* fix(relay): authorize send_message targets and surface egress declines
P5 of the relay egress-authorization workstream. The relay path
authenticated the SENDER but never authorized the DESTINATION, and the
gateway compounded it from both ends.
(a) send_message could silently name an arbitrary relay target. Its
`target` parameter is free-form ('platform:chat_id'), so a model could
name ANY chat id and the gateway would emit an outbound frame for it.
gateway/relay/egress.py adds an attestation floor: a relay-routed
destination must have a provenance this gateway can show -- the
operator's home channel, the channel directory, or its own gateway
session origins. Anything else is refused HERE, with a visible tool
error naming the target, before a frame is written. Non-relay platforms
and platforms served by a live native adapter in this process are
untouched (same precedence resolve_delivery_transport applies).
(b) Connector declines were swallowed into apparent successes. The
connector's egress floor answers an unauthorized destination with a
DEFINITE failure whose text is deliberately uniform (F-005). Several
relay lanes degrade a *transport drop* by design and were degrading an
*authorization refusal* the same way:
- _send_media returned None, sending the caller into
BasePlatformAdapter's text fallback -- a DIFFERENT op re-addressed at
the very chat the connector had just refused.
- _send_prompt returned None, so exec-approval / slash-confirm /
clarify reported "relay prompt op unavailable" (a wrong reason) and
ran their numbered-text fallbacks into the refused chat.
- task_card_stop discarded the error entirely.
- typing / delete / react / thread ops degraded silently at debug.
is_egress_decline() classifies THAT a decline happened (never why --
the uniform text is not parsed for reasons) and requires a definite,
non-ambiguous failure, so a lost-ack retry is still a transport
outcome. Lanes with an error-carrying contract now report the decline
verbatim; cosmetic bool/None lanes still degrade but log it at WARNING.
Advisory progress drops that legitimately degrade are unchanged: the
task_card send lane, the draft ambiguous/except branches, and every
transport-exception path keep their existing fail-open behaviour.
Tests: 21 mutations of the production source, all KILLED.
* fix(relay): authorize the RESOLVED target; declines must not fall back
Review round 1 (independently confirmed by a second reviewer) found three
blockers. Two are fixed here; the third (B-2, Telegram @username) is a policy
decision left open deliberately.
B-1 — THE FIX CAUSED THE OUTAGE IT PREVENTED (tools/send_message_tool.py)
The P5(a) guard ran ABOVE Slack user->DM resolution, so it authorized the
internal pseudo-id `_parse_target_ref` emits (`user_name:ben`, `user:U...`).
Provenances only ever hold RESOLVED conversation ids, so a fully attested DM
was compared as a handle against a set of `D...` ids and refused:
base slack:@ben SENT head(before) slack:@ben REFUSED
Every Slack DM by handle was broken. Moved the guard below resolution; it now
authorizes the destination that is actually sent to, and the refusal names the
resolved id. Position is load-bearing, so it is commented as such and pinned:
reverting the move turns exactly the four new cases red.
B-3 — A DECLINE IS NOT A LANE FAILURE (gateway/run.py)
`_approval_send_outcome` had only sent/failed/ambiguous, so a connector
decline collapsed into `failed` — which is the cue to run the plain-text
fallback into the chat the connector had just refused. The adapter fix in the
previous commit improved the error STRING while user-visible behaviour stayed
identical to base; the commit message overstated it. Fixed properly:
- new `declined` verdict, recognised via the shared `is_egress_decline`
contract (not string sniffing at the call site)
- exec-approval returns without the text fallback
- slash-confirm suppresses the text reply AND clears the registration, so a
card that never rendered cannot capture the user's next message
`send_clarify` was already correct (returns early inside the adapter).
MUTATIONS (production source; both directions)
classifier never returns 'declined' -> KILLED (4 cases)
ALL failures classified as 'declined' -> KILLED (2 cases)
guard moved back above Slack resolution -> KILLED (4 cases)
decline CODE changed (review M05) -> KILLED
marker match made case-sensitive (M10) -> KILLED
M05 was a tautology: the test asserted the imported constant against itself,
so changing the constant could not fail it. The wire contract is now pinned as
a literal, because the connector stamps that exact string and a one-sided
change is a silent cross-repo break.
REGRESSION CHECK: the 12 failures + 1 collection error in this test selection
are PRE-EXISTING cross-test contamination — the identical set fails at
7cf86188ac. Verified by diffing the failing sets: no new failures, 363 -> 374
passed.
NOT FIXED (deliberate): B-2, Telegram `@username`. The Bot API resolves handles
at send time, so there is no id to compare and no canonicalization exists yet.
That is a policy decision, not a code move.
* fix(relay): fail CLOSED on guard faults; classify the structured decline
Third independent review. Two more blockers, both reproduced before fixing.
1. THE GUARD ITSELF FAILED OPEN (tools/send_message_tool.py:158)
`_authorize_relay_target` wrapped BOTH the import and the call in one
`except Exception: return None` — and None means AUTHORIZED at every call site.
So any runtime bug inside the guard silently switched the entire P5(a) boundary
off. Reproduced: with the guard raising, an unattested target sent.
The docstring already stated the correct intent ("must not fail closed on its
own IMPORT error") and the code did something broader. The two failures are not
the same: a missing gateway package means there is no relay egress to
authorize; a fault inside the guard means authorization did not happen. The
import is tolerated, the call is not — a guard that cannot answer refuses.
2. THE STRUCTURED DECLINE WAS THROWN AWAY (gateway/run.py)
The adapter preserves the connector's dict in `SendResult.raw_response`. My
previous commit rebuilt a dict from the error STRING, which loses two
contracts:
* a decline carrying `code: egress_declined` and NO text renders as
"relay egress declined" — no marker colon — so it classified as `failed`,
which is exactly the cue to run the fallback into the refused chat;
* `ambiguous: True` (lost ack) was flattened into a DEFINITE failure,
re-sending a card that may already be on the user's screen. That is the
duplicate-card bug the ambiguous verdict exists to prevent, reintroduced
by the fix meant to harden the same path.
Both call sites now classify `raw_response` when present, ambiguity first, and
fall back to the wire sentence only for connectors that send no structured
response.
I had fixed the text-marker path and tested only the text-marker path. Worth
naming: the review's probe was a shape my tests never produced.
MUTATIONS (production source)
guard fault returns None (fail open again) -> KILLED
classifier ignores raw_response -> KILLED (3 cases)
ambiguous treated as a definite failure -> KILLED (2 cases)
40 focused tests pass. Regression check vs be321faf27: identical 13-item
failing set (pre-existing cross-test contamination), no new failures.
STILL OPEN: B-2 / finding 3, Telegram `@username`. The reviewer is right that
this is a REGRESSION of an existing contract (#53573 added Bot API username
support), not merely an unspecified input, since relay provenance stores the
numeric chat id. Fixing it means resolving the handle before authorization, or
explicitly revoking the contract. That is a policy decision, not a code move,
and it is Ben's call.
* test(relay): pin M21 and M25, the survivors whose comments called them load-bearing
Round-2 review reported six unpinned survivors from round 1. Two guard real
behaviour and are now covered; the other four are cosmetic-lane warnings and
fail-open branches I am leaving documented rather than pretending to close.
M25 — thread-qualified session ids. `_session_ids` adds BOTH "chat:thread" and
the bare chat, because the connector authorizes the CHAT. Without the split a
gateway whose session origin is `-100999:77` cannot send to `-100999`, the chat
it is demonstrably already talking in. KILLED.
M21 — the generic `relay` plane must union every fronted platform, since a
relay session is filed under its LOGICAL platform. KILLED.
MY FIRST M21 TEST WAS THE DEFECT IT WAS TESTING FOR. I patched `_relay_fronted`
— the very function the mutation empties — so emptying it changed nothing the
test could see, and the mutation SURVIVED against a green test. Rewritten to
drive the real `relay_fronted_platforms()` through its env source
(`GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORMS`), which is how production learns it.
That is the same "the test verifies my stand-in" failure I have spent this
workstream removing from the connector harnesses, reproduced here in three
lines of Python. The tell was identical: a mutation that survives a test
written specifically to kill it.
334 tests pass.
NOT PINNED, deliberately: M03 (success-guard on a malformed dict), M24
(empty-target allowance — the one fail-open branch, reachable only when the
bare-platform path already resolved a home channel), M35/M36 (decline WARNINGs
on cosmetic lanes). All four are observability or defence-in-depth rather than
authorization, and the review agrees they are non-blocking.
* fix(relay): defer Telegram @username authorization to the connector (B-2)
Closes the last blocker. Two reviewers independently called this a REGRESSION
of the public-channel username support added in #53573, not an unspecified
input, and they were right: provenance stores RESOLVED numeric chat ids, so
comparing `@channel` against them could only ever refuse.
WHY THE GATEWAY CANNOT ANSWER IT. The guard fires only when there is no live
native adapter — i.e. relay-fronted deployments — and on exactly those the
CONNECTOR holds the bot token, not this process. There is no local way to turn
a handle into the numeric id. Refusing here is not "fail closed", it is "fail
always".
WHY DEFERRING IS SAFE. The destination is still authorized one layer out: the
connector's Telegram egress floor (gg#238, merged 743a7c2) classifies and
refuses unauthorized destinations after ITS resolution — the layer that closed
the reported vulnerability in the first place. Handles go from two guards to
one, the authoritative one, not to zero.
The carve-out is deliberately narrow and its EDGES are pinned, because the
failure mode of an exemption is silent widening:
telegram `@handle` -> deferred (the regression case)
telegram numeric id -> still guarded
matrix `@user:server` -> still guarded (telegram-only)
bare name, no `@` -> still guarded
attested handle -> normal path, attestation still consulted
MUTATIONS
carve-out widened to all platforms -> KILLED
carve-out widened to every target -> KILLED
carve-out removed (regression back) -> KILLED
carve-out checked BEFORE attestation -> KILLED
THE ORDERING MUTANT SURVIVED MY FIRST TEST. Both orderings return None, so
asserting the verdict could not tell them apart — the test asserted the claim
instead of the mechanism. Rewritten to observe that attestation is actually
consulted. Same defect class as the M21 test earlier in this branch: a
mutation surviving a test written specifically to kill it means the test is
measuring the wrong thing.
341 tests pass.
FOLLOW-UP (option 2, Ben's call, deliberately NOT done here): resolve the
handle before authorizing so BOTH layers apply. That needs a resolution
round-trip through the connector — new wire surface — so it belongs in its own
phase rather than bolted onto this one. Recorded in the code comment at the
carve-out, not just here.
* fix(relay): close two fail-open boundaries; test the code-only decline for real
Both blockers from review, each REPRODUCED before fixing.
1. STRUCTURED DECLINE HAD NO GUARD. Deleting `raw_response=result` from both
`_send_prompt` return branches left all 34 tests green — a surviving,
non-equivalent security mutant. The `code` field is the documented
PREFERRED signal precisely because a connector may send no prose, and a
caller rebuilding `{"success": False, "error": ...}` cannot see it.
Cause: every existing case declines with marker TEXT. The evidence for the
code-only path was a hand-built SimpleNamespace in a different file — a
stand-in for the adapter, so it verified my fixture instead of production.
Fixed with a CodeOnlyDecliningConnector driving the real
`send_exec_approval` -> `_send_prompt`, feeding the REAL SendResult to the
REAL `_approval_send_outcome`, plus the same shape on the media lane.
drop raw_response SURVIVED (34 passed) -> KILLED
2. TWO FAIL-OPEN BOUNDARIES, both "absence" and "fault" sharing a return.
`_relay_fronted` swallowed EVERY exception and returned an empty set, which
`relay_routed_platform` reads as "not relay-routed" — skipping the guard.
Probe, with a positive control in the same run:
positive_control_denied = True
discovery_fault_denied = False <- unattested target AUTHORIZED
`_authorize_relay_target` caught every exception during IMPORT as "no
gateway package". A module that exists and fails to initialize is a fault,
not an absence, and returning None there means authorized.
Now: ImportError alone is absence; anything else raises RelayRouteUnknown
and `authorize_relay_target` converts it to a REFUSAL STRING (not a raised
exception — every caller treats the return value as the verdict, so raising
would trade a fail-open for a crash).
Kept the converse under test so "fail closed" does not silently become
"refuse everything in CLI/cron", which is the outage the broad except
existed to prevent.
discovery fault -> empty set KILLED
RelayRouteUnknown -> authorized KILLED
import fault -> authorized KILLED
397 passed (was 392, +5 new cases), zero failures.
* fix(relay): close all seven review-round-3 blockers
Every finding reproduced before fixing; every fix mutation-checked after.
CONTENT LEAKS (the decline was laundered into a different op, same chat)
#1 A declined DRAFT SEAL replayed as a plain send. On stream-is-the-message
platforms the turn-final becomes draft(final=True); `_seal_open_draft`
dropped the structured body, so `_absorb_into_open_draft` read a REFUSAL as
a lane failure and fell through. Probe, Slack descriptor:
before: draft(partial) -> draft(final,SECRET) -> send(SECRET)
after: draft(partial) -> draft(final,SECRET)
My first probe of this used a discord descriptor and showed no seal at all —
the leak is real, my probe was wrong (streams only arm for Slack).
#6 Task-card PROGRESS had the same defect one lane over: a bare failed
SendResult reads as "card lane unavailable", and TurnRunner then sends the
task text to the same chat. Both card methods now carry raw_response and
the caller suppresses the fallback on a decline.
AUTHORIZATION BYPASSES
#2 `except ImportError` was NOT the fix I claimed last round. ImportError also
covers a broken dependency inside an INSTALLED gateway; review probed
`ImportError.name = "gateway.relay.dependency"` and got an authorized
verdict. Now only a name identifying the gateway relay module itself is
absence. An ImportError with NO name stays absence — refusing on a fault we
cannot attribute would trade an unidentifiable bug for a real CLI/cron
outage, and an existing test caught exactly that when I first got it wrong.
#3 `relay_routed_platform` lowercases the requested platform; `_relay_fronted`
returned configured names verbatim. A platform configured as "Discord"
missed the membership test, looked native, and skipped the guard:
'discord' => refused 'Discord' => ALLOWED 'DISCORD' => ALLOWED
An attestation bypass on a string comparison.
UNDELIVERABLE PROMPTS THAT HUNG
#4 `_clarify_send_disposition` handled `failed` and `ambiguous` but not
`declined`, so a REFUSED clarify card fell through to wait_for_response and
blocked until clarify_timeout — indefinitely when configured non-positive.
A decline is more definitive than a failure, not less.
#5 The exec-approval decline branch returned quietly, which suppressed the text
fallback (right) but left the CENTRAL approval entry pending (wrong) — the
dangerous command stayed blocked until the approval timeout. My comment
claimed the registration was torn down; only RelayAdapter's private map was.
It now raises `_ExecApprovalDeclined`, which propagates to
`_await_gateway_decision`'s existing notify-failure path (drops the entry,
unblocks the tool). A dedicated type, re-raised past the local
`except Exception` that would otherwise have restored the leak.
#7 THE GAP THAT LET ALL OF THIS SHIP. Both caller-level suppressions were
unfalsifiable: deleting either branch left 36/38 tests green. The suites
drove `_approval_send_outcome` and `RelayAdapter` but never the real
TurnRunner / busy-session callers, so nothing observed whether a text send
FOLLOWED a decline — which is the whole property.
tests/gateway/test_decline_fallback_suppression.py drives both real callers
and records every send. Each decline case is paired with an ordinary-FAILURE
control, because without one a caller that never falls back would also pass.
MUTATIONS (all on production source, anchors count-checked, restored after)
#1 seal decline -> plain send KILLED
#1b seal drops raw_response KILLED
#2 nested ImportError -> authorized KILLED
#3 fronted set not normalized KILLED
#4 clarify declined branch removed KILLED
#5 approval decline returns not raises KILLED
#6 task_card drops raw_response KILLED
#7 slash-confirm suppression removed KILLED
#7's two were the reviewer's SURVIVORS (36/38 passing); both now die.
425 passed, zero failures.
* fix(relay): close the three round-4 blockers
Round 4 confirmed six of seven round-3 fixes and found three more. Each
reproduced before fixing, each mutation-checked after.
1. A NAMELESS ImportError still authorized. Last round I admitted it as
"absence" to protect the CLI/cron path. That reasoning was WRONG and the
interpreter says so:
import gateway.relay.nope -> ModuleNotFoundError, name="gateway.relay.nope"
import totally_absent_pkg -> ModuleNotFoundError, name="totally_absent_pkg"
Genuine absence is ALWAYS ModuleNotFoundError with `.name` set, so the
CLI/cron path never produces a bare ImportError and nothing legitimate was
being protected. A plain or nameless ImportError comes from an import hook
or a module that failed while initializing — an unattributable FAULT.
Now: absence is ModuleNotFoundError naming gateway / gateway.relay /
gateway.relay.egress; everything else refuses. Two existing tests raised a
bare ImportError to simulate absence and were corrected to the real shape.
2. SESSION ATTESTATION INVENTED IDS. `_session_ids` split every id on the first
colon to recover "chat" from "chat:thread". Matrix ids contain a colon
natively, so `!room:server.org` attested a bare `!room` — the guard
vouching for a destination on its own fabrication. The split now applies
only to platforms whose ids genuinely carry a `:thread` suffix (allow-list;
unknown platforms are treated as un-splittable, which can only refuse more).
Kept a Slack control: dropping the split entirely would refuse legitimate
thread replies, which is the outage the split exists to prevent.
3. THE TASK-CARD FIX WAS UNFALSIFIABLE — my own round-3 mistake, and the same
one round 3 caught me making. I added the production branch AND a test, but
the test stopped at RelayAdapter: it proved `raw_response` is carried and
never called `TurnRunner._task_card_publish`, which owns the property.
Deleting the real branch left 30 tests green. Now driven through the real
caller, with an ordinary-failure control.
The lesson generalises: proving the DATA reaches the boundary is not proving
the CALLER acts on it. Every one of these decline fixes has two halves and
the second half is where the security lives.
Also closed the round-4 non-blocking finding: `gateway/relay/egress.py` has its
OWN import boundary, and the existing test intercepted the earlier import in
tools/send_message_tool.py, so it was never exercised. Mutating that classifier
to treat every ImportError as absence now dies.
MUTATIONS (production source, anchors count-checked, restored after)
R4-1 nameless ImportError -> authorized KILLED
R4-2 session split unconditional KILLED
R4-3 task-card caller branch removed KILLED (was SURVIVED)
egress classifier: any ImportError = absence KILLED
Also probed and found NOT a leak: a refused OPENING draft frame disarms the
stream and the turn-final goes out via `send`. That send is itself guarded and
the connector refuses it too, so no content is delivered — unlike the seal case
(round 3, #1) where the seal was the only check on that path.
452 passed, zero failures.
* fix(relay): recover the thread parent from thread_id, not a colon split
Round 4 blocker 2 was closed with an allow-list of platforms whose ids have no
native colon. Reviewing my own fix while round 5 ran, the allow-list is the
wrong mechanism: it NARROWS a guess instead of removing it, and it still gets
Matrix wrong the moment a Matrix session is thread-qualified
(`!room:server.org:$thr` -> split yields `!room`).
The structured field was there all along. `_session_entry_id` composes the id
as f"{chat_id}:{thread_id}" and the entry still carries `thread_id`
separately, so the parent is knowable EXACTLY: strip the known suffix, or add
nothing. No platform list, no guessing, correct for ids that contain colons.
Mutations:
back to splitting on the first colon KILLED
thread parent never recovered (over-refuse) KILLED
Both directions matter: the first invents attestations, the second refuses
legitimate thread replies.
One existing test (M25) asserted the right PROPERTY with a fixture that omitted
`thread_id` — a shape real entries never have. Fixture corrected, assertions
untouched.
453 passed.
* fix(relay): close the four round-5 blockers
Each reproduced before fixing, each mutation-checked after.
R5-1 A DISABLED NATIVE ADAPTER BYPASSED AUTHORIZATION. `_has_live_native_adapter`
treated any entry in the adapter map as native; `resolve_delivery_transport`
ignores a native adapter whose config is disabled and routes over Relay.
Two independent routing classifiers, disagreeing:
guard says native: True delivery routes relay: True
So the guard skipped authorization for a send that went over the relay.
The guard now applies the router's enabled-state rule; probed both
configurations and they agree.
R5-2 THREAD IDS WERE NEVER AUTHORIZED. The parser splits chat_id and thread_id;
only chat_id reached the guard. On Discord the thread IS the destination —
`POST /channels/{thread_id}/messages` — so an attested parent channel
authorized an arbitrary caller-supplied thread. `authorize_relay_target`
now takes thread_id and requires its own attestation (bare id or the
`chat:thread` form a session origin produces); both call sites forward it.
R5-3 A DECLINED **INITIAL** DRAFT WAS RETRIED AS A PLAIN SEND. Round 3 fixed the
declined SEAL; the declined OPEN was a different path. `send_draft`
returned a bare failure, so the stream consumer read "draft transport
unusable", disabled drafts and fell through to `_first_send`. Measured
through the real adapter and real StreamTransportMixin:
before: ops ['draft', 'send'] after: ops ['draft']
send_draft now carries raw_response; a decline is terminal for the run and
the guard sits in `_first_send`, where every fallback path converges.
R5-4 MY ROUND-4 TASK-CARD FIX SUPPRESSED EXACTLY ONE UPDATE. It set
`native_failed`, which the entry gate already uses for an ordinary broken
lane, so the next progress event skipped the decline branch and went
straight to the text fallback:
after first publish: [] after second: ['send']
Terminal declines are now a separate `egress_declined` state checked at the
entry gate. A refusal does not expire after one tick.
MUTATIONS
R5-1 disabled native counts as native KILLED
R5-2 thread_id not authorized KILLED
R5-2b tool does not forward thread_id KILLED (was SURVIVED)
R5-3 initial-draft decline not terminal KILLED
R5-3b _first_send guard removed KILLED
R5-4 declined state not persistent KILLED
R5-2b is the same gap that produced findings 3 and 4 of the last two rounds, a
third time: every test called `authorize_relay_target` directly, so dropping the
argument from the TOOL WRAPPER changed nothing. Testing the callee never proves
the caller uses it — now pinned explicitly.
Each fix ships with an ordinary-failure control, because every one of these
makes the guard refuse MORE, and over-refusal is now the larger risk.
474 passed, zero failures.
* refactor(relay): declare the terminal-decline state where it lives
Both terminal-decline flags were set dynamically. They worked (neither class is
frozen or slotted) but an undeclared attribute hides the state from anyone
reading the class, and this one is security-relevant.
_TaskCardState.egress_declined — declared dataclass field
StreamConsumer._egress_declined — initialised in __init__
Lifetime verified while checking whether a refusal can leak ACROSS turns and
mute a healthy destination: it cannot. _TaskCardState is constructed per
progress-drain (run_turn_runner.py:420) and the consumer's flags per run
(stream_consumer.py:163), so both are fresh each turn.
Also verified the guard's blast radius after adding thread authorization: the
ONLY callers of authorize_relay_target are the two model-facing send_message
call sites. Gateway-internal sends — notably the handoff path, which creates a
thread and immediately posts to it with no session provenance yet — go through
transport.adapter directly and are unaffected. That was the most plausible
over-refusal, and it does not reach this guard.
461 passed.
* fix(relay): close the four round-6 blockers — the edit lane
R6-1 MY OWN R5-1 FIX REINTRODUCED THE BYPASS IT CLOSED. I wrote
`except Exception: return True` around the config lookup, so a config read
fault declared the platform native while the ROUTER, reading the real
config, sends over the relay:
guard_has_live_native True guard_verdict None router relay
Routing we cannot determine is UNKNOWN. It now raises RelayRouteUnknown,
which the outer handler must re-raise rather than flatten to False, and
`authorize_relay_target` turns into a refusal. This is the second time a
convenience `except` in this function created a bypass; there is now no
permissive return left in it.
R6-2/3/4 THE NINTH LANE: `edit`. ONE dropped field, THREE leaks.
`RelayAdapter.edit_message` discarded the connector response, and three
independent callers read a bare edit failure as "editing is unavailable"
and re-send the content as a NEW message to the same chat:
stream edit fallback ['edit', 'edit', 'send'] the unseen tail
queued reconciliation ['edit', 'send'] the WHOLE response
task-card fallback ['edit', 'send'] the task text again
Fixed at the source (edit_message carries raw_response) plus each caller:
`_on_edit_failure` — the single funnel for stream edit failures — makes a
decline terminal for the run, `_send_fallback_final` refuses to deliver a
continuation after one, the queued reconciler returns instead of sending,
and the task-card fallback sets the same terminal state R5-4 introduced.
R5-4 fixed the native task-card op and I did not check its sibling
fallback path. The pattern across rounds 3-6 is consistent: the fix goes
where the decline is OBSERVED, and the leak lives wherever someone else
later decides to retry.
MUTATIONS
R6-1 config fault -> assume native KILLED
R6-1b RelayRouteUnknown swallowed as False KILLED
R6-2 edit drops raw_response KILLED
R6-2b edit-failure decline not terminal KILLED
R6-3 queued reconcile falls back on decline KILLED
R6-4 task-card fallback edit decline KILLED
Each with an ordinary-failure control: a genuinely un-editable message must
still be delivered, and a broken card lane must still reach the user.
481 passed, zero failures.
* fix(relay): add a terminal-decline latch at the adapter choke point
THE STRUCTURAL FIX, not a twelfth local check.
Rounds 3-6 of review found ONE defect in eleven lanes: the connector refuses an
op, and some caller downstream reads that as 'this lane is unavailable' and
retries the same content through a DIFFERENT op against the SAME chat. Media,
prompt, draft-open, draft-seal, native task card, task-card fallback edit,
slash-confirm, exec-approval, clarify, stream edit, queued reconciliation.
Each was closed by adding a check at one more call site. That approach cannot
converge: gateway/ has ~60 outbound call sites, every one of them a place a
future change can reintroduce this, and four consecutive review rounds each
found another. The reviewer's own count of lanes is the argument against the
per-site design.
Every relay frame from every one of those callers passes through
_transport.send_outbound. One latch there covers them all: once the connector
refuses a chat, this adapter stops emitting CONTENT frames for that chat.
Proven to subsume the local checks: with the stream-edit per-site check
DISABLED, the leak probe still reports blocked=true — the frame never reaches
the wire. The local checks stay as defence in depth and for their better error
messages, but they are no longer the only thing standing between a decline and
a re-addressed send.
Scope is deliberately narrow, and each limit is mutation-pinned:
per CHAT - a refusal must not mute other conversations
CONTENT ops - typing/delete carry nothing; latching them would leave a
stuck typing indicator for no security gain
self-healing - cleared when the connector accepts that chat again, so a
transient policy change does not need a restart
Mutations:
latch never set KILLED
latch never consulted KILLED
latch is global, not per-chat KILLED
latch never clears KILLED
485 passed.
* fix(relay): one route source; the latch already covered round 7's lanes
Round 7 reviewed 573e41e294 — one commit BEFORE the terminal-decline latch —
and independently reached the same conclusion I had: 'The per-call-site
approach is structurally wrong. Use one turn-scoped choke point.' That is the
latch in 6dbc004594.
Its four 'still broken' lanes (tool-progress edit, progress-overflow edit,
long-running heartbeat edit, stale streamed-final reconciliation) all share the
shape edit_message->declined->adapter.send(same chat, same content), and NONE
has a local check. Probed all four against the latch:
tool_progress ops ['edit'] blocked
progress_overflow ops ['edit'] blocked
heartbeat ops ['edit'] blocked
stale_final ops ['edit'] blocked
That is the argument for the choke point, measured: lanes nobody patched are
safe anyway. Pinned by a parametrized test named for those four lanes.
R7-1 IS A REAL BYPASS THE LATCH DOES NOT COVER, and it is fixed here. The guard
rebuilt routing from GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORMS while resolve_delivery_transport
asks the CONNECTED adapter (fronts_platform, from the handshake identity set).
Different snapshots: with env discovery stale or momentarily empty, the guard
said 'native' and the router sent over the relay, skipping authorization.
before: guard_relay_routed False / delivery relay
after: guard_relay_routed True / delivery relay / unattested target refused
The guard now asks the live adapter first and falls back to config only when
there is no runner (CLI/cron) — pinned in both directions.
R7-5 (non-blocking, and a fair hit): my stream-fallback test asserted
_egress_declined and never drove _send_fallback_final, so removing that early
return SURVIVED. The test now calls the real fallback and asserts the wire is
untouched; the mutation dies.
Mutations:
R7-1 guard ignores the live adapter KILLED (was SURVIVED)
R7-5 fallback early return removed KILLED (was SURVIVED)
latch not consulted KILLED
491 passed.
* fix(relay): close three holes found by attacking my own latch
Round 8's brief told the reviewer to attack the latch. I did the same in
parallel and found three real holes in it before the review returned.
1. send_for_platform BYPASSED THE LATCH ENTIRELY. It builds and posts its frame
directly rather than through _outbound — and it is the delivery resolver's
OWN entry point, so it is the single most important caller.
before: ops ['edit', 'send'] after: ops ['edit']
gateway/AGENTS.md states the rule I had just broken: 'Seal-interception
exists at BOTH egress doors (send() and send_for_platform()); a new egress
door needs the same two checks.' The latch is a third such check and I had
wired it to one door.
2. A COSMETIC SUCCESS CLEARED THE LATCH. Clearing on ANY success meant a
typing indicator — routinely allowed for a chat whose content is refused —
re-opened the door for the very next send:
ops ['edit', 'typing', 'send']
Only a CONTENT op the connector accepted may clear it now.
3. A THREAD INSIDE A REFUSED CHAT WAS NOT COVERED. A thread lives inside its
parent, so the same content reached the same conversation one level down:
ops ['edit', 'send']
The latch key now strips the thread suffix.
Also normalised int/str chat ids (callers pass both; a type mismatch would
silently unlatch).
MUTATIONS
send_for_platform not latched KILLED
cosmetic success clears the latch KILLED
thread suffix not stripped KILLED
draft-seal retry not latched SURVIVED — EQUIVALENT, proven:
is unreachable while latched (a declined edit before the seal
produces ZERO seal frames, measured). Kept as defence in depth because it
posts directly, and documented at the site rather than covered by a
test that could not fail.
One self-inflicted bug on the way: a blanket replace put 1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal.
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Run 'op [command] --help' for more information on the command. into
send_for_platform, which has no such variable. Two existing unfurl tests caught
it — NameError at adapter.py:1407.
504 passed.
* fix(relay): Telegram handle exemption + a turn boundary for the latch
Round 8 blockers. Two of its four were already closed by 93750e351a (it
reviewed the commit before it); these two are real and both are mine.
B1 — THE TELEGRAM @HANDLE EXEMPTION COVERED A NATIVE SEND.
_is_unresolved_handle exempts telegram @handles from attestation because
"the connector resolves and authorizes it". That justification is FALSE
whenever the gateway holds its own token: _send_to_platform calls
_send_telegram(pconfig.token, ...) directly and no connector is involved.
So an unattested @handle went out under the gateway's own credential
while the numeric control was correctly refused.
The exemption now requires that no native credential exists. A probe
fault WITHDRAWS the exemption (falls back to the ordinary attestation
check) rather than granting it.
Shipped with the converse control: relay-only config still exempts
@handles, and numeric targets stay guarded in both modes.
B4 — THE LATCH HAD NO BOUNDARY, SO IT WAS AN OUTAGE MECHANISM.
My own regression, and worse than reported. Removing "clear on cosmetic
success" (correctly) removed the ONLY way the latch could ever clear: a
content op can never reach the connector to succeed, because the latch
blocks it locally first. A refusal at 09:00 muted that chat forever.
A new inbound message for a chat is the generation marker — the natural
teardown point. Suppression still holds for the whole turn.
same_turn_blocked: true next_turn_delivered: true
MUTATIONS (all killed)
handle exemption ignores native credential
native-credential fault GRANTS the exemption
no turn boundary (latch never clears)
teardown clears ALL chats not just this one
teardown ignores the chat
The last two SURVIVED first: I tested _clear_declined_for_turn directly
and never proved _on_inbound calls it — the caller-level gap that has now
produced four blockers on this branch. Added a test driving the real
inbound entry point.
One self-inflicted bug, caught by my own fault test: the probe imported
load_config, which does not exist (it is load_gateway_config), so it
always threw and returned the fault default. The test that pinned fault
behaviour is what exposed it.
510 passed.
* fix(relay): correct latch identity and boundary; one config snapshot
Round 9, four blockers, all reproduced.
B1+B4 — THE TEARDOWN WAS AT THE WRONG PLACE, twice over.
It sat on the adapter's raw _on_inbound, which runs BEFORE profile
routing, the ignored-channel guard, plugin hooks and user authorization.
An unauthorized or dropped event could therefore clear a refusal
belonging to an active turn, and stale content then went out as a
different op. The same placement missed Discord interaction passthrough,
which builds its own MessageEvent and calls handle_message directly, so
slash commands and modal submits stayed muted after an earlier decline.
Both are one mistake: I picked a lane instead of a boundary. Teardown now
runs immediately after _hm_admit_event, the single admission gate every
entry path shares.
dropped event -> latch survives, stale send blocked
admitted event -> latch clears
B2 — THE LATCH KEY SPLIT ON ':', WHICH IS A MISTAKE I ALREADY FIXED ONCE.
_latch_key did str(chat_id).split(":", 1)[0], so !room:tenant-a and
!room:tenant-b both keyed !room: a decline in one Matrix room muted
another, and inbound from one cleared the other's refusal. egress.py
::_session_ids stopped doing exactly this in round 4 and I reintroduced
it three rounds later.
Parent identity is never recoverable from identifier TEXT. Thread
coverage is now structural: _thread_parent looks the relationship up in
the recorded auto-thread map.
B3 — AUTHORIZATION AND DISPATCH USED DIFFERENT CONFIG SNAPSHOTS.
_handle_send retains one pconfig; the guard independently reloaded
config. Across a transition the authorization snapshot could see a
connector-only setup (exemption granted) while dispatch still held the
native token and sent the unattested @handle itself. The guard now takes
native_token from the SAME snapshot dispatch will use. A caller that
omits it does not silently look like "no token".
NB-1/2/3 also closed: real-object snapshot tests, an exception shield
that faces a real exception, and send_follow_up no longer discards the
connector's verdict (that discard is exactly how the edit lane laundered
declines).
MUTATIONS (all killed)
latch key splits on colon again
thread parent lookup disabled
dispatch token ignored by guard
tool drops the snapshot token
admission teardown removed
teardown moved BEFORE admission
exception shield removed
follow_up drops raw_response
"admission teardown removed" SURVIVED first: I had tested the helper, not
_handle_message. Added a test driving production _handle_message with
admission stubbed both ways. Fifth caller-level gap on this branch.
One self-inflicted bug caught before commit: I passed pconfig.token in
_handle_react, which has no pconfig — a NameError on every reaction.
516 passed.
* docs(relay): pin the latch's thread coverage limit as a deliberate trade
_thread_parent only sees connector auto-threads, and that map is capped at
256 entries, so a user-created or evicted thread does not inherit its
parent's latch. Documented at the site and asserted by a test, because the
alternative - deriving parents from identifier text - is exactly what muted
unrelated Matrix rooms in round 9.
The primary control is unaffected: authorize_relay_target takes thread_id as
part of the destination and attests it on every send (6 thread tests).
* refactor(relay): one SendResult decline classifier for all 8 gateway lanes
The extraction found a DEFECT, not just repetition.
Eight gateway lanes each hand-rolled the unwrapping of a decline from a
SendResult, and they did not agree. Six checked only raw_response. Two
also checked the error text. A connector that answers with the uniform
decline SENTENCE and no structured code - the documented contract for
older connectors, per _approval_send_outcome - was therefore classified
as an ordinary failure by those six lanes, so each treated a refusal as
"editing unavailable" and retried through another op.
Measured:
text-only decline six-site check False two-site check True
structured decline six-site check True two-site check True
No content leaked, because the adapter latch classifies the transport
dict directly and catches both shapes (verified: text-only decline still
latches C1 and keeps SECRET off the wire). The cost was wrong verdicts
and futile retries, not disclosure.
declined_send(result) in gateway/relay/egress.py now owns this. It checks
raw_response when structured, else the error text, and preserves the
ambiguous exclusion - an ambiguous result is a transport outcome, so it
must never read as a refusal.
run.py keeps its own shape deliberately: that lane has three verdicts
(ambiguous / declined / failed), so it checks ambiguous first and then
delegates the boolean.
MUTATIONS (all killed)
helper drops the text-only branch
helper drops the structured branch
ambiguous no longer excluded
draft lane decline check removed
edit-failure lane decline check removed
prompt verdict lane check removed
slash-confirm lane check removed
draft lane goes terminal on ANY failure (over-refusal direction)
"draft lane decline check removed" SURVIVED first: _send_draft_frame had
no test driving an unsuccessful send_draft at all. Added one, with an
ordinary-failure control so the fix cannot silently become "one flaky
frame mutes the chat". A non-unique anchor also masked the edit-failure
lane on the first pass - the trap my own skill warns about.
This closes the duplication that caused four of nine rounds of blockers:
a new lane now calls one classifier instead of copying three lines.
519 passed.
* fix(relay): latch identity, new-turn boundary, seal arming, ambiguity
Round 10, four blockers, each reproduced before fixing. Two are my own
regressions from the previous two rounds.
B1 - ADMISSION IS NOT A NEW-TURN BOUNDARY.
Round 9 moved teardown to just after _hm_admit_event. That is only an
ADMISSION gate: an authorized message can be steered into a running
session, answer a pending prompt, run a busy slash command, or be refused
by the pause/drain gates - all without starting a turn. Each of those
cleared the ACTIVE turn's refusal, and a later fallback from that turn
reached the wire (probe: latch emptied, wire ops ['edit', 'send']).
Teardown now runs after _claim_active_session_slot, the first point the
runner OWNS a new turn. The new test drives production _handle_message
through all four non-turn lanes plus the real new-turn path.
B2 - LATCH IDENTITY OMITTED THE LOGICAL PLATFORM.
One relay adapter fronts several platforms, so native ids collide. A
Discord refusal for chat 42 was cleared by clear_egress_latch("telegram",
"42") - the method took a platform and ignored it - and the Discord
fallback then reached the connector. Keyed by normalized platform plus
exact chat id; thread-parent expansion keeps the platform component.
B3 - THE DIRECT DRAFT-SEAL PATH DID NOT ARM THE LATCH.
_seal_open_draft posts through _attempt directly rather than _outbound,
so a definite decline logged and returned but never latched. The
immediate plain-send fallback was suppressed by the caller's own check;
later same-turn sends were not (wire ['draft', 'draft', 'send'], the
third frame carrying refused content).
B4 - MY OWN REFACTOR MADE AMBIGUOUS RESULTS TERMINAL.
send_draft's ambiguous projection discarded raw_response, so
declined_send fell through to the error-text branch - and an ambiguous
result whose text carries the decline marker ("... egress declined: ack
lost") read as a DEFINITE refusal and terminated the run. Ambiguous means
the frame may well have been delivered: a transport outcome, never an
authorization one.
Fixed on both layers: the projection carries the body (and the seal's
ambiguous return is now explicit too), and declined_send's text-only
branch - which cannot see the ambiguous flag - treats ack-lost text as
transport ambiguity. Audited every SendResult projection in adapter.py
for the same shape.
MUTATIONS (all killed)
latch key drops the platform
clear_egress_latch ignores platform
draft seal does not arm the latch
ambiguous projection drops raw body
declined_send infers decline from ack-lost text
teardown back at admission
523 passed.
* refactor(relay): split the terminal-decline latch out of the guard PR
The latch moves to feat/p5-egress-decline-latch (pushed at 3cf45736d7,
which retains the full history) for redesign. This PR keeps the
authorization guard and the per-site decline checks.
WHY. Across eleven review rounds the two halves behaved very differently.
The guard is a PURE FUNCTION of the destination - its blockers were all
"you asked the wrong question" (case sensitivity, nested ImportError,
missing thread_id, config snapshot skew), each a one-line correction that
then stayed fixed. Rounds 7-10 found nothing new in it.
The latch is MUTABLE STATE WITH A LIFETIME living on RelayAdapter - an
object registered once per process that holds the WebSocket and has no
concept of a turn. Nine of its blockers reduce to three questions the
adapter cannot answer: when does it end, who arms it, what is it keyed
on. Every answer so far has been a proxy (a successful op, an inbound
message, an admitted event, a claimed session slot) and every proxy was
wrong in a lane found later.
The per-site checks hold identical information on `st` - a PER-TURN
object - and have produced zero blockers, because the state dies with the
turn and nobody has to decide when it ends.
The no-relaunder property does NOT depend on the latch. Measured on the
real consumer path with the latch absent: a declined draft frame sets
_egress_declined and puts nothing on the wire.
Removal verified structurally rather than by eye: an AST diff of every
symbol between HEAD and this tree reports only latch symbols gone,
nothing added. That check caught two over-deletions my strip made -
_on_inbound (consumed by a "next def" boundary) and _SEEN_INBOUND_MAX
(a class constant inside the removed span). Both restored; 19 failures
went to 0.
ALSO: RESTORED A TEST I WRONGLY REPORTED AS PASSING.
test_tool_guard_forwards_thread_id never made it into the repo - `git log
-S` finds it in no commit - though round 5 recorded its mutant as killed.
Dropping thread_id from the guard call therefore survived the entire
tests/tools suite (146 passed). Written properly this time, driving the
real _handle_send far enough to reach the guard. It now KILLS that
mutant.
MUTATIONS on this tree
guard fault authorizes instead of refusing KILLED
thread_id dropped from the guard call KILLED (was SURVIVED)
handle exemption ignores native credential KILLED
draft lane decline check removed KILLED
prompt verdict lane check removed KILLED
slash-confirm lane check removed KILLED
503 passed.
* test(relay): close the phantom-coverage gaps the guard audit found
The thread_id test that was reported as killing a round-5 mutant turned
out never to have been committed. That is a reason to distrust the other
claimed kills, so I re-ran every guard mutation against the COMMITTED
tree instead of trusting the earlier reports.
Result: 9 of 11 killed, and the two "SKIPPED" ones had non-unique
anchors hiding SIX separate sites. Mutating those individually found
three real survivors.
CASE NORMALISATION (round 3, finding 3) WAS HALF-COVERED.
test_relay_fronted_matching_is_case_insensitive varies the CONFIGURED
name but always requests lowercase "discord", so it pins _relay_fronted's
normalisation and nothing else. The REQUESTED name's `.lower()` was
covered by nothing at all. Probe with it removed:
relay_routed("Discord") -> False
authorize("Discord", unattested) -> AUTHORIZED
which is exactly the bypass round 3 reported, alive again and untested.
Two further sites were untested in the OVER-REFUSAL direction: the
attested store is keyed lowercase, so a mixed-case request missed its own
attested set and refused legitimate traffic. attested_relay_targets' own
normalisation was invisible to every existing test because they all
monkeypatch that function away; it is now asserted against the real
function with only its leaf sources stubbed.
Three tests added. All six case sites now die when mutated.
I also re-did the three fail-closed RelayRouteUnknown mutations properly.
The first pass swapped whole lines and produced IndentationErrors, so
"KILLED" there proved nothing but a syntax error. Neutralising each raise
at correct indentation: all three genuinely KILLED.
FINAL AUDIT ON THIS TREE — 17 mutations, zero survivors
guard: thread_id dropped at the call site
guard: react path unguarded
guard: handle exemption ignores native credential
guard: 3x fail-closed raise neutralised
guard: 6x case-normalisation site
classifier: ambiguous treated as a decline
classifier: text-only decline branch removed
lane: draft / stream-edit / prompt / slash-confirm checks removed
511 passed.
* test(relay): make the stream-edit test fail for the right reason
Review of 45835a282d raised one blocking issue and three non-blocking
ones. All four are addressed; none was a production defect.
BLOCKING — the stream-edit test failed on the double, not on a leak.
test_declined_stream_edit_does_not_send_the_unseen_tail implemented only
the GUARDED path in its consumer double. Removing either guard therefore
raised AttributeError inside the fake before any send could be observed:
guard 1 removed -> AttributeError: no attribute '_is_flood_error'
guard 2 removed -> AttributeError: no attribute '_clean_for_display'
Red, but for the wrong reason — the test could not have caught the leak
it is named for. My own docstring claimed it drove the fallback and
checked the wire; it did neither.
The double now implements everything the UNGUARDED path reaches
(_is_flood_error, _flood_strikes, _current_edit_interval, _last_edit_time,
_notify_new_message, _try_strip_cursor, _clean_for_display,
_fallback_prefix, _metadata_for_send). Both mutations now fail on real
assertions:
guard 1 removed -> assert consumer._egress_declined is True
guard 2 removed -> AssertionError: the unseen tail reached the wire:
['send']
NON-BLOCKING 1 — a docstring claimed more than the test exercises.
test_requested_platform_name_is_also_normalised described a mixed-case
send_message(target="Discord:999") bypass. That entry point cannot reach
it: _resolve_tool_target lowercases the platform at
tools/send_message_tool.py:47 before the guard runs. The test still pins
a real contract — the helpers must not assume a lowercased argument, for
the gateway lanes and any future non-normalising caller — so the claim is
narrowed to that rather than the test removed.
NON-BLOCKING 2 — the module docstring said "every lane drives the REAL
RelayAdapter". The stream tests drive mixin doubles by design, because
the behaviour under test belongs to the adapter's CALLER. Docstring now
distinguishes the two kinds.
NON-BLOCKING 3 — latch-deletion residue in gateway/relay/adapter.py:418:
return None
return latched if surface_declines else None
The second line was unreachable and referenced a name deleted with the
latch. Removed, along with the 20-line comment block describing the latch
as "the structural fix" — that mechanism now lives on
feat/p5-egress-decline-latch, not here.
The reviewer independently confirmed the large deletion: an AST census
between 3cf45736d7 and f57a2298fa reports only latch symbols removed and
nothing added.
511 passed.
* docs(relay): correct three claims that outran the code
Review of 41ce3cc765 found no new production defect but three overstated
claims, one of them in my own commit message.
1. THE LATCH COMMENTARY WAS STILL THERE. My previous commit message said
it removed "the 20-line comment block describing the latch as the
structural fix". It removed only the unreachable statement. Twenty
lines at adapter.py:361-380 still described a per-chat latch, a choke
point and its scope rules - none of which exist on this branch. In a
refusal-sensitive module that reads as coverage this branch does not
have. Now removed for real.
This is the same defect class as the tests: a claim that outran what
the code does. I made it while fixing that class.
2. THE STREAM-TEST DOCSTRING OVERSTATED BOTH MUTANTS. It said the
mutation "now fails on the assertion that a send reached the wire" -
true of one guard, not both. Verified separately:
remove the _on_edit_failure check -> dies on _egress_declined,
never reaches the fallback
remove the fallback early return -> dies on the wire: ['send']
Both are valid behavioural failures, which is what the blocker asked
for; they are different observables and the docstring now says so.
3. Duplicate `from types import SimpleNamespace` from an earlier scripted
insert; imports reordered.
112 tests pass in the four focused files.
* fix(relay): close two authorization defects found in review
Both were reproduced before fixing and both mutants are pinned.
1. A LIVE relay adapter whose fronts_platform() raised degraded into the
config fallback. `_live_relay_fronted` returned None for every failure,
and None means "no live adapter, use the config snapshot" — so a faulting
adapter plus an empty/stale snapshot made the guard conclude "not
relay-routed" and authorize an unattested destination, while
resolve_delivery_transport asks that same adapter and still routes over
the relay. Measured: relay_routed=False, verdict None for chat 999.
Absence and fault now have separate return values: None only when there
is no runner or no relay adapter; a live adapter that cannot answer
raises RelayRouteUnknown. This is the third instance of this bug class in
this file, and the first two were also mine.
2. An attested chat whose id equalled the requested THREAD id vouched for
that thread. The `thread in attested` arm proved nothing about parentage.
Measured: attested {"-100A", "7"} authorized (-100A, thread 7).
Only the bound `parent:thread` form is accepted now. Nothing legitimate
needed the bare arm — _session_entry_id records a threaded origin as
f"{chat_id}:{thread_id}", and a thread addressed as its own channel
arrives as chat_id and passes the parent check.
The existing test blessed the bare form via parametrize, so it PINNED the
defect. Corrected, plus negative controls for the sibling-chat and
other-parent cases and a positive control proving genuine absence still
takes the config path (otherwise fix 1 would break native-only deploys).
Merged origin/main (was 22 behind). 428 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh;
full 10-row mutation ledger re-killed on the merged tree, none dying on an
exception rather than an assertion.
* fix(relay): only a missing adapter is absence; everything else is a fault
Reviewer BLOCKER, reproduced before fixing. Two more paths where a PRESENT
relay adapter still degraded into the config snapshot:
1. `fronts_platform` may be a property or descriptor, so the ATTRIBUTE
LOOKUP can raise — and the lookup sat inside the absence handler. Probed
with a raising property plus an empty snapshot: live=None, routed=False,
verdict=None, i.e. an unattested target authorized. The previous test made
an already-retrieved METHOD raise, so it could not reach this.
2. A present adapter with no usable `fronts_platform` returned None for the
same reason. An adapter that cannot say what it fronts is broken, not
absent, so it now raises too.
Also found by my own spot-check while the review ran: the nested imports of
`gateway.config` / `gateway.run` inside the live probe shared the broad
handler, so a broken installation degraded to the snapshot as well. Probed
with a healthy-adapter positive control in the same run — healthy refused
the unattested target, faulted authorized it. `_relay_fronted` one function
below already drew this exact distinction for its own import.
The boundary is now: `relay is None` is the ONLY absence. Everything about a
present adapter — attribute access, callability, the call itself, and the
imports needed to reach it — is a fault and raises RelayRouteUnknown.
This is the fourth variant of absence-vs-fault in this file and all four
were mine. The lesson is in the code as a comment rather than in a commit
message nobody re-reads.
Four controls keep genuine absence benign: no runner, no relay adapter in
the runner, a real ModuleNotFoundError naming the gateway package, and the
configured-attested-target-still-sends case.
434 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh; 9-row mutation ledger re-killed
including both new guards, none dying on an exception.
* fix(relay): invert the live probe to fail closed by default
Reviewer BLOCKER round 2, reproduced: reading the adapter registry can also
raise. A runner whose `adapters.get()` raised gave relay_present=True,
live=None, routed=False, verdict=None — unattested discord:999 authorized.
That was the FIFTH boundary in one function with the same defect: the call,
the attribute lookup, a non-callable attribute, the nested imports, and now
the registry lookup. Each round I patched the reported boundary and the
defect moved one statement up. The cause was the shape, not the statements:
the function asked "did something go wrong?" and answered None, and None
MEANS "no live adapter, use the config snapshot" — so every statement was a
new chance to fail open, and every new statement would have been too.
Inverted rather than patched a sixth time. Each `return None` now sits
behind an explicit narrow check that cannot itself be the fault (no runner,
no adapters, no relay key, gateway package genuinely absent), and one outer
handler turns anything else into RelayRouteUnknown. A statement added inside
this function is now fail-CLOSED by default.
Verified all six fault shapes raise (call, attribute, missing method,
registry .get, .adapters property, runner ref) and all five absence shapes
stay benign, plus a liveness control where the config snapshot disagrees
with a healthy adapter and the adapter still wins.
Four new tests, including the two absence controls that keep native-only and
CLI deployments working. 438 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh. Mutation
ledger: 8 killed. One survivor recorded as a proven equivalent mutant —
widening `if not registry` to `or {}` is behaviourally identical because
`{}.get()` returns None, i.e. the same absence; it is a readability guard.
707 lines
38 KiB
Python
707 lines
38 KiB
Python
"""Send Message Tool -- cross-channel messaging via platform APIs (send, list targets,
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react); works in both CLI and gateway contexts."""
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import asyncio
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import json
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import logging
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import os
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from functools import partial
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from agent.secret_scope import get_secret
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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from tools.send_message_targets import _HOME_CHANNEL_ENV_OVERRIDES, _SLACK_USER_ID_RE, resolve_send_target
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from tools.send_message_senders import (
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_AUDIO_EXTS, _DEFAULT_CAPTION_LIMIT, _IMAGE_EXTS, _NO_DELIVERABLE, _VIDEO_EXTS, _VOICE_EXTS,
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_adapter_media_method, _error, _live_adapter, _media_caption_split, _plugin_standalone_sender,
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_registry_standalone_send, _resolve_slack_user_target, _sanitize_error_text, _send_bluebubbles,
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_send_matrix_via_adapter, _send_qqbot, _send_signal, _send_telegram, _send_weixin, _send_yuanbao)
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from tools.registry import tool_error
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# NOTE: ``send_message`` is intentionally NOT registered as an agent-callable model tool
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# (the agent must not fire cross-platform messages on its own); cron delivery, the
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# ``hermes send`` CLI, the kanban notifier and the opt-in MCP server import the helpers.
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def prepare_send_message_platforms() -> None:
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"""Load enabled standalone plugins before tool schemas/cache keys are built."""
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from hermes_cli.plugins import discover_plugins
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discover_plugins()
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def send_message_tool(args, **kw):
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"""Handle cross-channel send_message tool calls."""
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action = args.get("action", "send")
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if action == "list":
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return _handle_list()
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if action in ("react", "unreact"):
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return _handle_react(args, remove=action == "unreact")
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return _handle_send(args)
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def _resolve_tool_target(target: str, *, pass_unresolved_references: bool = False):
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"""``(platform_name, chat_id, thread_id, error)``; ``chat_id`` is None when no ref was given
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(caller falls back to the home channel)."""
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platform_name, _, target_ref = target.partition(":")
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platform_name, target_ref = platform_name.strip().lower(), target_ref.strip() or None
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prepare_send_message_platforms()
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if not target_ref:
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return platform_name, None, None, None
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return platform_name, *resolve_send_target(platform_name, target_ref,
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pass_unresolved_references=pass_unresolved_references)
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def _handle_list():
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try:
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from gateway.channel_directory import format_directory_for_display
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return json.dumps({"targets": format_directory_for_display()})
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except Exception as e:
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return json.dumps(_error(f"Failed to load channel directory: {e}"))
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_TOKEN_UNSET = object()
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def _authorize_relay_target(platform_name: str, chat_id, thread_id=None, *,
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native_token=_TOKEN_UNSET) -> str | None:
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"""Relay egress-authorization guard (P5a); None when the send may proceed.
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Thin delegate to ``gateway.relay.egress`` so the tool keeps working in
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environments where the gateway package can't be imported.
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THE TWO FAILURES ARE NOT THE SAME, and conflating them disabled the
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boundary. A missing gateway module means there is no relay egress to
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authorize, so proceeding is correct. A fault INSIDE the guard means
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authorization did not happen — and returning None there means "authorized",
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so a single runtime bug in the guard silently switched the whole P5(a)
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boundary off. Review found this by making the guard raise and watching the
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send go through.
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So: the import is tolerated, the CALL is not. A guard that cannot answer
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refuses, which is the only safe polarity for an authorization check.
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"""
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try:
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from gateway.relay.egress import authorize_relay_target
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except ImportError as exc:
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# ABSENCE ONLY, and absence means the gateway relay module ITSELF is
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# missing — `exc.name` says which module was not found. An ImportError
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# naming a NESTED dependency is a broken installation, i.e. a fault,
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# and returning None here means "authorized". Review probed exactly
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# that (`ImportError.name = "gateway.relay.dependency"`) and got an
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# authorized verdict, so `except ImportError` alone was still fail-open.
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# ABSENCE has one shape and it is checkable: a genuinely missing module
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# raises ModuleNotFoundError with `.name` set to the module that was not
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# found (verified: `import gateway.relay.x` -> ModuleNotFoundError,
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# name="gateway.relay.x"). So a plain ImportError, or a nameless one, is
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# an unattributable FAULT — never proof that there is no relay here.
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# I previously admitted the nameless case to protect the CLI/cron path;
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# that reasoning was wrong, because that path does not produce one.
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_missing = getattr(exc, "name", None)
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if not isinstance(exc, ModuleNotFoundError) or _missing not in (
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"gateway",
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"gateway.relay",
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"gateway.relay.egress",
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):
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logger.exception(
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"relay egress module failed to import for %s — refusing the send",
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platform_name,
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)
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return (
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f"Refusing to send to relay target '{platform_name}': the egress "
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"authorization module could not be loaded, so this destination "
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"could not be verified."
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)
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logger.debug("relay target authorization unavailable", exc_info=True)
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return None
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - the module is THERE and broke; FAIL CLOSED
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logger.exception(
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"relay egress module failed to import for %s — refusing the send",
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platform_name,
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)
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return (
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f"Refusing to send to relay target '{platform_name}': the egress "
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"authorization module could not be loaded, so this destination "
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"could not be verified."
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)
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try:
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# ONE SNAPSHOT. `native_token` is the token from the SAME pconfig the
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# dispatch below will actually send with. Letting the guard reload
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# config independently allowed a transition where authorization saw a
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# connector-only setup (exemption granted) while dispatch still held a
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# native token and sent the unattested handle itself.
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if native_token is _TOKEN_UNSET:
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# A caller that forgets the snapshot must NOT silently look like
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# "no native token", which would grant the @handle exemption.
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return authorize_relay_target(platform_name, chat_id, thread_id)
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return authorize_relay_target(
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platform_name, chat_id, thread_id, native_token=native_token
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)
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - the guard faulted; FAIL CLOSED
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logger.exception(
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"relay target authorization FAILED for %s — refusing the send",
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platform_name,
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)
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return (
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f"Refusing to send to relay target '{platform_name}': the egress "
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"authorization check failed, so this destination could not be "
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"verified. This is a bug — the send was blocked rather than "
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"allowed through unchecked."
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)
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def _handle_react(args, remove=False):
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"""Attach (``remove=True``: retract) an emoji reaction via the live gateway adapter; no
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standalone fallback because reacting needs the adapter's live message-id state."""
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target, emoji = args.get("target", ""), (args.get("emoji") or "").strip()
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message_id = (args.get("message_id") or "").strip() or None
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if not target or (not remove and not emoji):
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return tool_error("'target' is required when action='unreact'" if remove
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else "Both 'target' and 'emoji' are required when action='react'")
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# Platform-native ids (e.g. photon GUIDs) match no parser/directory entry; the adapter validates.
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platform_name, chat_id, _thread_id, resolution_error = _resolve_tool_target(target, pass_unresolved_references=True)
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if resolution_error:
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return tool_error(resolution_error)
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platform, err = _platform_enum(platform_name)
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if err:
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return tool_error(err)
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if not chat_id:
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try:
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from gateway.config import load_gateway_config
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chat_id = load_gateway_config().get_home_channel(platform).chat_id
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except Exception:
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return tool_error(f"No chat specified and no home channel set for {platform_name}. "
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f"Use '{platform_name}:chat_id'.")
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# P5(a): same egress-authorization floor as the send path — a reaction is
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# an outbound act against a named destination, so an unattested relay
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# target must be refused here too, not just on `send`.
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# The react path has no pconfig snapshot of its own; it dispatches through
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# the LIVE adapter below, never through a native token, so the guard does
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# its own credential probe here.
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_relay_denial = _authorize_relay_target(platform_name, chat_id, _thread_id)
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if _relay_denial:
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return tool_error(_relay_denial)
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_, adapter = _live_adapter(platform)
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if adapter is None:
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return tool_error(f"Reactions require a live {platform_name} adapter in the running "
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"gateway (not available from cron/standalone contexts).")
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react_fn = getattr(adapter, "remove_reaction" if remove else "add_reaction", None)
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if not callable(react_fn):
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return tool_error(f"Platform '{platform_name}' does not support message reactions.")
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try:
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from model_tools import _run_async
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result = _run_async(react_fn(chat_id=chat_id, message_id=message_id, **({} if remove else {"emoji": emoji})))
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except Exception as e:
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return json.dumps(_error(f"Reaction failed: {e}"))
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return json.dumps(result if isinstance(result, dict) else {"success": bool(result)})
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def _handle_send(args):
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target, message = args.get("target", ""), args.get("message", "")
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if not target or not message:
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return tool_error("Both 'target' and 'message' are required when action='send'")
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platform_name, chat_id, thread_id, resolution_error = _resolve_tool_target(target)
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if resolution_error:
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return tool_error(resolution_error)
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from tools.interrupt import is_interrupted
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if is_interrupted():
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return tool_error("Interrupted")
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try:
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from gateway.config import load_gateway_config
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config = load_gateway_config()
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except Exception as e:
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return json.dumps(_error(f"Failed to load gateway config: {e}"))
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platform, pconfig, entry, err = _resolve_platform_config(platform_name, config)
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if err:
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return tool_error(err)
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from gateway.platforms.base import BasePlatformAdapter
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# Capture [[as_document]] before extract_media strips it (images keep original bytes via send_document).
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force_document_attachments = "[[as_document]]" in message
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media_files, cleaned_message = BasePlatformAdapter.extract_media(message)
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media_files = BasePlatformAdapter.filter_media_delivery_paths(media_files)
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mirror_text = cleaned_message.strip() or _describe_media_for_mirror(media_files)
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used_home_channel = not chat_id
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if used_home_channel:
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chat_id, err = _home_chat_id(config, platform, platform_name)
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if err:
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return tool_error(err)
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if duplicate_skip := _maybe_skip_cron_duplicate_send(platform_name, chat_id, thread_id):
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return json.dumps(duplicate_skip)
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# Slack: resolve user targets to DM channel IDs before sending. _parse_target_ref emits internal
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# ``user:U...`` / ``user_name:@handle`` targets; a bare U... id can also arrive from session metadata or
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# the home-channel config. All are opened via conversations.open (fixes #19236).
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if platform_name == "slack" and chat_id:
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chat_id, resolve_err = _slack_dm_chat_id(pconfig, chat_id)
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if resolve_err:
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return json.dumps(resolve_err)
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# POSITION IS LOAD-BEARING — this must stay BELOW Slack user→DM resolution.
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# `_parse_target_ref` emits internal pseudo-ids (`user_name:ben`,
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# `user:U...`) that no provenance can ever contain, because provenances
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# record RESOLVED conversation ids. Authorizing above the resolver compared
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# a handle against a set of `D...` ids and refused every Slack DM — a fix
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# that caused the outage it was meant to prevent. Pinned by
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# test_slack_user_targets_resolve_then_authorize; moving this call back up
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# turns those cases red.
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# thread_id is part of the DESTINATION: on Discord the thread is the literal
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# REST target, so an attested parent must not vouch for an arbitrary thread.
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_relay_denial = _authorize_relay_target(platform_name, chat_id, thread_id,
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native_token=getattr(pconfig, "token", None))
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if _relay_denial:
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return tool_error(_relay_denial)
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try:
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from model_tools import _run_async
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# Only custom plugin handlers receive the complete typed request.
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handler_args = {"args": args} if entry is not None and entry.send_message_handler is not None else {}
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result = _run_async(_send_to_platform(platform, pconfig, chat_id, cleaned_message, thread_id=thread_id,
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media_files=media_files, force_document=force_document_attachments,
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**handler_args))
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if isinstance(result, dict) and result.get("success"):
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if used_home_channel:
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result["note"] = f"Sent to {platform_name} home channel (chat_id: {chat_id})"
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if mirror_text and _mirror_sent_message(platform_name, chat_id, mirror_text, thread_id):
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result["mirrored"] = True
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if isinstance(result, dict) and "error" in result:
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result["error"] = _sanitize_error_text(result["error"])
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return json.dumps(result)
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except Exception as e:
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return json.dumps(_error(f"Send failed: {e}"))
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def _platform_enum(platform_name):
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"""``(Platform, None)`` or ``(None, error)`` for a platform name."""
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from gateway.config import Platform
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try:
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return Platform(platform_name), None
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except (ValueError, KeyError):
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return None, f"Unknown platform: {platform_name}"
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def _resolve_platform_config(platform_name, config):
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"""``(platform, pconfig, registry_entry, error)``. Plugin platforms must be registered;
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disabled/missing platforms error, except Weixin, which may be configured purely via .env."""
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from gateway.config import Platform
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from gateway.platform_registry import platform_registry
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entry = platform_registry.get(platform_name)
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if entry is None and platform_name not in {member.value for member in Platform}:
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return None, None, None, f"Unknown or unregistered plugin platform: {platform_name}"
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platform, err = _platform_enum(platform_name)
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if err:
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return None, None, None, err
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pconfig = config.platforms.get(platform)
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if not pconfig or not pconfig.enabled:
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pconfig = _weixin_env_pconfig() if platform_name == "weixin" else None
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if pconfig is None:
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return None, None, None, (f"Platform '{platform_name}' is not configured. Set up credentials in "
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"~/.hermes/config.yaml or environment variables.")
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return platform, pconfig, entry, None
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def _home_chat_id(config, platform, platform_name):
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"""``(home chat_id, None)`` or ``(None, actionable error)``; Weixin also honours WEIXIN_HOME_CHANNEL."""
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home = config.get_home_channel(platform)
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if home:
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return home.chat_id, None
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wx_home = os.getenv("WEIXIN_HOME_CHANNEL", "").strip() if platform_name == "weixin" else ""
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if wx_home:
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return wx_home, None
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home_env = _HOME_CHANNEL_ENV_OVERRIDES.get(platform_name, f"{platform_name.upper()}_HOME_CHANNEL")
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return None, (f"No home channel set for {platform_name} to determine where to send the message. "
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f"Either specify a channel directly with '{platform_name}:CHANNEL_NAME', "
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f"or set a home channel via: hermes config set {home_env} <channel_id>")
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def _slack_dm_chat_id(pconfig, chat_id):
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"""Open Slack user targets (``user:``/``user_name:`` from the parser, or a bare U... id from
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session metadata / home-channel config) as DM conversations. ``(chat_id, None)`` or ``(None, error_dict)``."""
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dm_target = f"user:{chat_id}" if chat_id.startswith("U") and _SLACK_USER_ID_RE.fullmatch(chat_id) else chat_id
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if not dm_target.startswith(("user:", "user_name:")):
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return chat_id, None
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from model_tools import _run_async
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return _run_async(_resolve_slack_user_target(pconfig.token, dm_target))
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def _mirror_sent_message(platform_name, chat_id, mirror_text, thread_id):
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"""Best-effort mirror of the sent message into the target's gateway session."""
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try:
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from gateway.mirror import mirror_to_session
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from gateway.session_context import get_session_env
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return bool(mirror_to_session(
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platform_name, chat_id, mirror_text, thread_id=thread_id,
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source_label=get_session_env("HERMES_SESSION_PLATFORM", "cli"),
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user_id=get_session_env("HERMES_SESSION_USER_ID", "") or None))
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except Exception:
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return False
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def _weixin_env_pconfig():
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"""Synthesize a Weixin PlatformConfig from .env secrets, or None."""
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wx_token = get_secret("WEIXIN_TOKEN", "").strip()
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wx_account = get_secret("WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID", "").strip()
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if not (wx_token and wx_account):
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return None
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from gateway.config import PlatformConfig
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return PlatformConfig(enabled=True, token=wx_token, extra={
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"account_id": wx_account, "base_url": get_secret("WEIXIN_BASE_URL", "").strip(),
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"cdn_base_url": get_secret("WEIXIN_CDN_BASE_URL", "").strip()})
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def _describe_media_for_mirror(media_files):
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"""Return a human-readable mirror summary when a message only contains media."""
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if not media_files:
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return ""
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if len(media_files) != 1:
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return f"[Sent {len(media_files)} media attachments]"
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media_path, is_voice = media_files[0]
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ext = os.path.splitext(media_path)[1].lower()
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if is_voice and ext in _VOICE_EXTS:
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return "[Sent voice message]"
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kind = next((k for exts, k in ((_IMAGE_EXTS, "image"), (_VIDEO_EXTS, "video"), (_AUDIO_EXTS, "audio"))
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if ext in exts), "document")
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return f"[Sent {kind} attachment]"
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def _maybe_skip_cron_duplicate_send(platform_name: str, chat_id: str, thread_id: str | None):
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"""Skip redundant cron send_message calls when the scheduler will auto-deliver there."""
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from gateway.session_context import get_session_env
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auto_platform = get_session_env("HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_PLATFORM", "").strip().lower()
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auto_chat_id = get_session_env("HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_CHAT_ID", "").strip()
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if not (auto_platform and auto_chat_id and auto_platform == platform_name and auto_chat_id == str(chat_id)
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and (get_session_env("HERMES_CRON_AUTO_DELIVER_THREAD_ID", "").strip() or None) == thread_id):
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return None
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target_label = f"{platform_name}:{chat_id}" + (f":{thread_id}" if thread_id is not None else "")
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return {"success": True, "skipped": True, "reason": "cron_auto_delivery_duplicate_target", "target": target_label,
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"note": (f"Skipped send_message to {target_label}. This cron job will already auto-deliver "
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"its final response to that same target. Put the intended user-facing content in "
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"your final response instead, or use a different target if you want an additional message.")}
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def _bounded_send_error(detail, max_chars=900):
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"""Bound untrusted adapter/plugin error detail returned by send_message."""
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text = str(detail or "send failed")
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return text if len(text) <= max_chars else f"{text[: max_chars - 3]}..."
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|
|
async def _send_live_adapter_media(adapter, chat_id, message, media_files, *, thread_id=None, metadata=None,
|
|
force_document=False):
|
|
"""Deliver text and every media descriptor through adapter media APIs; adapters that only
|
|
inherit the BasePlatformAdapter stub for a kind are unsupported, not no-op'd."""
|
|
caption, separate_text = _media_caption_split(message, media_files, max_caption_len=_DEFAULT_CAPTION_LIMIT)
|
|
last_result = None
|
|
if separate_text and separate_text.strip():
|
|
last_result = await adapter.send(chat_id=chat_id, content=separate_text, metadata=metadata)
|
|
if not last_result.success:
|
|
return {"error": f"Adapter send failed: {_bounded_send_error(last_result.error)}"}
|
|
from gateway.platforms.base import BasePlatformAdapter
|
|
total = len(media_files)
|
|
for index, descriptor in enumerate(media_files):
|
|
media_path = descriptor[0] if isinstance(descriptor, (list, tuple)) and descriptor else None
|
|
if not isinstance(media_path, str) or not media_path:
|
|
return {"error": f"Adapter media send failed: invalid media descriptor {index + 1}/{total}"}
|
|
is_voice = len(descriptor) > 1 and bool(descriptor[1])
|
|
if not os.path.exists(media_path):
|
|
return {"error": f"Adapter media send failed: media file {index + 1}/{total} was not found"}
|
|
ext = os.path.splitext(media_path)[1].lower()
|
|
method_name, media_kind = _adapter_media_method(ext, is_voice or ext in _AUDIO_EXTS, force_document)
|
|
adapter_method = getattr(type(adapter), method_name, None)
|
|
if adapter_method is None or adapter_method is getattr(BasePlatformAdapter, method_name):
|
|
return {"error": (f"Live adapter does not implement native {media_kind} delivery; "
|
|
f"media file {index + 1}/{total} was not sent")}
|
|
try:
|
|
last_result = await getattr(adapter, method_name)(
|
|
chat_id, media_path, caption=caption if index == 0 else None, reply_to=thread_id, metadata=metadata)
|
|
except asyncio.CancelledError:
|
|
raise
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
detail = _bounded_send_error(exc)
|
|
else:
|
|
if last_result.success:
|
|
continue
|
|
detail = _bounded_send_error(last_result.error or "media send failed")
|
|
return {"error": f"Adapter media send failed after {index}/{total} files: {detail}"}
|
|
if last_result is None:
|
|
return {"error": _NO_DELIVERABLE}
|
|
return {"success": True, "message_id": last_result.message_id, "media_delivered": True}
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _dispatch_on_gateway_loop(runner, make_coro, log_message):
|
|
"""Await ``make_coro()`` on the gateway's loop: adapter.send() uses queues/tasks bound to it,
|
|
so awaiting from another loop (the tool worker thread) deadlocks."""
|
|
gateway_loop = getattr(runner, "_gateway_loop", None)
|
|
if gateway_loop is None or asyncio.get_running_loop() is gateway_loop:
|
|
return await make_coro() # same loop / no gateway loop (CLI, tests)
|
|
if not gateway_loop.is_running():
|
|
return {"error": "Gateway loop is not running; cannot dispatch adapter send"}
|
|
from agent.async_utils import safe_schedule_threadsafe
|
|
fut = safe_schedule_threadsafe(make_coro(), gateway_loop, logger=logger, log_message=log_message)
|
|
if fut is None:
|
|
return {"error": "Gateway loop unavailable for send dispatch"}
|
|
# shield: a cancelled caller must not cancel the enqueued send (a retry would duplicate it).
|
|
# No timeout: the adapter and outer _run_async bound the wait.
|
|
return await asyncio.shield(asyncio.wrap_future(fut))
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _send_via_adapter(platform, pconfig, chat_id, chunk, *, thread_id=None, media_files=None,
|
|
force_document=False):
|
|
"""Live in-process gateway adapter first, else the plugin's ``standalone_sender_fn`` (cron),
|
|
else an error naming both; media uses the adapter's native media APIs under the same rules."""
|
|
platform_name = platform.value if hasattr(platform, "value") else str(platform)
|
|
runner, adapter = _live_adapter(platform)
|
|
if adapter is not None:
|
|
try:
|
|
metadata = {**({"thread_id": thread_id} if thread_id else {}),
|
|
**({"publish_topic": chat_id} if platform_name == "ntfy" and chat_id else {})} or None
|
|
if media_files: # always a dict result, returned as-is below
|
|
make_coro = lambda: _send_live_adapter_media( # noqa: E731
|
|
adapter, chat_id, chunk, media_files, thread_id=thread_id, metadata=metadata,
|
|
force_document=force_document)
|
|
else:
|
|
make_coro = lambda: adapter.send(chat_id=chat_id, content=chunk, metadata=metadata) # noqa: E731
|
|
result = await _dispatch_on_gateway_loop(
|
|
runner, make_coro, f"send_message: failed to schedule{' media send' if media_files else ''} on gateway loop")
|
|
except asyncio.CancelledError:
|
|
raise
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return {"error": f"Plugin platform send failed: {_bounded_send_error(e)}"}
|
|
if isinstance(result, dict):
|
|
return result
|
|
if result.success:
|
|
return {"success": True, "message_id": result.message_id}
|
|
return {"error": f"Adapter send failed: {_bounded_send_error(result.error)}"}
|
|
try:
|
|
from gateway.platform_registry import platform_registry
|
|
sender = platform_registry.get(platform_name).standalone_sender_fn
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
sender = None
|
|
if sender is None:
|
|
return {"error": (f"No live adapter for platform '{platform_name}'. Is the gateway running with this platform "
|
|
f"connected? For out-of-process delivery (e.g. cron in a separate process), the platform "
|
|
f"plugin must register a standalone_sender_fn on its PlatformEntry.")}
|
|
try:
|
|
result = await sender(pconfig, chat_id, chunk, thread_id=thread_id, media_files=media_files,
|
|
force_document=force_document)
|
|
except asyncio.CancelledError:
|
|
raise
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.debug("Plugin standalone send for %s raised", platform_name, exc_info=True)
|
|
return {"error": f"Plugin standalone send failed: {_bounded_send_error(e)}"}
|
|
if isinstance(result, dict) and (result.get("success") or result.get("error")):
|
|
return {**result, "error": _bounded_send_error(result["error"])} if result.get("error") else result
|
|
return {"error": (f"Plugin standalone send for '{platform_name}' returned an invalid result: "
|
|
f"expected a dict with 'success' or 'error' keys, got {type(result).__name__}")}
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _send_chunks(chunks, send_one):
|
|
"""``send_one(chunk, is_last)`` in order; stop at the first error dict, else last result."""
|
|
result = None
|
|
# --- Matrix: route ALL sends through the native adapter so text is encrypted in E2EE rooms too (issue:
|
|
# text-only sends arrived with a red padlock because they took the raw-HTTP standalone path). The
|
|
# adapter reuses the live gateway's E2EE session when available (#46310) and falls back to an
|
|
# encryption-aware ephemeral adapter for standalone/cron. ---
|
|
for i, chunk in enumerate(chunks):
|
|
result = await send_one(chunk, i == len(chunks) - 1)
|
|
if isinstance(result, dict) and result.get("error"):
|
|
break
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _platform_max_length(platform):
|
|
"""Chunking limit: Signal's adapter constant (its raw JSON-RPC path bypasses the adapter's
|
|
chunking), the registry's ``max_message_length`` for plugins, else None (no chunking)."""
|
|
from gateway.config import Platform
|
|
if platform == Platform.SIGNAL:
|
|
try:
|
|
from gateway.platforms.signal import MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH
|
|
return MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH
|
|
except ImportError:
|
|
return 8000
|
|
try:
|
|
from gateway.platform_registry import platform_registry
|
|
entry = platform_registry.get(platform.value)
|
|
return entry.max_message_length if entry and entry.max_message_length > 0 else None
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Plugin platforms whose media (Discord: all) sends deliberately bypass the live adapter for the
|
|
# registry ``standalone_sender_fn`` (Discord: forums/threads/multipart; Slack: files_upload_v2;
|
|
# WhatsApp: Baileys /send-media). platform -> (error label, run discover_plugins first,
|
|
# caption-capable, media_files sentinel for non-final chunks, forward force_document)
|
|
_PLUGIN_STANDALONE_MEDIA = {"discord": ("Discord", False, True, [], False), "feishu": ("Feishu", True, False, None, False),
|
|
"slack": ("Slack", True, True, [], False), "whatsapp": ("WhatsApp", True, True, None, True)}
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _send_plugin_standalone(platform_name, pconfig, chat_id, message, chunks, media_files, *, thread_id,
|
|
max_len, force_document):
|
|
"""Chunked send through a plugin's standalone_sender_fn; one captionable file + short text
|
|
rides as the media caption."""
|
|
label, discover, captionable, empty_media, pass_force = _PLUGIN_STANDALONE_MEDIA[platform_name]
|
|
sender, err = _plugin_standalone_sender(platform_name, label=label, discover=discover)
|
|
if err:
|
|
return err
|
|
extra = {"force_document": force_document} if pass_force else {}
|
|
if captionable:
|
|
# Cap on the platform's own message limit so the caption is deliverable.
|
|
caption, _ = _media_caption_split(message, media_files, max_caption_len=(max_len or _DEFAULT_CAPTION_LIMIT))
|
|
if caption is not None:
|
|
return await sender(pconfig, chat_id, "", thread_id=thread_id, media_files=media_files,
|
|
caption=caption, **extra)
|
|
return await _send_chunks(chunks, lambda chunk, is_last: sender(
|
|
pconfig, chat_id, chunk, thread_id=thread_id, media_files=media_files if is_last else empty_media, **extra))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _via_adapter_route(p, pc, cid, chunk, media, tid, fd):
|
|
return _send_via_adapter(p, pc, cid, chunk, thread_id=tid, media_files=media, force_document=fd)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Native-media chunked routes for built-in platforms; media rides on the final chunk, non-final
|
|
# chunks get the sentinel. platform -> (media required, sentinel, sender(platform, pconfig,
|
|
# chat_id, chunk, media, thread_id, force_document)). Matrix: ALL sends use the native adapter
|
|
# (E2EE text). Signal: attachments ride the JSON-RPC param. Yuanbao / WeCom: media needs the
|
|
# running gateway. Slack text: live adapter (multi-workspace, ignored_channels gates) else the
|
|
# plugin's standalone sender. Names resolve at call time so tests can monkeypatch ``_send_signal``.
|
|
_CHUNKED_ROUTES = {
|
|
"matrix": (False, [], lambda p, pc, cid, chunk, media, tid, fd: _send_matrix_via_adapter(
|
|
pc, cid, chunk, media_files=media, thread_id=tid)),
|
|
"signal": (True, [], lambda p, pc, cid, chunk, media, tid, fd: _send_signal(
|
|
pc.extra, cid, chunk, media_files=media)),
|
|
"yuanbao": (True, None, lambda p, pc, cid, chunk, media, tid, fd: _send_yuanbao(cid, chunk, media_files=media)),
|
|
"slack": (False, [], _via_adapter_route),
|
|
"wecom": (True, None, _via_adapter_route)}
|
|
|
|
# Text-only senders for built-in platforms (generic path; media is dropped with a
|
|
# warning). Signature: (pconfig, chat_id, chunk, thread_id) -> result.
|
|
_TEXT_SENDERS = {
|
|
**{name: partial(_registry_standalone_send, name)
|
|
for name in ("whatsapp", "email", "sms", "dingtalk", "feishu", "wecom")},
|
|
"signal": lambda pc, cid, chunk, tid: _send_signal(pc.extra, cid, chunk),
|
|
"bluebubbles": lambda pc, cid, chunk, tid: _send_bluebubbles(pc.extra, cid, chunk),
|
|
"qqbot": lambda pc, cid, chunk, tid: _send_qqbot(pc, cid, chunk),
|
|
"yuanbao": lambda pc, cid, chunk, tid: _send_yuanbao(cid, chunk)}
|
|
|
|
_MEDIA_PLATFORMS_NOTE = "telegram, discord, matrix, weixin, signal, yuanbao, feishu, whatsapp and slack"
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _send_to_platform(platform, pconfig, chat_id, message, thread_id=None, media_files=None, force_document=False, args=None):
|
|
"""Route to the platform sender, chunking long text with the adapters' splitter. Order matters:
|
|
Weixin first (its native helper must not be blocked by unrelated optional imports such as
|
|
lark-oapi), Telegram (chunks itself), plugin standalone media, native chunked, generic text."""
|
|
from gateway.config import Platform
|
|
platform_name = platform.value if hasattr(platform, "value") else str(platform)
|
|
media_files = media_files or []
|
|
if platform == Platform.WEIXIN:
|
|
return await _send_weixin(pconfig, chat_id, message, media_files=media_files)
|
|
# Telegram chunks internally on the *formatted* text (escaping inflates length).
|
|
if platform == Platform.TELEGRAM:
|
|
return await _send_telegram(
|
|
pconfig.token, chat_id, message, media_files=media_files, thread_id=thread_id, force_document=force_document,
|
|
disable_link_previews=bool(getattr(pconfig, "extra", {}) and pconfig.extra.get("disable_link_previews")))
|
|
from gateway.platforms.base import BasePlatformAdapter
|
|
max_len = _platform_max_length(platform)
|
|
chunks = BasePlatformAdapter.truncate_message(message, max_len) if max_len else [message]
|
|
if platform_name == "discord" or (media_files and platform_name in _PLUGIN_STANDALONE_MEDIA):
|
|
return await _send_plugin_standalone(platform_name, pconfig, chat_id, message, chunks, media_files,
|
|
thread_id=thread_id, max_len=max_len, force_document=force_document)
|
|
route = _CHUNKED_ROUTES.get(platform_name)
|
|
if route is not None and (media_files or not route[0]):
|
|
_, empty_media, sender = route
|
|
return await _send_chunks(chunks, lambda chunk, is_last: sender(
|
|
platform, pconfig, chat_id, chunk, media_files if is_last else empty_media, thread_id, force_document))
|
|
|
|
# Generic path: text only. Buzz delivers media natively via _send_via_adapter, so no warning.
|
|
warning = None
|
|
if media_files and platform_name != "buzz":
|
|
if not message.strip():
|
|
return {"error": (f"send_message MEDIA delivery is currently only supported for {_MEDIA_PLATFORMS_NOTE}; "
|
|
f"target {platform_name} had only media attachments")}
|
|
warning = (f"MEDIA attachments were omitted for {platform_name}; "
|
|
f"native send_message media delivery is currently only supported for {_MEDIA_PLATFORMS_NOTE}")
|
|
text_sender = _TEXT_SENDERS.get(platform_name)
|
|
if text_sender is not None:
|
|
send_one = lambda chunk, is_last: text_sender(pconfig, chat_id, chunk, thread_id) # noqa: E731
|
|
else:
|
|
from gateway.platform_registry import platform_registry
|
|
entry = platform_registry.get(platform_name)
|
|
if entry is not None and entry.send_message_handler is not None:
|
|
# Custom handler receives the full typed request once (not per chunk).
|
|
try:
|
|
import inspect
|
|
result = entry.send_message_handler(args or {}, chat_id, platform_name, pconfig)
|
|
return await result if inspect.isawaitable(result) else result
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return {"error": f"Plugin send_message handler failed: {e}"}
|
|
# Plugin platform: live gateway adapter if available, else standalone_sender_fn.
|
|
send_one = lambda chunk, is_last: _via_adapter_route( # noqa: E731
|
|
platform, pconfig, chat_id, chunk, media_files if is_last else [], thread_id, force_document)
|
|
last_result = await _send_chunks(chunks, send_one)
|
|
if (warning and isinstance(last_result, dict) and last_result.get("success")
|
|
and not last_result.get("media_delivered")):
|
|
last_result["warnings"] = [*last_result.get("warnings", []), warning]
|
|
return last_result
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---- BEGIN PLUGIN-COMPAT (revert-scheduled; see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md) ----
|
|
# Names external plugins imported from this module before the Sep 2026 decomposition.
|
|
# Internal code MUST NOT use these (scripts/check_compat_pointers.py fails CI if it does).
|
|
# The whole block is removed by reverting the commit that added it.
|
|
import re # noqa: F401,E402
|
|
import time # noqa: F401,E402
|
|
|
|
SEND_MESSAGE_SCHEMA = {
|
|
"name": "send_message",
|
|
"description": (
|
|
"Send a message to a connected messaging platform, or list available targets.\n\n"
|
|
"IMPORTANT: When the user asks to send to a specific channel or person "
|
|
"(not just a bare platform name), call send_message(action='list') FIRST to see "
|
|
"available targets, then send to the correct one.\n"
|
|
"If the user just says a platform name like 'send to telegram', send directly "
|
|
"to the home channel without listing first."
|
|
),
|
|
"parameters": {
|
|
"type": "object",
|
|
"properties": {
|
|
"action": {
|
|
"type": "string",
|
|
"enum": ["send", "list", "react", "unreact"],
|
|
"description": "Action to perform. 'send' (default) sends a message. 'list' returns all available channels/contacts across connected platforms. 'react' attaches an emoji reaction to a message (platforms that support it, e.g. photon/iMessage tapbacks). 'unreact' retracts a previously-added reaction."
|
|
},
|
|
"target": {
|
|
"type": "string",
|
|
"description": "Delivery target. Format: 'platform' (uses home channel), 'platform:#channel-name', 'platform:chat_id', or 'platform:chat_id:thread_id' for Telegram topics and Discord threads. Examples: 'telegram', 'telegram:-1001234567890:17585', 'discord:999888777:555444333', 'discord:#bot-home', 'slack:#engineering', 'signal:+155****4567', 'matrix:!roomid:server.org', 'matrix:@user:server.org', 'ntfy:alerts-channel' (explicit ntfy topic), 'yuanbao:direct:<account_id>' (DM), 'yuanbao:group:<group_code>' (group chat)"
|
|
},
|
|
"message": {
|
|
"type": "string",
|
|
"description": "The message text to send. To send an image or file, include MEDIA:<local_path> (e.g. 'MEDIA:/tmp/report.pdf') in the message — the platform will deliver it as a native media attachment."
|
|
},
|
|
"emoji": {
|
|
"type": "string",
|
|
"description": "For action='react': the emoji to react with (e.g. '❤️'). On iMessage, ❤️👍👎😂‼️❓ render as native tapbacks; other emoji use custom-emoji reactions."
|
|
},
|
|
"message_id": {
|
|
"type": "string",
|
|
"description": "For action='react'/'unreact': id of the message to react to. Omit to target the most recent message received in that chat (usually the one being replied to)."
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
"required": []
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
_PLUGIN_COMPAT_LAZY = {
|
|
'redact_sensitive_text': ('agent.redact', 'redact_sensitive_text'),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def __getattr__(name): # PEP 562 — lazy so no import cycles
|
|
target = _PLUGIN_COMPAT_LAZY.get(name)
|
|
if target is None:
|
|
raise AttributeError(f"module {__name__!r} has no attribute {name!r}")
|
|
import importlib
|
|
from hermes_cli.plugin_compat import warn_once
|
|
warn_once(__name__, name, *target)
|
|
return getattr(importlib.import_module(target[0]), target[1])
|
|
# ---- END PLUGIN-COMPAT ----
|