mints a new id while the transcript
may live under a compression child). Reset fence: a candidate is rejected when a peer boundary row
ended *after* its last activity, or the has-messages ranking could reach behind a /new. The
exact-key fallback requires the complete peer tuple (never cross chats/threads/users) plus a profile
fence: a Telegram DM's tuple is identical for every bot, so a sibling profile's legacy row would
otherwise be adopted. Ours = profile_name is the owner or NULL; stores outside the profile tree
derive no owner and stay unfenced.
See #60609.
Reset boundaries fence recovery (#68539): an intentional boundary such as ``session_reset`` (or any
explicit non-recoverable end_reason) must block fallback to an *older* row for the same peer. Each
candidate is therefore rejected when a boundary row for the peer ended *after* the candidate's last
activity — if the conversation's most recent event is an intentional reset, recovery returns nothing
rather than reaching behind it. The boundary row carries the same profile predicate as the
candidate: a sibling profile's reset must not suppress this profile's recovery.
"""
if not session_key:
return None
with self._read_ctx() as conn:
row = conn.execute(_PEER_BY_KEY_SQL, (session_key, source)).fetchone()
if row is not None:
return self._session_row_dict(row)
if chat_id is None or chat_type is None:
return None
# Profile fence (#74285): a Telegram DM's peer tuple is identical for every bot (chat_id ==
# user_id, no thread), so a sibling profile's row written into this store before the per-profile
# partition (legacy data) would otherwise be adopted here. Every profile-tree store has one
# owner; a row is ours when its profile_name is the owner or NULL (legacy rows this store
# minted). Stores outside the tree derive no owner and keep the historical unfenced behavior.
owner = self._own_profile_name()
row = conn.execute(
_PEER_BY_TUPLE_SQL,
(source, user_id, chat_id, chat_type, thread_id, owner, owner, owner, owner, owner, owner),
).fetchone()
return self._session_row_dict(row) if row else None
def find_orphaned_gateway_sessions(self, *, max_gap_s: Optional[float] = None) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Report message-bearing rows that lost their routing identity (messages, no ``session_key``).
Adoptable only when exactly one keyed predecessor can be named: ``lineage`` (``parent_session_id``
is a keyed row of the same source; no time window) or ``contiguity`` (exactly one keyed same-source
row with compatible ``user_id`` fell quiet within *max_gap_s* of the orphan's start and is older
than its last activity). Ambiguity is reported ``adoptable=False`` with a reason, never guessed —
mis-adopting splices one person's conversation into another's chat. The donor must share the
orphan's effective profile (NULL reads as this store's own): a sibling profile's keyed row in a
shared legacy store must never stamp its routing identity here. Branch/delegate/tool rows are
excluded: unkeyed by design, not damage."""
gap = self._ORPHAN_ADOPTION_MAX_GAP_S if max_gap_s is None else float(max_gap_s)
owner = self._own_profile_name()
records: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
with self._read_ctx() as conn:
for orphan in conn.execute(_ORPHANS_SQL).fetchall():
donor = None
reason = ""
orphan_owner = orphan["profile_name"] or owner
if orphan["parent_session_id"]:
evidence = "lineage"
donor = conn.execute(
_ORPHAN_LINEAGE_DONOR_SQL,
(orphan["parent_session_id"], orphan["source"], owner, owner, orphan_owner),
).fetchone()
if donor is None:
reason = "parent session carries no gateway identity of this source"
else:
evidence = "contiguity"
started = orphan["started_at"] or 0
candidates = conn.execute(
_ORPHAN_CONTIGUITY_DONORS_SQL,
(orphan["id"], orphan["source"], orphan["user_id"], orphan["user_id"],
started - gap, started + gap, orphan["last_active"],
owner, owner, orphan_owner),
).fetchall()
if not candidates:
reason = f"no keyed predecessor fell quiet within {gap:.0f}s of this session's start"
elif len(candidates) > 1:
reason = "ambiguous: more than one keyed predecessor matches this window"
else:
donor = candidates[0]
records.append({
"orphan_id": orphan["id"], "source": orphan["source"],
"message_count": orphan["message_count"], "started_at": orphan["started_at"],
"last_active": orphan["last_active"], "donor_id": donor["id"] if donor else None,
"session_key": donor["session_key"] if donor else None,
"evidence": evidence if donor else "", "adoptable": donor is not None, "reason": reason})
# Two unkeyed successors claiming one predecessor: at most one continues that chat.
contested = {
r["donor_id"] for r in records
if r["adoptable"] and sum(1 for x in records if x["donor_id"] == r["donor_id"]) > 1
}
for record in records:
if record["donor_id"] in contested:
record["adoptable"] = False
record["reason"] = "ambiguous: more than one unkeyed session claims this predecessor"
return records
def adopt_orphaned_gateway_session(self, orphan_id: str, donor_id: str) -> bool:
"""Stamp *orphan_id* with *donor_id*'s routing identity, retire *donor_id*.
Re-verifies the pair inside the write txn so a concurrent gateway that healed
either row makes this a no-op. Non-NULL orphan columns are preserved."""
if not orphan_id or not donor_id or orphan_id == donor_id:
return False
owner = self._own_profile_name()
def _do(conn):
donor = conn.execute(
"SELECT session_key, chat_id, chat_type, thread_id, user_id, "
"origin_json, display_name, source, profile_name FROM sessions WHERE id = ?",
(donor_id,),
).fetchone()
orphan = conn.execute(
"SELECT session_key, source, profile_name FROM sessions WHERE id = ?",
(orphan_id,)).fetchone()
if (donor is None or orphan is None or not donor["session_key"] or orphan["session_key"]
or (donor["source"] or "") != (orphan["source"] or "")
or (owner is not None
and (donor["profile_name"] or owner) != (orphan["profile_name"] or owner))):
return False
# Belt-and-suspenders for gateway routing metadata (#59527): the gateway re-records the peer on
# the child after rotation (d5b4879d4), but a hard crash between child creation and that write
# leaves the child row without origin columns, so ``find_latest_gateway_session_for_peer`` can't
# recover the mapping on restart. Inherit them from the parent at creation time — but ONLY for
# compression forks (parent already ended with end_reason='compression'). Delegate/subagent
# children are spawned while the parent is still live and must NOT inherit routing keys, or peer
# recovery could repoint gateway traffic into a subagent's session.
conn.execute(
"""UPDATE sessions
SET session_key = ?,
chat_id = COALESCE(chat_id, ?),
chat_type = COALESCE(chat_type, ?),
thread_id = COALESCE(thread_id, ?),
user_id = COALESCE(user_id, ?),
origin_json = COALESCE(origin_json, ?),
display_name = COALESCE(display_name, ?),
parent_session_id = COALESCE(parent_session_id, ?)
WHERE id = ? AND session_key IS NULL""",
(donor["session_key"], donor["chat_id"], donor["chat_type"], donor["thread_id"],
donor["user_id"], donor["origin_json"], donor["display_name"], donor_id, orphan_id),
)
# Retire under a reason recovery does NOT treat as resumable — 'agent_close' /
# 'ws_orphan_reap' would keep it in the running and the orphan could lose the chat again.
conn.execute(
"UPDATE sessions SET ended_at = COALESCE(ended_at, ?), "
"end_reason = 'superseded_by_repair' WHERE id = ?",
(time.time(), donor_id))
return True
return self._execute_write(_do)
def increment_hygiene_failure_streak(self, session_key: str) -> int:
"""Atomically increment the session-hygiene failure streak for one chat."""
if not session_key:
return 1
def _do(conn):
conn.execute(
"""INSERT INTO gateway_hygiene_state (session_key, failure_streak)
VALUES (?, 1)
ON CONFLICT(session_key) DO UPDATE SET
failure_streak = gateway_hygiene_state.failure_streak + 1""",
(session_key,),
)
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT failure_streak FROM gateway_hygiene_state WHERE session_key = ?", (session_key,),
).fetchone()
return int(row[0])
return self._execute_write(_do)
def reset_hygiene_failure_streak(self, session_key: str) -> None:
"""Clear the persisted session-hygiene failure streak for one chat."""
if not session_key:
return
self._write_sql("DELETE FROM gateway_hygiene_state WHERE session_key = ?", (session_key,))
def rekey_profile_state(self, old_name: str, new_name: str) -> Dict[str, int]:
"""Atomically rewrite exact profile identity in this state database."""
old, new = (old_name or "").strip(), (new_name or "").strip()
counts: Dict[str, int] = {}
if not old or not new or old == new:
return counts
old_ns, new_ns = f"agent:{old}:", f"agent:{new}:"
ns_len = len(old_ns)
def _do(conn):
existing = {row[0] for row in conn.execute(
"SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'").fetchall()}
topic_columns = _optional_table_columns(conn)
collision = conn.execute(
"SELECT old.scope, ? || substr(old.session_key, ?) "
"FROM gateway_routing AS old JOIN gateway_routing AS target "
"ON target.scope = old.scope "
"AND target.session_key = ? || substr(old.session_key, ?) "
"WHERE substr(old.session_key, 1, ?) = ? LIMIT 1",
(new_ns, ns_len + 1, new_ns, ns_len + 1, ns_len, old_ns),
).fetchone()
if collision is not None:
raise ValueError(
f"profile routing collision in scope {collision[0]!r}: {collision[1]!r}")
for table, columns in (
("telegram_dm_topic_mode", ("chat_id",)),
("telegram_dm_topic_bindings", ("chat_id", "thread_id")),
):
if "profile_name" not in topic_columns.get(table, set()):
continue
equality = " AND ".join(
f"target.{column} = old.{column}" for column in columns)
collision = conn.execute(
f"SELECT 1 FROM {table} AS old JOIN {table} AS target "
f"ON target.profile_name = ? AND {equality} "
"WHERE old.profile_name = ? LIMIT 1", (new, old)).fetchone()
if collision is not None:
raise ValueError(f"profile identity collision in {table}")
counts["sessions_profile_name"] = conn.execute(
"UPDATE sessions SET profile_name = ? WHERE profile_name = ?", (new, old)).rowcount
counts["gateway_heartbeats_profile"] = conn.execute(
"UPDATE gateway_heartbeats SET profile = ? WHERE profile = ?", (new, old)).rowcount
counts["sessions_session_key"] = conn.execute(
"UPDATE sessions SET session_key = ? || substr(session_key, ?) "
"WHERE substr(session_key, 1, ?) = ?",
(new_ns, ns_len + 1, ns_len, old_ns)).rowcount
origin_count = 0
for session_id, origin_json in conn.execute(
"SELECT id, origin_json FROM sessions WHERE origin_json IS NOT NULL").fetchall():
try:
payload = json.loads(origin_json)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
continue
if isinstance(payload, dict) and payload.get("profile") == old:
payload["profile"] = new
conn.execute("UPDATE sessions SET origin_json = ? WHERE id = ?",
(json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False), session_id))
origin_count += 1
counts["sessions_origin_json"] = origin_count
if "delivery_obligations" in existing:
if "adapter_profile" in topic_columns.get("delivery_obligations", set()):
counts["delivery_obligations_adapter_profile"] = conn.execute(
"UPDATE delivery_obligations SET adapter_profile = ? WHERE adapter_profile = ?",
(new, old)).rowcount
counts["delivery_obligations_session_key"] = conn.execute(
"UPDATE delivery_obligations SET session_key = ? || substr(session_key, ?) "
"WHERE substr(session_key, 1, ?) = ?",
(new_ns, ns_len + 1, ns_len, old_ns)).rowcount
for table in ("telegram_dm_topic_mode", "telegram_dm_topic_bindings"):
if "profile_name" in topic_columns.get(table, set()):
counts[f"{table}_profile_name"] = conn.execute(
f"UPDATE {table} SET profile_name = ? WHERE profile_name = ?",
(new, old)).rowcount
if "session_key" in topic_columns.get("telegram_dm_topic_bindings", set()):
counts["telegram_dm_topic_bindings_session_key"] = conn.execute(
"UPDATE telegram_dm_topic_bindings "
"SET session_key = ? || substr(session_key, ?) "
"WHERE substr(session_key, 1, ?) = ?",
(new_ns, ns_len + 1, ns_len, old_ns)).rowcount
routing = conn.execute(
"SELECT rowid, session_key, entry_json FROM gateway_routing "
"WHERE substr(session_key, 1, ?) = ?", (ns_len, old_ns)).fetchall()
for rowid, session_key, entry_json in routing:
new_session_key = new_ns + session_key[ns_len:]
new_json = entry_json
if entry_json:
try:
payload = json.loads(entry_json)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
payload = None
if isinstance(payload, dict):
if isinstance(payload.get("session_key"), str) and payload["session_key"].startswith(old_ns):
payload["session_key"] = new_ns + payload["session_key"][ns_len:]
origin = payload.get("origin")
if isinstance(origin, dict) and origin.get("profile") == old:
origin["profile"] = new
new_json = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False)
conn.execute(
"UPDATE gateway_routing SET session_key = ?, entry_json = ? WHERE rowid = ?",
(new_session_key, new_json, rowid))
counts["gateway_routing"] = len(routing)
self._execute_write(_do)
return counts
def purge_profile_state(self, profile: str) -> Dict[str, int]:
"""Delete exact profile identity from this state database (#111926, delete side).
The mirror of :meth:`rekey_profile_state`: a rename must rekey a profile's identity, a
delete must purge it. ``agent:<name>:*`` routing keys, ``gateway_heartbeats.profile``,
``delivery_obligations`` and the telegram topic tables are bookkeeping for a profile that
no longer exists — left behind, every inbound event on a chat keyed to the deleted name
enters the routing index, resolves a profile whose directory is gone, and logs
``Profile '<name>' does not exist`` on each event for the life of the store.
What each store gets, and why:
* Routing keys and heartbeat rows are hard-deleted — pure bookkeeping for a dead name.
* ``delivery_obligations`` rows are **terminalized** (``state='abandoned'``), not deleted:
a pending obligation is delivery state that should not vanish silently, and the ledger's
own retention prunes abandoned rows. Delivered history is left as it was.
* ``sessions`` rows are not deleted here: this helper settles identity, not history, and it
does not decide what a delete leaves of a profile's conversation record — ``delete_profile``
removes the profile's own home, ``state.db`` included, with the directory. Rows in a shared
store keep whatever ownership they had; re-binding or archiving them belongs to the flow
that recreates the name, not to this purge.
Idempotent.
"""
name = (profile or "").strip()
counts: Dict[str, int] = {}
if not name:
return counts
ns, ns_len = f"agent:{name}:", len(f"agent:{name}:")
def _do(conn):
existing = {row[0] for row in conn.execute(
"SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'").fetchall()}
topic_columns = _optional_table_columns(conn)
if "gateway_routing" in existing:
counts["gateway_routing"] = conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM gateway_routing WHERE substr(session_key, 1, ?) = ?",
(ns_len, ns)).rowcount
if "gateway_heartbeats" in existing:
counts["gateway_heartbeats"] = conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM gateway_heartbeats WHERE profile = ?", (name,)).rowcount
if "delivery_obligations" in existing:
# Terminalize, never hard-delete: a pending obligation is delivery state someone may
# still care about, and the ledger's own retention prunes abandoned rows. Only
# non-terminal rows are touched — delivered history is left exactly as it was.
# A ledger created before ``adapter_profile`` existed matches on namespace alone.
by_profile = ("adapter_profile = ? OR "
if "adapter_profile" in topic_columns.get("delivery_obligations", set())
else "")
params = (time.time(), name, ns_len, ns) if by_profile else (time.time(), ns_len, ns)
counts["delivery_obligations"] = conn.execute(
"UPDATE delivery_obligations SET state='abandoned', updated_at=? "
f"WHERE ({by_profile}substr(session_key, 1, ?) = ?) "
"AND state NOT IN ('delivered', 'abandoned')", params).rowcount
if "profile_name" in topic_columns.get("telegram_dm_topic_mode", set()):
counts["telegram_dm_topic_mode"] = conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM telegram_dm_topic_mode WHERE profile_name = ?", (name,)).rowcount
binding_columns = topic_columns.get("telegram_dm_topic_bindings", set())
if "session_key" in binding_columns:
# A rename rewrites a binding's session_key namespace as well as its profile_name
# (:meth:`rekey_profile_state`), so matching on one alone leaves the other behind.
# Legacy v1/v2 bindings have no profile_name but keep the ``agent:<name>:`` namespace
# in session_key, so the namespace match alone is the exact cleanup there.
by_profile = "profile_name = ? OR " if "profile_name" in binding_columns else ""
params = (name, ns_len, ns) if by_profile else (ns_len, ns)
counts["telegram_dm_topic_bindings"] = conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM telegram_dm_topic_bindings "
f"WHERE {by_profile}substr(session_key, 1, ?) = ?", params).rowcount
self._execute_write(_do)
return counts
@staticmethod
def session_gateway_runtime(session_meta: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Read the persisted runtime route off a session row dict (``model_config`` as
JSON string or parsed dict). Precedence: nested ``gateway_runtime`` (gateway sync /
CLI ``/model``), then top-level ``provider``/``base_url``/``api_mode`` (TUI), with
``billing_provider`` filling a missing provider so sessions that never ran ``/model``
still restore the provider that served them. Empty dict on parse failure — resume uses ambient config."""
from hermes_state import _BARE_BILLING_PROVIDERS
raw = (session_meta or {}).get("model_config")
if isinstance(raw, str):
try:
raw = json.loads(raw)
except Exception:
raw = {}
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raw = {}
runtime = raw.get("gateway_runtime")
# Filter None: the persist path writes or-None to trigger deletion in the top-level
# merge, but gateway_runtime is replaced whole (not deep-merged), so None survives here.
if isinstance(runtime, dict) and runtime.get("provider"):
return {k: v for k, v in runtime.items() if v is not None}
top_level = {key: raw.get(key) for key in ("provider", "base_url", "api_mode") if raw.get(key)}
# billing_provider is COALESCE-written on the first accounted API call — the only durable
# record for sessions that never ran /model. Bare buckets ("auto"/"custom") are not
# routable identities; filter them so resume falls back to the ambient default.
billing_provider = str((session_meta or {}).get("billing_provider") or "").strip()
if billing_provider and billing_provider.lower() not in _BARE_BILLING_PROVIDERS:
top_level.setdefault("provider", billing_provider)
if top_level:
return top_level
if not isinstance(runtime, dict):
return {}
return {k: v for k, v in runtime.items() if v is not None}
def register_backend_heartbeat(
self, *, backend_id: str, pid: int, started_at: float, last_heartbeat: Optional[float] = None,
profile: str = "", host: str = "") -> None:
"""Upsert this backend's liveness row. ``backend_id`` MUST be stable for the process
lifetime (e.g. ``f"{profile}@{host}:{pid}"``) so a respawn cannot inherit a dead
predecessor's heartbeat; ``started_at`` is when THIS process started, so a backend
whose previous run died is not mistaken for a freshly-spawned sibling."""
if not backend_id:
return
ts = time.time() if last_heartbeat is None else float(last_heartbeat)
self._write_sql(
"INSERT INTO gateway_heartbeats (backend_id, pid, started_at, last_heartbeat, profile, host)"
" VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?) ON CONFLICT(backend_id) DO UPDATE SET pid = excluded.pid,"
" started_at = excluded.started_at, last_heartbeat = excluded.last_heartbeat,"
" profile = excluded.profile, host = excluded.host",
(str(backend_id), int(pid), float(started_at), ts, str(profile), str(host)))
def clear_backend_heartbeat(self, backend_id: str) -> bool:
"""Remove this backend's heartbeat row (from ``atexit``); True if removed. A crashed
backend's row is reclaimed later by ``prune_stale_heartbeats``."""
if not backend_id:
return False
return self._write_rowcount(
"DELETE FROM gateway_heartbeats WHERE backend_id = ?", (str(backend_id),)) > 0
def prune_stale_heartbeats(self, *, max_age_seconds: float) -> List[str]:
"""Drop heartbeat rows older than the staleness window; return removed backend ids.
Safe from any process — only stale rows are touched."""
if max_age_seconds <= 0:
return []
cutoff = time.time() - max_age_seconds
def _do(conn):
cur = conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM gateway_heartbeats WHERE last_heartbeat < ? RETURNING backend_id",
(cutoff,))
return [str(r[0]) for r in cur.fetchall()]
return list(self._execute_write(_do) or [])
def list_backend_heartbeats(self) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Snapshot of every backend heartbeat (diagnostics/tests); fields mirror the table."""
rows = self._read_all(
"SELECT backend_id, pid, started_at, last_heartbeat, profile, host FROM gateway_heartbeats"
" ORDER BY last_heartbeat DESC")
return [dict(r) for r in rows]
def request_handoff(self, session_id: str, platform: str) -> bool:
"""Mark a session pending handoff to *platform*; False if a handoff is already in flight."""
return self._write_rowcount(
"UPDATE sessions SET handoff_state = 'pending', handoff_platform = ?, "
" handoff_error = NULL WHERE id = ? AND (handoff_state IS NULL "
" OR handoff_state IN ('completed', 'failed'))",
(platform, session_id),
) > 0
def get_handoff_state(self, session_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return ``{"state", "platform", "error"}`` or None if the session has no handoff record."""
try:
row = self._read_one(
"SELECT handoff_state, handoff_platform, handoff_error FROM sessions WHERE id = ?",
(session_id,))
if not row:
return None
return {"state": row["handoff_state"], "platform": row["handoff_platform"],
"error": row["handoff_error"]}
except Exception:
return None
def list_pending_handoffs(self) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""All sessions in handoff_state='pending', oldest first (gateway handoff watcher)."""
try:
rows = self._read_all(
"SELECT s.*, COALESCE(sp.prompt, s.system_prompt) AS _system_prompt_resolved FROM sessions s "
"LEFT JOIN system_prompts sp ON sp.hash = s.system_prompt_hash "
"WHERE s.handoff_state = 'pending' "
"ORDER BY s.started_at ASC")
return [self._session_row_dict(r) for r in rows]
except Exception:
return []
def claim_handoff(self, session_id: str) -> bool:
"""Atomically transition pending → running. Returns True if claimed."""
return self._write_rowcount(
"UPDATE sessions SET handoff_state = 'running' WHERE id = ? AND handoff_state = 'pending'",
(session_id,),
) > 0
def has_pending_handoffs(self) -> bool:
"""Bounded existence probe for the handoff watcher's idle gate (the gate fails open on error)."""
return self._read_one("SELECT 1 FROM sessions WHERE handoff_state = 'pending' LIMIT 1") is not None
def complete_handoff(self, session_id: str) -> None:
"""Mark a handoff as completed."""
self._write_sql(
"UPDATE sessions SET handoff_state = 'completed', handoff_error = NULL WHERE id = ?",
(session_id,))
def fail_handoff(
self, session_id: str, error: str, *, only_states: Optional[Tuple[str, ...]] = None) -> bool:
"""Mark a handoff failed and record the reason; True when a row transitioned. ``only_states`` makes
the write a compare-and-swap on ``handoff_state``. Waiters that give up (CLI 60s poll, Desktop
bounded poll) MUST pass ``only_states=("pending",)``: once the watcher has claimed the row
(``running``) it owns the terminal state, and an unconditional waiter-side fail races the dispatch —
the gateway later overwrites ``failed`` → ``completed`` after the user was told the gateway is down
(split-brain: the handoff delivered and ``switch_session`` re-pointed the session). The watcher
fails its OWN claimed row unconditionally."""
states = tuple(only_states) if only_states else ()
sql = _HANDOFF_FAIL_SQL + "id = ?" + (
f" AND handoff_state IN ({', '.join('?' for _ in states)})" if states else "")
return self._write_rowcount(sql, (error[:500], session_id, *states)) > 0
def reclaim_stale_running_handoffs(self, error: str) -> List[str]:
"""Fail every handoff stuck in ``running``; returns the ids reclaimed. Only the gateway watcher sets
``running``, for one in-process dispatch — so a ``running`` row at watcher startup belongs to a
PREVIOUS gateway that died mid-dispatch. It is poisonous: ``request_handoff`` only accepts
NULL/``completed``/``failed``, so the session could never hand off again, with no error surfaced.
Failing rather than re-queueing is deliberate: the dead gateway may already have switched the
session key and dispatched the synthetic turn, so a blind retry risks double delivery; a clean
terminal state the user can retry from is right."""
def _do(conn):
cur = conn.execute("SELECT id FROM sessions WHERE handoff_state = 'running'")
ids = [r[0] for r in cur.fetchall()]
if ids:
conn.execute(_HANDOFF_FAIL_SQL + "handoff_state = 'running'", (error[:500],))
return ids
try:
return self._execute_write(_do) or []
except Exception:
# Swallow but never silently: a persistently failing reclaim leaves poisonous
# 'running' rows in place, so the operator needs a trace.
logger.warning(
"reclaim_stale_running_handoffs failed; stranded 'running' "
"handoff rows (if any) were left in place", exc_info=True)
return []