Files
hermes-agent/tools/env_passthrough.py
beardthelion b534f4b8c8 fix(security): match credential env names case-insensitively
The provider-credential blocklist and every adjacent env-name check ran
case-sensitive membership tests while the Windows environment block
resolves names case-insensitively. A skill or terminal.env_passthrough
entry registering openai_api_key was accepted, then resolved to the real
OPENAI_API_KEY by os.getenv() and forwarded into SSH/Docker exec envs,
the same GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf tunnel the blocklist closes. The same gap
let variant-cased credentials survive the source-side strip
(_filter_secret_env, _scrub_credentials), evade the docker_forward_env
and docker_extra_args egress collision guards, and ride
strip_launch_profile_env residue into a routed sibling profile's child.

Add _is_provider_env_blocklisted (exact + folded membership) and apply
it at every layer: registration refusal, both scrub paths (Tier-1 and
plugin strip sets fold too; inherit_credentials still inherits), the
remote exec-env builder, and the docker egress collision checks. Fold
_matches_terminal_first_party_prefix symmetrically so a lowercase-stored
buzz_private_key keeps its terminal carve-out, and fold the launch-
residue pop (selection folds too so a lowercase path in .env stays
global). _HERMES_FORCE_* opt-in transport and docker_env literal
container names stay case-sensitive on purpose.
2026-09-20 12:53:47 -07:00

173 lines
8.0 KiB
Python

"""Environment variable passthrough registry: the session-scoped allowlist of vars a
skill's ``required_environment_variables`` (registered by ``skill_view``) or
``terminal.env_passthrough`` in config.yaml may forward into sandboxed children
(execute_code, terminal), which strip secrets by default. Under profile multiplexing,
forwarded values resolve through the profile's secret scope, not the process env."""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from contextvars import ContextVar
from typing import Iterable
from hermes_cli.config import cfg_get, read_raw_config
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Session-scoped allowlist; ContextVar-backed to prevent cross-session bleed
# in the gateway pipeline.
_allowed_env_vars_var: ContextVar[set[str]] = ContextVar("_allowed_env_vars")
def _get_allowed() -> set[str]:
"""Get or create the allowed env vars set for the current context/session."""
try:
return _allowed_env_vars_var.get()
except LookupError:
val: set[str] = set()
_allowed_env_vars_var.set(val)
return val
# Config-based allowlist, keyed by Hermes home: under gateway.multiplex_profiles one process serves
# many profiles, and a single slot would let the first profile's operator allowlist decide which env
# vars tunnel into every other profile's sandbox children.
_config_passthrough: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {}
def _is_hermes_provider_credential(name: str) -> bool:
"""True if ``name`` is a Hermes-managed provider credential per
``_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST`` or a dynamic Hermes-internal secret
(AUXILIARY_*_API_KEY / _BASE_URL, GATEWAY_RELAY_*). Skill-declared
``required_environment_variables`` must not override this — that was the
GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf bypass (a skill registered ``OPENAI_API_KEY`` and received it
in the ``execute_code`` child); non-Hermes keys (TENOR_API_KEY, …) stay
registerable. Fails closed when the blocklist cannot be imported."""
try:
from tools.environments.local_env_policy import (
_is_hermes_internal_secret, _is_provider_env_blocklisted)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(
"env passthrough: provider credential blocklist import failed; "
"failing closed and refusing passthrough registration for %r: %s", name, e)
return True
# Case-folded membership too: the remote-exec env builder resolves each
# registered name via os.getenv(), which is case-insensitive on Windows, so
# ``openai_api_key`` would tunnel the real OPENAI_API_KEY into children.
return _is_hermes_internal_secret(name) or _is_provider_env_blocklisted(name)
def register_env_passthrough(var_names: Iterable[str]) -> None:
"""Register env var names as allowed in sandboxed environments (typically a
skill's ``required_environment_variables``). Hermes-managed provider credentials
are rejected (GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf) — such skills should use the main-process tools
(web_search, web_extract, …); third-party keys pass normally."""
for name in _accepted((n.strip() for n in var_names), (
"env passthrough: refusing to register Hermes provider "
"credential %r (blocked by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST). "
"Skills must not override the execute_code sandbox's "
"credential scrubbing; see GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf."
)):
_get_allowed().add(name)
logger.debug("env passthrough: registered %s", name)
def _accepted(names, refusal_msg: str):
"""Yield non-empty *names* that are not Hermes provider credentials; refused
names are logged with *refusal_msg* (``%r`` = name)."""
for name in names:
if not name:
continue
if _is_hermes_provider_credential(name):
logger.warning(refusal_msg, name)
continue
yield name
def _load_config_passthrough() -> frozenset[str]:
"""Load ``tools.env_passthrough`` from config.yaml (cached). Same credential
filter as register_env_passthrough: operator config must not tunnel provider
credentials into sandbox children either (GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf)."""
from hermes_constants import hermes_home_key
try:
home_key = hermes_home_key()
except (RuntimeError, OSError):
# No resolvable home (stripped environ in a sandbox child): nothing to scope by.
home_key = ""
cached = _config_passthrough.get(home_key)
if cached is not None:
return cached
result: set[str] = set()
try:
passthrough = cfg_get(read_raw_config(), "terminal", "env_passthrough")
items = passthrough if isinstance(passthrough, list) else ()
result.update(_accepted((i.strip() for i in items if isinstance(i, str)), (
"env passthrough: refusing to register Hermes "
"provider credential %r from config.yaml (blocked "
"by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST). Operator "
"configuration must not override the execute_code "
"sandbox's credential scrubbing; see "
"GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf."
)))
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Could not read tools.env_passthrough from config: %s", e)
_config_passthrough[home_key] = frozenset(result)
return _config_passthrough[home_key]
def is_env_passthrough(var_name: str) -> bool:
"""True if *var_name* was registered by a skill or listed in config."""
return var_name in _get_allowed() or var_name in _load_config_passthrough()
def get_all_passthrough() -> frozenset[str]:
"""Return the union of skill-registered and config-based passthrough vars."""
return frozenset(_get_allowed()) | _load_config_passthrough()
def resolve_passthrough_value(name: str, fallback: str | None = None) -> str | None:
"""Resolve an allowlisted variable without crossing profile boundaries. ``fallback``
is what the caller would have forwarded before secret scopes existed (a snapshot of
``os.environ`` / the profile ``.env``). An active multiplex scope is authoritative:
a missing key returns ``None``, never the process-global env, and an unscoped read
raises the fail-closed ``UnscopedSecretError``. Outside multiplexing an installed
scope keeps overlay semantics and an unscoped caller keeps its fallback."""
from agent.secret_scope import (
_is_global_env, current_secret_scope, get_secret, is_multiplex_active)
# Global terminal/runtime settings are not profile secrets; ``fallback`` is
# already the caller's effective value (incl. an explicit per-call override).
if _is_global_env(name) and fallback is not None:
return fallback
multiplex_active = is_multiplex_active()
if current_secret_scope() is None:
return get_secret(name) if multiplex_active else fallback
return get_secret(name, None if multiplex_active else fallback)
def scoped_passthrough_additions(present: Iterable[str]) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Declared passthrough names the bound profile secret scope supplies but the env being
filtered (*present*) lacks. A routed profile's ``.env`` and hydrated sources never enter
``os.environ`` (``load_hermes_dotenv`` skips the process-global load for a routed home), so a
name-by-name filter over the process env can only forward a declared name the LAUNCH profile
also happens to define — the served profile's own value has no way in (#114209). Reads the
bound scope alone: never ``os.environ``, never another profile. Empty without a scope, so
single-profile spawns are byte-identical."""
from agent.secret_scope import _is_global_env, current_secret_scope
scope = current_secret_scope()
if not scope:
return {}
present = set(present)
additions: dict[str, str] = {}
for name in get_all_passthrough():
if name in present or _is_global_env(name):
continue
value = scope.get(name)
if value is not None:
additions[name] = value
return additions
def clear_env_passthrough() -> None:
"""Reset the skill-scoped allowlist (e.g. on session reset)."""
_get_allowed().clear()