"""Context demotions for plugin install-scan findings (``tools.plugin_guard``).

The threat regexes in ``tools.skills_guard`` are written for a SKILL.md the agent will execute
verbatim. A plugin repository is a codebase: the same text sits in READMEs, test fixtures, JSON
scenery, denylists and regex literals, where it cannot run on the host at install time. Each
helper here recognises one such *class* of inert context and lowers the finding one step or to
informational. Nothing is deleted — every finding stays in the report with file and line — and
nothing here applies to a bundled skill's own ``SKILL.md`` / ``skills/`` tree, which the agent
does read as instructions. Every function is a pure predicate on (finding, line, path).
"""
from __future__ import annotations

import base64
import binascii
import re
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Optional

from tools.skills_guard import _COMPILED_THREAT_PATTERNS, Finding

# pattern id -> compiled regex, to locate a finding's token on its full source line.
_PATTERN_BY_ID = {pid: rx for rx, pid, *_ in _COMPILED_THREAT_PATTERNS}

# One severity step down; ``medium``/``low`` are already informational (verdict-neutral).
STEP_DOWN = {"critical": "high", "high": "medium"}

# ── (1) documentation prose ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# A README/AGENTS.md/docs page describing a command, a refused path (``~/.ssh`` in a denylist
# table) or an uninstall step is not the plugin's runtime behaviour. Command- and path-shaped
# findings there step down once (critical→high, high→medium): a doc line can never on its own
# hard-block an install. Agent-facing shapes keep full severity because the prose IS the
# payload for them: every ``injection`` pattern, the Markdown exfil/context patterns, the
# agent-config edits, ``curl | sh`` install one-liners (a README is where those live), an
# ``authorized_keys`` append, and a leaked provider key (a real secret is a real leak anywhere).
DOC_PROSE_EXTENSIONS = {".md", ".txt", ".rst", ".html"}
_PROSE_KEEPS_FULL_SEVERITY_CATEGORIES = {"injection", "credential_exposure"}
_PROSE_KEEPS_FULL_SEVERITY_IDS = {
    "context_exfil", "send_to_url", "md_image_exfil", "md_link_exfil", "ssh_backdoor",
    "curl_pipe_shell", "wget_pipe_shell", "curl_pipe_python",
    "agent_config_mod", "agent_config_mod_shell", "agent_config_contract", "agent_config_ref",
    "hermes_config_mod", "hermes_config_mod_shell", "hermes_config_ref",
    "other_agent_config_mod", "other_agent_config_mod_shell", "other_agent_config_ref",
}
# Agent instruction surfaces inside a plugin — a bundled skill tree and the post-install note
# the agent is shown — are executed as instructions, so they get no prose cap.
_AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS = {"skills", "optional-skills"}
_AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES = {"skill.md", "after-install.md"}


def is_doc_prose(rel_path: str) -> bool:
    """A documentation file that the loader never executes and the agent never runs as a skill."""
    p = Path(rel_path)
    if p.suffix.lower() not in DOC_PROSE_EXTENSIONS or p.name.lower() in _AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES:
        return False
    return not any(part.lower() in _AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS for part in p.parts[:-1])


# A repository's CI pipeline (``.github/workflows/*.yml``) runs on the forge's runner, never on the
# host that installs the plugin, and the agent never reads it as instructions. Its ``os.environ``
# reads (``RUNNER_TEMP``, ``GITHUB_ENV``) and ``pip install`` steps are the CI's own plumbing, so
# it takes the same one-step prose cap as a README: visible, confirmable, never a hard block on
# its own. Only the workflow directory proper — a ``.github/scripts/*.py`` is real code.
_CI_WORKFLOW_SUFFIXES = {".yml", ".yaml"}


def is_ci_workflow(rel_path: str) -> bool:
    """A forge CI workflow definition (``.github/workflows/<name>.yml``)."""
    p = Path(rel_path)
    return (len(p.parts) == 3 and p.parts[0].lower() == ".github" and p.parts[1].lower() == "workflows"
            and p.suffix.lower() in _CI_WORKFLOW_SUFFIXES)


def is_agent_facing(finding: Finding) -> bool:
    """A shape whose prose IS the payload (injection, agent-config edit, install one-liner, leaked key)."""
    return (finding.category in _PROSE_KEEPS_FULL_SEVERITY_CATEGORIES
            or finding.pattern_id in _PROSE_KEEPS_FULL_SEVERITY_IDS)


def prose_cap(finding: Finding) -> Optional[str]:
    """Stepped-down severity for a command/path-shaped finding in documentation, else None."""
    return None if is_agent_facing(finding) else STEP_DOWN.get(finding.severity)


# ── (1b) language-pack catalogs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# ``locales/<lang>[.tui|.desktop].yaml`` in a ``provides_locales`` plugin is user-facing UI text
# the loader reads as string leaves and shows to a human; nothing in it is executed or edits a
# file, so the agent-config/hermes-config family steps down like any other prose (the bundled
# ``en.yaml`` itself matches ``updating: "... AGENTS.md"``). Injection shapes and leaked keys
# keep full severity: a pack can still carry model-directed text.
_CATALOG_STEPS_DOWN_IDS = {
    "agent_config_mod", "agent_config_mod_shell", "agent_config_contract", "agent_config_ref",
    "hermes_config_mod", "hermes_config_mod_shell", "hermes_config_ref",
    "other_agent_config_mod", "other_agent_config_mod_shell", "other_agent_config_ref",
}
_LOCALE_CATALOG_SUFFIXES = {".yaml", ".yml"}


def is_locale_catalog(rel_path: str) -> bool:
    """A ``locales/<name>.yaml`` catalog at the plugin root."""
    p = Path(rel_path)
    return len(p.parts) == 2 and p.parts[0].lower() == "locales" and p.suffix.lower() in _LOCALE_CATALOG_SUFFIXES


def catalog_cap(finding: Finding) -> Optional[str]:
    """Stepped-down severity for a finding inside a locale catalog, else None."""
    if finding.pattern_id in _CATALOG_STEPS_DOWN_IDS:
        return STEP_DOWN.get(finding.severity)
    return prose_cap(finding)


# A README "Uninstall" section removing the plugin's OWN install directory
# (``rm -rf "$HOME/.hermes/plugins/<name>"``, ``rm -rf ~/.hermes/plugins/<name>`` before a reinstall
# ``cp``) is the one destructive shape that is harmless by construction: one ``rm``, one argument
# rooted at ``$HOME``/``${HOME}``/``~`` + ``/.hermes/plugins/`` or ``skills/``
# with a plain leaf — no glob, no ``..``, nothing chained. It lands at medium (a note). Any
# wider target (``$HOME``, ``$HOME/.hermes``, ``$HOME/.hermes/plugins/*``) only gets the
# generic prose step (high, caution) and the same line in a ``.sh`` stays critical (#115353).
_SELF_UNINSTALL_RM = re.compile(
    r'^(?:\$\s*)?rm\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]+\s+)*'
    r'(?P<q>["\']?)(?:\$HOME|\$\{HOME\}|~)/\.hermes/(?:plugins|skills)/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*/?(?P=q)'
    r'\s*(?:#.*)?$'
)


def is_self_uninstall_doc(finding: Finding, line: str) -> bool:
    return finding.pattern_id == "destructive_home_rm" and _SELF_UNINSTALL_RM.match(line.strip()) is not None


# ── (2) test trees and fixtures ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Test code and fixtures deliberately hold hostile strings (``rm -rf /`` in a DENY table,
# ``/etc/passwd`` in a traversal probe, a fake ``sk-`` key in a redaction corpus) to prove the
# plugin rejects them. They are still scanned — ``from .tests import evil`` would run — but a
# finding there steps down once, so a fixture cannot hard-block and a string-only fixture is
# a note. A root-level test dir (``tests/``, ``fixtures/``) or the unambiguous dunder names at any
# depth (``src/__tests__/``), plus test-file naming (``foo.test.js``, ``test_foo.py``, and the
# plural ``tests_state.py`` / ``state_tests.py`` a single-module plugin uses when it has no
# ``tests/`` dir); a nested ``src/spec/handler.py`` is runtime code and gets no cap.
TEST_TREE_DIRS = {"tests", "test", "testing", "spec", "specs", "fixtures"}
_TEST_DIRS_ANY_DEPTH = {"__tests__", "__fixtures__", "__mocks__"}
_TEST_FILE_NAME = re.compile(r"^(?:tests?_[^/]*|[^/]*_tests?\.[^./]+|[^/]*\.(?:test|spec)\.[^./]+)$", re.IGNORECASE)


# In a test file, a hostile string that is only DATA — quoted, with no exec verb on the line
# (``verdict_for("rm -rf /")``, ``("/etc/passwd", "DENY")``) — is a note; a fixture file that is
# not code at all (``corpus.json``) likewise. ``os.system('rm -rf /')`` or ``open('/etc/passwd')``
# in a test still steps down only once: the line executes when imported.
_EXEC_ON_LINE = re.compile(
    r"\b(?:system|popen|run|call|check_output|check_call|Popen|exec|execv\w*|spawn\w*|eval|execSync|execFile\w*"
    r"|spawnSync|child_process|source|os\.startfile|open)\s*\(|\$\(|(?<![\w\\])`", re.IGNORECASE)


# In Python/JS/TS a quote never runs a command, so ``$(whoami)`` or a backtick INSIDE a string
# literal (``'; rm -rf / ; $(whoami) `id`'`` in a hostile-input table) is data, not an exec marker;
# the call that would run it (``os.system(``, ``exec(``) sits outside the literal and still counts.
# Shell-like files keep the raw line: there ``"$(id)"`` executes inside double quotes.
_QUOTES_NEVER_EXECUTE_SUFFIXES = {".py", ".pyi", ".js", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".jsx", ".ts", ".mts", ".cts", ".tsx"}


def _executes(line: str, rel_path: str) -> bool:
    if Path(rel_path).suffix.lower() in _QUOTES_NEVER_EXECUTE_SUFFIXES:
        line = _LITERAL_SPANS.sub(lambda m: m.group(0)[0] + " " * (len(m.group(0)) - 2) + m.group(0)[-1], line)
    return _EXEC_ON_LINE.search(line) is not None


def is_inert_fixture_line(finding: Finding, line: str, is_code: bool, rel_path: str = "") -> bool:
    """The finding's text is quoted test data on a line that does not execute anything."""
    if not is_code:
        return True
    if _executes(line, rel_path):
        return False
    rx = _PATTERN_BY_ID.get(finding.pattern_id)
    hits = list(rx.finditer(line)) if rx else []
    spans = [m.span() for m in _LITERAL_SPANS.finditer(line)]
    return bool(hits) and all(any(a <= h.start() and h.end() <= b for a, b in spans) for h in hits)


def is_test_tree(rel_path: str) -> bool:
    p = Path(rel_path)
    return (
        (len(p.parts) > 1 and p.parts[0].lower() in TEST_TREE_DIRS)
        or any(part.lower() in _TEST_DIRS_ANY_DEPTH for part in p.parts[:-1])
        or _TEST_FILE_NAME.match(p.name) is not None
    )


# ── (3) base64 media data ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# ``encoded_exfil`` (``base64 … env``) fires on a data URI whose payload happens to contain the
# letters "env" (PNG scenery, embedded fonts). Decode the head of the blob and sniff it: a
# known image/font/audio/document magic number means the bytes are an asset, not an encoder
# call, and the finding drops to informational (kept in the report).
_BASE64_RUN = re.compile(r"(?:base64,)?([A-Za-z0-9+/]{24,}={0,2})")
_MEDIA_MAGIC = (
    b"\x89PNG", b"\xff\xd8\xff", b"GIF8", b"RIFF", b"wOFF", b"wOF2", b"OTTO", b"\x00\x01\x00\x00",
    b"ttcf", b"BM", b"%PDF", b"\x00\x00\x01\x00", b"<svg", b"<?xml", b"ID3", b"OggS", b"fLaC", b"\x1a\x45\xdf\xa3",
)


def _decoded_head(blob: str) -> bytes:
    head = blob[:16]
    head = head[: len(head) - len(head) % 4]
    try:
        return base64.b64decode(head, validate=True)
    except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
        return b""


def is_base64_media(line: str) -> bool:
    """The line's first long base64 run decodes to a recognised media/document header."""
    for m in _BASE64_RUN.finditer(line):
        if _decoded_head(m.group(1)).startswith(_MEDIA_MAGIC):
            return True
    return False


# ── (5)/(6) alternation tokens inside string or regex literals in code ──────────────────────
# ``sudo`` in ``/clarify|approval|sudo|secret/.test(value)`` classifies an event name; ``env|``
# in ``re.compile(r"(?:api[_-]?key|…|env|headers)")`` is a redaction regex; ``"printenv",`` in
# ``_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS = frozenset({"pwd", "ls", …, "printenv"})`` is a denylist/allowlist entry;
# ``mkfs`` in ``re.compile(r"\b(?:rm|rmdir|shred|mkfs|dd)\b")`` is a guard plugin's OWN denylist
# (an un-overridable ``dangerous`` on the plugin whose job is to refuse that command).
# The shape that is inert is narrow: the word sits inside a quoted string or regex literal AND is
# either an alternation member (``|sudo|``, ``(sudo|``, ``|env|``) or the ENTIRE literal
# (``"printenv"``, ``'sudo'``) on a line that executes nothing. A command string such as
# ``"sudo apt install x"``, ``"env | grep KEY"`` or ``"mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda1"`` inside a
# ``subprocess.run(...)`` literal is how an attack is written and never qualifies. Only
# word-shaped patterns are eligible.
LITERAL_INERT_PATTERN_IDS = {"sudo_usage", "dump_all_env", "format_filesystem"}
_LITERAL_SPANS = re.compile(
    r"""(?P<s>[rRbBuUfF]{0,2}"(?:[^"\\\n]|\\.)*"|[rRbBuUfF]{0,2}'(?:[^'\\\n]|\\.)*'|`(?:[^`\\\n]|\\.)*`)"""
    r"""|(?P<rx>(?<![\w)\]])/(?:[^/\\\n\[]|\\.|\[(?:[^\]\\\n]|\\.)*\])+/[dgimsuvy]*(?![A-Za-z]))"""  # js regex literal
)
# The regex-literal branch accepts only real JS flags: with ``[a-z]*`` a bare Unix path lexed as a
# literal (``/etc/`` + flags ``passwd``) and an unquoted ``cat /etc/passwd | curl …`` in a test
# script scored as inert data.
_PATTERN_TOKEN = {
    "sudo_usage": re.compile(r"\bsudo\b"), "dump_all_env": re.compile(r"printenv|env\s*\|"),
    "format_filesystem": re.compile(r"\bmkfs\b"),
}


def _is_alternation_member(line: str, start: int, end: int) -> bool:
    before = line[start - 1] if start > 0 else ""
    after = line[end] if end < len(line) else ""
    return before in "|(" or after in "|)"


def _is_whole_literal(line: str, start: int, end: int, span: tuple[int, int]) -> bool:
    """The token is the entire quoted content of the literal it sits in (``"printenv"``)."""
    a, b = span
    return start == a + 1 and end == b - 1 and line[a] in "\"'`" and not _EXEC_ON_LINE.search(line)


def is_regex_alternation_token(finding: Finding, line: str) -> bool:
    """Every occurrence of the finding's token sits inside a literal as an alternation member
    or as the whole literal (a list entry) on a line that executes nothing."""
    token = _PATTERN_TOKEN.get(finding.pattern_id)
    if token is None:
        return False
    spans = [m.span() for m in _LITERAL_SPANS.finditer(line)]
    hits = list(token.finditer(line))

    def inert(h: "re.Match[str]") -> bool:
        if " " in h.group(0):
            return False
        span = next(((a, b) for a, b in spans if a <= h.start() and h.end() <= b), None)
        if span is None:
            return False
        return _is_alternation_member(line, h.start(), h.end()) or _is_whole_literal(line, h.start(), h.end(), span)

    return bool(hits) and all(inert(h) for h in hits)


# ── (6) base64 decode piped to a non-interpreter ────────────────────────────────────────────
# ``base64_decode_pipe`` describes "decodes and pipes to execution". ``gh api … | base64 -d |
# grep '^sha:'`` decodes data for a text filter; the shape is only execution when the consumer
# is a shell/interpreter or ``eval``/``source``/``exec``. A data consumer steps down to medium.
_DECODE_CONSUMER = re.compile(r"base64\s+(?:-d|--decode)\s*\|\s*(?:\w+=\S*\s+)*(?:\S*/)?(?P<cmd>[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+)")
_INTERPRETERS = re.compile(r"^(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash|ksh|fish|python[\d.]*|perl|ruby|node|nodejs|php|eval|source|exec|xargs|env|sudo)$")


def is_data_decode(line: str) -> bool:
    """``base64 -d`` whose pipe target is a non-interpreter command (grep, jq, tee, tar …)."""
    m = _DECODE_CONSUMER.search(line)
    return m is not None and _INTERPRETERS.match(m.group("cmd")) is None


# ── (7) loopback address with port ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# ``hardcoded_ip_port`` is the "network" family's egress tripwire, yet ``127.0.0.1:12306`` in a
# README, an ``.mcp.json`` or a client default is a LOCAL service the plugin talks to on the same
# machine — nothing leaves the host. When every IP:port on the line is loopback the finding is
# informational; a routable address anywhere on the line keeps the pattern's severity.
_LOOPBACK_IP_PORT = re.compile(r"\b127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}:\d{2,5}")


def is_loopback_only(finding: Finding, line: str) -> bool:
    """Every ``hardcoded_ip_port`` hit on the line is a 127.0.0.0/8 address."""
    if finding.pattern_id != "hardcoded_ip_port":
        return False
    rx = _PATTERN_BY_ID.get(finding.pattern_id)
    hits = list(rx.finditer(line)) if rx else []
    return bool(hits) and all(_LOOPBACK_IP_PORT.match(line, h.start()) for h in hits)


# ── (8) ``pip install`` as words inside a message string ─────────────────────────────────────
# ``unpinned_pip_install`` describes a dependency the plugin pulls at runtime. In code, the same
# two words inside a quoted literal at a NON-command position — ``"... no pip install is
# needed"``, ``f"(no pip install is suggested)"`` — are prose the plugin shows a user. A literal
# that starts with the command (``"pip install requests"``), or names it after ``python -m`` /
# ``uv`` / ``pipx`` / ``sudo`` / a shell separator, is a command string and never qualifies, nor
# does any line that executes something (``subprocess.run("pip install x", shell=True)``).
_PIP_INSTALL_TOKEN = re.compile(r"pip\s+install\b", re.IGNORECASE)
_PIP_COMMAND_POSITION = re.compile(r"(?:^|[;&|`(]|\b(?:uv|pipx|sudo|python[\d.]*\s+-m))\s*$", re.IGNORECASE)


def is_pip_install_in_prose_literal(finding: Finding, line: str) -> bool:
    """Every ``pip install`` on a code line sits mid-sentence inside a string literal, and the
    line executes nothing."""
    if finding.pattern_id != "unpinned_pip_install" or _EXEC_ON_LINE.search(line):
        return False
    spans = [m.span() for m in _LITERAL_SPANS.finditer(line)]
    hits = list(_PIP_INSTALL_TOKEN.finditer(line))

    def prose(h: "re.Match[str]") -> bool:
        span = next(((a, b) for a, b in spans if a <= h.start() and h.end() <= b), None)
        if span is None:
            return False
        content_start = next((i for i in range(span[0], span[1]) if line[i] in "\"'`/"), span[0]) + 1
        return _PIP_COMMAND_POSITION.search(line[content_start:h.start()]) is None

    return bool(hits) and all(prose(h) for h in hits)


# ── (9) ``\xHH`` escapes inside a regex character class ──────────────────────────────────────
# ``hex_encoded_string`` (three ``\xHH`` escapes on one line) describes an obfuscated payload —
# ``eval("\x63\x75\x72\x6c")``. A control-character or ANSI-escape *filter* is written with the
# same escapes as RANGES inside a bracket class: ``/[\x00-\x1F\x7F]/``, ``[\x1b\x9b][[\]()#;?]*``.
# Bytes named inside ``[...]`` are matched, never assembled into a string, so when every escape
# on the line sits inside a character class the finding is informational. One ``\xHH`` outside a
# class (a payload beside a filter) keeps the pattern's severity, and so does a bracket span that
# holds a quote — ``[b"\x01\x00" * 200]`` is a Python LIST of byte strings, not a class.
_HEX_ESCAPE = re.compile(r"\\x[0-9a-fA-F]{2}")
_CHAR_CLASS = re.compile(r"\[(?:[^\]\\\n\"'`]|\\.)*\]")


def is_hex_in_char_class(finding: Finding, line: str) -> bool:
    """Every ``\\xHH`` on the line is inside a ``[...]`` regex character class."""
    if finding.pattern_id != "hex_encoded_string":
        return False
    classes = [m.span() for m in _CHAR_CLASS.finditer(line)]
    hits = list(_HEX_ESCAPE.finditer(line))
    return bool(hits) and all(any(a <= h.start() and h.end() <= b for a, b in classes) for h in hits)


# ── (10) loopback ``curl``/``wget`` target on a shell continuation line ──────────────────────
# ``env_exfil_curl`` / ``env_exfil_wget`` already exempt a same-line loopback destination
# (``curl -H "Bearer $KEY" http://localhost:8080/health`` produces no finding). A README health
# check writes the same command over two lines with a trailing ``\``, so the scanner sees only
# ``curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \`` and the loopback URL never enters the regex. Re-run
# the pattern over the logical line (the finding's line plus its ``\``-continuations): when it no
# longer matches AND every ``http(s)://`` host on the logical line is loopback, the finding is
# informational. A routable host anywhere on the logical line keeps the severity.
_CONTINUATION_PATTERN_IDS = {"env_exfil_curl", "env_exfil_wget"}
_URL_HOST = re.compile(r"https?://(\[[0-9a-fA-F:]+\]|[^\s/:\"'`)\]]+)")
_LOOPBACK_HOSTS = {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]"}    # the pattern's own same-line exemption


def logical_line(lines: list[str], index: int) -> str:
    """``lines[index]`` joined with the lines a trailing backslash continues onto (max 8)."""
    out = [lines[index]]
    i = index
    while i + 1 < len(lines) and len(out) <= 8 and lines[i].rstrip().endswith("\\"):
        i += 1
        out.append(lines[i])
    return " ".join(part.rstrip().rstrip("\\") for part in out)


def is_loopback_continuation(finding: Finding, line: str, joined: str) -> bool:
    """The line continues with ``\\``, the finding's own pattern stops matching on the logical
    line, and every ``http(s)://`` host on it is loopback."""
    if finding.pattern_id not in _CONTINUATION_PATTERN_IDS or not line.rstrip().endswith("\\"):
        return False
    rx = _PATTERN_BY_ID.get(finding.pattern_id)
    hosts = [m.group(1).lower() for m in _URL_HOST.finditer(joined)]
    return rx is not None and rx.search(joined) is None and bool(hosts) and all(h in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS for h in hosts)


# ── (11) prose string values in a JSON data file ────────────────────────────────────────────
# A translation table or tips file (``tips_zh.json``: ``"en": "Bare sudo commands are
# auto-rewritten …"`` and a ``"tips": [ … ]`` list of sentences) is read with ``json.load`` and
# shown to a human. On a ``"key": "value"`` line whose key is a sentence or a plain data name, or a
# bare string list element, a token in the MIDDLE of the string is prose
# and takes the README prose cap for a ``high`` finding (one step down; agent-facing shapes keep
# full severity, and a ``critical`` stays critical — data a plugin's code may still hand to a
# shell can lose a confirm prompt here, never a block). A string
# that starts with the command (``"cleanup": "rm -rf /"``) or names it after a shell separator or
# ``sudo``/``exec`` (``"sudo",`` in an ``args`` array), keys that name something executed
# (``"command"``, ``"postinstall"``, ``"run"``, ``"args"`` …) and ``package.json`` (npm runs its
# ``scripts``) keep the severity.
_JSON_STRING_LINE = re.compile(r'^\s*(?:"(?P<k>(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"\s*:\s*)?"(?P<v>(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"\s*,?\s*$')
_JSON_COMMAND_KEY = re.compile(r"cmd|command|script|exec|run|shell|install|hook|arg|entry|bin|start|setup", re.IGNORECASE)
_JSON_EXECUTED_FILES = {"package.json"}
_COMMAND_POSITION = re.compile(r"(?:^|[;&|`(]|\$\(|\b(?:sudo|exec|eval|do|then|xargs|bash|sh|-c))\s*$", re.IGNORECASE)


def is_json_prose_value(finding: Finding, rel_path: str, line: str) -> bool:
    """Every hit sits mid-sentence inside the key or value of a ``"key": "string"`` pair (or a bare
    string list element) in a ``.json`` data file, under a key that does not name something executed."""
    p = Path(rel_path)
    if finding.severity != "high" or p.suffix.lower() != ".json" or p.name.lower() in _JSON_EXECUTED_FILES:
        return False
    m = _JSON_STRING_LINE.match(line)
    rx = _PATTERN_BY_ID.get(finding.pattern_id)
    if m is None or rx is None:
        return False
    key = m.group("k")
    if key is not None and not re.search(r"\s", key) and _JSON_COMMAND_KEY.search(key):
        return False

    def prose(h: "re.Match[str]") -> bool:
        part = next((g for g in ("k", "v") if m.start(g) <= h.start() and h.end() <= m.end(g)), None)
        return part is not None and _COMMAND_POSITION.search(line[m.start(part):h.start()]) is None

    hits = list(rx.finditer(line))
    return bool(hits) and all(prose(h) for h in hits)


# ── (12) a coin NAME without any mining machinery ───────────────────────────────────────────
# ``crypto_mining`` keys on miner software and pool protocols (``xmrig``, ``stratum+tcp``,
# ``coinhive``, ``cryptonight``) plus the bare coin name ``monero``. The name alone is a keyword
# in a connector catalog or search index (``"monero gateway"``, ``… monero multimodal …``), not a
# miner: with no miner binary, pool, algorithm or mining verb on the line it lands at medium
# (reported, verdict-neutral). Any of those beside it keeps the pattern's severity.
_MINING_MACHINERY = re.compile(
    r"xmrig|stratum|coinhive|cryptonight|randomx|cpuminer|minerd|nicehash|hashrate|donate-level"
    r"|\bmin(?:e[sd]?|ers?|ing)\b|--(?:coin|algo)\b", re.IGNORECASE)


def _is_standalone_coin_name(line: str, start: int, end: int) -> bool:
    return (line[start:end].lower() == "monero" and (start == 0 or not line[start - 1].isalnum())
            and (end == len(line) or not line[end].isalnum()))


def is_coin_name_only(finding: Finding, line: str) -> bool:
    """Every ``crypto_mining`` hit on the line is the standalone word ``monero`` and nothing on
    the line names mining software, a pool or the act of mining."""
    if finding.pattern_id != "crypto_mining" or _MINING_MACHINERY.search(line):
        return False
    rx = _PATTERN_BY_ID.get(finding.pattern_id)
    hits = list(rx.finditer(line)) if rx else []
    return bool(hits) and all(_is_standalone_coin_name(line, h.start(), h.end()) for h in hits)


# Google mints installed-app (desktop/CLI) OAuth clients with a ``GOCSPX-`` secret that its OAuth
# docs say cannot be kept confidential: every copy of the app ships it (gcloud does). A plugin is
# such an app, so the literal identifies a public client rather than leaking a credential; it stays
# in the report for review (caution) instead of hard-blocking the install.
_GOOGLE_PUBLIC_CLIENT_SECRET = re.compile(r'["\']GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}["\']')


def is_google_installed_app_secret(finding: Finding, line: str) -> bool:
    """A ``hardcoded_secret`` hit whose literal is a Google installed-app OAuth client secret."""
    return finding.pattern_id == "hardcoded_secret" and bool(_GOOGLE_PUBLIC_CLIENT_SECRET.search(line))


__all__ = [
    "STEP_DOWN", "DOC_PROSE_EXTENSIONS", "TEST_TREE_DIRS", "LITERAL_INERT_PATTERN_IDS",
    "is_doc_prose", "is_ci_workflow", "is_agent_facing", "prose_cap", "is_self_uninstall_doc", "is_test_tree",
    "is_inert_fixture_line", "is_base64_media",
    "is_regex_alternation_token", "is_data_decode", "is_loopback_only", "is_pip_install_in_prose_literal",
    "is_hex_in_char_class", "logical_line", "is_loopback_continuation", "is_json_prose_value", "is_coin_name_only",
    "is_google_installed_app_secret",
]