"""Terminal backend configuration: scope-aware TERMINAL_* reads, env-var parsing, container-cwd sanity checks, plugin-backend classification, and the ``_quiet`` best-effort block shared by the terminal_tool_* modules. Split out of ``tools/terminal_tool.py``; every public/patched name is re-imported there, so ``tools.terminal_tool.`` keeps resolving (and monkeypatching) as before. """ import logging import json import os import posixpath import re from contextlib import contextmanager from typing import Any, overload # Log-record parity with the origin module. logger = logging.getLogger("tools.terminal_tool") @contextmanager def _quiet(label: str, *args, exc=Exception, level: int = logging.DEBUG): """Best-effort block: swallow *exc*, log *label* (``%``-formatted with *args*) at *level* with the traceback. For janitor/advisory work that must never take the terminal tool down.""" try: yield except exc: logger.log(level, label, *args, exc_info=True) def _parse_env_var(name: str, default: str, converter: Any = int, type_label: str = "integer"): """Parse an env var with *converter*, raising a clear ValueError on bad values (e.g. TERMINAL_TIMEOUT=5m) instead of an opaque crash. TERMINAL_* names are read scope-aware via :func:`_tenv`.""" raw = _tenv(name, default) if name.startswith("TERMINAL_") else os.getenv(name, default) try: return converter(raw) except (ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError): raise ValueError( f"Invalid value for {name}: {raw!r} (expected {type_label}). " f"Check ~/.hermes/.env or environment variables." ) def _safe_getcwd() -> str: """``os.getcwd()`` tolerant of a deleted cwd (FileNotFoundError) or a macOS TCC-protected one without Full Disk Access (PermissionError); falls back to TERMINAL_CWD, then the home directory.""" try: return os.getcwd() except (FileNotFoundError, PermissionError): return _tenv("TERMINAL_CWD") or os.path.expanduser("~") # Host-cwd shapes that cannot exist inside a container sandbox: POSIX user dirs and ANY Windows # drive path (``D:\\...``, ``e:/...``) as they leak toward a Linux ``-w`` flag. _HOST_CWD_PREFIXES = ("/Users/", "/home/") _WINDOWS_DRIVE_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z]:[\\/]") def _is_host_cwd(path: str) -> bool: return path.startswith(_HOST_CWD_PREFIXES) or bool(_WINDOWS_DRIVE_RE.match(path)) def _is_windows_drive_path(path: str) -> bool: """True for any ``D:\\...`` / ``e:/...`` path. Not a username check.""" return bool(path) and bool(_WINDOWS_DRIVE_RE.match(path)) def _host_path_key(path: str) -> str: """Compare host paths without caring about slash style or drive-letter case. A trailing slash is not significant, except we never collapse a drive root (``C:/``) into a bare ``C:`` that would prefix-match every path on that drive. """ text = (path or "").replace("\\", "/") if len(text) >= 2 and text[1] == ":": text = text[0].lower() + text[1:] if len(text) > 3: text = text.rstrip("/") return text def translate_mounted_host_path(path: str, host_root: str, container_root: str) -> str | None: """Map *path* onto *container_root* when it is *host_root* or a child of it. Returns None when *path* is not under that host directory. Slash style and drive-letter case do not matter; a sibling directory (``proj`` vs ``proj-other``) is not a child. """ if not isinstance(path, str) or not isinstance(host_root, str) or not isinstance(container_root, str): return None if not path or not host_root or not container_root: return None key = _host_path_key(path) root = _host_path_key(host_root) if not key or not root: return None mount = container_root.rstrip("/") or "/" if key == root: return mount prefix = root if root.endswith("/") else root + "/" if not key.startswith(prefix): return None return f"{mount}/{key[len(prefix):]}" def cwd_follows_host_mount(cwd: str, mount: str) -> bool: """True when *cwd* was the host workspace (or the assumed ``/workspace`` view of it). An explicit in-container path other than that assumption is left alone. """ if not mount or not cwd or cwd == mount: return False if _is_unusable_container_cwd(cwd): return True return cwd == "/workspace" and mount != "/workspace" _CONTAINER_BACKENDS = frozenset({"docker", "singularity", "modal", "daytona", "vercel_sandbox"}) _BUILTIN_BACKENDS = _CONTAINER_BACKENDS | {"local", "ssh", "managed_modal"} def _plugin_registry_lookup(env_type: str, fn_name: str, default, *args): """Call ``agent.terminal_env_registry.(env_type, *args)`` for a plugin backend. Fail-soft: *default* for built-in/empty backends, when the registry is unavailable, or when the provider raises — a misbehaving plugin must never take the terminal tool down.""" if not env_type or env_type in _BUILTIN_BACKENDS: return default try: import agent.terminal_env_registry as reg return getattr(reg, fn_name)(env_type, *args) except Exception: return default def _plugin_env_flag(env_type: str, attr: str, default=False): """Classification flag of a plugin-registered backend (fail-soft, see above).""" return _plugin_registry_lookup(env_type, "provider_flag", default, attr, default) def _is_container_backend(env_type: str) -> bool: """True for built-in container backends and plugins declaring ``is_container``.""" return env_type in _CONTAINER_BACKENDS or _plugin_env_flag(env_type, "is_container") def _get_plugin_env_provider(env_type: str): """Return the registered plugin provider for *env_type*, or None.""" return _plugin_registry_lookup(env_type, "get_provider", None) @overload def coerce_ssh_remote_cwd(cwd: str, env_type: str | None) -> str: ... @overload def coerce_ssh_remote_cwd(cwd: None, env_type: str | None) -> None: ... def coerce_ssh_remote_cwd(cwd: str | None, env_type: str | None) -> str | None: """Cwd to send to an SSH backend. ``~``-prefixed paths stay literal so the remote shell expands them to the SSH user's home. The Hermes process's subprocess home (``/opt/data/home`` in the official Docker image) is a directory on the machine running Hermes: it and anything under it are rewritten onto the remote ``~``, since ``cd`` into the host path exits 126 on the target. A subprocess home that is the OS user's real home is left alone: a remote path may legitimately match it. Other backends are unchanged. """ if not isinstance(cwd, str) or (env_type or "").strip().lower() != "ssh": return cwd text = cwd.strip() if not text or text.startswith("~"): return text or "~" from hermes_constants import get_real_home, get_subprocess_home home = get_subprocess_home() if not home or not posixpath.isabs(text) or posixpath.normpath(home) == posixpath.normpath(get_real_home()): return text rel = posixpath.relpath(posixpath.normpath(text), posixpath.normpath(home)) if rel == ".": return "~" return text if rel == ".." or rel.startswith("../") else f"~/{rel}" def _is_mounted_host_cwd(cwd: str, mounted_host: str | None) -> bool: """True when *cwd* is the host directory mounted at ``/workspace``. Checked before the ``/Users`` / ``/home`` / drive-letter heuristic: a WSL checkout under ``/mnt/...`` or an absolute path under ``/srv/...`` is ``os.path.isabs`` and would otherwise look like a valid container workdir. """ if not cwd or not isinstance(mounted_host, str) or not mounted_host: return False try: left = os.path.normpath(os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(cwd))) right = os.path.normpath(os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(mounted_host))) except (OSError, ValueError): return False return left == right def _is_unusable_container_cwd(cwd: str, *, mounted_host: str | None = None) -> bool: """True if *cwd* is a host or relative path that can't be a container workdir: ``docker run -w`` needs an absolute in-sandbox path, otherwise the container fails to start (exit 125). Windows drive paths aren't ``isabs`` on POSIX, so they're caught by the prefix check. The directory mounted at ``/workspace`` is unusable inside the container even when it matches none of those prefixes. That equality check runs first so ``/mnt/...`` and ``/srv/...`` are not wrapped as ``cd`` targets. """ if not cwd: return False if _is_mounted_host_cwd(cwd, mounted_host): return True return _is_host_cwd(cwd) or not os.path.isabs(cwd) def _tenv(name: str, default: str = "") -> str: """Scope-aware read of a ``TERMINAL_*`` variable. Every terminal setting must go through this: under gateway multiplexing the active profile's config arrives via a per-turn scope, and a raw ``os.getenv`` would read whatever a previous turn pinned into the process env (cross-profile leak).""" from tools.terminal_scope import terminal_env return terminal_env(name, default) def _tenv_bool(name: str, default: str) -> bool: """Scope-aware boolean ``TERMINAL_*`` read: true/1/yes (case-insensitive).""" return _tenv(name, default).lower() in {"true", "1", "yes"}