Two content-level shapes the dangerous-command detector missed and that only the
bundled tirith scanner caught:
- a curl/wget request body carrying a secret-named variable or a credential file
(-d "k=$OPENAI_API_KEY", -F file=@.env, -T ~/.ssh/id_rsa, --post-file=/etc/passwd),
or a credential file piped into an uploading curl/wget. Authorization headers are
ordinary API use and stay unflagged; flag letters are case-sensitive (-D/-f do not
upload).
- zero-width / bidirectional Unicode controls that make the approved command differ
from the executed one. Emoji ZWJ sequences are not flagged.
Measured on a 40-command corpus: core now catches 13/16 attacks (was 9/16; tirith
0.4.2 caught 14/16) while flagging 5/24 benign commands (tirith flagged 12/24).