"""Credential-pool disk-boundary sanitization: strip raw secrets from *borrowed* pool entries before they reach ``auth.json``. Deliberately free of ``hermes_cli.auth`` imports so the pool model and the auth-store write boundary share one policy without import cycles.""" from __future__ import annotations import hashlib import re from typing import Any, Dict, Mapping # Sources Hermes owns and may persist with secrets. Any other non-empty, # non-manual source is borrowed/reference-only so new external providers fail # closed at the disk boundary. _PERSISTABLE_PROVIDER_SOURCES = frozenset({ ("anthropic", "hermes_pkce"), ("minimax-oauth", "oauth"), ("nous", "device_code"), ("openai-codex", "device_code"), ("xai-oauth", "device_code"), }) # Metadata keys that look secret-ish by suffix but are safe to persist. _SAFE_SECRETISH_METADATA_KEYS = frozenset({ "secret_fingerprint", "secret_source", "token_type", "scope", "client_id", "agent_key_id", "agent_key_expires_at", "agent_key_expires_in", "agent_key_reused", "agent_key_obtained_at", "expires_at", "expires_at_ms", "expires_in", "last_refresh", "last_status", "last_status_at", "last_error_code", "last_error_reason", "last_error_message", "last_error_reset_at", }) _SECRET_VALUE_KEYS = frozenset({ "access_token", "refresh_token", "agent_key", "api_key", "apikey", "api_token", "auth_token", "authorization", "bearer_token", "client_secret", "credential", "credentials", "id_token", "oauth_token", "private_key", "secret_key", "session_token", "password", "secret", "token", "tokens", }) _SECRET_VALUE_SUFFIXES = ( "_api_key", "_api_token", "_access_token", "_auth_token", "_refresh_token", "_bearer_token", "_client_secret", "_id_token", "_oauth_token", "_private_key", "_session_token", "_secret_key", "_password", "_secret", "_token", "_key", ) _CAMEL_CASE_BOUNDARY = re.compile(r"(?<=[a-z0-9])(?=[A-Z])") def _normalize_key(key: Any) -> str: raw = _CAMEL_CASE_BOUNDARY.sub("_", str(key or "").strip()) return raw.lower().replace("-", "_").replace(".", "_") def is_borrowed_credential_source(source: Any, provider_id: Any = None) -> bool: """Return True when ``source`` points at a borrowed/reference-only secret.""" normalized_source = str(source or "").strip().lower() if not normalized_source or normalized_source == "manual" or normalized_source.startswith("manual:"): return False normalized_provider = str(provider_id or "").strip().lower() return (normalized_provider, normalized_source) not in _PERSISTABLE_PROVIDER_SOURCES def _is_secret_payload_key(key: Any) -> bool: normalized = _normalize_key(key) if not normalized or normalized in _SAFE_SECRETISH_METADATA_KEYS: return False return normalized in _SECRET_VALUE_KEYS or normalized.endswith(_SECRET_VALUE_SUFFIXES) def fingerprint_secret_value(value: Any) -> str | None: """Non-reversible ``sha256:<16 hex>`` fingerprint of one secret value. Callers comparing a live secret against the ``secret_fingerprint`` left on a sanitized (borrowed) pool row need exactly the digest this module writes. """ text = "" if value is None else str(value) if not text: return None digest = hashlib.sha256(text.encode("utf-8", errors="surrogatepass")).hexdigest() return f"sha256:{digest[:16]}" def _credential_secret_fingerprint(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str | None: preferred = ("agent_key", "access_token", "refresh_token", "api_key", "token", "secret") candidates = [payload.get(k) for k in preferred] candidates += [v for k, v in payload.items() if _is_secret_payload_key(k)] for value in candidates: fingerprint = fingerprint_secret_value(value) if fingerprint: return fingerprint existing = payload.get("secret_fingerprint") if isinstance(existing, str) and existing.startswith("sha256:"): return existing return None def sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload( payload: Mapping[str, Any], provider_id: Any = None, ) -> Dict[str, Any]: """Return a disk-safe credential-pool payload. Owned sources pass through unchanged. Borrowed sources keep labels, source refs, status/cooldown metadata, counters and a fingerprint, but every raw secret value field is removed. """ result = dict(payload) if not is_borrowed_credential_source(result.get("source"), provider_id): return result fingerprint = _credential_secret_fingerprint(result) sanitized = {k: v for k, v in result.items() if not _is_secret_payload_key(k)} if fingerprint: sanitized["secret_fingerprint"] = fingerprint return sanitized