Files
hermes-agent/gateway/platforms/api_server.py
shali10 40523600b0 fix(sessions): refuse to delete a session row a live turn still owns (#123583)
Refactor entry-side deletion refusal to execute in-transaction via
`_write_guards_reject(conn, sid)` (#123583), per maintainer review:

- Underlying `delete_session` and `delete_sessions` now accept an opt-in
  kwarg `exclude_active_write_guards=True` running inside `_do` write
  transaction, eliminating the race condition where a turn acquires the lease
  between check and delete.
- Raises `SessionActiveWriteGuardError` when refusing single delete, leaving
  the row untouched; `delete_sessions` atomically skips active rows.
- Checks both active turn leases and compression locks via the existing
  reclaim-aware `_write_guards_reject` helper.
- Covers all user-facing delete sinks:
  * Web `DELETE /api/sessions/{id}` -> 409 Conflict
  * Web `POST /api/sessions/bulk-delete` -> skips active rows
  * Web / CLI `prune` -> passes `exclude_active_write_guards=True` so lineage
    parents of active conversations are not pruned
  * API Server `DELETE /api/sessions/{id}` -> 409 session_active_turn
  * CLI `hermes sessions delete` & `export --delete-after-verified` -> exits 1
  * CLI browse picker -> refuses active delete
  * TUI Gateway `session.delete` -> 4023 error
- Conforms to rubric with 2 targeted invariant tests in
  `tests/hermes_state/test_delete_session_write_guards.py`.
- Updates user guide and web dashboard docs for 409 / exit 1.

(cherry picked from commit 2c037a7a79dc211b49bacc72e3140951ccf900cf)
2026-09-27 20:49:04 +05:30

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"""OpenAI-compatible API server platform adapter (aiohttp).
Serves /v1/chat/completions, /v1/responses, /v1/models, /v1/capabilities, /api/sessions,
/v1/runs, /api/jobs and /health* (full table: ``APIServerAdapter._http_route_table``); any
OpenAI-compatible frontend connects at http://localhost:8642/v1 with API_SERVER_KEY. Under
``gateway.multiplex_profiles`` secondary profiles live at ``/p/<profile>/...``.
"""
import asyncio
import concurrent.futures
import errno
import hashlib
import hmac
import itertools
import json
from contextlib import contextmanager, nullcontext, suppress
from contextvars import ContextVar, copy_context
from functools import wraps
import logging
import os
import re
import sqlite3
import sys
import threading
import time
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
# _resolve_request_profile result for a /p/<profile>/ prefix this gateway does not serve (-> 404);
# distinct from None (no prefix / multiplexing off -> default profile).
_PROFILE_REJECTED = object()
def _prefix_names_served_profile(profile: str) -> bool:
"""True when a /p/<profile>/ prefix names the profile this gateway serves. Fail closed: a
single-profile gateway answering /p/<x>/ served the owner's toolsets under another URL."""
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import profile_matches_home
return profile_matches_home(profile)
except Exception:
return False
# Per-request /p/<profile>/ selection: set by the profile-prefix middleware, read by handlers.
_api_request_profile: ContextVar[Optional[str]] = ContextVar(
"api_server_request_profile", default=None)
_api_request_browser_control_principal: ContextVar[str] = ContextVar(
"api_server_browser_control_principal", default="")
_api_request_browser_control_transport_family: ContextVar[str] = ContextVar(
"api_server_browser_control_transport_family", default="")
class _ArtifactScopeFacade:
"""Minimal scope for ``artifact_scope_key``: server-derived principal + session + transport family."""
__slots__ = ("principal_id", "session_id", "transport_family")
def __init__(self, principal_id: str, *, session_id: str = "", transport_family: str = ""):
self.principal_id = principal_id
self.session_id = session_id
self.transport_family = transport_family
# Advertised in capabilities and echoed in registration responses; validated by the broker.
_BROWSER_CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1
# /v1/capabilities static feature flags (order is part of the JSON shape).
_STATIC_FEATURE_FLAGS = {
"run_status": True, "run_events_sse": True, "run_stop": True, "run_steer": True,
"run_approval_response": True, "tool_progress_events": True, "approval_events": True,
"session_resources": True, "model_options": True, "session_chat": True,
"session_chat_streaming": True, "session_fork": True, "session_model_lock": True,
"reasoning_streaming": True,
"admin_config_rw": False, "jobs_admin": False, "memory_write_api": False,
"skills_api": True, "audio_api": False, "realtime_voice": False,
"session_continuity_header": "X-Hermes-Session-Id",
"session_key_header": "X-Hermes-Session-Key"}
# /v1/capabilities "endpoints" table: name -> (method, path).
_CAPABILITY_ENDPOINTS = (
("health", ("GET", "/health")), ("health_detailed", ("GET", "/health/detailed")),
("models", ("GET", "/v1/models")), ("model_options", ("GET", "/api/model/options")),
("chat_completions", ("POST", "/v1/chat/completions")),
("responses", ("POST", "/v1/responses")), ("runs", ("POST", "/v1/runs")),
("run_status", ("GET", "/v1/runs/{run_id}")),
("run_events", ("GET", "/v1/runs/{run_id}/events")),
("run_approval", ("POST", "/v1/runs/{run_id}/approval")),
("run_steer", ("POST", "/v1/runs/{run_id}/steer")),
("run_stop", ("POST", "/v1/runs/{run_id}/stop")), ("skills", ("GET", "/v1/skills")),
("toolsets", ("GET", "/v1/toolsets")), ("sessions", ("GET", "/api/sessions")),
("session_create", ("POST", "/api/sessions")),
("session", ("GET", "/api/sessions/{session_id}")),
("session_update", ("PATCH", "/api/sessions/{session_id}")),
("session_delete", ("DELETE", "/api/sessions/{session_id}")),
("session_messages", ("GET", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/messages")),
("session_fork", ("POST", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/fork")),
("session_chat", ("POST", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/chat")),
("session_chat_stream", ("POST", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/chat/stream")),
("session_model_lock", ("POST", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/model")),
("browser_control_register", ("POST", "/v1/browser-control/register")),
("browser_control_ws", ("GET", "/v1/browser-control/ws")),
("artifact_upload", ("POST", "/v1/artifacts/upload")),
("artifact_download", ("GET", "/v1/artifacts/download/{artifact_id}")))
_BROWSER_CONTROL_WS_PROTOCOL = "hermes-browser-control-v1"
_BROWSER_CONTROL_TICKET_PROTOCOL_PREFIX = "hermes-browser-control-ticket."
def _approval_event_choices(*, smart_denied: bool, allow_session: bool, allow_permanent: bool) -> list[str]:
if smart_denied or not allow_session:
return ["once", "deny"]
return ["once", "session", "always", "deny"] if allow_permanent else ["once", "session", "deny"]
def _approval_request_event(run_id: str, approval_data: Optional[Dict[str, Any]], **fields: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""The ``approval.request`` payload every approval surface emits (runs bridge, session stream,
chat completions): the flagged command redacted before egress (#48456), the ``_run_event``
envelope, and the ``choices`` the client may send back to ``POST /v1/runs/{id}/approval``."""
from gateway.platforms.api_server_runs import _run_event
event = dict(approval_data or {})
if "command" in event:
from gateway.run import _redact_approval_command
event["command"] = _redact_approval_command(event.get("command"))
event.update(_run_event(run_id, "approval.request", **fields, choices=_approval_event_choices(
smart_denied=bool(event.get("smart_denied")),
allow_session=event.get("allow_session") is not False,
allow_permanent=event.get("allow_permanent") is not False)))
return event
try:
from aiohttp import web
AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError:
AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE = False
web = None # type: ignore[assignment]
from gateway.config import Platform, PlatformConfig
from gateway.display_config import resolve_display_setting
from gateway.platforms import api_server_room_dispatch as _room_dispatch
from gateway.platforms import api_server_room_grants as _room_grants
from gateway.platforms import api_server_runs as _api_runs
from gateway.platforms.api_server_openai_routes import OpenAICompatRoutesMixin
from gateway.platforms.api_server_memory_sessions import ApiServerMemorySessions
from gateway.platforms.base import (
MEDIA_TAG_CLEANUP_RE, BasePlatformAdapter, SendResult, _terminal_sentinel_start, is_network_accessible,
validate_media_delivery_path)
from gateway.platforms.api_server_run_idempotency import RunIdempotencyStore
from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
from agent.interrupt_compat import request_hard_interrupt
from gateway.readiness import collect_runtime_readiness
from gateway.browser_control_artifacts import (
ArtifactError, ArtifactRateLimiter, ArtifactStore, ArtifactTooLarge, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES,
DEFAULT_MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES, DEFAULT_ARTIFACT_TTL_SECONDS)
from gateway.browser_control_broker import (
BROWSER_CONTROL_ARTIFACT_CAPABILITIES, BROWSER_CONTROL_CAPABILITIES, BROWSER_CONTROL_DEVELOPER_CAPABILITIES,
ControllerScope, ControllerTicketInvalid, browser_control_developer_mode,
browser_control_protocol_supported, filter_browser_control_capabilities, get_browser_control_broker)
from gateway.platforms._shared import coerce_port as _coerce_port
from gateway.platforms._shared import get_scoped_secret as _get_scoped_secret
from gateway.platforms.tcp_site import start_tcp_site
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _browser_controller_ws_sender(ws, loop, *, wait_timeout: float = 10.0):
"""Return a loop-aware broker sender for one aiohttp controller socket.
A wait timeout means the coroutine is still in flight, not that the frame was rejected:
keep the broker command pending (its own deadline decides); a real send error propagates.
"""
def send(frame: dict) -> None:
if ws.closed:
raise ConnectionError("browser-control websocket is closed")
try:
on_loop = asyncio.get_running_loop() is loop
except RuntimeError:
on_loop = False
if on_loop:
loop.create_task(ws.send_json(frame))
return
future = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(ws.send_json(frame), loop)
try:
future.result(timeout=wait_timeout)
except concurrent.futures.TimeoutError:
if future.done():
raise
def observe_late_send(completed):
try:
completed.result()
except Exception:
logger.exception("browser-controller websocket send failed after wait timeout")
future.add_done_callback(observe_late_send)
return send
async def _call_verifier(verifier, *args, **kwargs):
"""Await a sync-or-async verifier; sync ones may do blocking network I/O (signing-cert / JWKS
fetches), so they run off the loop."""
if asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(verifier):
return await verifier(*args, **kwargs)
return await asyncio.to_thread(verifier, *args, **kwargs)
def _hermes_version() -> str:
"""Canonical base version for API protocol and compatibility payloads."""
from hermes_cli.version_info import get_version_info
return get_version_info().base_version
# Default settings
DEFAULT_HOST = "127.0.0.1"
DEFAULT_PORT = 8642
_BIND_ATTEMPTS = 5 # EADDRINUSE retries while a restart's predecessor releases the port (#91547)
def listen_address(extra: Dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[str, int]:
"""Host/port the adapter binds: config.yaml ``platforms.api_server`` wins over the env fallbacks.
Shared with the CLI restart path, which must wait on the SAME address the replacement will
bind — an env-only reading missed every config.yaml port (#91547).
"""
host = extra.get("host", os.getenv("API_SERVER_HOST", DEFAULT_HOST))
raw_port = extra.get("port")
if raw_port is None:
raw_port = os.getenv("API_SERVER_PORT", str(DEFAULT_PORT))
return host, _coerce_port(raw_port, DEFAULT_PORT)
MAX_STORED_RESPONSES = 100
MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 10_000_000 # 10 MB — accommodates long agent conversations with tool calls
# Send a comment before remote API clients' common 20-second idle deadline.
# This constant is shared by OpenAI chat/Responses and native session SSE.
CHAT_COMPLETIONS_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECONDS = 10.0
API_SERVER_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS = 30.0
API_SERVER_LATENCY_SAMPLE_LIMIT = 512
MAX_NORMALIZED_TEXT_LENGTH = 65_536 # 64 KB cap for normalized content parts
MAX_CONTENT_LIST_SIZE = 1_000 # Max items when content is an array
RESPONSES_AUTO_TRUNCATION_HISTORY_LIMIT = 100
class ThreadSafeAsyncQueue(asyncio.Queue):
"""``asyncio.Queue`` a non-loop thread (run_conversation's executor) can push into via
``put_threadsafe``; the SSE consumer's ``await get()`` is woken by ``call_soon_threadsafe``."""
def put_threadsafe(self, item, *, loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop = None) -> None:
(loop or self._loop_ref).call_soon_threadsafe(self.put_nowait, item)
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
# Always constructed inside a running async handler (the SSE
# request handlers below), so get_running_loop() is safe here.
self._loop_ref = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def _sse_frame(
data: Any, *, event: str = None, ensure_ascii: bool = True, id: Optional[int] = None
) -> bytes:
"""Encode one SSE frame (``id:``/``event:`` lines if given, then ``data: <json>\n\n``) for
every SSE writer. ``ensure_ascii=False`` keeps raw non-ASCII on the wire."""
prefix = (f"id: {id}\n" if id is not None else "") + (f"event: {event}\n" if event else "")
return f"{prefix}data: {json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=ensure_ascii)}\n\n".encode()
_TRUE_REQUEST_BOOL_STRINGS = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
_FALSE_REQUEST_BOOL_STRINGS = frozenset({"0", "false", "no", "off"})
def _coerce_request_bool(value: Any, default: bool = False) -> bool:
"""Normalize boolean-like payload values; only explicit bool-ish scalars count (some
frontends send ``"false"`` for ``stream``, which is truthy), else ``default``."""
if isinstance(value, bool):
return value
if value is None:
return default
if isinstance(value, str):
normalized = value.strip().lower()
if normalized in _TRUE_REQUEST_BOOL_STRINGS:
return True
return False if normalized in _FALSE_REQUEST_BOOL_STRINGS else default
return bool(value) if isinstance(value, (int, float)) else default
_REQUEST_OPTION_MISSING = object()
# Full internal ladder + "none" (what /reasoning and config.yaml accept); provider
# vocabulary clamping happens downstream in agent.reasoning_effort.
_REASONING_EFFORTS = frozenset({"none", "minimal", "low", "medium", "high", "xhigh", "max", "ultra"})
_RUNTIME_AGENT_OVERRIDE_KEYS = (
"api_key", "base_url", "provider", "api_mode", "command", "args", "credential_pool")
def _clean_request_string(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a stripped request string, or None for absent/non-string values."""
return (value.strip() or None) if isinstance(value, str) else None
def _request_reasoning_config(model_options: Any) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Translate model_options (structured ``reasoning`` or legacy ``reasoning_effort``) into
AIAgent reasoning_config; unknown effort values are ignored, never raised."""
if not isinstance(model_options, dict):
return None
reasoning = model_options.get("reasoning")
enabled: Any = None
effort: Any = model_options.get("reasoning_effort")
if isinstance(reasoning, dict):
enabled = reasoning.get("enabled")
effort = reasoning.get("effort", effort)
effort_norm = str(effort).strip().lower() if effort is not None else ""
if enabled is False or effort_norm == "none":
return {"enabled": False}
if effort_norm in _REASONING_EFFORTS and effort_norm != "none":
return {"enabled": True, "effort": effort_norm}
if enabled is True:
return {"enabled": True}
return None
def _request_service_tier(model_options: Any) -> Any:
"""Return a per-request service_tier override or _REQUEST_OPTION_MISSING."""
if not isinstance(model_options, dict):
return _REQUEST_OPTION_MISSING
if "service_tier" in model_options:
raw_tier = model_options.get("service_tier")
return _clean_request_string(raw_tier) if isinstance(raw_tier, str) else raw_tier
if "fast" in model_options:
return "priority" if _coerce_request_bool(model_options.get("fast"), default=False) else None
return _REQUEST_OPTION_MISSING
def _apply_runtime_agent_overrides(
runtime_kwargs: Dict[str, Any], overrides: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Merge resolved provider/runtime fields into ``runtime_kwargs`` in place."""
if not isinstance(overrides, dict):
return runtime_kwargs
for key in _RUNTIME_AGENT_OVERRIDE_KEYS:
value = overrides.get(key)
if value is None:
continue
runtime_kwargs[key] = list(value) if key == "args" and isinstance(value, (list, tuple)) else value
return runtime_kwargs
def _resolve_request_runtime_agent_kwargs(provider: str, target_model: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""gateway.run._resolve_runtime_agent_kwargs() for an explicit provider/model, so an API
caller uses the same authenticated provider catalog without mutating config.yaml."""
from hermes_cli.runtime_provider import resolve_runtime_provider, format_runtime_provider_error, _get_model_config
try:
runtime = resolve_runtime_provider(requested=provider, target_model=target_model)
except Exception as exc:
raise RuntimeError(format_runtime_provider_error(exc)) from exc
return {
**{k: runtime.get(k) for k in ("api_key", "base_url", "provider", "api_mode", "command")},
"args": list(runtime.get("args") or []),
"credential_pool": runtime.get("credential_pool")}
def _request_agent_overrides(
body: Any, *, virtual_model: Optional[str] = None, allow_bare_model: bool = True
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Extract per-request model/provider/options for _run_agent.
The virtual model (``hermes-agent``) means "gateway default". A bare ``model`` without
``provider`` is honored only when ``allow_bare_model`` (generic clients hardcode "gpt-4o";
OpenAI-compatible handlers pass the ``direct_model_requests`` opt-in, Hermes-native
endpoints always allow it). An explicit ``provider`` is always honored.
"""
if not isinstance(body, dict):
return {}
overrides: Dict[str, Any] = {}
provider = _clean_request_string(body.get("provider"))
if provider:
overrides["requested_provider"] = provider
model = _clean_request_string(body.get("model"))
if model and model != virtual_model and (provider or allow_bare_model):
overrides["requested_model"] = model
model_options = body.get("model_options")
if isinstance(model_options, dict):
overrides["model_options"] = dict(model_options)
return overrides
def _request_relay_metadata(body: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Extract Relay metadata from an OpenAI request body."""
if not isinstance(body, dict):
return {}
metadata = body.get("metadata")
if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
return {}
return dict(metadata)
def _is_compressed_summary_message(message: Any) -> bool:
"""Recognize every compaction carrier shape via the compressor's own classifier
(SessionDB drops the in-process marker; a prefix scan misses merge-into-tail carriers)."""
if not isinstance(message, dict):
return False
from agent.context_compressor import is_compaction_summary_message
return is_compaction_summary_message(message)
def _project_client_message(message: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Strip compaction scaffolding: standalone handoffs become hidden empty rows (stable
ids), merged handoffs keep only the real prior-tail content; inherited tool calls dropped."""
from agent.compaction_display import (
_COMPACTION_INTERNAL_FIELDS, project_compaction_message_for_display)
if (message.get("display_kind") == "hidden"
and (message.get("display_metadata") or {}).get("notification_category") == "diagnostic"):
# Retain row identity and execution evidence in storage, not in the notification UI.
return {k: v for k, v in message.items() if k in {
"id", "session_id", "role", "timestamp", "display_kind", "platform_message_id",
}} | {"content": ""}
projected = project_compaction_message_for_display(message)
if projected is None:
projected = {k: v for k, v in message.items() if k not in _COMPACTION_INTERNAL_FIELDS}
projected["content"] = ""
projected["display_kind"] = "hidden"
return projected
def _auto_truncate_response_history(
conversation_history: List[Dict[str, Any]],
*,
limit: int = RESPONSES_AUTO_TRUNCATION_HISTORY_LIMIT) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Keep the most recent ``limit`` messages, always preserving compaction summaries
wherever they sit (the /compress path can leave them after a retained system head)."""
if limit <= 0 or len(conversation_history) <= limit:
return conversation_history
summary_indices = [i for i, m in enumerate(conversation_history) if _is_compressed_summary_message(m)]
if not summary_indices:
return conversation_history[-limit:]
kept_indices = set(summary_indices[:limit])
remaining = limit - len(kept_indices)
if remaining > 0:
summary_index_set = set(summary_indices)
for index in range(len(conversation_history) - 1, -1, -1):
if index in summary_index_set:
continue
kept_indices.add(index)
remaining -= 1
if remaining <= 0:
break
return [conversation_history[index] for index in sorted(kept_indices)]
def _cap_text(text: str) -> str:
return text[:MAX_NORMALIZED_TEXT_LENGTH] if len(text) > MAX_NORMALIZED_TEXT_LENGTH else text
def _cap_list(items: list) -> list:
return items[:MAX_CONTENT_LIST_SIZE] if len(items) > MAX_CONTENT_LIST_SIZE else items
def _normalize_chat_content(content: Any, *, _max_depth: int = 10, _depth: int = 0) -> str:
"""Flatten OpenAI chat content (string or typed-part array) into one plain string; non-text
parts are skipped, recursion depth / list size / output length are bounded."""
if _depth > _max_depth or content is None:
return ""
if isinstance(content, str):
return _cap_text(content)
if isinstance(content, list):
parts: List[str] = []
total_len = 0
for item in _cap_list(content):
part = ""
if isinstance(item, str):
part = item
elif isinstance(item, dict):
if str(item.get("type") or "").strip().lower() in _TEXT_PART_TYPES:
text = item.get("text", "")
if text:
with suppress(Exception):
part = str(text)
elif isinstance(item, list):
part = _normalize_chat_content(item, _max_depth=_max_depth, _depth=_depth + 1)
if part:
part = _cap_text(part)
parts.append(part)
total_len += len(part)
if total_len >= MAX_NORMALIZED_TEXT_LENGTH:
break
return _cap_text("\n".join(parts))
try:
return _cap_text(str(content))
except Exception:
return ""
# Chat Completions / Responses part-type spellings; emitted shape is always the canonical
# ``{"type": "text", ...}`` / ``{"type": "image_url", ...}`` the agent pipeline understands.
_TEXT_PART_TYPES = frozenset({"text", "input_text", "output_text"})
_IMAGE_PART_TYPES = frozenset({"image_url", "input_image"})
_FILE_PART_TYPES = frozenset({"file", "input_file"})
def _normalize_image_part(part: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Validate one image part (Responses top-level ``image_url`` string or Chat Completions
``{"url", "detail"}`` dict) into the canonical vision shape; raises ValueError."""
detail = part.get("detail")
image_ref = part.get("image_url")
if isinstance(image_ref, dict):
url_value = image_ref.get("url")
detail = image_ref.get("detail", detail)
else:
url_value = image_ref
if not isinstance(url_value, str) or not url_value.strip():
raise ValueError("invalid_image_url:Image parts must include a non-empty image URL.")
url_value = url_value.strip()
lowered = url_value.lower()
if lowered.startswith("data:"):
if not lowered.startswith("data:image/") or "," not in url_value:
raise ValueError(
"unsupported_content_type:Only image data URLs are supported. "
"Non-image data payloads are not supported.")
elif not (lowered.startswith("http://") or lowered.startswith("https://")):
raise ValueError(
"invalid_image_url:Image inputs must use http(s) URLs or data:image/... URLs.")
image_part: Dict[str, Any] = {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": url_value}}
if detail is not None:
if not isinstance(detail, str) or not detail.strip():
raise ValueError("invalid_content_part:Image detail must be a non-empty string when provided.")
image_part["image_url"]["detail"] = detail.strip()
return image_part
def _normalize_multimodal_content(content: Any) -> Any:
"""Validate multimodal content: a plain string when text-only, else canonical ``text`` /
``image_url`` parts (native OpenAI vision shape; Anthropic conversion happens downstream).
Raises ``ValueError("<code>:<message>")`` with codes ``unsupported_content_type`` (file
parts, non-image data URLs, unknown types), ``invalid_image_url``, ``invalid_content_part``.
"""
if content is None:
return ""
if isinstance(content, str):
return _cap_text(content)
if not isinstance(content, list):
return _normalize_chat_content(content)
normalized_parts: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for part in _cap_list(content):
if isinstance(part, str):
if part:
normalized_parts.append({"type": "text", "text": _cap_text(part)})
continue
if not isinstance(part, dict):
continue # unknown scalars are ignored for forward compatibility (e.g. ``refusal``)
raw_type = part.get("type")
part_type = str(raw_type or "").strip().lower()
if part_type in _TEXT_PART_TYPES:
text = part.get("text")
if text is not None and str(text):
normalized_parts.append({"type": "text", "text": _cap_text(str(text))})
elif part_type in _IMAGE_PART_TYPES:
normalized_parts.append(_normalize_image_part(part))
elif part_type in _FILE_PART_TYPES:
raise ValueError(
"unsupported_content_type:Inline image inputs are supported, "
"but uploaded files and document inputs are not supported on this endpoint.")
else:
raise ValueError(
f"unsupported_content_type:Unsupported content part type {raw_type!r}. "
"Only text and image_url/input_image parts are supported.")
if not normalized_parts:
return ""
# Text-only collapses to a plain string so trajectory logging and prompt caching see
# the native shape.
if all(p.get("type") == "text" for p in normalized_parts):
return "\n".join(p["text"] for p in normalized_parts if p.get("text"))
return normalized_parts
def _content_has_visible_payload(content: Any) -> bool:
"""True when content has any text or image attachment. Used to reject empty turns."""
if isinstance(content, str):
return bool(content.strip())
if isinstance(content, list):
for part in content:
if isinstance(part, dict):
ptype = str(part.get("type") or "").strip().lower()
if ptype in _IMAGE_PART_TYPES or (
ptype in _TEXT_PART_TYPES and str(part.get("text") or "").strip()):
return True
return False
def _multimodal_validation_error(exc: ValueError, *, param: str) -> "web.Response":
"""Translate a ``_normalize_multimodal_content`` ValueError into a 400 response."""
raw = str(exc)
code, _, message = raw.partition(":")
if not message:
code, message = "invalid_content_part", raw
return _error_response(message, 400, code=code, param=param)
def _reap_disconnected_agent_processes(
agent: Any, *, source: str = "api_server_sse_disconnect") -> None:
"""Reap background processes an abandoned API-server turn created (these turns bypass
``TurnRunner``). Daemon-thread fire-and-forget; epoch-gated so a stale reaper never kills
a newer run's process on a shared task_id.
Mirrors the gateway-turn cleanup in ``gateway/run.py`` (#76115) for this API-server surface, which runs
its own agent lifecycle via ``_run_agent`` and never passes through ``TurnRunner`` — so it needs its own
trigger for the same baseline-diff reap.
"""
process_task_id = getattr(agent, "_gateway_turn_process_task_id", "")
process_baseline = getattr(agent, "_gateway_turn_process_baseline", None)
if not process_task_id or process_baseline is None:
return
epoch = getattr(agent, "_gateway_turn_process_epoch", None)
is_still_current: Optional[Any] = None
if epoch is not None:
def _epoch_still_current(_task_id=process_task_id, _epoch=epoch):
# Skip only when a NEWER run claimed this task_id. A missing entry means
# our own clear pruned it — no newer claimant, so the reap must proceed.
with _TURN_PROCESS_EPOCH_LOCK:
current = _TURN_PROCESS_EPOCHS.get(_task_id)
return current is None or current == _epoch
is_still_current = _epoch_still_current
from gateway.run import _reap_gateway_turn_processes
threading.Thread(
target=copy_context().run, args=(_reap_gateway_turn_processes, process_task_id, process_baseline),
kwargs={"source": source, "is_still_current": is_still_current},
name=f"api-turn-reaper-{process_task_id[:12]}", daemon=True).start()
# Per-task-id run epochs for the reap gate: monotonic counter (never reused),
# pruned on clear while still current, so the dict is bounded to in-flight runs.
_TURN_PROCESS_EPOCHS: Dict[str, int] = {}
_TURN_PROCESS_EPOCH_LOCK = threading.Lock()
_TURN_PROCESS_EPOCH_COUNTER = itertools.count(1)
def _publish_turn_process_ownership(agent: Any, task_id: str) -> None:
"""Snapshot the process baseline and claim the task_id's epoch — the single place every
API-server agent lifecycle records turn ownership (marker names cannot drift)."""
from tools.process_registry import process_registry
with _TURN_PROCESS_EPOCH_LOCK:
epoch = next(_TURN_PROCESS_EPOCH_COUNTER)
_TURN_PROCESS_EPOCHS[task_id] = epoch
agent._gateway_turn_process_task_id = task_id
agent._gateway_turn_process_baseline = process_registry.snapshot_running_ids(task_id)
agent._gateway_turn_process_epoch = epoch
def _clear_turn_process_ownership(agent: Any) -> None:
"""Clear turn ownership as soon as the turn ends: a later disconnect/cancel must not reap
background work the turn deliberately left running (same guard as gateway/run.py)."""
task_id = getattr(agent, "_gateway_turn_process_task_id", "")
epoch = getattr(agent, "_gateway_turn_process_epoch", None)
if task_id and epoch is not None:
with _TURN_PROCESS_EPOCH_LOCK:
# Prune only when this run is still the current claimant; a
# newer concurrent run owns the entry otherwise.
if _TURN_PROCESS_EPOCHS.get(task_id) == epoch:
del _TURN_PROCESS_EPOCHS[task_id]
agent._gateway_turn_process_task_id = ""
agent._gateway_turn_process_baseline = frozenset()
agent._gateway_turn_process_epoch = None
def _session_chat_user_message(body: Dict[str, Any], *, param: str = "message") -> tuple[Any, Optional["web.Response"]]:
"""Parse and normalize session chat ``message`` / ``input`` like chat completions."""
user_message = body.get("message") or body.get("input")
if not _content_has_visible_payload(user_message):
return None, _error_response("Missing 'message' field", 400, code="missing_message")
try:
return _normalize_multimodal_content(user_message), None
except ValueError as exc:
return None, _multimodal_validation_error(exc, param=param)
def _request_turn_author(body: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Normalized body ``author``, None when absent or null, ValueError when not an object. It only labels memory."""
raw = body.get("author")
if raw is None:
return None
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError("author must be an object")
from agent.turn_author import parse_turn_author
return parse_turn_author(raw)
_USAGE_TOKEN_KEYS = ("input_tokens", "output_tokens", "total_tokens")
def _chat_usage_payload(usage: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, int]:
"""OpenAI Chat Completions ``usage`` block (prompt/completion/total) from the agent's usage."""
values = (usage.get(key, 0) for key in _USAGE_TOKEN_KEYS)
return dict(zip(("prompt_tokens", "completion_tokens", "total_tokens"), values))
def _responses_usage_payload(usage: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, int]:
"""OpenAI Responses ``usage`` block from the agent's usage dict."""
return {key: usage.get(key, 0) for key in _USAGE_TOKEN_KEYS}
async def _abandon_agent_task(
agent_ref, agent_task, reason: str, *,
reap_source: str = "api_server_sse_disconnect", await_cancel: bool = True) -> None:
"""Interrupt + reap an abandoned SSE agent run, then cancel its task wrapper.
``await_cancel=False`` on the CancelledError path, which must not await in the handler."""
agent = agent_ref[0] if agent_ref else None
if agent is not None:
with suppress(Exception):
# The abandoning client/server is the issuer, not the user (#112647).
request_hard_interrupt(agent, reason, tool_reason=reason.lower())
_reap_disconnected_agent_processes(agent, source=reap_source)
if not agent_task.done():
agent_task.cancel()
if await_cancel:
with suppress(asyncio.CancelledError, Exception):
await agent_task
def check_api_server_requirements() -> bool:
"""Check if API server dependencies are available."""
return AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE
class ResponseStore:
"""SQLite-backed LRU store for Responses API state (full conversation history per response
for ``previous_response_id`` chaining). Persists across restarts; in-memory fallback."""
def __init__(self, max_size: int = MAX_STORED_RESPONSES, db_path: str = None):
self._max_size = max_size
if db_path is None:
db_path = ":memory:"
with suppress(Exception):
from hermes_cli.config import get_hermes_home
db_path = str(get_hermes_home() / "response_store.db")
self._db_path: Optional[str] = db_path if db_path != ":memory:" else None
try:
self._conn = sqlite3.connect(db_path, check_same_thread=False)
except Exception:
self._conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:", check_same_thread=False)
self._db_path = None
# Shared WAL-fallback so response_store.db degrades gracefully on NFS/SMB/FUSE homes.
from hermes_state_wal import apply_wal_with_fallback
apply_wal_with_fallback(self._conn, db_label="response_store.db")
self._conn.execute(
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS responses ("
"response_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, data TEXT NOT NULL, accessed_at REAL NOT NULL)")
self._conn.execute(
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS conversations (name TEXT PRIMARY KEY, response_id TEXT NOT NULL)")
self._conn.commit()
# Conversation history lives here: owner-only perms, once at init (not per commit).
self._tighten_file_permissions()
def _tighten_file_permissions(self) -> None:
"""Force owner-only permissions on the DB and SQLite sidecars."""
if not self._db_path:
return
for candidate in (Path(self._db_path), Path(f"{self._db_path}-wal"), Path(f"{self._db_path}-shm")):
try:
if candidate.exists():
candidate.chmod(0o600)
except OSError:
logger.debug("Failed to restrict response store permissions for %s", candidate, exc_info=True)
def get(self, response_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Retrieve a stored response by ID (updates access time for LRU)."""
row = self._conn.execute(
"SELECT data FROM responses WHERE response_id = ?", (response_id,)).fetchone()
if row is None:
return None
self._conn.execute(
"UPDATE responses SET accessed_at = ? WHERE response_id = ?",
(time.time(), response_id))
self._conn.commit()
try:
return json.loads(row[0])
except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError):
logger.warning("Corrupted JSON in response store for id=%s, evicting entry", response_id)
self._conn.execute("DELETE FROM responses WHERE response_id = ?", (response_id,))
self._conn.commit()
return None
def put(self, response_id: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""Store a response, evicting the oldest if at capacity."""
self._conn.execute(
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO responses (response_id, data, accessed_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
(response_id, json.dumps(data, default=str), time.time()))
count = self._conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM responses").fetchone()[0]
if count > self._max_size:
evict_ids = [row[0] for row in self._conn.execute(
"SELECT response_id FROM responses ORDER BY accessed_at ASC LIMIT ?",
(count - self._max_size,)).fetchall()]
if evict_ids:
placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in evict_ids)
# Conversation mappings pointing at evicted responses go too.
self._conn.execute(f"DELETE FROM conversations WHERE response_id IN ({placeholders})", evict_ids)
self._conn.execute(f"DELETE FROM responses WHERE response_id IN ({placeholders})", evict_ids)
self._conn.commit()
def delete(self, response_id: str) -> bool:
"""Remove a response (and conversation mappings to it). True if found and deleted."""
self._conn.execute("DELETE FROM conversations WHERE response_id = ?", (response_id,))
cursor = self._conn.execute("DELETE FROM responses WHERE response_id = ?", (response_id,))
self._conn.commit()
return cursor.rowcount > 0
def get_conversation(self, name: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Get the latest response_id for a conversation name."""
row = self._conn.execute("SELECT response_id FROM conversations WHERE name = ?", (name,)).fetchone()
return row[0] if row else None
def set_conversation(self, name: str, response_id: str) -> None:
"""Map a conversation name to its latest response_id."""
self._conn.execute("INSERT OR REPLACE INTO conversations (name, response_id) VALUES (?, ?)", (name, response_id))
self._conn.commit()
def close(self) -> None:
"""Close the database connection."""
with suppress(Exception):
self._conn.close()
def __len__(self) -> int:
row = self._conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM responses").fetchone()
return row[0] if row else 0
_CORS_HEADERS = {
"Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS",
"Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "Authorization, Content-Type, Idempotency-Key, X-Hermes-Session-Id"}
_SECURITY_HEADERS = {
"Content-Security-Policy": "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'",
"Permissions-Policy": "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()",
"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains",
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
"X-XSS-Protection": "0",
"Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer"}
if AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE:
@web.middleware
async def cors_middleware(request, handler):
"""Add CORS headers for explicitly allowed origins; handle OPTIONS preflight."""
adapter = request.app.get("api_server_adapter")
origin = request.headers.get("Origin", "")
cors_headers = None
if adapter is not None:
if not adapter._origin_allowed(origin):
return web.Response(status=403)
cors_headers = adapter._cors_headers_for_origin(origin)
if request.method == "OPTIONS":
if cors_headers is None:
return web.Response(status=403)
return web.Response(status=200, headers=cors_headers)
response = await handler(request)
if cors_headers is not None:
response.headers.update(cors_headers)
return response
@web.middleware
async def body_limit_middleware(request, handler):
"""Reject overly large request bodies early based on Content-Length."""
if request.method in {"POST", "PUT", "PATCH"}:
cl = request.headers.get("Content-Length")
if cl is not None:
try:
if int(cl) > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES:
return _error_response("Request body too large.", 413, code="body_too_large")
except ValueError:
return _error_response("Invalid Content-Length header.", 400, code="invalid_content_length")
try:
return await handler(request)
except web.HTTPRequestEntityTooLarge:
# client_max_size tripped mid-read (chunked bodies carry no Content-Length): a
# proper 413, not the handler's 400 "Invalid JSON".
return _error_response("Request body too large.", 413, code="body_too_large")
@web.middleware
async def security_headers_middleware(request, handler):
"""Add security headers to all responses (including errors)."""
response = await handler(request)
for k, v in _SECURITY_HEADERS.items():
response.headers.setdefault(k, v)
return response
else:
cors_middleware = body_limit_middleware = security_headers_middleware = None # type: ignore
_MEDIA_MIME = {".png": "image/png", ".jpg": "image/jpeg", ".jpeg": "image/jpeg", ".gif": "image/gif",
".webp": "image/webp", ".bmp": "image/bmp"}
_MEDIA_IMG_EXT = set(_MEDIA_MIME)
_MEDIA_DATA_URL_MAX_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024 # skip images larger than 5MB
def _resolve_media_to_data_urls(text: str) -> str:
"""Replace ``MEDIA:<path>`` tags with inline base64 data URLs (remote frontends can't read
server paths); non-image/unreadable paths stay untouched. Security: the shared
``MEDIA_TAG_CLEANUP_RE`` anchor + ``validate_media_delivery_path`` denylist — a bare-token
match would let a traversal path in the reply exfiltrate any readable image."""
if not text or "MEDIA:" not in text:
return text
import base64
def _to_data_url(path_str: str) -> Optional[str]:
# validate_media_delivery_path() strips wrapping quotes/trailing punctuation itself.
safe_path = validate_media_delivery_path(path_str)
p = Path(safe_path) if safe_path else None
suffix = p.suffix.lower() if p else ""
if suffix not in _MEDIA_IMG_EXT:
return None
try:
if p.stat().st_size > _MEDIA_DATA_URL_MAX_BYTES:
return None
b64 = base64.b64encode(p.read_bytes()).decode()
except OSError:
return None
return f"![image](data:{_MEDIA_MIME[suffix]};base64,{b64})"
def _repl(m: "re.Match[str]") -> str:
return _to_data_url(m.group("path")) or m.group(0)
try:
# A leaked terminal <|eos|> glued to the last tag is not a path terminator (#111046):
# scan without it, and drop it (control token, never content) only when a tag resolved.
sentinel_start = _terminal_sentinel_start(text)
scan = text[:sentinel_start] if sentinel_start >= 0 else text
resolved = MEDIA_TAG_CLEANUP_RE.sub(_repl, scan)
return text if resolved == scan else resolved
except Exception:
return text
def _redact_api_error_text(value: Any, *, limit: int | None = None) -> str:
"""Redact API-bound error text before it crosses the HTTP boundary."""
redacted = redact_sensitive_text(str(value), force=True)
return redacted[:limit] if limit is not None else redacted
def _openai_error(message: str, err_type: str = "invalid_request_error", param: str = None, code: str = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""OpenAI-style error envelope."""
return {"error": {
"message": _redact_api_error_text(message), "type": err_type, "param": param, "code": code}}
def _error_response(
message: str, status: int, *, err_type: str = "invalid_request_error",
param: str = None, code: str = None, headers: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
) -> "web.Response":
"""``web.json_response(_openai_error(...), status=...)`` in one call."""
return web.json_response(_openai_error(message, err_type, param, code), status=status, headers=headers)
def _invalid_request(message: str) -> "web.Response":
"""400 with the bare ``{message, type}`` envelope the OpenAI-compatible validators use."""
return web.json_response({"error": {"message": message, "type": "invalid_request_error"}}, status=400)
_api_agent_request_reservation: ContextVar[Optional[dict[str, bool]]] = ContextVar(
"api_agent_request_reservation", default=None)
def _admit_api_agent_request(handler):
"""Reserve an authenticated API turn before its handler first awaits: drain check +
reservation in one non-awaiting block so a request admitted just before shutdown can't go
invisible while parsing its body. The mutable reservation releases the slot exactly once."""
@wraps(handler)
async def _wrapped(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
auth_err = (
self._check_run_auth(request, permission="dispatch")
if _api_runs._uses_room_run_auth(self, request)
else self._check_auth(request))
if auth_err:
return auth_err
draining = self._draining_response()
if draining is not None:
return draining
reservation = {"active": True}
token = _api_agent_request_reservation.set(reservation)
self._pending_agent_requests += 1
try:
return await handler(self, request, *args, **kwargs)
finally:
_release_pending_api_work(self, reservation)
_api_agent_request_reservation.reset(token)
return _wrapped
def _release_pending_api_work(adapter, reservation: dict[str, bool]) -> None:
"""Release a pending-work reservation exactly once."""
if reservation["active"]:
reservation["active"] = False
adapter._pending_agent_requests = max(0, adapter._pending_agent_requests - 1)
def _require_auth(handler):
"""Run ``self._check_auth`` first and return its 401 instead of the handler."""
@wraps(handler)
async def _wrapped(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
auth_err = self._check_auth(request)
if auth_err:
return auth_err
return await handler(self, request, *args, **kwargs)
return _wrapped
@contextmanager
def _reserve_pending_api_work(adapter):
"""Keep externally-triggered background work visible across awaits; a handler may detach
the reservation to a task whose done callback then owns release."""
reservation = {"active": True, "detached": False}
adapter._pending_agent_requests += 1
try:
yield reservation
finally:
if not reservation["detached"]:
_release_pending_api_work(adapter, reservation)
class _IdempotencyCache:
"""In-memory idempotency cache with TTL and basic LRU semantics."""
def __init__(self, max_items: int = 1000, ttl_seconds: int = 300):
from collections import OrderedDict
self._store = OrderedDict()
self._inflight: Dict[tuple[str, str], "asyncio.Task[Any]"] = {}
self._ttl = ttl_seconds
self._max = max_items
def _purge(self):
now = time.time()
expired = [k for k, v in self._store.items() if now - v["ts"] > self._ttl]
for k in expired:
self._store.pop(k, None)
while len(self._store) > self._max:
self._store.popitem(last=False)
async def get_or_set(self, key: str, fingerprint: str, compute_coro):
self._purge()
item = self._store.get(key)
if item and item["fp"] == fingerprint:
return item["resp"]
inflight_key = (key, fingerprint)
task = self._inflight.get(inflight_key)
if task is None:
async def _compute_and_store():
resp = await compute_coro()
self._store[key] = {"resp": resp, "fp": fingerprint, "ts": time.time()}
self._purge()
return resp
task = asyncio.create_task(_compute_and_store())
self._inflight[inflight_key] = task
def _clear_inflight(done_task: "asyncio.Task[Any]") -> None:
if self._inflight.get(inflight_key) is done_task:
self._inflight.pop(inflight_key, None)
task.add_done_callback(_clear_inflight)
return await asyncio.shield(task)
_idem_cache = _IdempotencyCache()
def _make_request_fingerprint(body: Dict[str, Any], keys: List[str]) -> str:
subset = {k: body.get(k) for k in keys}
return hashlib.sha256(repr(subset).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
def _derive_chat_session_id(system_prompt: Optional[str], first_user_message: str) -> str:
"""Stable session id from the system prompt + first user message (constant across all
turns of an Open WebUI-style conversation), so one Hermes session/sandbox is reused."""
seed = f"{system_prompt or ''}\n{first_user_message}"
digest = hashlib.sha256(seed.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:16]
return f"api-{digest}"
_CRON_AVAILABLE = False
try:
from cron.jobs import (
list_jobs as _cron_list, get_job as _cron_get, update_job as _cron_update,
remove_job as _cron_remove, pause_job as _cron_pause, resume_job as _cron_resume,
trigger_job as _cron_trigger)
from cron.scheduler import (
CronSchedulerRegistrationError as _CronSchedulerRegistrationError,
create_job_with_scheduler_registration as _cron_create)
_CRON_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError:
_cron_list = _cron_get = _cron_create = _cron_update = None
_cron_remove = _cron_pause = _cron_resume = _cron_trigger = None
class _CronSchedulerRegistrationError(RuntimeError):
pass
def _notify_cron_provider_jobs_changed() -> None:
"""Best-effort notify of the active cron provider after a REST mutation (built-in: no-op)."""
with suppress(Exception):
from cron.scheduler import _notify_provider_jobs_changed
_notify_provider_jobs_changed()
# Defense-in-depth parity with the cronjob tool's prompt injection scan (the REST
# endpoints are authenticated, so this is not the trust boundary). Optional import:
# a missing scanner must not disable the cron REST API.
try:
from tools.cronjob_tools import _scan_cron_prompt as _scan_cron_prompt
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - scanner is optional hardening
_scan_cron_prompt = None
class _ProviderAuthResolutionError(RuntimeError):
"""Provider credential resolution failed. Typed so callers never mislabel other
RuntimeErrors from run_conversation() (e.g. a closed OpenAI client) as auth failures."""
def user_text(self) -> str:
"""Raw-surface failure line. A quota/429 cap with valid credentials must not be labelled an
authentication failure — the cause chain (RuntimeError -> AuthError) tells them apart (#89401)."""
from hermes_cli.auth import is_rate_limited_auth_error
cause = self.__cause__
cause = getattr(cause, "__cause__", None) if isinstance(cause, RuntimeError) else cause
label = "Provider rate-limited" if is_rate_limited_auth_error(cause) else "Provider authentication failed"
return f"⚠️ {label}: {self}"
class _SessionEventQueue:
"""Ordered SSE event queue for one /api/sessions/{id}/chat/stream run. ``payload`` stamps
session_id/run_id/seq/ts; ``enqueue`` is executor-thread safe (hops onto the owning loop)."""
def __init__(self, session_id: str, run_id: str):
self.loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
self.queue: "asyncio.Queue[Optional[tuple[str, Dict[str, Any]]]]" = asyncio.Queue()
self.session_id = session_id
self.run_id = run_id
self.seq = 0
def payload(self, name: str, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
self.seq += 1
payload.setdefault("session_id", self.session_id)
payload.setdefault("run_id", self.run_id)
payload.setdefault("seq", self.seq)
payload.setdefault("ts", time.time())
return name, payload
def enqueue(self, name: str, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
event = self.payload(name, payload)
try:
running_loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
except RuntimeError:
running_loop = None
with suppress(RuntimeError):
if running_loop is self.loop:
self.queue.put_nowait(event)
else:
self.loop.call_soon_threadsafe(self.queue.put_nowait, event)
def _room_grant_delegate(name: str):
"""Adapter method forwarding to ``api_server_room_grants.<name>`` (looked up at call time so
test patches on that module take effect) with this module's error/profile bindings."""
async def _handler(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
return await getattr(_room_grants, name)(
self, request, _openai_error=_openai_error, _api_request_profile=_api_request_profile)
_handler.__name__ = name
return _handler
def _run_route_delegate(name: str):
"""Adapter method forwarding to ``api_server_runs.<name>`` (call-time lookup) with this
module's namespace as ``_api_server``."""
async def _handler(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.StreamResponse":
return await getattr(_api_runs, name)(self, request, _api_server=sys.modules[__name__])
_handler.__name__ = name
return _handler
class APIServerAdapter(OpenAICompatRoutesMixin, BasePlatformAdapter):
"""aiohttp server routing OpenAI-format requests through hermes-agent's AIAgent."""
# Stateless request/response (``send()`` is a stub): async-delivery tools must not promise
# delivery here, and a resumed turn completes the work rather than asking.
supports_async_delivery: bool = False
# ``/p/<profile>/v1/...`` on the shared listener (``_make_profile_prefix_middleware``).
serves_profile_prefix: bool = True
# Same statelessness applies to the startup auto-resume prompt: no client is waiting to answer "session
# restored — what next?", so a resumed turn should complete the interrupted work rather than acknowledge
# (#57056).
interactive_resume: bool = False
# Opt-in cap (chars) on tool outputs / tool-call arguments in the stored /v1/responses
# transcript; 0 = store verbatim (gateway.api_server.history_tool_output_max_chars, #82513).
_history_tool_output_max_chars: int = 0
# Admission-gated OpenAI-compatible entry points (bodies live in the mixin).
_handle_chat_completions = _admit_api_agent_request(OpenAICompatRoutesMixin._handle_chat_completions)
_handle_responses = _admit_api_agent_request(OpenAICompatRoutesMixin._handle_responses)
def __init__(self, config: PlatformConfig):
super().__init__(config, Platform.API_SERVER)
extra = config.extra or {}
self._host, self._port = listen_address(extra)
self._api_key: str = extra.get("key", _get_scoped_secret("API_SERVER_KEY", ""))
self._cors_origins: tuple[str, ...] = self._parse_cors_origins(
extra.get("cors_origins", os.getenv("API_SERVER_CORS_ORIGINS", "")))
self._model_name: str = self._resolve_model_name(
extra.get("model_name", _get_scoped_secret("API_SERVER_MODEL_NAME", "")))
# alias (client "model") -> {model, provider?, api_key? (UPSTREAM, never logged), base_url?}
self._model_routes: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = self._parse_model_routes(extra.get("model_routes"))
# Opt-in bare ``model`` passthrough on OpenAI-compatible surfaces (generic clients
# hardcode "gpt-4o" etc., hence off by default).
# Off by default: generic OpenAI clients routinely hardcode model names ("gpt-4o", ...), and
# existing deployments rely on those falling back to the gateway default rather than switching the
# executing model. Requests that send an explicit ``provider`` — and the Hermes-native session-chat
# and /v1/runs endpoints — are always honored regardless of this flag. (Idea credit: PR #22825 by
# @mssteuer.)
self._direct_model_requests: bool = _coerce_request_bool(
extra.get("direct_model_requests"), default=False)
# ``platforms.api_server.tool_progress_events: false`` drops the custom
# ``hermes.tool.progress`` SSE frames from Chat Completions streams for strict OpenAI
# clients that choke on named events (#12020). Default on.
self._tool_progress_events: bool = _coerce_request_bool(
extra.get("tool_progress_events"), default=True)
self._app: Optional["web.Application"] = None
self._runner: Optional["web.AppRunner"] = None
self._site: Optional["web.TCPSite"] = None
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
self._response_store = ResponseStore() # this home's; a /p/<profile>/ route gets its own
self._response_store_home = str(get_hermes_home())
self._response_stores: Dict[str, ResponseStore] = {}
self._response_store_lock = threading.Lock()
_api_runs._initialize_run_state(self, store_factory=RunIdempotencyStore)
self._session_db: Optional[Any] = None # explicit override (tests/manual wiring)
self._session_dbs: Dict[str, Any] = {} # per-profile-home SessionDB cache
self._session_db_cache_lock = threading.Lock()
self._session_db_cache_closed = False
# Last-known-good model per gateway_session_key ("*" = process-wide; never session_id,
# which is per request -> unbounded). Recovers a transient empty model resolution.
self._last_resolved_model: Dict[str, str] = {}
self._session_db_lock: Optional[asyncio.Lock] = None # single-flight for lazy init
self._max_concurrent_runs: int = self._resolve_max_concurrent_runs() # 0 disables
self._history_tool_output_max_chars = self._resolve_api_server_int(
"history_tool_output_max_chars", default=0)
# In-flight _run_agent() turns (/v1/runs tracks its own via _active_run_tasks).
# Concurrency cap shared across all agent-serving endpoints (/v1/chat/completions, /v1/responses,
# /v1/runs, /api/sessions/{id}/chat[/stream]). Read from config.yaml
# gateway.api_server.max_concurrent_runs; 0 disables the cap.
# Bounds CPU / memory / upstream-LLM-quota exhaustion from a request flood (#7483).
self._inflight_agent_runs: int = 0
# Every agent inside _run_agent() for shutdown interrupt, keyed by id() (the strong ref
# keeps the id() from recycling); distinct from the run_id-keyed _active_run_agents.
self._shutdown_interruptible_agents: Dict[int, Any] = {}
# One memory provider per session across requests (this surface rebuilds the agent per turn).
self._memory_sessions = ApiServerMemorySessions()
self.gateway_runner: Optional[Any] = None # set by gateway/run.py
# Admitted requests not yet in agent bookkeeping, so shutdown drain counts them.
self._pending_agent_requests: int = 0
# Shared broker; this adapter maps HTTP registration + controller WS onto it.
self._browser_control_broker = get_browser_control_broker()
# One-shot artifact transport: lazy per-profile stores + limiter (tests inject).
self._browser_control_artifacts: Dict[str, ArtifactStore] = {}
self._browser_control_artifact_limiter: Optional[ArtifactRateLimiter] = None
# Per-profile single-flight locks for the off-loop store construction in
# _artifact_store_for_async(); a lost race would strand receipts (in-memory index).
self._browser_control_artifact_locks: Dict[str, asyncio.Lock] = {}
# Daily API metrics + heartbeat stamps published to gateway runtime status (#52323).
self._metrics_day: str = self._metrics_day_key()
self._metrics_requests_today: int = 0
self._metrics_messages_today: int = 0
self._metrics_tokens_today: int = 0
self._metrics_latency_ms: List[float] = []
self._metrics_last_request_at: Optional[float] = None
self._metrics_last_heartbeat_at: Optional[float] = None
def active_agent_work_count(self) -> int:
"""All live agent work: pending admissions + in-flight turns + live /v1/runs tasks
(task-based, since ``_active_run_agents`` has a queued-before-agent gap)."""
try:
return (int(getattr(self, "_pending_agent_requests", 0))
+ int(self._inflight_agent_runs)
+ sum(not task.done() for task in self._active_run_tasks.values()))
except Exception:
return 0
def interrupt_active_runs(self, reason: str) -> int:
"""Interrupt every adapter-owned agent during shutdown (they are not in
``GatewayRunner._running_agents``): exactly the set the drain waits on. Returns count."""
run_ids = {
run_id for run_id, task in self._active_run_tasks.items() if not task.done()
} | set(self._active_run_agents)
_api_runs._mark_shutdown_interrupted_runs(self, run_ids)
# Dedupe by identity: an agent in both registries must be interrupted once.
agents = {id(agent): agent for agent in (
*self._active_run_agents.values(), *self._shutdown_interruptible_agents.values())
if agent is not None}
interrupted = 0
for agent in agents.values():
try:
if request_hard_interrupt(agent, reason, tool_reason="gateway shutdown"):
interrupted += 1
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("[api_server] failed interrupting active agent: %s", exc)
return interrupted
def mark_shutdown_requested(self) -> int:
"""Persist the gateway drain start on every nonterminal API run."""
return _api_runs._mark_shutdown_requested(self)
@staticmethod
def _gateway_is_draining() -> bool:
"""Whether the owning gateway currently refuses new agent turns."""
try:
from gateway.run import _gateway_runner_ref
runner = _gateway_runner_ref()
return bool(runner and (getattr(runner, "_draining", False)
or getattr(runner, "_external_drain_active", False)))
except Exception:
return False
def _draining_response(self) -> Optional["web.Response"]:
"""Return a retryable response while the gateway drains existing work."""
if not self._gateway_is_draining():
return None
return _error_response(
"Gateway is draining existing work; retry shortly.", 503, code="gateway_draining",
headers={"Retry-After": "1"})
def _activate_admitted_request(self) -> None:
"""Transfer this request's drain reservation to agent bookkeeping."""
reservation = _api_agent_request_reservation.get()
if reservation:
_release_pending_api_work(self, reservation)
def _readiness_work_counts(self) -> tuple[int, int, int]:
"""Return bounded work counts from each subsystem's public state."""
active_api_runs = self._active_structured_run_count()
process_depth = 0
active_delegations = 0
with suppress(Exception):
from tools.process_registry import process_registry
process_depth = process_registry.completion_queue.qsize()
with suppress(Exception):
from tools.async_delegation import active_count
active_delegations = active_count()
return active_api_runs, process_depth, active_delegations
def _active_structured_run_count(self) -> int:
"""Count structured runs that still have executable work."""
# "stopping" is not terminal: executor work continues until the agent notices.
return sum(
1
for status in self._run_statuses.values()
if status.get("status") in {"queued", "running", "waiting_for_approval", "stopping"}
)
@staticmethod
def _parse_cors_origins(value: Any) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Normalize configured CORS origins into a stable tuple."""
if not value:
return ()
items = (
value.split(",") if isinstance(value, str)
else value if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set)) else [str(value)])
return tuple(str(item).strip() for item in items if str(item).strip())
@staticmethod
def _resolve_max_concurrent_runs() -> int:
"""gateway.api_server.max_concurrent_runs (0 disables; default 10; negatives -> 0)."""
return APIServerAdapter._resolve_api_server_int("max_concurrent_runs", default=10)
@staticmethod
def _resolve_api_server_int(key: str, *, default: int) -> int:
"""Integer setting under gateway.api_server (unreadable config -> default; negatives -> 0)."""
try:
from hermes_cli.config import cfg_get, load_config
value = int(cfg_get(load_config(), "gateway", "api_server", key, default=default))
except Exception:
return default
return max(0, value)
@staticmethod
def _metrics_day_key(timestamp: Optional[float] = None) -> str:
"""Return the UTC day bucket for daily API metrics."""
return time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d", time.gmtime(timestamp or time.time()))
@staticmethod
def _iso_timestamp(timestamp: Optional[float]) -> Optional[str]:
if timestamp is None:
return None
return datetime.fromtimestamp(timestamp, timezone.utc).isoformat()
def _reset_metrics_if_needed(self) -> None:
current_day = self._metrics_day_key()
if self._metrics_day == current_day:
return
self._metrics_day = current_day
self._metrics_requests_today = 0
self._metrics_messages_today = 0
self._metrics_tokens_today = 0
self._metrics_latency_ms.clear()
@staticmethod
def _total_tokens_from_usage(usage: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> int:
if not isinstance(usage, dict):
return 0
try:
return max(0, int(usage.get("total_tokens") or 0))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return 0
@staticmethod
def _latency_p95_ms(samples: List[float]) -> Optional[float]:
if not samples:
return None
ordered = sorted(samples)
index = max(0, min(len(ordered) - 1, int(len(ordered) * 0.95 + 0.999999) - 1))
return round(ordered[index], 2)
def _api_server_status_payload(self, *, heartbeat_at: Optional[float] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
self._reset_metrics_if_needed()
heartbeat = self._metrics_last_heartbeat_at if heartbeat_at is None else heartbeat_at
return {
"host": self._host,
"port": self._port,
"active_runs": self._active_structured_run_count() + self._inflight_agent_runs,
"stored_runs": len(self._run_statuses),
"last_request_at": self._iso_timestamp(self._metrics_last_request_at),
"last_heartbeat": self._iso_timestamp(heartbeat),
"metrics_today": {
"day": self._metrics_day,
"requests": self._metrics_requests_today,
"messages": self._metrics_messages_today,
"tokens": self._metrics_tokens_today,
"latency_p95_ms": self._latency_p95_ms(self._metrics_latency_ms),
},
}
def _publish_runtime_status(self) -> None:
self._metrics_last_heartbeat_at = time.time()
self._write_runtime_status_safe(
"api_server_heartbeat",
platform_state="connected" if self.is_connected else "disconnected",
platform_metrics=self._api_server_status_payload(),
)
def _record_api_metrics(self, usage: Optional[Dict[str, Any]], latency_seconds: float) -> None:
self._reset_metrics_if_needed()
self._metrics_requests_today += 1
self._metrics_messages_today += 1
self._metrics_tokens_today += self._total_tokens_from_usage(usage)
self._metrics_last_request_at = time.time()
self._metrics_latency_ms.append(max(0.0, latency_seconds * 1000.0))
if len(self._metrics_latency_ms) > API_SERVER_LATENCY_SAMPLE_LIMIT:
del self._metrics_latency_ms[:-API_SERVER_LATENCY_SAMPLE_LIMIT]
self._publish_runtime_status()
async def _heartbeat_loop(self) -> None:
while self.is_connected:
self._publish_runtime_status()
if not self.is_connected:
break
await asyncio.sleep(API_SERVER_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS)
@staticmethod
def _resolve_model_name(explicit: str) -> str:
"""Advertised /v1/models name: explicit override > active profile name > "hermes-agent"
(precedence owned by ``hermes_cli.model_switch.resolve_effective_model``)."""
from hermes_cli.model_switch import resolve_effective_model
profile_name = ""
with suppress(Exception):
from hermes_cli.profiles import get_active_profile_name
profile = get_active_profile_name() # launch profile, pre-identity (advertised model name)
if profile and profile not in {"default", "custom"}:
profile_name = profile
return resolve_effective_model(explicit, profile_name, "hermes-agent")
def _cors_headers_for_origin(self, origin: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, str]]:
"""Return CORS headers for an allowed browser origin."""
if not origin or not self._cors_origins:
return None
if "*" in self._cors_origins:
return {**_CORS_HEADERS, "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*", "Access-Control-Max-Age": "600"}
if origin not in self._cors_origins:
return None
return {**_CORS_HEADERS, "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": origin, "Vary": "Origin",
"Access-Control-Max-Age": "600"}
def _sse_headers(self, request: "web.Request", extra: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Headers for an SSE StreamResponse prepared inside a handler: the CORS middleware only
touches the response after the handler returns, by which point ``prepare()`` has already
flushed the head, so CORS must be resolved up front (#72892, #6358)."""
headers = {"Content-Type": "text/event-stream", "Cache-Control": "no-cache", "X-Accel-Buffering": "no"}
headers.update(self._cors_headers_for_origin(request.headers.get("Origin", "")) or {})
if extra:
headers.update(extra)
return headers
def _origin_allowed(self, origin: str) -> bool:
"""Allow non-browser clients and explicitly configured browser origins."""
return not origin or "*" in self._cors_origins or origin in self._cors_origins
@staticmethod
def _clean_log_value(value: Any, *, max_len: int = 200) -> str:
"""Sanitize request metadata before it reaches security logs."""
if value is None:
return ""
text = str(value).replace("\r", " ").replace("\n", " ").strip()
return text[:max_len]
def _request_audit_context(self, request: "web.Request") -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Return non-secret source metadata for security/audit warnings."""
peer_ip = ""
with suppress(Exception):
peer = request.transport.get_extra_info("peername") if request.transport else None
if isinstance(peer, (tuple, list)) and peer:
peer_ip = str(peer[0])
return {
"remote": self._clean_log_value(getattr(request, "remote", "") or peer_ip),
"peer_ip": self._clean_log_value(peer_ip),
"forwarded_for": self._clean_log_value(request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For", "")),
"real_ip": self._clean_log_value(request.headers.get("X-Real-IP", "")),
"method": self._clean_log_value(request.method, max_len=16),
"path": self._clean_log_value(request.path_qs, max_len=500),
"user_agent": self._clean_log_value(request.headers.get("User-Agent", ""), max_len=300)}
def _request_audit_log_suffix(self, request: "web.Request") -> str:
ctx = self._request_audit_context(request)
fields = [f"{key}={value!r}" for key, value in ctx.items() if value]
return " ".join(fields) if fields else "source='unknown'"
def _cron_origin_from_request(self, request: "web.Request") -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Persist safe API source metadata on cron jobs created over HTTP."""
ctx = self._request_audit_context(request)
origin = {"platform": "api_server", "chat_id": "api"}
for ctx_key, origin_key in (("remote", "source_ip"), ("peer_ip", "peer_ip"),
("forwarded_for", "forwarded_for"), ("real_ip", "real_ip"),
("user_agent", "user_agent")):
if ctx.get(ctx_key):
origin[origin_key] = ctx[ctx_key]
return origin
def _expected_api_key(self) -> str:
"""Return the API key authorized for the URL-selected profile."""
profile = _api_request_profile.get()
if not profile or profile == "default":
return self._api_key
try:
from agent.secret_scope import get_secret
from hermes_cli.auth import has_usable_secret
key = get_secret("API_SERVER_KEY", "") or ""
return key if has_usable_secret(key, min_length=16) else ""
except Exception as exc:
# Fail closed; never log the key or exception text.
logger.warning(
"Failed to resolve a usable profile-scoped API_SERVER_KEY for %r: %s",
profile, type(exc).__name__)
return ""
@staticmethod
def _auth_failed_response() -> "web.Response":
return web.json_response(
{"error": {"message": "Invalid gateway API key (API_SERVER_KEY)", "type": "gateway_auth_error",
"code": "gateway_auth_failed"}},
status=401)
def _check_auth(self, request: "web.Request") -> Optional["web.Response"]:
"""Validate the Bearer token; None when OK, else a 401. The no-key branch (connect()
refuses to start without API_SERVER_KEY) exists for tests/manual wiring on the default
listener only; named profiles fail closed rather than inherit the owner's key."""
profile = _api_request_profile.get()
expected_key = self._expected_api_key()
if not expected_key:
if not (profile and profile != "default"):
return None
logger.warning(
"API server rejected request for profile %r: no profile-scoped "
"API_SERVER_KEY is configured; %s",
profile, self._request_audit_log_suffix(request))
return self._auth_failed_response()
auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
if auth_header.startswith("Bearer "):
token = auth_header[7:].strip()
# Compare as bytes: compare_digest raises TypeError on non-ASCII str, and the
# token is raw client input — a stray byte must 401, not 500.
if hmac.compare_digest(token.encode(), expected_key.encode()):
return None
logger.warning("API server rejected invalid API key: %s", self._request_audit_log_suffix(request))
return self._auth_failed_response()
@staticmethod
def _normalize_callback_platform(value: str) -> str:
normalized = (value or "").strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
return normalized if re.fullmatch(r"[a-z0-9_]+", normalized) else ""
def _get_platform_callback_adapter(
self, request: "web.Request", platform_name: str) -> Optional[Any]:
injected = request.app.get("platform_event_adapters")
adapter = injected.get(platform_name) if isinstance(injected, dict) else None
if adapter is None:
adapter = request.app.get(f"{platform_name}_adapter")
if adapter is not None:
return adapter
runner = self.gateway_runner or request.app.get("gateway_runner")
if runner is None:
return None
# ``/p/<profile>/`` binds the callback to that profile's adapter map; a missing adapter there is a
# 503, never the primary profile's adapter (verifying/dispatching a secondary's events under the
# default bot's credentials, #84266). ``_authorization_adapter`` is the shared fail-closed resolver.
try:
platform = Platform(platform_name)
except Exception:
return None
return runner._authorization_adapter(platform, _api_request_profile.get())
async def _handle_platform_event_callback(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
platform_name = self._normalize_callback_platform(request.match_info.get("platform", ""))
if not platform_name:
return _error_response("Invalid platform name", 400, code="invalid_platform")
adapter = self._get_platform_callback_adapter(request, platform_name)
if adapter is None:
return _error_response("Platform adapter is not connected", 503, code="platform_unavailable")
verifier = getattr(adapter, "verify_http_event_request", None)
dispatcher = getattr(adapter, "dispatch_http_event", None)
if verifier is None or dispatcher is None:
return _error_response(
"Platform adapter does not support HTTP events", 503, code="platform_http_events_unsupported")
auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
try:
ok, code = await _call_verifier(verifier, auth_header)
except Exception:
# Fail closed: a crashing verifier must never admit the event.
logger.exception("Platform HTTP event verifier failed for %s", platform_name)
ok, code = False, "platform_event_verifier_error"
if not ok:
return _error_response(
"Invalid platform event authorization", 401, code=code or "invalid_platform_event_authorization")
try:
payload = await request.json()
except Exception:
return _error_response("Invalid JSON in platform event", 400, code="invalid_json")
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return _error_response("Platform event must be a JSON object", 400, code="invalid_request")
try:
result = await dispatcher(payload)
except Exception:
logger.exception("Platform HTTP event dispatch failed for %s", platform_name)
return _error_response(
"Platform event dispatch failed", 500, err_type="server_error",
code="platform_event_dispatch_failed")
return web.json_response(result if isinstance(result, dict) else {})
# -- Multi-profile multiplexing (/p/<profile>/...) --------------------------------
def _resolve_request_profile(self, request: "web.Request"):
"""Resolve + validate the /p/<profile>/ prefix: ``None`` (no prefix, or multiplexing
off and the prefix names this gateway's own profile), the served profile name, or
``_PROFILE_REJECTED`` (-> 404). Fail closed: a foreign prefix must never be ignored."""
profile = (request.match_info.get("profile") or "").strip()
if not profile:
return None
cfg = getattr(self.gateway_runner, "config", None)
if not getattr(cfg, "multiplex_profiles", False):
return None if _prefix_names_served_profile(profile) else _PROFILE_REJECTED
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import profiles_to_serve
served = {name for name, _ in profiles_to_serve(multiplex=True)}
except Exception:
return _PROFILE_REJECTED
return profile if profile in served else _PROFILE_REJECTED
@staticmethod
def _profile_scope(profile: Optional[str]):
"""Enter the multiplex profile runtime scope, or a no-op when unset. No prefix AND
multiplexing active enters the DEFAULT profile's scope (an unscoped run would raise
UnscopedSecretError on its first credential read); single-profile gateways no-op.
Single-profile gateways keep the no-op — ``get_secret`` falls through to ``os.environ`` there,
unchanged. See #61276.
"""
if not profile:
with suppress(Exception):
from agent.secret_scope import is_multiplex_active
if is_multiplex_active():
from gateway.run import _profile_runtime_scope
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
return _profile_runtime_scope(get_hermes_home())
return nullcontext()
from gateway.run import _profile_runtime_scope
from hermes_cli.profiles import get_profile_dir
return _profile_runtime_scope(get_profile_dir(profile))
async def _handle_profile_ingress(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.StreamResponse":
"""``/p/<profile>/<tail>`` → the served profile's shared-listener adapter (already scoped by the
prefix middleware); a profile with no adapter for the path is a 404, never the default's."""
from gateway.platforms.shared_ingress import dispatch_profile_ingress
return await dispatch_profile_ingress(
self.gateway_runner, _api_request_profile.get(), request.match_info.get("tail", ""), request,
scoped=True)
def _make_profile_prefix_middleware(self):
"""Reject unknown /p/<profile>/ prefixes and scope the request home."""
@web.middleware
async def profile_prefix_middleware(request: "web.Request", handler):
profile = self._resolve_request_profile(request)
if profile is _PROFILE_REJECTED:
return web.json_response({"error": "Unknown or unconfigured profile"}, status=404)
token = _api_request_profile.set(profile)
try:
with self._profile_scope(profile):
resolved_profile = profile or "default"
principal_token = _api_request_browser_control_principal.set(
self._derive_browser_control_principal(resolved_profile))
family_token = _api_request_browser_control_transport_family.set(
self._browser_control_transport_family(request))
try:
return await handler(request)
finally:
_api_request_browser_control_transport_family.reset(family_token)
_api_request_browser_control_principal.reset(principal_token)
finally:
_api_request_profile.reset(token)
return profile_prefix_middleware
def _http_route_table(self) -> List[tuple]:
"""(method, path, handler) rows registered by ``connect()`` (a method so multiplex tests
can assert the /p/<profile>/ mirrors without a listener)."""
routes: List[tuple] = [
("GET", "/health", self._handle_health),
("GET", "/health/detailed", self._handle_health_detailed),
("GET", "/v1/health", self._handle_health),
("GET", "/v1/models", self._handle_models),
("GET", "/api/model/options", self._handle_model_options),
("GET", "/v1/capabilities", self._handle_capabilities),
# Browser-control (gated on browser.extension_control.enabled + API key): POST
# mints a short-lived ticket, WS consumes it; artifacts are bounded + scope-bound.
("POST", "/v1/browser-control/register", self._handle_browser_control_register),
("GET", "/v1/browser-control/ws", self._handle_browser_control_ws),
("POST", "/v1/artifacts/upload", self._handle_artifact_upload),
("GET", "/v1/artifacts/download/{artifact_id}", self._handle_artifact_download),
("GET", "/v1/skills", self._handle_skills),
("GET", "/v1/toolsets", self._handle_toolsets),
("GET", "/api/sessions", self._handle_list_sessions),
("POST", "/api/sessions", self._handle_create_session),
("GET", "/api/sessions/{session_id}", self._handle_get_session),
("PATCH", "/api/sessions/{session_id}", self._handle_patch_session),
("DELETE", "/api/sessions/{session_id}", self._handle_delete_session),
("GET", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/messages", self._handle_session_messages),
("POST", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/fork", self._handle_fork_session),
("POST", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/chat", self._handle_session_chat),
("POST", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/chat/stream", self._handle_session_chat_stream),
("POST", "/api/sessions/{session_id}/model", self._handle_session_model_lock),
("POST", "/v1/chat/completions", self._handle_chat_completions),
("POST", "/v1/responses", self._handle_responses),
("GET", "/v1/responses/{response_id}", self._handle_get_response),
("DELETE", "/v1/responses/{response_id}", self._handle_delete_response),
# Platform event ingress: authenticated by the target adapter's own verifier,
# NOT API_SERVER_KEY (external platforms hold no API server key).
("POST", "/api/platforms/{platform}/events", self._handle_platform_event_callback),
("GET", "/api/jobs", self._handle_list_jobs),
("POST", "/api/jobs", self._handle_create_job),
("GET", "/api/jobs/{job_id}", self._handle_get_job),
("PATCH", "/api/jobs/{job_id}", self._handle_update_job),
("DELETE", "/api/jobs/{job_id}", self._handle_delete_job),
("POST", "/api/jobs/{job_id}/pause", self._handle_pause_job),
("POST", "/api/jobs/{job_id}/resume", self._handle_resume_job),
("POST", "/api/jobs/{job_id}/run", self._handle_run_job)]
routes.extend(_room_grants._http_routes(self))
routes.extend(_api_runs._http_routes(self))
if _CRON_AVAILABLE:
# Chronos fire webhook (NAS -> agent): authenticated by a NAS-minted JWT.
routes.append(("POST", "/api/cron/fire", self._handle_cron_fire))
return routes
# -- Session header helpers -------------------------------------------------------
# Cap on session headers: above any realistic channel id, safe for Honcho / state.db.
_MAX_SESSION_HEADER_LEN = 256
# Source stamped on every session row this platform owns (also hardwired in
# _bind_api_server_session and _create_agent) so peer lookups can filter on it.
_SESSION_SOURCE = "api_server"
def _declared_conversation_session(self, gateway_session_key: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Resolve the live session a client declared with ``X-Hermes-Session-Key`` (the key
names the conversation, ``session_id`` its current transcript). Same reset-fenced
recovery as ``SessionStore._recover_session_for_peer``; concurrent first requests
converge (later row wins). None when undeclared, no live row, or DB error."""
key = (gateway_session_key or "").strip()
db = self._ensure_session_db() if key else None
if db is None:
return None
try:
row = db.find_latest_gateway_session_for_peer(
source=self._SESSION_SOURCE, session_key=key)
except Exception:
logger.debug("[%s] declared-conversation lookup failed", self.name, exc_info=True)
return None
return str(row["id"]) if row and row.get("id") else None
def _bind_declared_conversation(
self, session_id: Optional[str], gateway_session_key: Optional[str]) -> None:
"""Record the declared conversation key on the session row (AIAgent writes it unkeyed);
``include_compression_ancestors`` covers a mid-turn rotation. UPDATE: no-op w/o a row.
``include_compression_ancestors`` carries the key up a mid-turn compression rotation so the pre- and
post-rotation rows of one conversation share it, while that same walk deliberately stops at
``/branch``, delegate and tool children (#79161). The statement is an UPDATE, so it is a harmless
no-op on a turn that failed before the row was created.
"""
key = (gateway_session_key or "").strip()
sid = str(session_id or "").strip()
db = self._ensure_session_db() if key and sid else None
if db is None:
return
try:
# Never rewrite a row that already belongs to a different conversation
# (record_gateway_session_peer does SET session_key = ?).
existing = db.get_session(sid) or {}
current = str(existing.get("session_key") or "").strip()
if current and current != key:
logger.debug(
"[%s] refusing to rebind session %s from a different declared conversation",
self.name, sid)
return
db.record_gateway_session_peer(
sid, source=self._SESSION_SOURCE, session_key=key,
include_compression_ancestors=True)
except Exception:
logger.debug(
"[%s] declared-conversation bind failed for %s", self.name, sid, exc_info=True)
def _parse_session_key_header(
self, request: "web.Request") -> tuple[Optional[str], Optional["web.Response"]]:
"""Validate ``X-Hermes-Session-Key`` (per-channel memory scope) -> ``(key_or_None, None)``
or ``(None, error)``. Requires API-key auth so a client can't guess another scope."""
raw = request.headers.get("X-Hermes-Session-Key", "").strip()
if not raw:
return None, None
if not self._api_key:
logger.warning(
"X-Hermes-Session-Key rejected: no API key configured. "
"Set API_SERVER_KEY to enable long-term memory scoping.")
return None, _error_response(
"X-Hermes-Session-Key requires API key authentication. "
"Configure API_SERVER_KEY to enable this feature.", 403)
# Control characters could enable header injection on the echo path.
if re.search(r'[\r\n\x00]', raw):
return None, _invalid_request("Invalid session key")
if len(raw) > self._MAX_SESSION_HEADER_LEN:
return None, _invalid_request("Session key too long")
return raw, None
# -- Responses state ----------------------------------------------------------------
def _current_response_store(self) -> "ResponseStore":
"""Responses state of the routed profile's home. Conversation names are client-chosen, so one
shared store let any profile's key read, chain onto and overwrite another's (#84253)."""
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
home = get_hermes_home()
if str(home) == self._response_store_home:
return self._response_store
with self._response_store_lock:
store = self._response_stores.get(str(home))
if store is None:
store = self._response_stores[str(home)] = ResponseStore(db_path=str(home / "response_store.db"))
return store
# -- Session DB -------------------------------------------------------------------
def _open_and_cache_session_db(self, home) -> Optional[Any]:
"""Cached SessionDB for ``home`` (shared by both ``_ensure_session_db*``). Never writes
``self._session_db`` (explicit override only), so no profile pins later requests."""
from hermes_state_registry import acquire
key = str(home)
with self._session_db_cache_lock:
if self._session_db_cache_closed:
return None
db = self._session_dbs.get(key)
if db is None:
db = acquire(home / "state.db")
self._session_dbs[key] = db
return db
def _close_cached_session_dbs(self) -> None:
"""Close SessionDB handles owned by this adapter's profile cache."""
with self._session_db_cache_lock:
self._session_db_cache_closed = True
cached = list(self._session_dbs.values())
self._session_dbs.clear()
shared_db = getattr(self, "_session_db", None)
for db in cached:
if db is shared_db:
continue
try:
from hermes_state_registry import release_or_close
release_or_close(db)
except Exception:
logger.debug("Failed to close API-server SessionDB", exc_info=True)
def _ensure_session_db(self):
"""SessionDB for the active profile home (the runtime scope redirects ``get_hermes_home()``
per profile). Sync, for ``_create_agent``; handlers use ``_ensure_session_db_async``."""
if self._session_db is not None:
return self._session_db
try:
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
return self._open_and_cache_session_db(get_hermes_home())
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("SessionDB unavailable for API server: %s", e)
return None
async def _ensure_session_db_async(self):
"""Async variant: the profile home is captured on the loop thread (its scope is invisible
inside ``to_thread``), only the blocking open runs in the worker, single-flight locked."""
if self._session_db is not None:
return self._session_db
try:
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
home = get_hermes_home()
key = str(home)
with self._session_db_cache_lock:
cached = self._session_dbs.get(key)
if cached is not None:
return cached
if self._session_db_lock is None:
self._session_db_lock = asyncio.Lock()
async with self._session_db_lock:
with self._session_db_cache_lock:
cached = self._session_dbs.get(key)
if cached is not None:
return cached
return await asyncio.to_thread(self._open_and_cache_session_db, home)
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("SessionDB unavailable for API server: %s", e)
return None
# -- Agent creation ---------------------------------------------------------------
@staticmethod
def _parse_model_routes(raw: Any) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Validate ``model_routes`` (``alias -> {model, provider?, api_key?, base_url?}``); invalid
shapes are dropped, never raised. Route ``api_key`` is an UPSTREAM credential: never log."""
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
if raw:
logger.warning(
"api_server model_routes ignored: expected a mapping, got %s", type(raw).__name__)
return {}
allowed_keys = ("model", "provider", "api_key", "base_url")
routes: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for alias, cfg in raw.items():
alias_str = str(alias).strip()
if not alias_str or not isinstance(cfg, dict):
logger.warning(
"api_server model_routes: dropping invalid route entry %r", alias_str or alias)
continue
route = {
key: str(cfg[key]).strip()
for key in allowed_keys
if cfg.get(key) is not None and str(cfg[key]).strip()}
if not route.get("model"):
logger.warning(
"api_server model_routes: route %r has no 'model'; dropping", alias_str)
continue
routes[alias_str] = route
return routes
def _resolve_route(self, model_alias: Any) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return the model_routes entry for *model_alias*, or None."""
return self._model_routes.get(model_alias) if isinstance(model_alias, str) else None
def _stored_session_model(self, session: Any) -> Optional[str]:
"""The model persisted on a session row, minus the virtual alias (replaying
"hermes-agent" upstream as a provider model id 400s)."""
stored = session.get("model") if isinstance(session, dict) else None
if not stored or stored == self._model_name:
return None
return stored
@staticmethod
def _clean_runtime_id(value: Any, *, max_len: int = 200) -> str:
text = "" if value is None else str(value).strip()
return "" if len(text) > max_len or re.search(r"[\r\n\x00]", text) else text
@classmethod
def _split_provider_prefixed_model(cls, model: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
text = cls._clean_runtime_id(model)
if "::" in text:
provider, raw = text.split("::", 1)
if re.match(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{2,64}$", provider) and raw.strip():
return provider, raw.strip()
return "", text
@classmethod
def _runtime_options_from_model_options(cls, model_options: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(model_options, dict):
return {}
runtime_options: Dict[str, Any] = {}
reasoning = model_options.get("reasoning")
if isinstance(reasoning, dict):
enabled = reasoning.get("enabled")
effort = cls._clean_runtime_id(reasoning.get("effort"), max_len=32)
if enabled is False:
runtime_options["reasoning_config"] = {"enabled": False}
elif effort:
runtime_options["reasoning_config"] = {"enabled": True, "effort": effort}
elif enabled is True:
runtime_options["reasoning_config"] = {"enabled": True}
service_tier = cls._clean_runtime_id(model_options.get("service_tier"), max_len=32)
if service_tier:
runtime_options["service_tier"] = service_tier
elif _coerce_request_bool(model_options.get("fast"), default=False):
runtime_options["service_tier"] = "priority"
return runtime_options
def _session_runtime_request_from_body(self, body: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
raw_model = self._clean_runtime_id(body.get("model") or body.get("model_id"))
raw_provider = self._clean_runtime_id(body.get("provider") or body.get("provider_id"), max_len=80)
prefixed_provider, split_model = self._split_provider_prefixed_model(raw_model)
provider = raw_provider or prefixed_provider
model = split_model or raw_model
alias_route = self._resolve_route(raw_model) or self._resolve_route(model)
route = dict(alias_route) if isinstance(alias_route, dict) else None
# The virtual alias is not a provider model id: null it upstream of route-building and
# every "requested" dict so it is never persisted or misread as a raw override.
if model == self._model_name:
model = None
route_source = "model_routes" if route else "global"
if not route and model:
route = {"model": model}
if provider:
route["provider"] = provider
route_source = "raw_request"
return {
"requested": {"provider": provider, "model": model, "raw_model": raw_model},
"route": route, "route_source": route_source,
"runtime_options": self._runtime_options_from_model_options(body.get("model_options")),
"require_model_lock": _coerce_request_bool(body.get("require_model_lock"), default=False),
"model_options": (
body.get("model_options") if isinstance(body.get("model_options"), dict) else {})}
@classmethod
def _requested_ids(cls, requested: Any) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""``(model, provider)`` cleaned from a ``requested``/lock mapping."""
requested = requested or {}
return (cls._clean_runtime_id(requested.get("model")),
cls._clean_runtime_id(requested.get("provider"), max_len=80))
def _runtime_lock_error(self, runtime_request: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional["web.Response"]:
if not runtime_request.get("require_model_lock"):
return None
model, provider = self._requested_ids(runtime_request.get("requested"))
route = runtime_request.get("route")
if not model and not provider:
return _error_response(
"require_model_lock was set but no model/provider was provided", 400, code="missing_model")
if not route or runtime_request.get("route_source") == "global":
return _error_response(
"Requested Browser model lock cannot be routed; refusing silent global fallback",
409, code="model_lock_unavailable")
return None
def _persist_session_runtime_lock(self, session_id: str, runtime_request: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
# Persist only a newly confirmed lock: a reused stored lock must not be rewritten each
# turn, and a one-off request override must not erase a confirmed lock.
if runtime_request.get("persisted_lock") or not runtime_request.get("require_model_lock"):
return True
model, provider = self._requested_ids(runtime_request.get("requested"))
if not model and not provider:
return False
db = self._ensure_session_db()
if db is None:
return False
try:
db.update_session_runtime_lock(
session_id, model=model or None, provider=provider or None,
model_options=runtime_request.get("model_options") or {},
route_source=runtime_request.get("route_source") or "",
confirmed=bool(runtime_request.get("require_model_lock")))
return True
except Exception:
logger.warning("[%s] failed to persist session runtime lock for %s", self.name, session_id, exc_info=True)
return False
@staticmethod
def _parse_session_model_config(raw: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if isinstance(raw, dict):
return dict(raw)
if isinstance(raw, str) and raw.strip():
with suppress(Exception):
parsed = json.loads(raw)
return parsed if isinstance(parsed, dict) else {}
return {}
def _runtime_request_from_persisted_session_lock(
self, session: Optional[Dict[str, Any]], body: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
if not isinstance(session, dict):
return None
model_config = self._parse_session_model_config(session.get("model_config"))
lock = model_config.get("browser_model_lock")
if not isinstance(lock, dict) or not _coerce_request_bool(lock.get("confirmed"), default=False):
return None
model, provider = self._requested_ids(lock)
if not model and not provider:
return None
if self._clean_runtime_id(lock.get("route_source"), max_len=64).lower() == "model_routes":
route = self._resolve_route(model) if model else None
else:
route = {"model": model} if model else {}
if provider:
route["provider"] = provider
model_options = body.get("model_options")
if not isinstance(model_options, dict):
model_options = lock.get("model_options")
return {
"requested": {"provider": provider, "model": model, "raw_model": model},
"route": route or None, "route_source": "session_model_lock",
"runtime_options": self._runtime_options_from_model_options(model_options),
"require_model_lock": True,
"model_options": model_options if isinstance(model_options, dict) else {},
"persisted_lock": True}
def _effective_session_runtime_request(
self, *, session: Optional[Dict[str, Any]], body: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
runtime_request = self._session_runtime_request_from_body(body)
requested = runtime_request.get("requested") or {}
if requested.get("model") or requested.get("provider"):
return runtime_request
return self._runtime_request_from_persisted_session_lock(session, body) or runtime_request
@classmethod
def _sanitize_runtime_metadata(
cls, *, runtime: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, requested_runtime: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
route_source: str = "global", model_lock: str = "") -> Dict[str, Any]:
payload = dict(runtime or {})
provider = cls._clean_runtime_id(
payload.get("provider") or payload.get("provider_id") or payload.get("effective_provider"),
max_len=80)
model = cls._clean_runtime_id(payload.get("model") or payload.get("model_id") or payload.get("effective_model"))
source = cls._clean_runtime_id(payload.get("route_source") or route_source, max_len=64)
result: Dict[str, Any] = {
"provider": provider, "model": model, "route_source": source or "global"}
if requested_runtime or payload.get("requested"):
model, provider = cls._requested_ids(requested_runtime or payload.get("requested"))
result["requested"] = {"provider": provider, "model": model}
if model_lock or payload.get("model_lock"):
result["model_lock"] = cls._clean_runtime_id(model_lock or payload.get("model_lock"), max_len=32)
return result
@staticmethod
def _normalize_session_source(value: Any) -> str:
text = str(value or "").strip().lower()
allowed = {"api_server", "hermes_browser", "browser", "cli", "telegram", "discord", "slack", "desktop", "dashboard"}
if text not in allowed:
return "api_server"
return "hermes_browser" if text == "browser" else text
def _session_model_override_for(self, session_key: Optional[str]) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""The gateway's per-session ``/model`` override for *session_key*, if any — a
user-issued ``/model`` always wins over static route config."""
if not session_key:
return None
try:
from gateway.run import _gateway_runner_ref
runner = _gateway_runner_ref()
if runner is None:
return None
try:
rehydrate = getattr(runner, "_rehydrate_session_model_override", None)
if callable(rehydrate):
rehydrate(session_key)
except Exception:
logger.debug(
"api_server failed to rehydrate session /model override for %s", session_key, exc_info=True)
override = runner._session_model_overrides.get(session_key)
return dict(override) if isinstance(override, dict) else None
except Exception:
return None
def _request_route_conflict_error(
self, *, session_id: Optional[str], gateway_session_key: Optional[str], requested_model: Optional[str],
requested_provider: Optional[str], route: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a 400-worthy conflict string for ambiguous route/provider mixes."""
request_provider = _clean_request_string(requested_provider)
if not request_provider or not isinstance(route, dict):
return None
if self._session_model_override_for(gateway_session_key or session_id):
return None # session /model wins over both, so nothing is ambiguous
route_provider = _clean_request_string(route.get("provider"))
route_api_key = _clean_request_string(route.get("api_key"))
route_base_url = _clean_request_string(route.get("base_url"))
route_alias = _clean_request_string(requested_model) or "requested model"
if route_provider and request_provider != route_provider:
return (
f"Model route '{route_alias}' is pinned to provider '{route_provider}'. "
f"Remove 'provider' or use '{route_provider}'.")
if not route_provider and (route_api_key or route_base_url):
return (
f"Model route '{route_alias}' pins route credentials/base_url. "
"Do not combine it with an explicit 'provider'.")
return None
@staticmethod
def _resolve_provider_runtime(
provider: Optional[str], *, target_model: Optional[str], required: bool,
) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Runtime kwargs for ``provider``, falling back to the gateway's resolver; ``required``
raises ``_ProviderAuthResolutionError`` (controlled response, not a raw 500), not None."""
provider_name = _clean_request_string(provider)
if not provider_name:
return None
try:
return _resolve_request_runtime_agent_kwargs(provider_name, target_model=target_model or None)
except Exception as exc:
with suppress(Exception):
from gateway.run import _resolve_runtime_agent_kwargs_for_provider
return _resolve_runtime_agent_kwargs_for_provider(provider_name, target_model=target_model or None)
if required:
raise _ProviderAuthResolutionError(str(exc)) from exc
logger.debug(
"api_server provider-runtime refresh failed for provider=%s model=%s",
provider_name, target_model or "", exc_info=True)
return None
def _apply_provider_runtime(
self, runtime_kwargs: Dict[str, Any], provider: Optional[str], *,
target_model: Optional[str], required: bool = False) -> bool:
"""Resolve ``provider``'s runtime and merge it into ``runtime_kwargs``; True if applied."""
provider_runtime = self._resolve_provider_runtime(
provider, target_model=target_model, required=required)
if provider_runtime:
_apply_runtime_agent_overrides(runtime_kwargs, provider_runtime)
return bool(provider_runtime)
def _recover_or_record_model(self, model: str, runtime_kwargs: Dict[str, Any], gateway_session_key) -> str:
"""Fill an empty resolved model: provider's default catalog model, then the last-known-good
model for this key / process-wide. Non-empty non-virtual models are recorded instead."""
# No model.default but a provider resolved (e.g. `hermes auth add` without `hermes model`).
if not model and runtime_kwargs.get("provider"):
with suppress(Exception):
from hermes_cli.models import get_default_model_for_provider
model = get_default_model_for_provider(runtime_kwargs["provider"])
if model:
logger.info(
"No model configured — defaulting to %s for provider %s",
model, runtime_kwargs["provider"])
# Keyed by gateway_session_key only (session_id is per-request -> unbounded growth).
_resolved_key = gateway_session_key or ""
if not model:
_recovered = (self._last_resolved_model.get(_resolved_key)
or self._last_resolved_model.get("*"))
if _recovered and _recovered != self._model_name:
logger.warning(
"Empty model resolved for session=%s — recovering "
"last-known-good model %s (config read likely returned "
"empty; see #35314)",
_resolved_key, _recovered)
model = _recovered
elif model != self._model_name:
if _resolved_key:
self._last_resolved_model[_resolved_key] = model
self._last_resolved_model["*"] = model
return model
def _select_agent_runtime(
self, runtime_kwargs: Dict[str, Any], model: str, *, requested_model: Optional[str],
requested_provider: Optional[str], route: Optional[Dict[str, Any]], session_model: Optional[str],
confirmed_runtime_lock: bool, gateway_session_key: Optional[str], session_id: Optional[str]) -> tuple:
"""Apply the model/provider precedence chain for one agent (mutates ``runtime_kwargs``):
confirmed Browser lock > session ``/model`` override > session-persisted model >
model_routes alias > per-request provider/model > global defaults. A confirmed lock
bypasses the override and fails closed if its provider cannot be resolved.
Returns ``(model, session_override, request_model, request_provider)``."""
request_model = _clean_request_string(requested_model)
request_provider = _clean_request_string(requested_provider)
route_cfg = route if isinstance(route, dict) else {}
route_model = _clean_request_string(route_cfg.get("model"))
route_provider = _clean_request_string(route_cfg.get("provider"))
session_key = gateway_session_key or session_id
session_row_model = _clean_request_string(session_model)
current_provider = _clean_request_string(runtime_kwargs.get("provider"))
session_override = None if confirmed_runtime_lock else self._session_model_override_for(session_key)
# Model-string precedence (override > session-persisted > global) is owned by
# hermes_cli.model_switch.resolve_effective_model.
from hermes_cli.model_switch import resolve_effective_model
if session_override:
model = resolve_effective_model(session_override, None, model)
self._apply_provider_runtime(
runtime_kwargs,
_clean_request_string(session_override.get("provider")) or current_provider,
target_model=model)
_apply_runtime_agent_overrides(runtime_kwargs, session_override)
if route or request_model or request_provider:
logger.debug(
"api_server request selection skipped: session /model override wins for %s",
session_key or "")
elif session_row_model and not confirmed_runtime_lock:
# A session-persisted raw model (no route alias) is a standing selection that pins
# this session's turns ahead of per-request body values.
self._apply_provider_runtime(
runtime_kwargs, current_provider, target_model=session_row_model)
model = resolve_effective_model(None, session_row_model, model)
if request_model or request_provider:
logger.debug(
"api_server request selection skipped: session-persisted model wins for %s",
session_key or "")
else:
# The request's ``model`` selected the route, so its value is the ALIAS — never a
# model name; a route with no ``model`` key keeps the global default.
effective_model = (route_model or model) if route is not None else (request_model or model)
effective_provider = request_provider or route_provider or current_provider
applied = False
if effective_provider and (bool(request_provider or route_provider) or effective_model != model):
# A confirmed Browser lock fails closed: never fall through to the previous
# global provider's credentials.
applied = self._apply_provider_runtime(
runtime_kwargs, effective_provider, target_model=effective_model,
required=bool(request_provider) or confirmed_runtime_lock)
if not applied and effective_provider and effective_provider != current_provider:
runtime_kwargs["provider"] = effective_provider
model = effective_model
# Per-route explicit transport secrets/base URLs win after provider resolution.
for key in ("api_key", "base_url"):
value = _clean_request_string(route_cfg.get(key))
if value:
runtime_kwargs[key] = value
if route:
logger.debug(
"api_server request selection applied: model=%s provider=%s route_provider=%s request_provider=%s",
model, runtime_kwargs.get("provider"), route_provider or "", request_provider or "")
model = self._recover_or_record_model(model, runtime_kwargs, gateway_session_key)
return model, session_override, request_model, request_provider
def _create_agent(
self, ephemeral_system_prompt: Optional[str] = None, session_id: Optional[str] = None,
stream_delta_callback=None, tool_progress_callback=None, tool_start_callback=None,
tool_complete_callback=None, interim_assistant_callback=None, reasoning_callback=None,
status_callback=None, gateway_session_key: Optional[str] = None,
requested_model: Optional[str] = None, requested_provider: Optional[str] = None,
model_options: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, route: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
session_model: Optional[str] = None, confirmed_runtime_lock: bool = False,
room_dispatch: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
room_execution_policy: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> Any:
"""Create an AIAgent from the gateway runtime config + platform toolsets.
``gateway_session_key`` persists across transcripts (memory scope), unlike ``session_id``;
``route`` / ``session_model`` are mutually exclusive; ``confirmed_runtime_lock`` beats the
session ``/model`` override, disables the fallback chain and fails closed."""
from run_agent import AIAgent
from gateway.run import (
_checkpoint_agent_kwargs, _current_max_iterations, _resolve_runtime_agent_kwargs,
_resolve_gateway_model, _load_gateway_config, GatewayRunner)
from hermes_cli.tools_config import _get_platform_tools
# RuntimeError is caught ONLY here (sole provider-auth raiser); the typed subclass keeps
# run_conversation() errors distinct.
try:
runtime_kwargs = _resolve_runtime_agent_kwargs()
except RuntimeError as exc:
raise _ProviderAuthResolutionError(str(exc)) from exc
# A fallback-provider runtime carries its own ``model``: pop it (overrides config, and
# must not collide with the ``**runtime_kwargs`` spread).
model = runtime_kwargs.pop("model", None) or _resolve_gateway_model()
runtime_kwargs.pop("_fallback_notice", None) # raw API surface: the switch is already logged
request_reasoning_config = _request_reasoning_config(model_options)
request_service_tier = _request_service_tier(model_options)
model, session_override, request_model, request_provider = self._select_agent_runtime(
runtime_kwargs, model,
requested_model=requested_model, requested_provider=requested_provider, route=route,
session_model=session_model, confirmed_runtime_lock=confirmed_runtime_lock,
gateway_session_key=gateway_session_key, session_id=session_id)
user_config = _load_gateway_config()
enabled_toolsets = sorted(_get_platform_tools(user_config, "api_server"))
# Same gate the messaging gateway and TUI apply: ``display.interim_assistant_messages``
# off means no callback is installed, so mid-turn commentary never leaves the agent.
if not resolve_display_setting(user_config, "api_server", "interim_assistant_messages", True):
interim_assistant_callback = None
max_iterations = _current_max_iterations()
if room_dispatch is not None:
from gateway.hosted_room_execution_policy import RoomExecutionPolicy
policy = RoomExecutionPolicy.from_mapping(room_execution_policy or {})
enabled_toolsets = list(policy.enabled_toolsets)
max_iterations = policy.max_iterations
# Reasoning resolves against the model that actually runs (per-model overrides), so only
# after the precedence chain settles; an explicit request wins.
if request_reasoning_config is None:
request_reasoning_config = GatewayRunner._load_reasoning_config(model)
agent_kwargs = {
"model": model, **runtime_kwargs, **_checkpoint_agent_kwargs(user_config),
"max_iterations": max_iterations, "quiet_mode": True, "verbose_logging": False,
"ephemeral_system_prompt": ephemeral_system_prompt or None,
"enabled_toolsets": enabled_toolsets, "session_id": session_id,
"platform": "api_server",
"stream_delta_callback": stream_delta_callback,
"tool_progress_callback": tool_progress_callback,
"tool_start_callback": tool_start_callback,
"tool_complete_callback": tool_complete_callback,
"interim_assistant_callback": interim_assistant_callback,
"reasoning_callback": reasoning_callback,
"status_callback": status_callback,
"session_db": self._ensure_session_db(),
# Same fallback provider chain as Telegram/Discord/Slack.
"fallback_model": None if confirmed_runtime_lock else GatewayRunner._load_fallback_model(),
"reasoning_config": request_reasoning_config,
"gateway_session_key": gateway_session_key,
# The session's provider from the previous request, so its queued recall reaches this turn
# (#120116); checked back in by the turn's finally.
"memory_manager": self._memory_sessions.checkout(session_id)}
if request_service_tier is not _REQUEST_OPTION_MISSING:
agent_kwargs["service_tier"] = request_service_tier
agent = AIAgent(**agent_kwargs)
route_source = (
"session_model_lock" if confirmed_runtime_lock
else "session_model_override" if session_override
else "raw_request" if route or request_model or request_provider else "global")
agent._hermes_api_runtime = {
"provider": runtime_kwargs.get("provider") or getattr(agent, "provider", "") or "",
"model": getattr(agent, "model", None) or model,
"route_source": route_source}
return agent
# -- HTTP handlers ----------------------------------------------------------------
async def _handle_health(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /health — simple health check."""
return web.json_response({"status": "ok", "platform": "hermes-agent", "version": _hermes_version()})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_health_detailed(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /health/detailed — gateway state, platforms, PID for dashboard probing (Bearer auth)."""
from gateway.status import (
derive_gateway_busy, derive_gateway_drainable, normalize_updated_at, parse_active_agents,
read_runtime_status)
runtime = read_runtime_status() or {}
gw_state = runtime.get("gateway_state")
gw_active = parse_active_agents(runtime.get("active_agents", 0))
# Serve the live adapter's own metrics alongside the persisted platform map: the
# heartbeat loop keeps the file fresh, but a just-booted or wedged writer would
# otherwise show boot-time values here too (#52323).
platforms = runtime.get("platforms", {})
if not isinstance(platforms, dict):
platforms = {}
platforms = dict(platforms)
api_status = self._api_server_status_payload(heartbeat_at=time.time())
api_platform = dict(platforms.get("api_server", {}))
api_platform.setdefault("state", "connected" if self.is_connected else "disconnected")
api_platform["metrics"] = api_status
platforms["api_server"] = api_platform
# Served BY the gateway process, so gateway_running is True by definition; busy/
# drainable use the same shared contract as /api/status so the two never disagree.
active_api_runs, process_depth, active_delegations = self._readiness_work_counts()
from gateway.run import _resolve_gateway_model
readiness = collect_runtime_readiness(
configured_model=_resolve_gateway_model(), runtime_status=runtime,
active_api_runs=active_api_runs, process_completion_queue_depth=process_depth,
active_delegations=active_delegations)
return web.json_response({
"status": readiness["status"], "readiness": readiness, "platform": "hermes-agent",
"version": _hermes_version(), "gateway_state": gw_state,
"platforms": platforms,
"api_server": api_status,
"metrics_today": api_status["metrics_today"],
"last_heartbeat": api_status["last_heartbeat"],
"active_agents": gw_active,
"gateway_busy": derive_gateway_busy(
gateway_running=True, gateway_state=gw_state, active_agents=gw_active),
"gateway_drainable": derive_gateway_drainable(
gateway_running=True, gateway_state=gw_state),
"exit_reason": runtime.get("exit_reason"),
# Contract: RFC3339 string | null, never a number (legacy epoch floats exist).
"updated_at": normalize_updated_at(runtime.get("updated_at")), "pid": os.getpid()})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_models(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /v1/models — hermes-agent plus configured model_routes aliases (alias + resolved
model only, never credentials). Under /p/<profile>/ the primary id follows that profile."""
now = int(time.time())
# The middleware already entered the profile scope, so get_active_profile_name() resolves.
model_name = self._resolve_model_name("") if _api_request_profile.get() else self._model_name
def _model(mid: str, root: str, parent) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {"id": mid, "object": "model", "created": now, "owned_by": "hermes", "permission": [],
"root": root, "parent": parent}
models = [_model(model_name, model_name, None)]
models.extend(
_model(alias, route_cfg.get("model", alias), model_name)
for alias, route_cfg in self._model_routes.items() if alias != model_name)
return web.json_response({"object": "list", "data": models})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_model_options(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /api/model/options — the dashboard/TUI model-picker inventory, so external clients
can sync to the configured provider catalog instead of scraping /v1/models."""
refresh = _coerce_request_bool(request.query.get("refresh"), default=False)
try:
from hermes_cli.inventory import build_model_options_payload, load_picker_context
def _build_payload() -> Dict[str, Any]:
return build_model_options_payload(
load_picker_context(), include_unconfigured=True, refresh=refresh)
# Enrichment can fetch pricing/provider catalogs: keep it off the event loop.
payload = await asyncio.to_thread(_build_payload)
return web.json_response(payload)
except Exception:
logger.exception("[%s] GET /api/model/options failed", self.name)
return _error_response("Failed to list model options.", 500, code="model_options_failed")
@_require_auth
async def _handle_capabilities(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /v1/capabilities — the stable, machine-readable API surface for external UIs."""
return web.json_response({
"object": "hermes.api_server.capabilities", "platform": "hermes-agent",
"model": self._model_name,
"auth": {"type": "bearer", "required": bool(self._api_key)},
"runtime": {
"mode": "server_agent", "tool_execution": "server", "split_runtime": False,
"description": (
"The API server creates a server-side Hermes AIAgent; "
"tools execute on the API-server host unless a future "
"explicit split-runtime mode is enabled.")},
"features": {
"chat_completions": True, "chat_completions_streaming": True,
"responses_api": True, "responses_streaming": True, "run_submission": True,
"runs_idempotency": _api_runs._idempotency_capabilities(self, store_type=RunIdempotencyStore),
**_STATIC_FEATURE_FLAGS,
"cors": bool(self._cors_origins),
# Always advertised for feature-detection; enabled follows config.
"browser_extension_control": {
"enabled": self._browser_control_enabled(),
"protocol_version": _BROWSER_CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
"capabilities": sorted(BROWSER_CONTROL_CAPABILITIES),
"artifact_capabilities": sorted(BROWSER_CONTROL_ARTIFACT_CAPABILITIES),
"developer_capabilities": sorted(BROWSER_CONTROL_DEVELOPER_CAPABILITIES),
"developer_mode": self._browser_control_developer_mode(),
"artifact_transport": {
"upload": {"method": "POST", "path": "/v1/artifacts/upload"},
"download": {
"method": "GET", "path": "/v1/artifacts/download/{artifact_id}"},
"max_bytes": DEFAULT_MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES,
"ttl_seconds": DEFAULT_ARTIFACT_TTL_SECONDS,
"allowed_mime_types": sorted(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES)},
"real_browser_actions": True,
"transports": {
"local_vps": "websocket-subprotocol-ticket",
"cloud": "authenticated-gateway-rpc"}}},
"endpoints": {name: {"method": m, "path": p} for name, (m, p) in _CAPABILITY_ENDPOINTS},
})
# -- Browser-extension control (authenticated local/VPS API) ----------------------
async def _handle_browser_control_register(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /v1/browser-control/register — mint a short-lived single-use controller ticket.
Identity is NOT taken from the body: the principal is a server-derived digest of the
authenticated key/profile and capabilities are filtered to the allowlist (a spoofed
``principal_id`` / inflated list is ignored); the session must exist in the profile's
SessionDB. Ladder: 404 disabled, 403 no API key, 401 bad Bearer, 201 success.
"""
if not self._browser_control_enabled():
return _error_response(
"Browser control is not enabled on this server.", 404, code="browser_control_disabled")
if not self._api_key:
logger.warning(
"browser-control registration rejected: no API key configured; "
"set API_SERVER_KEY to enable authenticated browser control.")
return _error_response(
"Browser control registration requires a configured API key.", 403,
err_type="gateway_auth_error", code="browser_control_auth_required")
auth_err = self._check_auth(request)
if auth_err:
return auth_err
try:
payload = await request.json()
except Exception:
return _error_response("Request body must be valid JSON.", 400)
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return _error_response("Request body must be a JSON object.", 400)
if not browser_control_protocol_supported(payload.get("protocol_version")):
return _error_response(
"Unsupported browser-control protocol version.", 400, code="browser_control_protocol_unsupported")
controller_id = str(payload.get("controller_id") or "").strip()
browser_profile_id = str(payload.get("browser_profile_id") or "").strip()
session_id = str(payload.get("session_id") or "").strip()
if not controller_id or not browser_profile_id or not session_id:
return _error_response(
"controller_id, browser_profile_id, and session_id are required.", 400,
code="browser_control_invalid_registration")
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
if db is None:
return _error_response("Session database unavailable.", 503, code="session_db_unavailable")
if not await asyncio.to_thread(db.get_session, session_id):
return _error_response(
"Browser control may register only for an existing server session.", 403,
err_type="gateway_auth_error", code="browser_control_session_forbidden")
profile = _api_request_profile.get() or "default"
developer_mode = self._browser_control_developer_mode()
capabilities = filter_browser_control_capabilities(payload.get("capabilities"), developer_mode=developer_mode)
if not capabilities:
return _error_response(
"At least one permitted browser-control capability is required.", 400,
code="browser_control_no_capabilities")
# Developer capabilities need broker Developer Mode (fail closed past the filter).
if capabilities & BROWSER_CONTROL_DEVELOPER_CAPABILITIES and not developer_mode:
return _error_response(
"Developer Mode is required for browser_evaluate and raw CDP.", 403,
code="browser_control_developer_mode_required")
scope = ControllerScope(
principal_id=self._derive_browser_control_principal(profile), profile_id=profile,
session_id=session_id or None, controller_id=controller_id,
browser_profile_id=browser_profile_id,
transport_family=self._browser_control_transport_family(request),
capabilities=capabilities)
ticket = self._browser_control_broker.mint_ticket(scope)
ticket_ttl = self._browser_control_broker.ticket_ttl_seconds
return web.json_response(
{
"protocol_version": _BROWSER_CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, "ticket": ticket.value,
# Best-effort wall-clock projection; the broker enforces expiry on its monotonic
# clock, so after an NTP step trust ticket_expires_in_seconds.
"ticket_expires_at": time.time() + ticket_ttl,
"ticket_expires_in_seconds": ticket_ttl,
"ws_path": "/v1/browser-control/ws",
"scope": {
**{key: getattr(scope, key) for key in (
"principal_id", "profile_id", "session_id", "controller_id",
"browser_profile_id", "transport_family")},
"capabilities": sorted(scope.capabilities)}},
status=201)
async def _handle_browser_control_ws(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.WebSocketResponse":
"""GET /v1/browser-control/ws — controller WebSocket (one-shot ticket).
The ticket rides in ``Sec-WebSocket-Protocol`` (never the query string: targets land in
access logs) and is exchanged once for the registration scope; bad/consumed/expired
tickets 401 before upgrade. Owner-aware teardown cannot detach a newer generation.
"""
# Re-checked at upgrade so disabling the feature closes the gate immediately.
if not self._browser_control_enabled():
raise web.HTTPNotFound()
if request.query.get("ticket"):
raise web.HTTPUnauthorized()
requested_protocols = [
value.strip() for value in request.headers.get("Sec-WebSocket-Protocol", "").split(",")
if value.strip()]
ticket_protocols = [
value for value in requested_protocols if value.startswith(_BROWSER_CONTROL_TICKET_PROTOCOL_PREFIX)]
if _BROWSER_CONTROL_WS_PROTOCOL not in requested_protocols or len(ticket_protocols) != 1:
raise web.HTTPUnauthorized()
ticket_value = ticket_protocols[0][len(_BROWSER_CONTROL_TICKET_PROTOCOL_PREFIX) :]
if not ticket_value:
raise web.HTTPUnauthorized()
try:
scope = self._browser_control_broker.consume_ticket(ticket_value)
except ControllerTicketInvalid:
raise web.HTTPUnauthorized() from None
except Exception:
logger.exception("browser-control WS ticket consumption failed")
raise web.HTTPUnauthorized() from None
ws = web.WebSocketResponse(heartbeat=30.0, protocols=(_BROWSER_CONTROL_WS_PROTOCOL,))
await ws.prepare(request)
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
_send = _browser_controller_ws_sender(ws, loop)
# attach/disconnect take the controller send_lock, which a worker-thread dispatch may
# hold while blocking on THIS loop: offload so the race parks a worker, not the loop.
await asyncio.to_thread(self._browser_control_broker.attach, scope, _send, owner=ws)
try:
async for msg in ws:
if msg.type == web.WSMsgType.TEXT:
try:
frame = msg.json()
except Exception:
continue
if isinstance(frame, dict):
reply = await asyncio.to_thread(
self._handle_browser_control_frame, scope, frame, owner=ws)
if isinstance(reply, dict):
await ws.send_json(reply)
elif msg.type in (web.WSMsgType.CLOSE, web.WSMsgType.ERROR):
break
finally:
await asyncio.to_thread(self._browser_control_broker.disconnect, scope, owner=ws)
return ws
def _handle_browser_control_frame(
self, scope: "ControllerScope", frame: dict, *, owner: Any = None) -> Optional[dict]:
"""Apply one controller->broker frame with exact-scope checks."""
method = frame.get("method")
params = frame.get("params")
if not isinstance(params, dict) or owner is None or not self._browser_control_broker.is_owner(scope, owner):
return
if method == "browser.controller.heartbeat":
nonce = str(params.get("nonce") or "").strip()
if not nonce or len(nonce) > 128:
return
# Echoing the opaque nonce proves the socket is live without granting anything.
return {"method": "browser.controller.heartbeat", "params": {"nonce": nonce, "ok": True}}
if method == "browser.controller.detach":
self._browser_control_broker.detach(scope, owner=owner, notify_controller=False)
return {"method": "browser.controller.detach", "params": {"ok": True}}
if method == "browser.controller.result":
command_id = params.get("command_id")
if isinstance(command_id, str) and command_id:
# The broker resolves only a pending command with this socket's exact scope.
ok = params.get("ok") is True
self._browser_control_broker.complete(
command_id, scope=scope, ok=ok,
result=params.get("result") if ok else params.get("error"))
elif method == "browser.controller.cancel":
tool_call_id = params.get("tool_call_id")
if isinstance(tool_call_id, str) and tool_call_id:
self._browser_control_broker.cancel(scope, tool_call_id=tool_call_id)
def _browser_control_enabled(self) -> bool:
"""``browser.extension_control.enabled`` (default False); tests monkeypatch this."""
try:
from gateway.browser_control_broker import browser_control_enabled as _flag
return _flag()
except Exception:
return False
def _derive_browser_control_principal(self, profile: str) -> str:
"""Non-reversible principal digest bound to the profile's expected API key, so a client
cannot impersonate another controller by echoing an id."""
key = self._expected_api_key() or self._api_key or ""
digest = hashlib.sha256(f"{profile}\x00{key}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return f"principal:{profile}:{digest[:32]}"
def _browser_control_transport_family(self, request: "web.Request") -> str:
"""``local-api`` for a loopback peer, else ``remote-api``; the broker treats the family as
part of exact identity, so a remote controller never satisfies a local-only dispatch."""
host = None
with suppress(Exception):
transport = request.transport
peer = transport.get_extra_info("peername") if transport is not None else None
if isinstance(peer, tuple) and peer:
host = peer[0]
elif isinstance(peer, str):
host = peer
return "local-api" if host in ("127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost") else "remote-api"
def _browser_control_developer_mode(self) -> bool:
"""Broker Developer Mode gate for ``browser_evaluate`` / raw CDP; tests monkeypatch this."""
try:
return browser_control_developer_mode()
except Exception:
return False
# -- One-shot artifact transport --------------------------------------------------
def _artifact_store_for(self, profile: str) -> ArtifactStore:
"""Profile-scoped artifact store, lazily created under the profile's data dir and cached
BY RESOLVED PROFILE (on a multiplex listener profile A must never pin B to A's root).
The store root lives under the profile's data directory
(``<HERMES_HOME>/plugin-data/.../artifacts``-style controlled root), so artifacts never escape the
profile boundary. Stores are cached BY RESOLVED PROFILE — on a multiplex listener, profile A
touching the artifact route first must never pin profile B to A's physical root (same frozen-handle
class as the per-profile session-storage fix in #88734). The root itself is created on first use;
TTL cleanup runs on every store/load/prune.
"""
profile_key = str(profile or "default")
store = self._browser_control_artifacts.get(profile_key)
if store is not None:
return store
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import get_profile_dir
root = Path(get_profile_dir(profile or "default")) / "artifacts" / "browser-control"
except Exception:
# Unscoped fallback (tests/manual wiring): controlled root under the Hermes home.
try:
from hermes_state import get_hermes_home
root = Path(get_hermes_home()) / "artifacts" / "browser-control"
except Exception:
raise ArtifactError("no artifact root is resolvable") from None
store = ArtifactStore(
root, ttl_seconds=DEFAULT_ARTIFACT_TTL_SECONDS, max_bytes=DEFAULT_MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES,
allowed_mime_types=DEFAULT_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES)
store.prune_expired()
self._browser_control_artifacts[profile_key] = store
# Shared with the broker so dispatched artifact actions validate against the same
# profile's controlled root ("approved artifact id only").
try:
self._browser_control_broker.attach_artifact_store(store, profile_id=profile_key)
except Exception:
logger.debug("could not attach artifact store to broker", exc_info=True)
return store
async def _artifact_store_for_async(self, profile: str) -> ArtifactStore:
"""Async variant for the artifact routes: resolve the store off the loop.
``ArtifactStore.__init__`` mkdirs the root and iterates the whole directory to sweep
orphans, and the caller then runs ``prune_expired`` (glob + one unlink per expired
entry). On a cold profile under filesystem pressure that is unbounded, and it runs on
the single aiohttp event-loop thread. Cache hits stay on the loop; only construction
hops. The per-profile single-flight lock is load-bearing: the offload adds a real await
between cache miss and cache fill, so two racing first requests would each build a
store and the loser's instance — which holds its receipts IN MEMORY — would be evicted,
making anything uploaded through it permanently undownloadable. Same shape as
``_ensure_session_db_async``.
"""
profile_key = str(profile or "default")
store = self._browser_control_artifacts.get(profile_key)
if store is not None:
return store
lock = self._browser_control_artifact_locks.setdefault(profile_key, asyncio.Lock())
async with lock:
store = self._browser_control_artifacts.get(profile_key)
if store is not None:
return store
return await asyncio.to_thread(self._artifact_store_for, profile_key)
def _artifact_limiter(self) -> ArtifactRateLimiter:
"""Return the per-principal artifact route limiter (lazy)."""
if self._browser_control_artifact_limiter is None:
self._browser_control_artifact_limiter = ArtifactRateLimiter(window_seconds=60.0, max_requests=30)
return self._browser_control_artifact_limiter
def _inject_browser_control_artifacts(
self, store: Optional[ArtifactStore], limiter: Optional[ArtifactRateLimiter] = None, *,
profile: str = "default") -> None:
"""Inject a store/limiter (tests, diagnostics)."""
if store is None:
self._browser_control_artifacts.pop(profile, None)
else:
self._browser_control_artifacts[profile] = store
if limiter is not None:
self._browser_control_artifact_limiter = limiter
def _artifact_route_prelude(self, request: "web.Request", action: str, *, check_enabled: bool = True) -> tuple:
"""Shared upload/download gate (feature flag -> API key -> Bearer -> per-principal rate
limit) -> ``((profile, principal), None)`` or ``(None, error_response)``."""
if check_enabled and not self._browser_control_enabled():
return None, _error_response(
"Browser control is not enabled on this server.", 404, code="browser_control_disabled")
if not self._api_key:
return None, _error_response(
"Artifact transport requires a configured API key.", 403,
err_type="gateway_auth_error", code="browser_control_auth_required")
auth_err = self._check_auth(request)
if auth_err:
return None, auth_err
profile = _api_request_profile.get() or "default"
principal = self._derive_browser_control_principal(profile)
if not self._artifact_limiter().allow(f"{action}:{principal}"):
return None, _error_response(
f"Artifact {action} rate limit exceeded.", 429, err_type="rate_limit_error",
code="rate_limit_exceeded", headers={"Retry-After": "1"})
return (profile, principal), None
async def _handle_artifact_upload(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /v1/artifacts/upload — one-shot bounded raw upload; ``Content-Type`` must be an
allowed MIME type, ``X-Artifact-Filename`` is display-only. Returns a provenance receipt
(never a filesystem path). Ladder: 404 disabled, 403 no API key, 401 bad Bearer, 429
rate limited, 413 too large, 415 MIME rejected, 400 missing filename/scope, 201."""
ctx, err = self._artifact_route_prelude(request, "upload")
if err is not None:
return err
profile, principal = ctx
content_type = request.headers.get("Content-Type", "")
filename = request.headers.get("X-Artifact-Filename", "").strip()
if not filename:
return _error_response("X-Artifact-Filename header is required.", 400)
try:
store = await self._artifact_store_for_async(profile)
except ArtifactError as exc:
return _error_response(str(exc), 500, code="artifact_rejected")
max_bytes = store.max_bytes
try:
# Read cap + 1 so an oversize body is rejected without unbounded buffering.
data = await request.content.read(max_bytes + 1)
except Exception:
return _error_response("Failed to read request body.", 400)
if len(data) > max_bytes:
return _error_response(f"Artifact exceeds the {max_bytes}-byte cap.", 413, code="artifact_too_large")
if not data:
return _error_response("Empty artifact body.", 400)
scope = _ArtifactScopeFacade(principal, transport_family=self._browser_control_transport_family(request))
try:
# store ends in mkstemp + write + os.fsync + os.replace — unbounded under
# filesystem pressure, and this is a coroutine on the single loop thread.
# Awaited (not fire-and-forget): the caller needs the receipt, and a swallowed
# failure would return 201 for bytes that never reached disk.
receipt = await asyncio.to_thread(
store.store, data, filename=filename, content_type=content_type, scope=scope)
except ArtifactTooLarge as exc:
return _error_response(str(exc), 413, code="artifact_too_large")
except ArtifactError as exc:
if "allowlist" in str(exc):
return _error_response(str(exc), 415, code="artifact_mime_rejected")
return _error_response(str(exc), 400, code="artifact_rejected")
return web.json_response(
receipt.to_dict(download_path=f"/v1/artifacts/download/{receipt.artifact_id}"), status=201)
async def _handle_artifact_download(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /v1/artifacts/download/{artifact_id} — one-shot download (a second one 404s) with
``X-Artifact-Sha256``. Ladder: 404 disabled/unknown, 403 no API key, 401 bad Bearer, 429
rate limited, 410 expired, 400 invalid id/scope mismatch, 200."""
if not self._browser_control_enabled():
raise web.HTTPNotFound()
ctx, err = self._artifact_route_prelude(request, "download", check_enabled=False)
if err is not None:
return err
profile, principal = ctx
artifact_id = request.match_info.get("artifact_id", "")
scope = _ArtifactScopeFacade(principal, transport_family=self._browser_control_transport_family(request))
try:
# load is the same class as the upload write: whole-file read_bytes, SHA-256
# re-hash, unlink — all blocking, all on the loop thread.
store = await self._artifact_store_for_async(profile)
data, receipt = await asyncio.to_thread(store.load, artifact_id, scope=scope)
except ArtifactError as exc:
message = str(exc)
if "expired" in message:
return _error_response(message, 410, code="artifact_expired")
status = 400 if "scope" in message or "invalid" in message else 404
return _error_response(message, status, code="artifact_not_found")
return web.Response(
body=data, status=200, content_type=receipt.content_type,
headers={"X-Artifact-Sha256": receipt.sha256, "X-Artifact-Id": receipt.artifact_id,
"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{receipt.filename}"'})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_skills(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /v1/skills — deterministic JSON listing of installed skills (name, description,
category), the same set ``/skills list`` shows."""
try:
from tools.skills_tool import _find_all_skills, _sort_skills
skills = _sort_skills(
_find_all_skills(
skip_disabled=False, include_editorial=True
)
)
except Exception:
logger.exception("GET /v1/skills failed")
return _error_response("Failed to enumerate skills", 500, err_type="server_error")
return web.json_response({"object": "list", "data": skills})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_toolsets(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /v1/toolsets — each toolset the api_server agent exposes: enabled/configured state
plus the concrete tool names it expands to."""
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
_get_effective_configurable_toolsets, _get_platform_tools, _toolset_has_keys,
get_nous_subscription_features)
from toolsets import resolve_toolset
config = load_config()
enabled_toolsets = _get_platform_tools(config, "api_server", include_default_mcp_servers=False)
features = get_nous_subscription_features(config)
data: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for name, label, desc in _get_effective_configurable_toolsets():
try:
tools = sorted(set(resolve_toolset(name)))
except Exception:
tools = []
data.append({
"name": name, "label": label, "description": desc,
"enabled": name in enabled_toolsets,
"configured": _toolset_has_keys(name, config, features=features),
"tools": tools})
except Exception:
logger.exception("GET /v1/toolsets failed")
return _error_response("Failed to enumerate toolsets", 500, err_type="server_error")
return web.json_response({"object": "list", "platform": "api_server", "data": data})
# -- /api/sessions: thin client/session resource API -------------------------------
@staticmethod
def _parse_nonnegative_int(value: Any, default: int, maximum: int) -> int:
try:
parsed = int(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return default
return default if parsed < 0 else min(parsed, maximum)
@staticmethod
def _session_db_unavailable() -> "web.Response":
return _error_response("Session database unavailable", 503, code="session_db_unavailable")
@staticmethod
def _session_response(session: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Return a stable, client-safe session representation."""
safe_keys = (
"id", "source", "user_id", "model", "title", "started_at", "ended_at", "end_reason",
"message_count", "tool_call_count", "input_tokens", "output_tokens",
"cache_read_tokens", "cache_write_tokens", "reasoning_tokens", "estimated_cost_usd",
"actual_cost_usd", "api_call_count", "parent_session_id", "last_active", "preview",
"_lineage_root_id", "pinned", "archived", "hidden")
payload = {key: session.get(key) for key in safe_keys if key in session}
# SQLite stores the flags as 0/1.
payload.update(
{f: bool(payload[f]) for f in ("pinned", "archived", "hidden") if f in payload})
# Full system prompts / model_config never cross the client API; only their presence.
payload["has_system_prompt"] = bool(session.get("system_prompt"))
payload["has_model_config"] = bool(session.get("model_config"))
return payload
@staticmethod
def _message_response(message: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
message = _project_client_message(message)
safe_keys = (
"id", "session_id", "role", "content", "tool_call_id", "tool_calls", "tool_name",
"timestamp", "token_count", "finish_reason", "reasoning", "reasoning_content",
"display_kind")
return {key: message.get(key) for key in safe_keys if key in message}
async def _read_json_body(self, request: "web.Request") -> tuple[Dict[str, Any], Optional["web.Response"]]:
try:
body = await request.json()
except Exception:
return {}, _error_response("Invalid JSON in request body", 400)
if not isinstance(body, dict):
return {}, _error_response("Request body must be a JSON object", 400)
return body, None
async def _get_existing_session_or_404(self, session_id: str) -> tuple[Optional[Dict[str, Any]], Optional["web.Response"]]:
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
if db is None:
return None, self._session_db_unavailable()
session = await asyncio.to_thread(db.get_session, session_id)
if not session:
return None, _error_response(f"Session not found: {session_id}", 404, code="session_not_found")
return session, None
async def _conversation_history_for_session(self, session_id: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
if db is None:
return []
try:
return await asyncio.to_thread(db.get_messages_as_conversation, session_id)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("Failed to load session history for %s: %s", session_id, exc)
return []
async def run_internal_session_turn(self, *, session_id: str, text: str, profile: str,
notification_category: str = "result") -> None:
"""Run one background wake turn against a raw session id IN-PROCESS (no HTTP, no API key);
see ``api_server_runs.run_internal_session_turn``."""
await _api_runs.run_internal_session_turn(
self, session_id=session_id, text=text, profile=profile,
notification_category=notification_category, _api_server=sys.modules[__name__])
@_require_auth
async def _handle_list_sessions(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /api/sessions — list persisted Hermes sessions."""
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
if db is None:
return self._session_db_unavailable()
limit = self._parse_nonnegative_int(request.query.get("limit"), default=50, maximum=200)
offset = self._parse_nonnegative_int(request.query.get("offset"), default=0, maximum=1_000_000)
source = request.query.get("source") or None
include_children = _coerce_request_bool(request.query.get("include_children"), default=False)
# Exact-title lookup (`hermes peer dm` -> canonical "Bot Chat"). include_hidden is honored
# ONLY with a title filter: a blanket hidden listing stays off this client surface.
title_filter = (request.query.get("title") or "").strip() or None
include_hidden = bool(title_filter) and _coerce_request_bool(
request.query.get("include_hidden"), default=False)
async def _list() -> list:
# include_pinned back-fills pins past the recency window; search_query pushes the
# title needle into SQL (substring) so a hidden/old row is found, exact match below.
rows = await asyncio.to_thread(
db.list_sessions_rich, source=source, limit=limit, offset=offset,
include_children=include_children, order_by_last_active=True, include_pinned=True,
search_query=title_filter, include_hidden=include_hidden)
if title_filter:
rows = [s for s in rows if (s.get("title") or "").strip() == title_filter]
return rows
sessions = await _list()
if title_filter and not sessions:
# A canonical Bot Chat auto-archived by the orphan reaper would make `hermes peer dm`
# mint transient sessions: resurrect and re-list; deliberate archives stay put.
try:
# Recoverable-archive resurrection (#92687): a canonical Bot Chat archived by the ws-orphan
# reaper / older agent cleanup is invisible to list_sessions_rich (include_archived=False),
# which would fail `hermes peer dm` resolution and mint transient sessions — same accident
# the tui_gateway lookups heal.
from tools.bot_mode_probe import BOT_CHAT_TITLE
def _resurrect() -> bool:
# Lookup + unarchive (a WRITE with the full write patience) as one worker-thread
# hop: a contended lock parks this thread, never the event loop (#113772).
stale = db.get_session_by_title(title_filter)
return bool(stale and stale.get("archived") and db.unarchive_recoverable_session(stale["id"]))
if title_filter == BOT_CHAT_TITLE and await asyncio.to_thread(_resurrect):
sessions = await _list()
except Exception:
pass # resolution degrades to today's no-row behavior
# Back-filled pins arrive PAST the limit, so counting them would report
# another page that doesn't exist. Only the recency window decides.
windowed = sum(1 for s in sessions if not s.get("pinned"))
return web.json_response({
"object": "list", "data": [self._session_response(s) for s in sessions],
"limit": limit, "offset": offset, "has_more": windowed >= limit})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_create_session(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /api/sessions -- create an empty Hermes session row. Existence check, insert and
title handling run as ONE off-loop write so concurrent same-id creates can't both 201."""
body, err = await self._read_json_body(request)
if err:
return err
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
if db is None:
return self._session_db_unavailable()
raw_id = body.get("id") or body.get("session_id")
session_id = str(raw_id).strip() if raw_id else f"api_{int(time.time())}_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
from gateway.session import _is_path_unsafe
if not session_id or re.search(r'[\r\n\x00]', session_id) or _is_path_unsafe(session_id):
return _error_response("Invalid session ID", 400, code="invalid_session_id")
if len(session_id) > self._MAX_SESSION_HEADER_LEN:
return _error_response("Session ID too long", 400, code="invalid_session_id")
system_prompt = body.get("system_prompt")
if system_prompt is not None and not isinstance(system_prompt, str):
return _error_response("system_prompt must be a string", 400, code="invalid_system_prompt")
source = self._normalize_session_source(body.get("source") or "api_server")
runtime_request = self._session_runtime_request_from_body(body)
lock_error = self._runtime_lock_error(runtime_request)
if lock_error is not None:
return lock_error
requested = runtime_request.get("requested") or {}
# The normalized requested["model"] (prefix split, virtual alias nulled) — the raw body
# would persist "hermes-agent" and later send it to the provider literally.
model_name = self._clean_runtime_id(requested.get("model")) or None
model_config = None
if requested.get("model") or requested.get("provider"):
model_config = {"browser_model_lock": {
"provider": requested.get("provider") or "", "model": requested.get("model") or "",
"model_options": runtime_request.get("model_options") or {},
"route_source": runtime_request.get("route_source") or "",
"confirmed": bool(runtime_request.get("require_model_lock")),
"updated_at": time.time()}}
title = body.get("title")
def _atomic(conn):
# One BEGIN IMMEDIATE write: a concurrent same-id create blocks and sees the row.
if conn.execute("SELECT id FROM sessions WHERE id = ?", (session_id,)).fetchone():
return None, "exists"
conn.execute(
"""INSERT INTO sessions (
id, source, model, model_config, system_prompt, started_at
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)""",
(session_id, source, model_name, json.dumps(model_config) if model_config else None,
system_prompt, time.time()))
if title is not None:
clean_title = db.sanitize_title(str(title))
if clean_title:
conflict = conn.execute(
"SELECT id FROM sessions WHERE title = ? AND id != ?", (clean_title, session_id)).fetchone()
if conflict:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ?", (session_id,))
return None, f"title:Title already in use by session {conflict['id']}"
conn.execute("UPDATE sessions SET title = ? WHERE id = ?", (clean_title, session_id))
session_row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE id = ?", (session_id,)).fetchone()
return (dict(session_row) if session_row else {
"id": session_id, "source": source, "model": model_name, "title": title}), None
session, err = await asyncio.to_thread(db._execute_write, _atomic)
if err == "exists":
return _error_response(f"Session already exists: {session_id}", 409, code="session_exists")
if err and err.startswith("title:"):
return _error_response(err[len("title:"):], 400, code="invalid_title")
return web.json_response({"object": "hermes.session", "session": self._session_response(session)}, status=201)
@_require_auth
async def _handle_get_session(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /api/sessions/{session_id}."""
session, err = await self._get_existing_session_or_404(request.match_info["session_id"])
if err:
return err
return web.json_response({"object": "hermes.session", "session": self._session_response(session)})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_patch_session(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""PATCH /api/sessions/{session_id} — update client-safe session metadata."""
session_id = request.match_info["session_id"]
session, err = await self._get_existing_session_or_404(session_id)
if err:
return err
body, err = await self._read_json_body(request)
if err:
return err
# pinned/archived/unread are durable desktop-sidebar flags.
unknown = sorted(set(body) - {"title", "end_reason", "pinned", "archived", "hidden", "unread"})
if unknown:
return _error_response(
f"Unsupported session fields: {', '.join(unknown)}", 400, code="unsupported_session_field")
for flag in ("pinned", "archived", "hidden", "unread"):
if flag in body and not isinstance(body[flag], bool):
return _error_response(f"'{flag}' must be a boolean", 400, code="invalid_session_field")
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
if db is None:
return self._session_db_unavailable()
if "title" in body:
try:
await asyncio.to_thread(
db.set_session_title, session_id, "" if body["title"] is None else str(body["title"]))
except ValueError as exc:
return _error_response(str(exc), 400, code="invalid_title")
# Pinned last: set_session_pinned clears hidden, so a pin in the same request
# wins over an explicit hidden (same order as the dashboard's _RENAME_FLAG_SETTERS).
for flag, setter in (("archived", db.set_session_archived), ("hidden", db.set_session_hidden),
("pinned", db.set_session_pinned)):
if flag in body:
await asyncio.to_thread(setter, session_id, body[flag])
if "unread" in body:
await asyncio.to_thread(db.set_session_read, session_id, read=not body["unread"])
if body.get("end_reason"):
await asyncio.to_thread(db.end_session, session_id, str(body["end_reason"]))
session = await asyncio.to_thread(db.get_session, session_id) or session
return web.json_response({"object": "hermes.session", "session": self._session_response(session)})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_delete_session(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""DELETE /api/sessions/{session_id}."""
session_id = request.match_info["session_id"]
session, err = await self._get_existing_session_or_404(session_id)
if err:
return err
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
if db is None:
return self._session_db_unavailable()
# Same profile home the DB was resolved from (the profile middleware scopes
# get_hermes_home() for this request) — without it the transcript/dump scrub is skipped.
sessions_dir = None
try:
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
sessions_dir = Path(get_hermes_home()) / "sessions"
except Exception:
logger.debug("sessions dir unavailable for delete of %s", session_id, exc_info=True)
from hermes_state_errors import SessionActiveWriteGuardError
try:
deleted = await asyncio.to_thread(
db.delete_session, session_id, sessions_dir=sessions_dir, exclude_active_write_guards=True)
except SessionActiveWriteGuardError as exc:
return _error_response(str(exc), 409, code="session_active_turn")
if deleted:
# A hard delete must also drop the gateway's durable channel→session routing entries
# for the id, or the next inbound message resolves the SAME id and run_agent's
# INSERT OR IGNORE resurrects the deleted row (#42422).
runner = self.gateway_runner or request.app.get("gateway_runner")
store = getattr(runner, "session_store", None)
if store is not None:
await asyncio.to_thread(store.remove_by_session_id, session_id)
return web.json_response({"object": "hermes.session.deleted", "id": session_id, "deleted": bool(deleted)})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_session_messages(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /api/sessions/{session_id}/messages."""
session_id = request.match_info["session_id"]
_, err = await self._get_existing_session_or_404(session_id)
if err:
return err
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
resolved_id = await asyncio.to_thread(db.resolve_resume_session_id, session_id)
raw_limit, raw_offset = request.query.get("limit"), request.query.get("offset", "0")
order = request.query.get("order")
if order not in (None, "oldest", "latest"):
return _error_response("order must be one of: oldest, latest", 400, code="invalid_pagination")
try:
offset = int(raw_offset)
requested_limit = None if raw_limit is None else int(raw_limit)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
offset = requested_limit = -1
if offset < 0 or (requested_limit is not None and requested_limit < 0):
return _error_response("limit and offset must be non-negative integers", 400, code="invalid_pagination")
default_page = requested_limit is None
latest_page = order == "latest" or (order is None and default_page)
limit = 500 if default_page else min(requested_limit, 500)
messages = await asyncio.to_thread(
db.get_messages, resolved_id, limit=limit, offset=offset, latest=latest_page)
return web.json_response({
"object": "list", "session_id": resolved_id,
"data": [self._message_response(m) for m in messages],
"pagination": {
"limit": limit, "offset": offset,
"order": order or ("latest" if default_page else "oldest"),
"returned": len(messages)}})
@_require_auth
async def _handle_fork_session(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /api/sessions/{session_id}/fork — branch via current SessionDB primitives."""
source_id = request.match_info["session_id"]
source, err = await self._get_existing_session_or_404(source_id)
if err:
return err
body, err = await self._read_json_body(request)
if err:
return err
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
fork_id = str(body.get("id") or body.get("session_id") or f"api_{int(time.time())}_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}").strip()
if not fork_id or re.search(r'[\r\n\x00]', fork_id):
return _error_response("Invalid session ID", 400, code="invalid_session_id")
if await asyncio.to_thread(db.get_session, fork_id):
return _error_response(f"Session already exists: {fork_id}", 409, code="session_exists")
# CLI /branch semantics: create the child, then end the original as branched (child first, so
# a failed create never leaves the source ended with no fork, #11030).
# ``_branched_from`` is the durable branch marker (same as CLI /branch): with the child created
# first, the timestamp fallback in _BRANCH_CHILD_SQL (child.started_at >= parent.ended_at) no
# longer holds, and an unmarked child would vanish from default session listings.
await asyncio.to_thread(
db.create_session, fork_id, "api_server", model=source.get("model"),
system_prompt=source.get("system_prompt"), parent_session_id=source_id,
model_config={"_branched_from": source_id})
await asyncio.to_thread(db.end_session, source_id, "branched")
messages = await asyncio.to_thread(db.get_messages, source_id)
await asyncio.to_thread(db.replace_messages, fork_id, messages)
title = body.get("title")
if title is None:
base = source.get("title") or "fork"
title = f"{base} fork"
with suppress(Exception):
title = await asyncio.to_thread(db.get_next_title_in_lineage, base)
try:
await asyncio.to_thread(db.set_session_title, fork_id, str(title))
except ValueError as exc:
return _error_response(str(exc), 400, code="invalid_title")
fork = await asyncio.to_thread(db.get_session, fork_id) or {"id": fork_id, "parent_session_id": source_id}
return web.json_response({"object": "hermes.session", "session": self._session_response(fork)}, status=201)
async def _prepare_session_chat(self, request: "web.Request") -> tuple:
"""Shared prelude for /api/sessions/{id}/chat[/stream]: header/body validation, then
runtime selection — a Browser model lock (body ``require_model_lock`` or a confirmed
persisted lock) wins; else the session-persisted model routes via model_routes when an
alias or threads through as ``session_model`` when raw, then body values.
Returns ``(ctx, None)`` or ``(None, error)``; ``ctx["run_kwargs"]`` feeds ``_run_agent``."""
gateway_session_key, key_err = self._parse_session_key_header(request)
if key_err is not None:
return None, key_err
session_id = request.match_info["session_id"]
session, err = await self._get_existing_session_or_404(session_id)
if err:
return None, err
body, err = await self._read_json_body(request)
if err:
return None, err
user_message, err = _session_chat_user_message(body)
if err is not None:
return None, err
try:
turn_author = _request_turn_author(body)
except ValueError as exc:
return None, _error_response(str(exc), 400, code="invalid_author")
system_prompt = body.get("system_message") or body.get("instructions")
if system_prompt is not None and not isinstance(system_prompt, str):
return None, _error_response("system_message must be a string", 400, code="invalid_system_message")
runtime_request = self._effective_session_runtime_request(session=session, body=body)
lock_error = self._runtime_lock_error(runtime_request)
if lock_error is not None:
return None, lock_error
if not await asyncio.to_thread(self._persist_session_runtime_lock, session_id, runtime_request):
return None, _error_response(
"Could not persist the requested session model lock", 500, code="model_lock_persistence_failed")
lock_active = bool(runtime_request.get("require_model_lock"))
if lock_active:
route = runtime_request.get("route")
session_model = None
requested = runtime_request.get("requested") or {}
agent_overrides: Dict[str, Any] = {}
for src_key, dst_key in (("model", "requested_model"), ("provider", "requested_provider")):
if requested.get(src_key):
agent_overrides[dst_key] = requested[src_key]
if runtime_request.get("model_options"):
agent_overrides["model_options"] = runtime_request["model_options"]
else:
stored_model = self._stored_session_model(session)
stored_route = self._resolve_route(stored_model)
route = stored_route or self._resolve_route(body.get("model"))
session_model = stored_model if (stored_model and stored_route is None) else None
agent_overrides = _request_agent_overrides(body, virtual_model=self._model_name)
selection_error = self._request_route_conflict_error(
session_id=session_id, gateway_session_key=gateway_session_key,
requested_model=agent_overrides.get("requested_model"),
requested_provider=agent_overrides.get("requested_provider"), route=route)
if selection_error:
return None, _error_response(selection_error, 400)
run_kwargs = dict(
user_message=user_message, ephemeral_system_prompt=system_prompt, session_id=session_id,
gateway_session_key=gateway_session_key, route=route, session_model=session_model,
requested_runtime=runtime_request.get("requested") or {},
route_source=runtime_request.get("route_source") or "global",
confirmed_runtime_lock=lock_active, turn_author=turn_author,
# #98619: the client addresses this session by construction — the id is in the
# request path (/api/sessions/{session_id}/chat) — so a wake self-post lands where
# the client will read it. The audited native-session opt-in.
session_history_delivery="1", **agent_overrides)
return {
"gateway_session_key": gateway_session_key, "session_id": session_id, "body": body,
"user_message": user_message, "runtime_request": runtime_request,
"lock_active": lock_active, "run_kwargs": run_kwargs}, None
@staticmethod
def _session_headers(session_id: str, gateway_session_key: Optional[str]) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""``X-Hermes-Session-Id`` (+ ``X-Hermes-Session-Key`` when declared) response headers."""
headers = {"X-Hermes-Session-Id": session_id}
if gateway_session_key:
headers["X-Hermes-Session-Key"] = gateway_session_key
return headers
def _effective_turn_runtime(self, runtime_request: Dict[str, Any], result: Any, usage: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Sanitized runtime metadata for a finished session-chat turn."""
runtime = self._result_runtime(result, usage)
return self._sanitize_runtime_metadata(
# Same shared ladder /api/status uses. Before this was unified, the two endpoints disagreed on
# the same page load — the sidebar strip read "running" (it probed GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL and scoped
# to the requested profile) while the Channels page rendered "The gateway is not running" (it
# did neither). Cross-container, profile-scoped, and launch-service-managed deployments each hit
# that split. profile_home is passed when the request was scoped to a named profile:
# gateway/status readers resolve process-level paths and do NOT follow the HERMES_HOME
# contextvar override (#56986 / #69143), so the profile's directory has to be handed over
# explicitly or messaging silently reports another profile's gateway (#71211).
runtime=runtime,
requested_runtime=runtime_request.get("requested"),
route_source=runtime_request.get("route_source") or "global",
model_lock=self._model_lock_state(runtime_request, runtime))
@staticmethod
def _result_runtime(result: Any, usage: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Runtime metadata from the result dict, falling back to the usage dict."""
runtime = (result.get("runtime") or {}) if isinstance(result, dict) else {}
return runtime or ((usage.get("runtime") or {}) if isinstance(usage, dict) else {})
@staticmethod
def _model_lock_state(runtime_request: Dict[str, Any], runtime: Any) -> str:
"""``confirmed`` once a runtime was observed under a lock, ``accepted`` before, else ``""``."""
if not runtime_request.get("require_model_lock"):
return ""
return "confirmed" if runtime else "accepted"
async def _admit_to_live_bot_chat(
self, session_id: str, message: Any, author: Optional[Dict[str, Any]],
) -> Optional[Tuple[Path, Dict[str, Any]]]:
"""Admit a turn aimed at the canonical Bot Chat to the Desktop session that holds it live.
``(profile home, mailbox record)`` when a live owner took it; None when this process should
run the turn itself — the session is not the canonical Bot Chat's own lineage, or nobody
holds that chat. Both peer transports (``/api/sessions/{id}/chat`` for ``peer dm``,
``/v1/runs`` for ``peer run``) go through here, so the two lanes cannot drift.
"""
if not isinstance(message, str):
return None
db = await self._ensure_session_db_async()
if db is None:
return None
home = Path(db.db_path).parent
from tools.bot_live_delivery import deliver_to_live_owner, find_canonical_live_owner
def _admit() -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
owner = find_canonical_live_owner(home)
# Only the canonical Bot Chat's own lineage: a peer turn into any other session runs here.
if owner is None or db.get_compression_tip(session_id) != owner["session_id"]:
return None
return deliver_to_live_owner(home, owner, message, author=author)
record = await asyncio.to_thread(_admit)
return None if record is None else (home, record)
async def _answer_through_live_bot_chat(self, ctx: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional["web.Response"]:
"""Hand a turn aimed at a canonical Bot Chat that a Desktop holds live to that owner.
This is the ``hermes peer dm`` transport. Running the turn here would make this process a
second writer beside the lease holder: the open chat never shows the message or the reply,
its live context never learns of them, and the two transcripts interleave in state.db.
Local and relayed DMs already hand such a message to the owner's mailbox
(``tools/bot_mode_dm.py``, ``tui_gateway/methods_bot_relay.py``). This waits for the owner's
receipt on the same budget as the local path, so the peer still gets the reply on this call.
"""
session_id = ctx["session_id"]
admitted = await self._admit_to_live_bot_chat(session_id, ctx["user_message"], ctx["run_kwargs"]["turn_author"])
if admitted is None:
return None
record = await self._await_live_bot_chat_receipt(*admitted)
delivery_id = record["delivery_id"]
headers = self._session_headers(session_id, ctx["gateway_session_key"])
if record["status"] == "settled":
return web.json_response(
{"object": "hermes.session.chat.completion", "session_id": session_id,
"message": {"role": "assistant", "content": record.get("reply") or ""},
"usage": {}, "runtime": {}, "delivery_id": delivery_id}, headers=headers)
if record["status"] in ("queued", "claimed"):
return web.json_response(
{"object": "hermes.session.chat.queued", "session_id": session_id,
"status": record["status"], "delivery_id": delivery_id}, status=202, headers=headers)
return _error_response(record.get("error") or f"Bot Chat delivery {record['status']}", 502,
code=record.get("reason") or record["status"], headers=headers)
async def _await_live_bot_chat_receipt(self, home: Path, record: Dict[str, Any], *, keepalive=None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Wait on the owner's mailbox record through the shared ``await_delivery_async`` primitive until it
settles or the local DM budget runs out; ``keepalive`` (async) is called every SSE keepalive interval
so a streaming caller's proxy keeps the socket."""
from tools.bot_live_delivery import await_delivery_async
from tools.bot_mode_dm import _LIVE_WAIT_SECONDS
delivery_id = record["delivery_id"]
deadline = time.monotonic() + _LIVE_WAIT_SECONDS
while record["status"] in ("queued", "claimed"):
remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
if remaining <= 0:
break
budget = remaining if keepalive is None else min(remaining, CHAT_COMPLETIONS_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECONDS)
record = await await_delivery_async(home, delivery_id, budget) or record
if keepalive is not None and record["status"] in ("queued", "claimed"):
await keepalive()
return record
async def _stream_through_live_bot_chat(self, request: "web.Request", ctx: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional["web.StreamResponse"]:
"""``_answer_through_live_bot_chat`` for the SSE sibling route: the owner's settled receipt is
the run's single ``assistant.completed`` event; a receipt still open at the budget is a
``run.queued`` event (the 202 shape), a failed one an ``error`` event carrying the reason."""
session_id = ctx["session_id"]
admitted = await self._admit_to_live_bot_chat(session_id, ctx["user_message"], ctx["run_kwargs"]["turn_author"])
if admitted is None:
return None
events = _SessionEventQueue(session_id, f"run_{uuid.uuid4().hex}")
response = await self._prepare_sse_response(request, session_id, ctx["gateway_session_key"])
async def _write(name: str, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
name, payload = events.payload(name, payload)
await response.write(_sse_frame(payload, event=name, ensure_ascii=False))
async def _keepalive() -> None:
await response.write(b": keepalive\n\n")
try:
await _write("run.started", {"user_message": {"role": "user", "content": ctx["user_message"]}, "runtime": {}})
record = await self._await_live_bot_chat_receipt(*admitted, keepalive=_keepalive)
delivery_id = record["delivery_id"]
if record["status"] == "settled":
message_id = f"msg_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
await _write("message.started", {"message": {"id": message_id, "role": "assistant"}})
await _write("assistant.completed", {
"message_id": message_id, "content": record.get("reply") or "", "delivery_id": delivery_id, "runtime": {}})
await _write("run.completed", {"message_id": message_id, "delivery_id": delivery_id, "usage": {}, "runtime": {}})
elif record["status"] in ("queued", "claimed"):
await _write("run.queued", {"status": record["status"], "delivery_id": delivery_id})
else:
await _write("error", {"message": record.get("error") or f"Bot Chat delivery {record['status']}",
"code": record.get("reason") or record["status"], "delivery_id": delivery_id})
await _write("done", {})
except (ConnectionResetError, ConnectionAbortedError, BrokenPipeError, OSError):
logger.info("Session SSE client disconnected while a live Bot Chat held the turn")
return response
@_admit_api_agent_request
async def _handle_session_chat(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /api/sessions/{session_id}/chat — one synchronous agent turn (plus the delivery lanes'
one bounded re-run of a transient failure; ``hermes peer dm`` is the client)."""
from tools.bot_failure_reasons import RETRY_NONE, result_retry_action
# This turn runs through _run_agent, so it already COUNTS toward the cap (#7483).
# Spending the budget without checking it refused every other caller while never
# refusing this route — and a fleet's cross-machine DMs all arrive here.
limited = self._concurrency_limited_response()
if limited is not None:
return limited
ctx, err = await self._prepare_session_chat(request)
if err is not None:
return err
handed_off = await self._answer_through_live_bot_chat(ctx)
if handed_off is not None:
return handed_off
gateway_session_key = ctx["gateway_session_key"]
session_id = ctx["session_id"]
history = await self._conversation_history_for_session(session_id)
result, usage = await self._run_agent(conversation_history=history, **ctx["run_kwargs"])
# One policy-gated re-run of a transiently failed turn — the peer-DM transport's half of the
# retry the local (``tools.bot_mode_dm``) and relayed (``tui_gateway.methods_bot_relay``)
# delivery lanes already apply (#93091 item 5, #115325). Same policy, same gate: transient
# classes (429 / 5xx) re-run the SAME session once, a context overflow lets the re-run's
# pre-API compaction shrink the transcript first, and auth/quota/config/model never re-run. The
# store is read again first: the failed attempt's turn-start persist left the DM as the
# transcript's unanswered tail row, and the re-run resumes that row instead of appending a
# second copy of it. A turn that fails again reaches the peer client exactly as before.
if result_retry_action(result) != RETRY_NONE:
history = await self._conversation_history_for_session(session_id)
result, usage = await self._run_agent(
conversation_history=history, resume_unanswered_turn=True, **ctx["run_kwargs"])
is_dict = isinstance(result, dict)
effective_session_id = result.get("session_id") if is_dict else session_id
final_response = _resolve_media_to_data_urls(
result.get("final_response", "") if is_dict else "")
headers = self._session_headers(effective_session_id or session_id, gateway_session_key)
return web.json_response(
{"object": "hermes.session.chat.completion",
"session_id": effective_session_id or session_id,
"message": {"role": "assistant", "content": final_response}, "usage": usage,
"runtime": self._effective_turn_runtime(ctx["runtime_request"], result, usage)},
headers=headers)
@_admit_api_agent_request
async def _handle_session_chat_stream(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.StreamResponse":
"""POST /api/sessions/{session_id}/chat/stream — SSE wrapper over _run_agent."""
limited = self._concurrency_limited_response()
if limited is not None:
return limited
ctx, err = await self._prepare_session_chat(request)
if err is not None:
return err
handed_off = await self._stream_through_live_bot_chat(request, ctx)
if handed_off is not None:
return handed_off
gateway_session_key, session_id = ctx["gateway_session_key"], ctx["session_id"]
user_message, runtime_request = ctx["user_message"], ctx["runtime_request"]
runtime_meta = self._sanitize_runtime_metadata(
requested_runtime=runtime_request.get("requested"),
route_source=runtime_request.get("route_source") or "global",
model_lock=("accepted" if ctx["lock_active"] else ""))
message_id = f"msg_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
run_id = f"run_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
events = _SessionEventQueue(session_id, run_id)
queue, _event_payload = events.queue, events.payload
# Claim ownership inside the request's profile scope before any run-keyed state
# exists, so /v1/runs/{id}* control is confined to the starting profile.
# See #93689.
self._run_owners[run_id] = self._run_idempotency_scope(request)
self._set_run_status(
run_id, "queued", session_id=session_id, model=ctx["body"].get("model", self._model_name))
def _delta(delta: str) -> None:
if delta:
events.enqueue("assistant.delta", {"message_id": message_id, "delta": delta})
def _tool_progress(event_type: str, tool_name: str = None, preview: str = None, args=None, **kwargs) -> None:
if event_type == "reasoning.available":
events.enqueue("tool.progress", {"message_id": message_id, "tool_name": tool_name or "_thinking", "delta": preview or ""})
elif event_type in {"tool.started", "tool.completed", "tool.failed"}:
event_name = (
"tool.failed"
if event_type == "tool.completed" and kwargs.get("is_error")
else event_type
)
events.enqueue(event_name, {"message_id": message_id, "tool_name": tool_name, "preview": preview, "args": args})
def _commentary(text: str, *, already_streamed: bool = False) -> None:
# Mid-turn assistant commentary (Codex ``phase="commentary"``, text beside tool calls)
# as its own typed event — never folded into ``assistant.completed`` (#67580).
if isinstance(text, str) and text.strip():
events.enqueue("assistant.commentary", {
"message_id": message_id, "text": text, "already_streamed": bool(already_streamed)})
approval_notify = self._register_session_stream_approval(run_id, events, message_id)
async def _run_and_signal() -> None:
try:
await queue.put(_event_payload("run.started", {
"user_message": {"role": "user", "content": user_message},
"runtime": runtime_meta}))
self._set_run_status(run_id, "running", last_event="run.started")
await queue.put(_event_payload("message.started", {"message": {"id": message_id, "role": "assistant"}}))
history = await self._conversation_history_for_session(session_id)
result, usage = await self._run_agent(
conversation_history=history, stream_delta_callback=_delta,
tool_progress_callback=_tool_progress, interim_assistant_callback=_commentary,
active_run_id=run_id, approval_notify_callback=approval_notify,
approval_session_key=run_id, **ctx["run_kwargs"])
is_dict = isinstance(result, dict)
final_response = _resolve_media_to_data_urls(result.get("final_response", "") if is_dict else "")
effective_session_id = result.get("session_id", session_id) if is_dict else session_id
turn_messages = self._turn_transcript_messages(history, user_message, result) if is_dict else []
effective_runtime = self._effective_turn_runtime(runtime_request, result, usage)
# Terminal status and flags come from the result (interrupted -> cancelled,
# unfinished -> failed); a late steer rides along as ``pending_steer`` for replay.
status, fields = _api_runs.terminal_run_status(result if is_dict else {})
await queue.put(_event_payload("assistant.completed", {
"session_id": effective_session_id, "message_id": message_id,
"content": final_response, **fields, "runtime": effective_runtime}))
await queue.put(_event_payload(f"run.{status}", {
"session_id": effective_session_id, "message_id": message_id, **fields,
"messages": turn_messages, "usage": usage, "runtime": effective_runtime}))
self._set_run_status(
run_id, status, session_id=effective_session_id,
# The reply text, so a caller whose stream died can still read it from
# GET /v1/runs/{run_id}; POST /v1/runs already records output in `_finish`.
output=final_response, usage=usage,
last_event=f"run.{status}", **fields)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
self._set_run_status(run_id, "cancelled", last_event="run.cancelled")
raise
except Exception as exc:
logger.exception("[api_server] session chat stream failed")
self._set_run_status(
run_id, "failed", error=_redact_api_error_text(exc), last_event="run.failed")
await queue.put(_event_payload("error", {"message": _redact_api_error_text(exc)}))
finally:
self._active_run_agents.pop(run_id, None)
self._run_approval_sessions.pop(run_id, None)
self._release_run_owner_if_forgotten(run_id)
await queue.put(_event_payload("done", {}))
await queue.put(None)
# NOT in _active_run_tasks: _run_agent already counts this turn for the shutdown drain.
task = asyncio.create_task(_run_and_signal())
self._track_background_task(task)
response = await self._prepare_sse_response(request, session_id, gateway_session_key)
try:
while True:
try:
item = await asyncio.wait_for(queue.get(), timeout=CHAT_COMPLETIONS_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECONDS)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
await response.write(b": keepalive\n\n")
continue
if item is None:
break
name, payload = item
await response.write(_sse_frame(payload, event=name, ensure_ascii=False))
except (ConnectionResetError, ConnectionAbortedError, BrokenPipeError, OSError):
await self._drain_session_stream_task_on_disconnect(
run_id, task, interrupt_message="SSE client disconnected", shield_wait=False)
logger.info("Session SSE client disconnected; interrupted live run %s", run_id)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
await self._drain_session_stream_task_on_disconnect(
run_id, task, interrupt_message="SSE task cancelled", shield_wait=True)
logger.info("Session SSE task cancelled; drained live run %s", run_id)
raise
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("[api_server] session SSE stream error: %s", exc)
return response
def _register_session_stream_approval(self, run_id: str, events: "_SessionEventQueue", message_id: str):
"""Route a session-stream turn's dangerous-command approvals to its SSE queue and to
``POST /v1/runs/{run_id}/approval`` (#58856). Keyed by the run id (never the shared
session key) so concurrent turns on one session can't cross-resolve."""
self._run_approval_sessions[run_id] = run_id
def _approval_notify(approval_data: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
event = _approval_request_event(run_id, approval_data, message_id=message_id)
self._set_run_status(run_id, "waiting_for_approval", last_event="approval.request", approval=event)
events.enqueue("approval.request", event) # executor thread -> loop hop inside
return _approval_notify
async def _drain_session_stream_task_on_disconnect(
self, run_id: str, task: "asyncio.Task", *, interrupt_message: str, shield_wait: bool
) -> None:
"""Preserve live run control refs until the executor-backed turn actually exits."""
agent = self._active_run_agents.get(run_id)
if agent is None:
if not task.done():
task.cancel()
with suppress(Exception):
await task
return
with suppress(Exception):
agent.interrupt(interrupt_message)
if not task.done():
with suppress(Exception):
await (asyncio.shield(task) if shield_wait else task)
@_require_auth
async def _handle_session_model_lock(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /api/sessions/{session_id}/model — backend-ack a Browser model lock."""
session_id = request.match_info["session_id"]
_, err = await self._get_existing_session_or_404(session_id)
if err:
return err
body, err = await self._read_json_body(request)
if err:
return err
runtime_request = self._session_runtime_request_from_body(body)
runtime_request["require_model_lock"] = True
lock_error = self._runtime_lock_error(runtime_request)
if lock_error is not None:
return lock_error
if not await asyncio.to_thread(self._persist_session_runtime_lock, session_id, runtime_request):
return _error_response(
"Could not persist the requested session model lock", 500, code="model_lock_persistence_failed")
requested = runtime_request.get("requested") or {}
route = runtime_request.get("route") or {}
runtime = self._sanitize_runtime_metadata(
runtime={
"provider": route.get("provider") or requested.get("provider") or "",
"model": route.get("model") or requested.get("model") or "",
"route_source": runtime_request.get("route_source") or "raw_request"},
requested_runtime=requested,
route_source=runtime_request.get("route_source") or "raw_request",
model_lock="accepted")
return web.json_response(
{"object": "hermes.session.model_lock", "session_id": session_id, "runtime": runtime})
# -- Cron jobs API ----------------------------------------------------------------
_JOB_ID_RE = re.compile(r"[a-f0-9]{12}")
# Update whitelist — prevents clients injecting arbitrary keys.
_UPDATE_ALLOWED_FIELDS = {"name", "schedule", "prompt", "deliver", "skills", "skill", "repeat", "enabled"}
_MAX_NAME_LENGTH = 200
_MAX_PROMPT_LENGTH = 5000
def _cron_request_guard(
self, request: "web.Request", *, need_job_id: bool = False, check_draining: bool = False,
) -> tuple:
"""Shared /api/jobs prelude: auth → (drain) → cron available → (job_id). Returns (job_id, err)."""
auth_err = self._check_auth(request)
if auth_err:
return None, auth_err
if check_draining:
draining = self._draining_response()
if draining is not None:
return None, draining
if not _CRON_AVAILABLE:
return None, web.json_response({"error": "Cron module not available"}, status=501)
if not need_job_id:
return None, None
job_id = request.match_info["job_id"]
if not self._JOB_ID_RE.fullmatch(job_id):
logger.warning(
"Cron jobs API rejected invalid job_id %r: %s", job_id, self._request_audit_log_suffix(request))
return job_id, web.json_response({"error": "Invalid job ID format"}, status=400)
return job_id, None
@staticmethod
def _cron_error_response(exc: BaseException) -> "web.Response":
return web.json_response({"error": _redact_api_error_text(exc)}, status=500)
def _validate_cron_prompt(self, prompt: str) -> Optional["web.Response"]:
"""Length cap + injection scan shared by create/update/run."""
if len(prompt) > self._MAX_PROMPT_LENGTH:
return web.json_response({"error": f"Prompt must be ≤ {self._MAX_PROMPT_LENGTH} characters"}, status=400)
if prompt and _scan_cron_prompt is not None:
scan_error = _scan_cron_prompt(prompt)
if scan_error:
return web.json_response({"error": scan_error}, status=400)
return None
def _job_response(self, fn, job_id: str, *, notify: bool) -> "web.Response":
"""Run ``fn(job_id)``: 404 when falsy, else ``{"job": ...}``; exceptions -> 500."""
try:
job = fn(job_id)
if not job:
return web.json_response({"error": "Job not found"}, status=404)
if notify:
_notify_cron_provider_jobs_changed()
return web.json_response({"job": job})
except Exception as e:
return self._cron_error_response(e)
async def _job_lookup_or_mutate(self, request: "web.Request", fn, *, notify: bool) -> "web.Response":
job_id, err = self._cron_request_guard(request, need_job_id=True)
return err if err else self._job_response(fn, job_id, notify=notify)
async def _handle_list_jobs(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /api/jobs — list all cron jobs."""
_, err = self._cron_request_guard(request)
if err:
return err
try:
include_disabled = request.query.get("include_disabled", "").lower() in {"true", "1"}
return web.json_response({"jobs": _cron_list(include_disabled=include_disabled)})
except Exception as e:
return self._cron_error_response(e)
async def _handle_create_job(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /api/jobs — create a new cron job."""
_, err = self._cron_request_guard(request)
if err:
return err
try:
body = await request.json()
name = (body.get("name") or "").strip()
schedule = (body.get("schedule") or "").strip()
prompt = body.get("prompt", "")
skills = body.get("skills")
repeat = body.get("repeat")
if not name:
return web.json_response({"error": "Name is required"}, status=400)
if len(name) > self._MAX_NAME_LENGTH:
return web.json_response({"error": f"Name must be ≤ {self._MAX_NAME_LENGTH} characters"}, status=400)
if not schedule:
return web.json_response({"error": "Schedule is required"}, status=400)
prompt_err = self._validate_cron_prompt(prompt)
if prompt_err:
return prompt_err
if repeat is not None and (not isinstance(repeat, int) or repeat < 1):
return web.json_response({"error": "Repeat must be a positive integer"}, status=400)
kwargs = {
"prompt": prompt, "schedule": schedule, "name": name,
"deliver": body.get("deliver", "local"),
"origin": self._cron_origin_from_request(request)}
for key in ("paused", "paused_reason"):
if key in body:
kwargs[key] = body[key]
if skills:
kwargs["skills"] = skills
if repeat is not None:
kwargs["repeat"] = repeat
return web.json_response({"job": _cron_create(**kwargs)})
except _CronSchedulerRegistrationError as e:
return web.json_response(e.to_dict(), status=424)
except ValueError as e:
return web.json_response({"error": str(e)}, status=400)
except Exception as e:
return self._cron_error_response(e)
async def _handle_get_job(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""GET /api/jobs/{job_id} — get a single cron job."""
return await self._job_lookup_or_mutate(request, _cron_get, notify=False)
async def _handle_update_job(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""PATCH /api/jobs/{job_id} — update a cron job."""
job_id, err = self._cron_request_guard(request, need_job_id=True)
if err:
return err
try:
body = await request.json()
# Whitelist allowed fields to prevent arbitrary key injection
sanitized = {k: v for k, v in body.items() if k in self._UPDATE_ALLOWED_FIELDS}
if not sanitized:
return web.json_response({"error": "No valid fields to update"}, status=400)
if "name" in sanitized and len(sanitized["name"]) > self._MAX_NAME_LENGTH:
return web.json_response({"error": f"Name must be ≤ {self._MAX_NAME_LENGTH} characters"}, status=400)
if "prompt" in sanitized:
prompt_err = self._validate_cron_prompt(sanitized["prompt"])
if prompt_err:
return prompt_err
except Exception as e:
return self._cron_error_response(e)
return self._job_response(lambda jid: _cron_update(jid, sanitized), job_id, notify=True)
async def _handle_delete_job(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""DELETE /api/jobs/{job_id} — delete a cron job."""
job_id, err = self._cron_request_guard(request, need_job_id=True)
if err:
return err
try:
if not _cron_remove(job_id):
return web.json_response({"error": "Job not found"}, status=404)
_notify_cron_provider_jobs_changed()
return web.json_response({"ok": True})
except Exception as e:
return self._cron_error_response(e)
async def _handle_pause_job(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /api/jobs/{job_id}/pause — pause a cron job."""
return await self._job_lookup_or_mutate(request, _cron_pause, notify=True)
async def _handle_resume_job(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /api/jobs/{job_id}/resume — resume a paused cron job."""
return await self._job_lookup_or_mutate(request, _cron_resume, notify=True)
async def _handle_run_job(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /api/jobs/{job_id}/run — trigger immediate execution."""
job_id, err = self._cron_request_guard(request, need_job_id=True, check_draining=True)
if err:
return err
# Optional transient per-run context (standalone `hermes cron run` /
# cronjob(action='run', prompt=...)) — same cap + scan as a stored prompt.
extra_prompt = body = None
with suppress(Exception):
body = await request.json()
if isinstance(body, dict):
raw_prompt = body.get("prompt")
if raw_prompt is not None:
extra_prompt = str(raw_prompt)
prompt_err = self._validate_cron_prompt(extra_prompt)
if prompt_err:
return prompt_err
extra_prompt = extra_prompt or None
return self._job_response(
lambda jid: _cron_trigger(jid, extra_prompt=extra_prompt), job_id, notify=False)
async def _handle_cron_fire(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
"""POST /api/cron/fire — Chronos fire webhook (NAS -> agent), authenticated by a
NAS-minted JWT via the pluggable verifier, NOT API_SERVER_KEY. 202 + background run so
a long turn never trips NAS's timeout; the store CAS claim guards double-fire on retry."""
from hermes_cli.config import cfg_get, load_config
from plugins.cron_providers.chronos.verify import get_fire_verifier
auth = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
token = auth[7:].strip() if auth.startswith("Bearer ") else ""
cfg = load_config()
verifier = get_fire_verifier()
verify_kwargs = dict(
token=token,
expected_audience=cfg_get(cfg, "cron", "chronos", "expected_audience", default=""),
jwks_or_key=cfg_get(cfg, "cron", "chronos", "nas_jwks_url", default="") or None,
issuer=cfg_get(cfg, "cron", "chronos", "portal_url", default="") or None)
try:
claims = await _call_verifier(verifier, **verify_kwargs)
except Exception:
# Fail closed: a crashing verifier must never admit a fire.
logger.exception("cron fire: verifier crashed; rejecting token")
claims = None
if claims is None:
logger.warning("cron fire: rejected invalid token: %s", self._request_audit_log_suffix(request))
return web.json_response({"error": "invalid fire token"}, status=401)
draining = self._draining_response()
if draining is not None:
return draining
with _reserve_pending_api_work(self) as reservation:
body = {}
with suppress(Exception):
body = await request.json()
job_id = (body or {}).get("job_id")
if not job_id:
return web.json_response({"error": "missing job_id"}, status=400)
# `hermes pause` ESTOP: refuse the fire and ask NAS to retry later.
# Placed after JWT verify (don't leak pause state to unauth callers)
# and after the drain check (drain is transient shutdown, ESTOP is
# operator override). 503 + Retry-After reschedules the job via NAS
# retry or the misfire backstop rather than silently dropping it —
# matches _CRON_FIRE_RETRY_AFTER_SECONDS in web_routers/cron.py.
with suppress(ImportError):
from agent.estop import check_paused as _estop_check_paused
if _estop_check_paused("cron-webhook", logger):
return web.json_response(
{"error": "hermes is paused (ESTOP)", "job_id": job_id},
status=503,
headers={"Retry-After": str(60)},
)
from cron.scheduler_provider import provider_supports_split_fire, resolve_cron_scheduler
provider = resolve_cron_scheduler()
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
# Live adapters (parity with the built-in ticker): E2EE / relay-fronted platforms
# have no native credential, so without them delivery fails.
runner = self.gateway_runner or request.app.get("gateway_runner")
if runner is None:
with suppress(Exception):
from gateway.run import _gateway_runner_ref
runner = _gateway_runner_ref()
adapters = getattr(runner, "adapters", None) or None
def _detach_fire(fire_fn, *fire_args) -> "web.Response":
# The done callback owns the reservation once the task is detached.
task = asyncio.create_task(asyncio.to_thread(fire_fn, *fire_args, adapters=adapters, loop=loop))
reservation["detached"] = True
task.add_done_callback(lambda _task: _release_pending_api_work(self, reservation))
self._track_background_task(task, tolerate_missing=True)
return web.json_response({"status": "accepted", "job_id": job_id}, status=202)
if not provider_supports_split_fire(provider):
# A legacy single-phase provider overrides ``fire_due`` but inherits the base
# ``claim_fire``; the split path would silently bypass that override.
return _detach_fire(provider.fire_due, job_id)
# Persist the attempt + exact store owner before acknowledging NAS; a failure here
# is retryable and the reservation remains attached.
try:
claimed_job = await asyncio.to_thread(provider.claim_fire, job_id)
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("cron fire admission failed for %s: %s", job_id, exc)
return web.json_response({"error": "cron fire admission failed", "job_id": job_id}, status=503)
if claimed_job is None:
return web.json_response({"status": "duplicate", "job_id": job_id}, status=200)
return _detach_fire(provider.fire_claimed, claimed_job)
# -- Agent execution --------------------------------------------------------------
def _track_background_task(self, task, *, tolerate_missing: bool = False) -> None:
"""Register a task in ``_background_tasks`` (tolerates test doubles) with auto-discard.
``tolerate_missing`` (cron fire paths) also swallows AttributeError from the whole
registration; the run/sweep paths only tolerate an unhashable task."""
if tolerate_missing:
with suppress(TypeError, AttributeError):
self._background_tasks.add(task)
task.add_done_callback(self._background_tasks.discard)
return
with suppress(TypeError):
self._background_tasks.add(task)
if hasattr(task, "add_done_callback"):
task.add_done_callback(self._background_tasks.discard)
def _concurrency_limited_response(self) -> Optional["web.Response"]:
"""429 when the concurrent-run cap is reached (0 disables), else None. Uses the same
adapter-owned work count as shutdown draining (admitted requests included)."""
limit = self._max_concurrent_runs
if limit <= 0:
return None
inflight = self.active_agent_work_count()
# The current request's own reservation must not consume its last available slot.
reservation = _api_agent_request_reservation.get()
if reservation and reservation["active"]:
inflight -= 1
if inflight >= limit:
return _error_response(
f"Too many concurrent runs (max {limit})", 429, err_type="rate_limit_error",
code="rate_limit_exceeded", headers={"Retry-After": "1"})
return None
@staticmethod
def _bind_api_server_session(
*, chat_id: str = "", session_key: str = "", session_id: str = "", profile: str = "",
browser_control_principal: str = "", browser_control_transport_family: str = "",
session_history_delivery: str = "") -> list:
"""Bind an API turn with push disabled and history delivery default-denied.
Only routes whose continuation reads SessionDB may pass "1". An omitted
declaration or fingerprint-derived identity keeps delegation synchronous.
``profile`` is the ``/p/<profile>/`` prefix serving the request (``""`` = default). It must
reach ``HERMES_SESSION_PROFILE``: the persistent-Docker container key is derived from it, so an
unbound profile collapses every profile's turns onto the default sandbox (#96370)."""
from gateway.session_context import set_session_vars
return set_session_vars(
platform="api_server", chat_id=chat_id, session_key=session_key, session_id=session_id,
profile=profile, browser_control_principal=browser_control_principal,
browser_control_transport_family=browser_control_transport_family,
async_delivery=False, cron_session="", session_history_delivery=session_history_delivery)
def _turn_runtime_metadata(
self, agent: Any, *, route: Optional[Dict[str, Any]], requested_runtime: Optional[Dict[str, Any]],
route_source: str, confirmed_runtime_lock: bool) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Sanitized actual-vs-requested runtime for a finished turn; raises RuntimeError when a
confirmed model lock's provider/model differs from what the agent actually ran with."""
runtime = dict(getattr(agent, "_hermes_api_runtime", {}) or {})
raw_provider = getattr(agent, "provider", "")
raw_model = getattr(agent, "model", "")
actual_provider = self._clean_runtime_id(raw_provider, max_len=80) if isinstance(raw_provider, str) else ""
actual_model = self._clean_runtime_id(raw_model) if isinstance(raw_model, str) else ""
resolved_provider = self._clean_runtime_id(runtime.get("provider"), max_len=80)
for key, actual in (("provider", actual_provider), ("model", actual_model)):
if actual:
runtime[key] = actual
else:
runtime.setdefault(key, "")
route = route or {}
requested_runtime = requested_runtime or {}
if confirmed_runtime_lock:
requested_provider = self._clean_runtime_id(
route.get("provider") or requested_runtime.get("provider"), max_len=80)
# _create_agent records the provider after resolving the request through the
# provider catalog. Compare that identity with the agent's actual runtime so
# aliases and named custom providers do not fail a literal-string check.
expected_provider = self._clean_runtime_id(
resolved_provider or requested_provider, max_len=80)
expected_model = self._clean_runtime_id(route.get("model") or requested_runtime.get("model"))
if (expected_provider and actual_provider != expected_provider) or (
expected_model and actual_model != expected_model):
raise RuntimeError(
"confirmed model lock runtime mismatch: "
f"expected provider={requested_provider or expected_provider or '<unspecified>'} "
f"model={expected_model or '<unspecified>'}; "
f"actual provider={actual_provider or '<unknown>'} "
f"model={actual_model or '<unknown>'}")
if requested_runtime:
model, provider = self._requested_ids(requested_runtime)
runtime["requested"] = {"provider": provider, "model": model}
runtime["route_source"] = route_source or runtime.get("route_source") or "global"
return self._sanitize_runtime_metadata(
runtime=runtime, requested_runtime=requested_runtime or None, route_source=route_source or "global",
model_lock=("confirmed" if confirmed_runtime_lock else ""))
def _finish_turn_result(
self, agent: Any, result: Any, session_id: Optional[str], *, route, requested_runtime, route_source,
confirmed_runtime_lock: bool) -> tuple:
"""Attach usage, effective session id, ``_compressed`` and runtime metadata to a finished turn."""
usage = {"input_tokens": getattr(agent, "session_prompt_tokens", 0) or 0,
"output_tokens": getattr(agent, "session_completion_tokens", 0) or 0,
"total_tokens": getattr(agent, "session_total_tokens", 0) or 0}
# Effective session id lets callers track compression-triggered rotations.
# (#16938)
_eff_sid = getattr(agent, "session_id", session_id)
if isinstance(_eff_sid, str) and _eff_sid:
result["session_id"] = _eff_sid
# _compressed tells _build_response_conversation_history to store the compacted
# transcript as-is (rotation changes session_id; in-place compaction sets a flag).
_session_rotated = isinstance(_eff_sid, str) and isinstance(session_id, str) and _eff_sid != session_id
if getattr(agent, "_last_compaction_in_place", False) or _session_rotated:
result["_compressed"] = True
if requested_runtime or route or confirmed_runtime_lock or (route_source and route_source != "global"):
runtime = self._turn_runtime_metadata(
agent, route=route, requested_runtime=requested_runtime,
route_source=route_source, confirmed_runtime_lock=confirmed_runtime_lock)
if isinstance(result, dict):
result["runtime"] = runtime
usage["runtime"] = runtime
return result, usage
async def _run_agent(
self, user_message: str, conversation_history: List[Dict[str, str]],
ephemeral_system_prompt: Optional[str] = None, session_id: Optional[str] = None,
stream_delta_callback=None, tool_progress_callback=None, tool_start_callback=None,
tool_complete_callback=None, interim_assistant_callback=None, reasoning_callback=None,
status_callback=None, agent_ref: Optional[list] = None, active_run_id: Optional[str] = None,
gateway_session_key: Optional[str] = None, requested_model: Optional[str] = None,
requested_provider: Optional[str] = None, model_options: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
route: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, session_model: Optional[str] = None,
requested_runtime: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, route_source: str = "global",
confirmed_runtime_lock: bool = False, bind_declared_conversation: bool = False,
session_history_delivery: str = "", turn_author: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
relay_metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, notification_category: str = "result",
resume_unanswered_turn: bool = False, approval_notify_callback=None,
approval_session_key: Optional[str] = None) -> tuple:
"""Create an agent and run one turn in a thread executor -> ``(result, usage)``.
``approval_notify_callback`` (with ``approval_session_key``) routes dangerous-command
approval requests to the caller's stream, keyed like ``/v1/runs`` approvals (#51871).
``agent_ref[0]`` receives the agent so SSE writers can interrupt it; ``active_run_id``
registers it in ``_active_run_agents``. Under a confirmed model lock the actual
provider/model must match or the turn fails; ``runtime`` metadata is attached.
``session_history_delivery`` declares #98619 session-id provenance and default-denies: only audited
producers whose client can address the id again pass "1" (see
``_bind_api_server_session``).
``turn_author`` only labels the turn for memory attribution. It grants nothing.
``resume_unanswered_turn`` marks a policy-gated re-run of a turn whose user row the failed attempt
already persisted: the transcript's unanswered tail row is adopted from ``conversation_history``
as THIS turn's user message instead of being appended a second time
(``agent.session_persistence.adopt_unanswered_turn``; #115325)."""
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
# ContextVars do not follow run_in_executor threads: capture here, re-enter in _run().
request_profile = _api_request_profile.get()
request_browser_control_principal = _api_request_browser_control_principal.get()
request_browser_control_transport_family = _api_request_browser_control_transport_family.get()
def _run():
from gateway.session_context import clear_session_vars
with self._profile_scope(request_profile):
tokens = self._bind_api_server_session(
chat_id=session_id or "", session_key=gateway_session_key or session_id or "",
session_id=session_id or "", profile=request_profile or "",
browser_control_principal=request_browser_control_principal,
browser_control_transport_family=request_browser_control_transport_family,
session_history_delivery=session_history_delivery)
agent = None
from agent.notification_presentation import notification_turn
from gateway.warning_notifications import diagnostic_turn_muted
muted = diagnostic_turn_muted({"notification_category": notification_category}, "api_server")
try:
agent = self._create_agent(
ephemeral_system_prompt=ephemeral_system_prompt, session_id=session_id,
stream_delta_callback=stream_delta_callback, tool_progress_callback=tool_progress_callback,
tool_start_callback=tool_start_callback, tool_complete_callback=tool_complete_callback,
interim_assistant_callback=interim_assistant_callback,
reasoning_callback=reasoning_callback, status_callback=status_callback,
gateway_session_key=gateway_session_key, requested_model=requested_model,
requested_provider=requested_provider, model_options=model_options, route=route,
session_model=session_model, confirmed_runtime_lock=confirmed_runtime_lock)
if agent_ref is not None:
agent_ref[0] = agent
if resume_unanswered_turn:
# A dispatcher's re-run of a failed delivery turn: the DM's own row is already
# in the store (the failed attempt persisted it at turn start), so continue THAT
# row instead of appending a second copy of the same text (#115325).
from agent.session_persistence import adopt_unanswered_turn
adopt_unanswered_turn(conversation_history, user_message, agent)
if active_run_id:
self._active_run_agents[active_run_id] = agent
effective_task_id = session_id or str(uuid.uuid4())
# Process baseline for disconnect reaping (this surface bypasses TurnRunner)
# + shutdown-interrupt registration, once for every caller.
# Baseline for selective background-process reaping on SSE client disconnect — mirrors
# gateway/run.py's gateway-turn cleanup (#76115); this API-server surface runs its own
# agent lifecycle and doesn't go through TurnRunner, so it needs its own baseline.
# /v1/runs runs its own agent lifecycle (no TurnRunner, no _run_agent) — record turn
# process ownership so stop/cancel can reap only the background processes this run
# created (#76115).
_publish_turn_process_ownership(agent, effective_task_id)
# Registering here, once, covers every _run_agent() caller — the same reason the
# _ProviderAuthResolutionError handler below lives here rather than in each route. Only
# two callers pass ``agent_ref``, and only /v1/runs has a run_id, so neither is a usable
# hook for the rest. See #63529.
self._shutdown_interruptible_agents[id(agent)] = agent
# Passed only when set: a human turn keeps today's call shape.
author_kwargs = {"turn_author": turn_author} if turn_author is not None else {}
conversation_kwargs = dict(
user_message=user_message,
conversation_history=conversation_history,
task_id=effective_task_id,
**author_kwargs,
)
if relay_metadata:
conversation_kwargs["relay_metadata"] = relay_metadata
approval_token = None
if approval_notify_callback is not None and approval_session_key:
# Same machinery as /v1/runs (_run_agent_sync): the contextvar scopes
# this turn's approvals to the key the resolve endpoint looks up.
from tools.approval import register_gateway_notify
from tools.approval_context import set_current_session_key
approval_token = set_current_session_key(approval_session_key)
register_gateway_notify(approval_session_key, approval_notify_callback)
try:
with notification_turn(agent, muted=muted, session_id=session_id or ""):
result = agent.run_conversation(**conversation_kwargs)
finally:
if approval_token is not None:
from tools.approval_context import reset_current_session_key
_api_runs._unregister_approval_notify(approval_session_key)
with suppress(Exception):
reset_current_session_key(approval_token)
result, usage = self._finish_turn_result(
agent, result, session_id, route=route, requested_runtime=requested_runtime,
route_source=route_source, confirmed_runtime_lock=confirmed_runtime_lock)
if muted and isinstance(result, dict):
# Project presentation only after finishing the source outcome. Keep
# the agent's result, transcript, failure flags and usage intact.
result = {**result, "_notification_presentation_suppressed": True}
return result, usage
except _ProviderAuthResolutionError as exc:
# Typed provider-auth failure only, handled once for every caller in
# run.py's response shape (text, no HTTP error).
logger.warning("Provider resolution failed for session=%s: %s",
session_id or "", exc)
return (
{"final_response": exc.user_text(), "messages": [],
"api_calls": 0, "tools": [],
**({"_notification_presentation_suppressed": True} if muted else {})},
{"input_tokens": 0, "output_tokens": 0, "total_tokens": 0})
except Exception as exc:
if muted:
# Keep the original exception/traceback for logs and failure
# handling; the HTTP/SSE boundary suppresses its presentation.
setattr(exc, "_notification_presentation_suppressed", True)
raise
finally:
# Turn over (any outcome): clear ownership so a late disconnect can't reap
# background work this turn deliberately left running.
if active_run_id:
self._active_run_agents.pop(active_run_id, None)
if agent is not None:
_clear_turn_process_ownership(agent)
self._shutdown_interruptible_agents.pop(id(agent), None)
self._memory_sessions.checkin(agent)
# Bind the declared key to the row the turn actually ended on
# (agent.session_id carries a mid-turn rotation). Opt-in per route.
# Record the declared conversation on the row the turn actually ended on —
# ``agent.session_id`` already carries a mid-turn compression rotation (#16938), so
# the next reply resolves the live transcript rather than its retired parent.
# Opt-in: only the routes that resolve their session id from the declared key
# (/v1/responses, /v1/runs) record one, so no other caller's rows change shape.
if bind_declared_conversation:
self._bind_declared_conversation(
getattr(agent, "session_id", None) or session_id, gateway_session_key)
clear_session_vars(tokens)
self._activate_admitted_request()
self._inflight_agent_runs += 1
started_at = time.perf_counter()
usage: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
try:
# Worker-scoped count rides along so the shutdown close gate still sees the thread
# after this handler task is cancelled (#116535); released in the worker's finally.
result, usage = await _api_runs._submit_api_worker(loop, _run)
return result, usage
finally:
self._inflight_agent_runs -= 1
if usage is not None:
self._record_api_metrics(usage, time.perf_counter() - started_at)
# -- /v1/runs, room grants, room dispatch: thin delegators (real methods: tests assert
# __dict__ membership and patch the module-level implementations) ---------------------
_RUN_STREAM_TTL = 300 # seconds before orphaned runs are swept
_RUN_STATUS_TTL = 3600 # seconds to retain terminal run status for polling
def _set_run_status(self, run_id: str, status: str, **fields: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return _api_runs._set_run_status(self, run_id, status, **fields)
def _make_run_event_callback(self, run_id: str, loop: "asyncio.AbstractEventLoop"):
return _api_runs._make_run_event_callback(self, run_id, loop, _api_server=sys.modules[__name__])
def _run_idempotency_scope(self, request: "web.Request") -> str:
return _api_runs._run_idempotency_scope(self, request, _api_server=sys.modules[__name__])
@staticmethod
def _room_grant_token(request: "web.Request") -> str:
return _room_grants._room_grant_token(request)
def _room_grant_secret(self) -> bytes:
return _room_grants._room_grant_secret(self)
def _room_grant_claims(self, request: "web.Request", *, permission: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
return _room_grants._room_grant_claims(self, request, permission=permission)
def _check_run_auth(self, request: "web.Request", *, permission: str) -> "web.Response | None":
return _api_runs._check_run_auth(self, request, permission=permission, _api_server=sys.modules[__name__])
async def _ensure_hosted_member_session(self, dispatch: Any) -> str:
return await _room_dispatch._ensure_hosted_member_session(self, dispatch)
async def _normalize_room_dispatch(self, request: "web.Request", body: Any) -> tuple[Any, "web.Response | None"]:
return await _room_dispatch._normalize_room_dispatch(self, request, body, _api_server=sys.modules[__name__])
_handle_room_member_invitation = _room_grant_delegate("_handle_room_member_invitation")
_handle_room_member_capabilities = _room_grant_delegate("_handle_room_member_capabilities")
_handle_room_member_grant_refresh = _room_grant_delegate("_handle_room_member_grant_refresh")
_handle_room_member_grant_revoke = _room_grant_delegate("_handle_room_member_grant_revoke")
def _durable_run_status(self, request: "web.Request", run_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any] | None:
return _api_runs._durable_run_status(self, request, run_id)
@_admit_api_agent_request
async def _handle_runs(self, request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
return await _api_runs._handle_runs(self, request, _api_server=sys.modules[__name__])
def _request_owns_run(self, request: "web.Request", run_id: str) -> bool:
return _api_runs._request_owns_run(self, request, run_id)
def _release_run_owner_if_forgotten(self, run_id: str) -> None:
_api_runs._release_run_owner_if_forgotten(self, run_id)
_handle_get_run = _run_route_delegate("_handle_get_run")
_handle_run_events = _run_route_delegate("_handle_run_events")
_handle_run_approval = _run_route_delegate("_handle_run_approval")
_handle_steer_run = _run_route_delegate("_handle_steer_run")
_handle_stop_run = _run_route_delegate("_handle_stop_run")
async def _sweep_orphaned_runs(self) -> None:
return await _api_runs._sweep_orphaned_runs(self)
def _sweep_orphaned_runs_once(self, now: Optional[float] = None) -> None:
return _api_runs._sweep_orphaned_runs_once(self, now)
# -- BasePlatformAdapter interface ------------------------------------------------
def _api_key_passes_startup_guard(self) -> bool:
"""Return True when API_SERVER_KEY is present and strong enough to start."""
if not self._api_key:
logger.error(
"[%s] Refusing to start: API_SERVER_KEY is required for the API server, "
"including loopback-only binds on %s.",
self.name, self._host)
return False
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import has_usable_secret
except Exception as exc:
# Fail CLOSED: "could not check" must not mean "start" on a terminal-capable endpoint.
logger.error(
"[%s] Refusing to start: API_SERVER_KEY strength could not be "
"verified (%s: %s), and this endpoint dispatches "
"terminal-capable agent work. Repair the installation before "
"starting the API server on %s.",
self.name, type(exc).__name__, exc, self._host)
return False
if not has_usable_secret(self._api_key, min_length=16):
logger.error(
"[%s] Refusing to start: API_SERVER_KEY is a "
"placeholder or too short (<16 chars). This endpoint "
"dispatches terminal-capable agent work — a guessable "
"key is remote code execution. Generate a strong secret "
"(e.g. `openssl rand -hex 32`) and set API_SERVER_KEY "
"before starting the API server on %s.",
self.name, self._host)
return False
return True
async def connect(self, *, is_reconnect: bool = False) -> bool:
"""Start the aiohttp web server."""
if not AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE:
logger.warning("[%s] aiohttp not installed", self.name)
return False
with self._session_db_cache_lock:
self._session_db_cache_closed = False
if not self._api_key_passes_startup_guard():
# Config error, not transient: a bare ``return False`` would make the reconnect watcher
# re-instantiate the adapter (+ sqlite connection) until EMFILE.
self._set_fatal_error(
# A rejected API_SERVER_KEY is a configuration error, not a transient blip — the key will
# not become valid on its own. A bare ``return False`` makes the reconnect watcher in
# gateway.run treat it as retryable and loop forever at the backoff cap, re-instantiating
# the adapter (and its ResponseStore sqlite connection) every retry (#38803: ~501 leaked
# connections / 1002 fds over 2.5 days until EMFILE took the whole gateway down).
# Non-retryable drops it from the reconnect queue — same treatment as the port-conflict
# guard (api_server_port_in_use). The guard already logged the specific rejection reason
# just above.
"api_server_key_invalid",
"API_SERVER_KEY was rejected by the startup guard (missing, "
"placeholder/too short, or strength unverifiable — see the "
"error logged above). Generate a strong secret (e.g. "
"`openssl rand -hex 32`), set API_SERVER_KEY, then "
"`/platform resume api_server`.",
retryable=False)
return False
try:
mws = [mw for mw in (
self._make_profile_prefix_middleware(), cors_middleware, body_limit_middleware,
security_headers_middleware) if mw is not None]
self._app = web.Application(middlewares=mws, client_max_size=MAX_REQUEST_BYTES)
assert self._app is not None
# Native routes + multiplex /p/<profile>/ mirrors (the prefix middleware validates and
# scopes config/credentials when multiplexing is on).
for method, path, handler in self._http_route_table():
self._app.router.add_route(method, path, handler)
self._app.router.add_route(method, f"/p/{{profile}}{path}", handler)
# Registered LAST so every native mirror above wins: anything else under /p/<profile>/ is a
# secondary profile's inbound-port platform (Twilio, LINE, Teams, ...) served on this listener.
self._app.router.add_route("*", "/p/{profile}/{tail:.*}", self._handle_profile_ingress)
# After native routes: Relay bootstrap shims feature-detect on this key and must
# no-op rather than shadow the native session-control handlers.
self._app["api_server_adapter"] = self
if self.gateway_runner is not None:
self._app["gateway_runner"] = self.gateway_runner
self._track_background_task(asyncio.create_task(self._sweep_orphaned_runs()))
# Network-accessible + unsandboxed local terminal backend = host-user RCE surface;
# warn, don't refuse (the operator may have a firewall / strong key).
if is_network_accessible(self._host):
_backend = "local"
with suppress(Exception):
from hermes_cli.config import load_config as _load_cfg
_backend = ((_load_cfg() or {}).get("terminal") or {}).get("backend", "local")
if str(_backend).lower() == "local":
logger.warning(
"[%s] API server is network-accessible (%s) AND the "
"terminal backend is 'local' (unsandboxed). Agent work "
"dispatched through this endpoint runs as the host user "
"with full terminal/file access. Strongly consider a "
"sandboxed backend (terminal.backend: docker) and "
"firewalling this port to trusted networks only.",
self.name, self._host)
# Plugin-registered native handlers, wired before AppRunner.setup() freezes the router.
self._wire_plugin_handlers(self._app)
self._runner = web.AppRunner(self._app)
await self._runner.setup()
# Bind directly instead of probing 127.0.0.1 first — the old single-family pre-probe raced the
# real bind and reported a TIME_WAIT socket as "in use" (#10297), failing gateway restarts for
# up to ~60s. Platform-dependent SO_REUSEADDR and the macOS TIME_WAIT rebind live in
# start_tcp_site; the loop below covers a predecessor still holding the port for a moment.
try:
# aiohttp registers a site with its runner before binding, so a failed start leaves the
# site registered: rebuild the runner per attempt rather than reach into its internals.
for attempt in range(_BIND_ATTEMPTS):
try:
self._site = await start_tcp_site(self._runner, self._host, self._port, log_tag=self.name)
break
except OSError as exc:
if exc.errno != errno.EADDRINUSE or attempt == _BIND_ATTEMPTS - 1:
raise
await self._runner.cleanup()
self._runner = web.AppRunner(self._app)
await self._runner.setup()
await asyncio.sleep(0.2 * (attempt + 1))
except OSError as exc:
await self._runner.cleanup()
self._runner = None
self._site = None
if getattr(exc, "errno", None) == errno.EADDRINUSE:
# Config error: non-retryable, or the reconnect watcher leaks fds forever.
self._set_fatal_error(
# A port conflict is a configuration error, not a transient blip — another process
# holds the port for its lifetime. A bare ``return False`` makes the reconnect
# watcher in gateway.run treat it as retryable and loop forever at the backoff cap
# (observed: 1568+ retries over 5 days across multi-profile setups all defaulting
# to the same port, #52132), filling errors.log and leaking the adapter's ResponseStore
# fds each retry. Non-retryable drops it from the reconnect queue; the operator
# recovers with ``/platform resume api_server`` after changing the port.
"api_server_port_in_use",
f"Port {self._port} already in use. Set "
f"platforms.api_server.port in config.yaml to a "
f"different value, then `/platform resume api_server`.",
retryable=False)
logger.error(
"[%s] Could not bind %s:%d: %s. Set a different port in "
"config.yaml: platforms.api_server.port",
self.name, self._host, self._port, exc)
return False
from gateway.platforms.shared_ingress import listener_base_url
self._mark_connected(listener_base=listener_base_url(self._host, self._port))
# Publish a metrics-bearing snapshot at bind and keep it fresh: the
# heartbeat loop updates last_heartbeat/metrics_today (#52323).
self._publish_runtime_status()
self._track_background_task(asyncio.create_task(self._heartbeat_loop()))
logger.info(
"[%s] API server listening on http://%s:%d (model: %s)",
self.name, self._host, self._port, self._model_name)
return True
except Exception as e:
logger.error("[%s] Failed to start API server: %s", self.name, e)
return False
async def disconnect(self) -> None:
"""Stop the aiohttp server and release every owned resource, including the ResponseStore
connection (the reconnect loop builds a fresh adapter per retry; leaked fds hit EMFILE).
Without this, every adapter instance leaks 2 file descriptors (the database file and its WAL
sidecar) — the reconnect loop in ``gateway.run`` constructs a fresh adapter on every retry, so 2
fds/retry × 300s backoff cap ≈ 12 fds/hour, which exhausts the default 2560 fd limit after ~12h of
failed reconnects and turns the whole gateway into a zombie (OSError: [Errno 24] Too many open
files, #37011).
"""
self._mark_disconnected()
# getattr: disconnect() tolerates bare __new__ fixtures (pinned in test_api_server_run_idempotency).
routed = getattr(self, "_response_stores", {})
stores = [s for s in (getattr(self, "_response_store", None), *list(routed.values())) if s is not None]
routed.clear()
for store in stores:
try:
store.close()
except Exception:
logger.debug("Failed to close response store for %s", self.name, exc_info=True)
_api_runs._close_run_state(self)
with suppress(Exception):
await asyncio.to_thread(self._memory_sessions.close_all)
try:
if self._site:
await self._site.stop()
self._site = None
if self._runner:
await self._runner.cleanup()
self._runner = None
finally:
self._close_cached_session_dbs()
self._app = None
logger.info("[%s] API server stopped", self.name)
async def send(
self, chat_id: str, content: str, reply_to: Optional[str] = None,
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> SendResult:
"""Not used — the HTTP request/response cycle handles delivery directly."""
return SendResult(success=False, error="API server uses HTTP request/response, not send()")
async def get_chat_info(self, chat_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Return basic info about the API server."""
return {"name": "API Server", "type": "api", "host": self._host, "port": self._port}