4398 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Teknium	fb5715c19f	fix: preserve subagent controls across attached session peers	2026-09-08 03:06:30 -07:00
Teknium	7befa11bf2	fix: retain subagent control after live session reattachment	2026-09-08 03:06:30 -07:00
Ben Barclay	866332bfb5	fix(relay): authorize send_message targets and surface egress declines (P5) (#99220) ... * fix(relay): authorize send_message targets and surface egress declines P5 of the relay egress-authorization workstream. The relay path authenticated the SENDER but never authorized the DESTINATION, and the gateway compounded it from both ends. (a) send_message could silently name an arbitrary relay target. Its `target` parameter is free-form ('platform:chat_id'), so a model could name ANY chat id and the gateway would emit an outbound frame for it. gateway/relay/egress.py adds an attestation floor: a relay-routed destination must have a provenance this gateway can show -- the operator's home channel, the channel directory, or its own gateway session origins. Anything else is refused HERE, with a visible tool error naming the target, before a frame is written. Non-relay platforms and platforms served by a live native adapter in this process are untouched (same precedence resolve_delivery_transport applies). (b) Connector declines were swallowed into apparent successes. The connector's egress floor answers an unauthorized destination with a DEFINITE failure whose text is deliberately uniform (F-005). Several relay lanes degrade a *transport drop* by design and were degrading an *authorization refusal* the same way: - _send_media returned None, sending the caller into BasePlatformAdapter's text fallback -- a DIFFERENT op re-addressed at the very chat the connector had just refused. - _send_prompt returned None, so exec-approval / slash-confirm / clarify reported "relay prompt op unavailable" (a wrong reason) and ran their numbered-text fallbacks into the refused chat. - task_card_stop discarded the error entirely. - typing / delete / react / thread ops degraded silently at debug. is_egress_decline() classifies THAT a decline happened (never why -- the uniform text is not parsed for reasons) and requires a definite, non-ambiguous failure, so a lost-ack retry is still a transport outcome. Lanes with an error-carrying contract now report the decline verbatim; cosmetic bool/None lanes still degrade but log it at WARNING. Advisory progress drops that legitimately degrade are unchanged: the task_card send lane, the draft ambiguous/except branches, and every transport-exception path keep their existing fail-open behaviour. Tests: 21 mutations of the production source, all KILLED. * fix(relay): authorize the RESOLVED target; declines must not fall back Review round 1 (independently confirmed by a second reviewer) found three blockers. Two are fixed here; the third (B-2, Telegram @username) is a policy decision left open deliberately. B-1 — THE FIX CAUSED THE OUTAGE IT PREVENTED (tools/send_message_tool.py) The P5(a) guard ran ABOVE Slack user->DM resolution, so it authorized the internal pseudo-id `_parse_target_ref` emits (`user_name:ben`, `user:U...`). Provenances only ever hold RESOLVED conversation ids, so a fully attested DM was compared as a handle against a set of `D...` ids and refused: base slack:@ben SENT head(before) slack:@ben REFUSED Every Slack DM by handle was broken. Moved the guard below resolution; it now authorizes the destination that is actually sent to, and the refusal names the resolved id. Position is load-bearing, so it is commented as such and pinned: reverting the move turns exactly the four new cases red. B-3 — A DECLINE IS NOT A LANE FAILURE (gateway/run.py) `_approval_send_outcome` had only sent/failed/ambiguous, so a connector decline collapsed into `failed` — which is the cue to run the plain-text fallback into the chat the connector had just refused. The adapter fix in the previous commit improved the error STRING while user-visible behaviour stayed identical to base; the commit message overstated it. Fixed properly: - new `declined` verdict, recognised via the shared `is_egress_decline` contract (not string sniffing at the call site) - exec-approval returns without the text fallback - slash-confirm suppresses the text reply AND clears the registration, so a card that never rendered cannot capture the user's next message `send_clarify` was already correct (returns early inside the adapter). MUTATIONS (production source; both directions) classifier never returns 'declined' -> KILLED (4 cases) ALL failures classified as 'declined' -> KILLED (2 cases) guard moved back above Slack resolution -> KILLED (4 cases) decline CODE changed (review M05) -> KILLED marker match made case-sensitive (M10) -> KILLED M05 was a tautology: the test asserted the imported constant against itself, so changing the constant could not fail it. The wire contract is now pinned as a literal, because the connector stamps that exact string and a one-sided change is a silent cross-repo break. REGRESSION CHECK: the 12 failures + 1 collection error in this test selection are PRE-EXISTING cross-test contamination — the identical set fails at 7cf86188ac. Verified by diffing the failing sets: no new failures, 363 -> 374 passed. NOT FIXED (deliberate): B-2, Telegram `@username`. The Bot API resolves handles at send time, so there is no id to compare and no canonicalization exists yet. That is a policy decision, not a code move. * fix(relay): fail CLOSED on guard faults; classify the structured decline Third independent review. Two more blockers, both reproduced before fixing. 1. THE GUARD ITSELF FAILED OPEN (tools/send_message_tool.py:158) `_authorize_relay_target` wrapped BOTH the import and the call in one `except Exception: return None` — and None means AUTHORIZED at every call site. So any runtime bug inside the guard silently switched the entire P5(a) boundary off. Reproduced: with the guard raising, an unattested target sent. The docstring already stated the correct intent ("must not fail closed on its own IMPORT error") and the code did something broader. The two failures are not the same: a missing gateway package means there is no relay egress to authorize; a fault inside the guard means authorization did not happen. The import is tolerated, the call is not — a guard that cannot answer refuses. 2. THE STRUCTURED DECLINE WAS THROWN AWAY (gateway/run.py) The adapter preserves the connector's dict in `SendResult.raw_response`. My previous commit rebuilt a dict from the error STRING, which loses two contracts: * a decline carrying `code: egress_declined` and NO text renders as "relay egress declined" — no marker colon — so it classified as `failed`, which is exactly the cue to run the fallback into the refused chat; * `ambiguous: True` (lost ack) was flattened into a DEFINITE failure, re-sending a card that may already be on the user's screen. That is the duplicate-card bug the ambiguous verdict exists to prevent, reintroduced by the fix meant to harden the same path. Both call sites now classify `raw_response` when present, ambiguity first, and fall back to the wire sentence only for connectors that send no structured response. I had fixed the text-marker path and tested only the text-marker path. Worth naming: the review's probe was a shape my tests never produced. MUTATIONS (production source) guard fault returns None (fail open again) -> KILLED classifier ignores raw_response -> KILLED (3 cases) ambiguous treated as a definite failure -> KILLED (2 cases) 40 focused tests pass. Regression check vs be321faf27: identical 13-item failing set (pre-existing cross-test contamination), no new failures. STILL OPEN: B-2 / finding 3, Telegram `@username`. The reviewer is right that this is a REGRESSION of an existing contract (#53573 added Bot API username support), not merely an unspecified input, since relay provenance stores the numeric chat id. Fixing it means resolving the handle before authorization, or explicitly revoking the contract. That is a policy decision, not a code move, and it is Ben's call. * test(relay): pin M21 and M25, the survivors whose comments called them load-bearing Round-2 review reported six unpinned survivors from round 1. Two guard real behaviour and are now covered; the other four are cosmetic-lane warnings and fail-open branches I am leaving documented rather than pretending to close. M25 — thread-qualified session ids. `_session_ids` adds BOTH "chat:thread" and the bare chat, because the connector authorizes the CHAT. Without the split a gateway whose session origin is `-100999:77` cannot send to `-100999`, the chat it is demonstrably already talking in. KILLED. M21 — the generic `relay` plane must union every fronted platform, since a relay session is filed under its LOGICAL platform. KILLED. MY FIRST M21 TEST WAS THE DEFECT IT WAS TESTING FOR. I patched `_relay_fronted` — the very function the mutation empties — so emptying it changed nothing the test could see, and the mutation SURVIVED against a green test. Rewritten to drive the real `relay_fronted_platforms()` through its env source (`GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORMS`), which is how production learns it. That is the same "the test verifies my stand-in" failure I have spent this workstream removing from the connector harnesses, reproduced here in three lines of Python. The tell was identical: a mutation that survives a test written specifically to kill it. 334 tests pass. NOT PINNED, deliberately: M03 (success-guard on a malformed dict), M24 (empty-target allowance — the one fail-open branch, reachable only when the bare-platform path already resolved a home channel), M35/M36 (decline WARNINGs on cosmetic lanes). All four are observability or defence-in-depth rather than authorization, and the review agrees they are non-blocking. * fix(relay): defer Telegram @username authorization to the connector (B-2) Closes the last blocker. Two reviewers independently called this a REGRESSION of the public-channel username support added in #53573, not an unspecified input, and they were right: provenance stores RESOLVED numeric chat ids, so comparing `@channel` against them could only ever refuse. WHY THE GATEWAY CANNOT ANSWER IT. The guard fires only when there is no live native adapter — i.e. relay-fronted deployments — and on exactly those the CONNECTOR holds the bot token, not this process. There is no local way to turn a handle into the numeric id. Refusing here is not "fail closed", it is "fail always". WHY DEFERRING IS SAFE. The destination is still authorized one layer out: the connector's Telegram egress floor (gg#238, merged 743a7c2) classifies and refuses unauthorized destinations after ITS resolution — the layer that closed the reported vulnerability in the first place. Handles go from two guards to one, the authoritative one, not to zero. The carve-out is deliberately narrow and its EDGES are pinned, because the failure mode of an exemption is silent widening: telegram `@handle` -> deferred (the regression case) telegram numeric id -> still guarded matrix `@user:server` -> still guarded (telegram-only) bare name, no `@` -> still guarded attested handle -> normal path, attestation still consulted MUTATIONS carve-out widened to all platforms -> KILLED carve-out widened to every target -> KILLED carve-out removed (regression back) -> KILLED carve-out checked BEFORE attestation -> KILLED THE ORDERING MUTANT SURVIVED MY FIRST TEST. Both orderings return None, so asserting the verdict could not tell them apart — the test asserted the claim instead of the mechanism. Rewritten to observe that attestation is actually consulted. Same defect class as the M21 test earlier in this branch: a mutation surviving a test written specifically to kill it means the test is measuring the wrong thing. 341 tests pass. FOLLOW-UP (option 2, Ben's call, deliberately NOT done here): resolve the handle before authorizing so BOTH layers apply. That needs a resolution round-trip through the connector — new wire surface — so it belongs in its own phase rather than bolted onto this one. Recorded in the code comment at the carve-out, not just here. * fix(relay): close two fail-open boundaries; test the code-only decline for real Both blockers from review, each REPRODUCED before fixing. 1. STRUCTURED DECLINE HAD NO GUARD. Deleting `raw_response=result` from both `_send_prompt` return branches left all 34 tests green — a surviving, non-equivalent security mutant. The `code` field is the documented PREFERRED signal precisely because a connector may send no prose, and a caller rebuilding `{"success": False, "error": ...}` cannot see it. Cause: every existing case declines with marker TEXT. The evidence for the code-only path was a hand-built SimpleNamespace in a different file — a stand-in for the adapter, so it verified my fixture instead of production. Fixed with a CodeOnlyDecliningConnector driving the real `send_exec_approval` -> `_send_prompt`, feeding the REAL SendResult to the REAL `_approval_send_outcome`, plus the same shape on the media lane. drop raw_response SURVIVED (34 passed) -> KILLED 2. TWO FAIL-OPEN BOUNDARIES, both "absence" and "fault" sharing a return. `_relay_fronted` swallowed EVERY exception and returned an empty set, which `relay_routed_platform` reads as "not relay-routed" — skipping the guard. Probe, with a positive control in the same run: positive_control_denied = True discovery_fault_denied = False <- unattested target AUTHORIZED `_authorize_relay_target` caught every exception during IMPORT as "no gateway package". A module that exists and fails to initialize is a fault, not an absence, and returning None there means authorized. Now: ImportError alone is absence; anything else raises RelayRouteUnknown and `authorize_relay_target` converts it to a REFUSAL STRING (not a raised exception — every caller treats the return value as the verdict, so raising would trade a fail-open for a crash). Kept the converse under test so "fail closed" does not silently become "refuse everything in CLI/cron", which is the outage the broad except existed to prevent. discovery fault -> empty set KILLED RelayRouteUnknown -> authorized KILLED import fault -> authorized KILLED 397 passed (was 392, +5 new cases), zero failures. * fix(relay): close all seven review-round-3 blockers Every finding reproduced before fixing; every fix mutation-checked after. CONTENT LEAKS (the decline was laundered into a different op, same chat) #1 A declined DRAFT SEAL replayed as a plain send. On stream-is-the-message platforms the turn-final becomes draft(final=True); `_seal_open_draft` dropped the structured body, so `_absorb_into_open_draft` read a REFUSAL as a lane failure and fell through. Probe, Slack descriptor: before: draft(partial) -> draft(final,SECRET) -> send(SECRET) after: draft(partial) -> draft(final,SECRET) My first probe of this used a discord descriptor and showed no seal at all — the leak is real, my probe was wrong (streams only arm for Slack). #6 Task-card PROGRESS had the same defect one lane over: a bare failed SendResult reads as "card lane unavailable", and TurnRunner then sends the task text to the same chat. Both card methods now carry raw_response and the caller suppresses the fallback on a decline. AUTHORIZATION BYPASSES #2 `except ImportError` was NOT the fix I claimed last round. ImportError also covers a broken dependency inside an INSTALLED gateway; review probed `ImportError.name = "gateway.relay.dependency"` and got an authorized verdict. Now only a name identifying the gateway relay module itself is absence. An ImportError with NO name stays absence — refusing on a fault we cannot attribute would trade an unidentifiable bug for a real CLI/cron outage, and an existing test caught exactly that when I first got it wrong. #3 `relay_routed_platform` lowercases the requested platform; `_relay_fronted` returned configured names verbatim. A platform configured as "Discord" missed the membership test, looked native, and skipped the guard: 'discord' => refused 'Discord' => ALLOWED 'DISCORD' => ALLOWED An attestation bypass on a string comparison. UNDELIVERABLE PROMPTS THAT HUNG #4 `_clarify_send_disposition` handled `failed` and `ambiguous` but not `declined`, so a REFUSED clarify card fell through to wait_for_response and blocked until clarify_timeout — indefinitely when configured non-positive. A decline is more definitive than a failure, not less. #5 The exec-approval decline branch returned quietly, which suppressed the text fallback (right) but left the CENTRAL approval entry pending (wrong) — the dangerous command stayed blocked until the approval timeout. My comment claimed the registration was torn down; only RelayAdapter's private map was. It now raises `_ExecApprovalDeclined`, which propagates to `_await_gateway_decision`'s existing notify-failure path (drops the entry, unblocks the tool). A dedicated type, re-raised past the local `except Exception` that would otherwise have restored the leak. #7 THE GAP THAT LET ALL OF THIS SHIP. Both caller-level suppressions were unfalsifiable: deleting either branch left 36/38 tests green. The suites drove `_approval_send_outcome` and `RelayAdapter` but never the real TurnRunner / busy-session callers, so nothing observed whether a text send FOLLOWED a decline — which is the whole property. tests/gateway/test_decline_fallback_suppression.py drives both real callers and records every send. Each decline case is paired with an ordinary-FAILURE control, because without one a caller that never falls back would also pass. MUTATIONS (all on production source, anchors count-checked, restored after) #1 seal decline -> plain send KILLED #1b seal drops raw_response KILLED #2 nested ImportError -> authorized KILLED #3 fronted set not normalized KILLED #4 clarify declined branch removed KILLED #5 approval decline returns not raises KILLED #6 task_card drops raw_response KILLED #7 slash-confirm suppression removed KILLED #7's two were the reviewer's SURVIVORS (36/38 passing); both now die. 425 passed, zero failures. * fix(relay): close the three round-4 blockers Round 4 confirmed six of seven round-3 fixes and found three more. Each reproduced before fixing, each mutation-checked after. 1. A NAMELESS ImportError still authorized. Last round I admitted it as "absence" to protect the CLI/cron path. That reasoning was WRONG and the interpreter says so: import gateway.relay.nope -> ModuleNotFoundError, name="gateway.relay.nope" import totally_absent_pkg -> ModuleNotFoundError, name="totally_absent_pkg" Genuine absence is ALWAYS ModuleNotFoundError with `.name` set, so the CLI/cron path never produces a bare ImportError and nothing legitimate was being protected. A plain or nameless ImportError comes from an import hook or a module that failed while initializing — an unattributable FAULT. Now: absence is ModuleNotFoundError naming gateway / gateway.relay / gateway.relay.egress; everything else refuses. Two existing tests raised a bare ImportError to simulate absence and were corrected to the real shape. 2. SESSION ATTESTATION INVENTED IDS. `_session_ids` split every id on the first colon to recover "chat" from "chat:thread". Matrix ids contain a colon natively, so `!room:server.org` attested a bare `!room` — the guard vouching for a destination on its own fabrication. The split now applies only to platforms whose ids genuinely carry a `:thread` suffix (allow-list; unknown platforms are treated as un-splittable, which can only refuse more). Kept a Slack control: dropping the split entirely would refuse legitimate thread replies, which is the outage the split exists to prevent. 3. THE TASK-CARD FIX WAS UNFALSIFIABLE — my own round-3 mistake, and the same one round 3 caught me making. I added the production branch AND a test, but the test stopped at RelayAdapter: it proved `raw_response` is carried and never called `TurnRunner._task_card_publish`, which owns the property. Deleting the real branch left 30 tests green. Now driven through the real caller, with an ordinary-failure control. The lesson generalises: proving the DATA reaches the boundary is not proving the CALLER acts on it. Every one of these decline fixes has two halves and the second half is where the security lives. Also closed the round-4 non-blocking finding: `gateway/relay/egress.py` has its OWN import boundary, and the existing test intercepted the earlier import in tools/send_message_tool.py, so it was never exercised. Mutating that classifier to treat every ImportError as absence now dies. MUTATIONS (production source, anchors count-checked, restored after) R4-1 nameless ImportError -> authorized KILLED R4-2 session split unconditional KILLED R4-3 task-card caller branch removed KILLED (was SURVIVED) egress classifier: any ImportError = absence KILLED Also probed and found NOT a leak: a refused OPENING draft frame disarms the stream and the turn-final goes out via `send`. That send is itself guarded and the connector refuses it too, so no content is delivered — unlike the seal case (round 3, #1) where the seal was the only check on that path. 452 passed, zero failures. * fix(relay): recover the thread parent from thread_id, not a colon split Round 4 blocker 2 was closed with an allow-list of platforms whose ids have no native colon. Reviewing my own fix while round 5 ran, the allow-list is the wrong mechanism: it NARROWS a guess instead of removing it, and it still gets Matrix wrong the moment a Matrix session is thread-qualified (`!room:server.org:$thr` -> split yields `!room`). The structured field was there all along. `_session_entry_id` composes the id as f"{chat_id}:{thread_id}" and the entry still carries `thread_id` separately, so the parent is knowable EXACTLY: strip the known suffix, or add nothing. No platform list, no guessing, correct for ids that contain colons. Mutations: back to splitting on the first colon KILLED thread parent never recovered (over-refuse) KILLED Both directions matter: the first invents attestations, the second refuses legitimate thread replies. One existing test (M25) asserted the right PROPERTY with a fixture that omitted `thread_id` — a shape real entries never have. Fixture corrected, assertions untouched. 453 passed. * fix(relay): close the four round-5 blockers Each reproduced before fixing, each mutation-checked after. R5-1 A DISABLED NATIVE ADAPTER BYPASSED AUTHORIZATION. `_has_live_native_adapter` treated any entry in the adapter map as native; `resolve_delivery_transport` ignores a native adapter whose config is disabled and routes over Relay. Two independent routing classifiers, disagreeing: guard says native: True delivery routes relay: True So the guard skipped authorization for a send that went over the relay. The guard now applies the router's enabled-state rule; probed both configurations and they agree. R5-2 THREAD IDS WERE NEVER AUTHORIZED. The parser splits chat_id and thread_id; only chat_id reached the guard. On Discord the thread IS the destination — `POST /channels/{thread_id}/messages` — so an attested parent channel authorized an arbitrary caller-supplied thread. `authorize_relay_target` now takes thread_id and requires its own attestation (bare id or the `chat:thread` form a session origin produces); both call sites forward it. R5-3 A DECLINED **INITIAL** DRAFT WAS RETRIED AS A PLAIN SEND. Round 3 fixed the declined SEAL; the declined OPEN was a different path. `send_draft` returned a bare failure, so the stream consumer read "draft transport unusable", disabled drafts and fell through to `_first_send`. Measured through the real adapter and real StreamTransportMixin: before: ops ['draft', 'send'] after: ops ['draft'] send_draft now carries raw_response; a decline is terminal for the run and the guard sits in `_first_send`, where every fallback path converges. R5-4 MY ROUND-4 TASK-CARD FIX SUPPRESSED EXACTLY ONE UPDATE. It set `native_failed`, which the entry gate already uses for an ordinary broken lane, so the next progress event skipped the decline branch and went straight to the text fallback: after first publish: [] after second: ['send'] Terminal declines are now a separate `egress_declined` state checked at the entry gate. A refusal does not expire after one tick. MUTATIONS R5-1 disabled native counts as native KILLED R5-2 thread_id not authorized KILLED R5-2b tool does not forward thread_id KILLED (was SURVIVED) R5-3 initial-draft decline not terminal KILLED R5-3b _first_send guard removed KILLED R5-4 declined state not persistent KILLED R5-2b is the same gap that produced findings 3 and 4 of the last two rounds, a third time: every test called `authorize_relay_target` directly, so dropping the argument from the TOOL WRAPPER changed nothing. Testing the callee never proves the caller uses it — now pinned explicitly. Each fix ships with an ordinary-failure control, because every one of these makes the guard refuse MORE, and over-refusal is now the larger risk. 474 passed, zero failures. * refactor(relay): declare the terminal-decline state where it lives Both terminal-decline flags were set dynamically. They worked (neither class is frozen or slotted) but an undeclared attribute hides the state from anyone reading the class, and this one is security-relevant. _TaskCardState.egress_declined — declared dataclass field StreamConsumer._egress_declined — initialised in __init__ Lifetime verified while checking whether a refusal can leak ACROSS turns and mute a healthy destination: it cannot. _TaskCardState is constructed per progress-drain (run_turn_runner.py:420) and the consumer's flags per run (stream_consumer.py:163), so both are fresh each turn. Also verified the guard's blast radius after adding thread authorization: the ONLY callers of authorize_relay_target are the two model-facing send_message call sites. Gateway-internal sends — notably the handoff path, which creates a thread and immediately posts to it with no session provenance yet — go through transport.adapter directly and are unaffected. That was the most plausible over-refusal, and it does not reach this guard. 461 passed. * fix(relay): close the four round-6 blockers — the edit lane R6-1 MY OWN R5-1 FIX REINTRODUCED THE BYPASS IT CLOSED. I wrote `except Exception: return True` around the config lookup, so a config read fault declared the platform native while the ROUTER, reading the real config, sends over the relay: guard_has_live_native True guard_verdict None router relay Routing we cannot determine is UNKNOWN. It now raises RelayRouteUnknown, which the outer handler must re-raise rather than flatten to False, and `authorize_relay_target` turns into a refusal. This is the second time a convenience `except` in this function created a bypass; there is now no permissive return left in it. R6-2/3/4 THE NINTH LANE: `edit`. ONE dropped field, THREE leaks. `RelayAdapter.edit_message` discarded the connector response, and three independent callers read a bare edit failure as "editing is unavailable" and re-send the content as a NEW message to the same chat: stream edit fallback ['edit', 'edit', 'send'] the unseen tail queued reconciliation ['edit', 'send'] the WHOLE response task-card fallback ['edit', 'send'] the task text again Fixed at the source (edit_message carries raw_response) plus each caller: `_on_edit_failure` — the single funnel for stream edit failures — makes a decline terminal for the run, `_send_fallback_final` refuses to deliver a continuation after one, the queued reconciler returns instead of sending, and the task-card fallback sets the same terminal state R5-4 introduced. R5-4 fixed the native task-card op and I did not check its sibling fallback path. The pattern across rounds 3-6 is consistent: the fix goes where the decline is OBSERVED, and the leak lives wherever someone else later decides to retry. MUTATIONS R6-1 config fault -> assume native KILLED R6-1b RelayRouteUnknown swallowed as False KILLED R6-2 edit drops raw_response KILLED R6-2b edit-failure decline not terminal KILLED R6-3 queued reconcile falls back on decline KILLED R6-4 task-card fallback edit decline KILLED Each with an ordinary-failure control: a genuinely un-editable message must still be delivered, and a broken card lane must still reach the user. 481 passed, zero failures. * fix(relay): add a terminal-decline latch at the adapter choke point THE STRUCTURAL FIX, not a twelfth local check. Rounds 3-6 of review found ONE defect in eleven lanes: the connector refuses an op, and some caller downstream reads that as 'this lane is unavailable' and retries the same content through a DIFFERENT op against the SAME chat. Media, prompt, draft-open, draft-seal, native task card, task-card fallback edit, slash-confirm, exec-approval, clarify, stream edit, queued reconciliation. Each was closed by adding a check at one more call site. That approach cannot converge: gateway/ has ~60 outbound call sites, every one of them a place a future change can reintroduce this, and four consecutive review rounds each found another. The reviewer's own count of lanes is the argument against the per-site design. Every relay frame from every one of those callers passes through _transport.send_outbound. One latch there covers them all: once the connector refuses a chat, this adapter stops emitting CONTENT frames for that chat. Proven to subsume the local checks: with the stream-edit per-site check DISABLED, the leak probe still reports blocked=true — the frame never reaches the wire. The local checks stay as defence in depth and for their better error messages, but they are no longer the only thing standing between a decline and a re-addressed send. Scope is deliberately narrow, and each limit is mutation-pinned: per CHAT - a refusal must not mute other conversations CONTENT ops - typing/delete carry nothing; latching them would leave a stuck typing indicator for no security gain self-healing - cleared when the connector accepts that chat again, so a transient policy change does not need a restart Mutations: latch never set KILLED latch never consulted KILLED latch is global, not per-chat KILLED latch never clears KILLED 485 passed. * fix(relay): one route source; the latch already covered round 7's lanes Round 7 reviewed 573e41e294 — one commit BEFORE the terminal-decline latch — and independently reached the same conclusion I had: 'The per-call-site approach is structurally wrong. Use one turn-scoped choke point.' That is the latch in 6dbc004594. Its four 'still broken' lanes (tool-progress edit, progress-overflow edit, long-running heartbeat edit, stale streamed-final reconciliation) all share the shape edit_message->declined->adapter.send(same chat, same content), and NONE has a local check. Probed all four against the latch: tool_progress ops ['edit'] blocked progress_overflow ops ['edit'] blocked heartbeat ops ['edit'] blocked stale_final ops ['edit'] blocked That is the argument for the choke point, measured: lanes nobody patched are safe anyway. Pinned by a parametrized test named for those four lanes. R7-1 IS A REAL BYPASS THE LATCH DOES NOT COVER, and it is fixed here. The guard rebuilt routing from GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORMS while resolve_delivery_transport asks the CONNECTED adapter (fronts_platform, from the handshake identity set). Different snapshots: with env discovery stale or momentarily empty, the guard said 'native' and the router sent over the relay, skipping authorization. before: guard_relay_routed False / delivery relay after: guard_relay_routed True / delivery relay / unattested target refused The guard now asks the live adapter first and falls back to config only when there is no runner (CLI/cron) — pinned in both directions. R7-5 (non-blocking, and a fair hit): my stream-fallback test asserted _egress_declined and never drove _send_fallback_final, so removing that early return SURVIVED. The test now calls the real fallback and asserts the wire is untouched; the mutation dies. Mutations: R7-1 guard ignores the live adapter KILLED (was SURVIVED) R7-5 fallback early return removed KILLED (was SURVIVED) latch not consulted KILLED 491 passed. * fix(relay): close three holes found by attacking my own latch Round 8's brief told the reviewer to attack the latch. I did the same in parallel and found three real holes in it before the review returned. 1. send_for_platform BYPASSED THE LATCH ENTIRELY. It builds and posts its frame directly rather than through _outbound — and it is the delivery resolver's OWN entry point, so it is the single most important caller. before: ops ['edit', 'send'] after: ops ['edit'] gateway/AGENTS.md states the rule I had just broken: 'Seal-interception exists at BOTH egress doors (send() and send_for_platform()); a new egress door needs the same two checks.' The latch is a third such check and I had wired it to one door. 2. A COSMETIC SUCCESS CLEARED THE LATCH. Clearing on ANY success meant a typing indicator — routinely allowed for a chat whose content is refused — re-opened the door for the very next send: ops ['edit', 'typing', 'send'] Only a CONTENT op the connector accepted may clear it now. 3. A THREAD INSIDE A REFUSED CHAT WAS NOT COVERED. A thread lives inside its parent, so the same content reached the same conversation one level down: ops ['edit', 'send'] The latch key now strips the thread suffix. Also normalised int/str chat ids (callers pass both; a type mismatch would silently unlatch). MUTATIONS send_for_platform not latched KILLED cosmetic success clears the latch KILLED thread suffix not stripped KILLED draft-seal retry not latched SURVIVED — EQUIVALENT, proven: is unreachable while latched (a declined edit before the seal produces ZERO seal frames, measured). Kept as defence in depth because it posts directly, and documented at the site rather than covered by a test that could not fail. One self-inflicted bug on the way: a blanket replace put 1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Turn on the 1Password app integration and sign in to get started. Run 'op signin --help' to learn more. For more help, read our documentation: https://www.1password.dev/cli 1Password CLI is built using open-source software. View our credits and licenses: https://downloads.1password.com/op/credits/stable/credits.html Usage: op [command] [flags] Management Commands: account Manage your locally configured 1Password accounts connect Manage Connect server instances and tokens in your 1Password account document Perform CRUD operations on Document items in your vaults events-api Manage Events API integrations in your 1Password account group Manage the groups in your 1Password account item Perform CRUD operations on the 1Password items in your vaults plugin Manage the shell plugins you use to authenticate third-party CLIs service-account Manage service accounts user Manage users within this 1Password account vault Manage permissions and perform CRUD operations on your 1Password vaults Commands: completion Generate shell completion information inject Inject secrets into a config file read Read a secret reference run Pass secrets as environment variables to a process signin Sign in to a 1Password account signout Sign out of a 1Password account update Check for and download updates. whoami Get information about a signed-in account Global Flags: --account account Select the account to execute the command by account shorthand, sign-in address, account ID, or user ID. For a list of available accounts, run 'op account list'. Can be set as the OP_ACCOUNT environment variable. --cache Store and use cached information. Caching is enabled by default on UNIX-like systems. Caching is not available on Windows. Options: true, false. Can also be set with the OP_CACHE environment variable. (default true) --config directory Use this configuration directory. --debug Enable debug mode. Can also be enabled by setting the OP_DEBUG environment variable to true. --encoding type Use this character encoding type. Default: UTF-8. Supported: SHIFT_JIS, gbk. --format string Use this output format. Can be 'human-readable' or 'json'. Can be set as the OP_FORMAT environment variable. (default "human-readable") -h, --help Get help for op. --iso-timestamps Format timestamps according to ISO 8601 / RFC 3339. Can be set as the OP_ISO_TIMESTAMPS environment variable. --no-color Print output without color. --session token Authenticate with this session token. 1Password CLI outputs session tokens for successful 'op signin' commands when 1Password app integration is not enabled. -v, --version version for op Run 'op [command] --help' for more information on the command. into send_for_platform, which has no such variable. Two existing unfurl tests caught it — NameError at adapter.py:1407. 504 passed. * fix(relay): Telegram handle exemption + a turn boundary for the latch Round 8 blockers. Two of its four were already closed by 93750e351a (it reviewed the commit before it); these two are real and both are mine. B1 — THE TELEGRAM @HANDLE EXEMPTION COVERED A NATIVE SEND. _is_unresolved_handle exempts telegram @handles from attestation because "the connector resolves and authorizes it". That justification is FALSE whenever the gateway holds its own token: _send_to_platform calls _send_telegram(pconfig.token, ...) directly and no connector is involved. So an unattested @handle went out under the gateway's own credential while the numeric control was correctly refused. The exemption now requires that no native credential exists. A probe fault WITHDRAWS the exemption (falls back to the ordinary attestation check) rather than granting it. Shipped with the converse control: relay-only config still exempts @handles, and numeric targets stay guarded in both modes. B4 — THE LATCH HAD NO BOUNDARY, SO IT WAS AN OUTAGE MECHANISM. My own regression, and worse than reported. Removing "clear on cosmetic success" (correctly) removed the ONLY way the latch could ever clear: a content op can never reach the connector to succeed, because the latch blocks it locally first. A refusal at 09:00 muted that chat forever. A new inbound message for a chat is the generation marker — the natural teardown point. Suppression still holds for the whole turn. same_turn_blocked: true next_turn_delivered: true MUTATIONS (all killed) handle exemption ignores native credential native-credential fault GRANTS the exemption no turn boundary (latch never clears) teardown clears ALL chats not just this one teardown ignores the chat The last two SURVIVED first: I tested _clear_declined_for_turn directly and never proved _on_inbound calls it — the caller-level gap that has now produced four blockers on this branch. Added a test driving the real inbound entry point. One self-inflicted bug, caught by my own fault test: the probe imported load_config, which does not exist (it is load_gateway_config), so it always threw and returned the fault default. The test that pinned fault behaviour is what exposed it. 510 passed. * fix(relay): correct latch identity and boundary; one config snapshot Round 9, four blockers, all reproduced. B1+B4 — THE TEARDOWN WAS AT THE WRONG PLACE, twice over. It sat on the adapter's raw _on_inbound, which runs BEFORE profile routing, the ignored-channel guard, plugin hooks and user authorization. An unauthorized or dropped event could therefore clear a refusal belonging to an active turn, and stale content then went out as a different op. The same placement missed Discord interaction passthrough, which builds its own MessageEvent and calls handle_message directly, so slash commands and modal submits stayed muted after an earlier decline. Both are one mistake: I picked a lane instead of a boundary. Teardown now runs immediately after _hm_admit_event, the single admission gate every entry path shares. dropped event -> latch survives, stale send blocked admitted event -> latch clears B2 — THE LATCH KEY SPLIT ON ':', WHICH IS A MISTAKE I ALREADY FIXED ONCE. _latch_key did str(chat_id).split(":", 1)[0], so !room:tenant-a and !room:tenant-b both keyed !room: a decline in one Matrix room muted another, and inbound from one cleared the other's refusal. egress.py ::_session_ids stopped doing exactly this in round 4 and I reintroduced it three rounds later. Parent identity is never recoverable from identifier TEXT. Thread coverage is now structural: _thread_parent looks the relationship up in the recorded auto-thread map. B3 — AUTHORIZATION AND DISPATCH USED DIFFERENT CONFIG SNAPSHOTS. _handle_send retains one pconfig; the guard independently reloaded config. Across a transition the authorization snapshot could see a connector-only setup (exemption granted) while dispatch still held the native token and sent the unattested @handle itself. The guard now takes native_token from the SAME snapshot dispatch will use. A caller that omits it does not silently look like "no token". NB-1/2/3 also closed: real-object snapshot tests, an exception shield that faces a real exception, and send_follow_up no longer discards the connector's verdict (that discard is exactly how the edit lane laundered declines). MUTATIONS (all killed) latch key splits on colon again thread parent lookup disabled dispatch token ignored by guard tool drops the snapshot token admission teardown removed teardown moved BEFORE admission exception shield removed follow_up drops raw_response "admission teardown removed" SURVIVED first: I had tested the helper, not _handle_message. Added a test driving production _handle_message with admission stubbed both ways. Fifth caller-level gap on this branch. One self-inflicted bug caught before commit: I passed pconfig.token in _handle_react, which has no pconfig — a NameError on every reaction. 516 passed. * docs(relay): pin the latch's thread coverage limit as a deliberate trade _thread_parent only sees connector auto-threads, and that map is capped at 256 entries, so a user-created or evicted thread does not inherit its parent's latch. Documented at the site and asserted by a test, because the alternative - deriving parents from identifier text - is exactly what muted unrelated Matrix rooms in round 9. The primary control is unaffected: authorize_relay_target takes thread_id as part of the destination and attests it on every send (6 thread tests). * refactor(relay): one SendResult decline classifier for all 8 gateway lanes The extraction found a DEFECT, not just repetition. Eight gateway lanes each hand-rolled the unwrapping of a decline from a SendResult, and they did not agree. Six checked only raw_response. Two also checked the error text. A connector that answers with the uniform decline SENTENCE and no structured code - the documented contract for older connectors, per _approval_send_outcome - was therefore classified as an ordinary failure by those six lanes, so each treated a refusal as "editing unavailable" and retried through another op. Measured: text-only decline six-site check False two-site check True structured decline six-site check True two-site check True No content leaked, because the adapter latch classifies the transport dict directly and catches both shapes (verified: text-only decline still latches C1 and keeps SECRET off the wire). The cost was wrong verdicts and futile retries, not disclosure. declined_send(result) in gateway/relay/egress.py now owns this. It checks raw_response when structured, else the error text, and preserves the ambiguous exclusion - an ambiguous result is a transport outcome, so it must never read as a refusal. run.py keeps its own shape deliberately: that lane has three verdicts (ambiguous / declined / failed), so it checks ambiguous first and then delegates the boolean. MUTATIONS (all killed) helper drops the text-only branch helper drops the structured branch ambiguous no longer excluded draft lane decline check removed edit-failure lane decline check removed prompt verdict lane check removed slash-confirm lane check removed draft lane goes terminal on ANY failure (over-refusal direction) "draft lane decline check removed" SURVIVED first: _send_draft_frame had no test driving an unsuccessful send_draft at all. Added one, with an ordinary-failure control so the fix cannot silently become "one flaky frame mutes the chat". A non-unique anchor also masked the edit-failure lane on the first pass - the trap my own skill warns about. This closes the duplication that caused four of nine rounds of blockers: a new lane now calls one classifier instead of copying three lines. 519 passed. * fix(relay): latch identity, new-turn boundary, seal arming, ambiguity Round 10, four blockers, each reproduced before fixing. Two are my own regressions from the previous two rounds. B1 - ADMISSION IS NOT A NEW-TURN BOUNDARY. Round 9 moved teardown to just after _hm_admit_event. That is only an ADMISSION gate: an authorized message can be steered into a running session, answer a pending prompt, run a busy slash command, or be refused by the pause/drain gates - all without starting a turn. Each of those cleared the ACTIVE turn's refusal, and a later fallback from that turn reached the wire (probe: latch emptied, wire ops ['edit', 'send']). Teardown now runs after _claim_active_session_slot, the first point the runner OWNS a new turn. The new test drives production _handle_message through all four non-turn lanes plus the real new-turn path. B2 - LATCH IDENTITY OMITTED THE LOGICAL PLATFORM. One relay adapter fronts several platforms, so native ids collide. A Discord refusal for chat 42 was cleared by clear_egress_latch("telegram", "42") - the method took a platform and ignored it - and the Discord fallback then reached the connector. Keyed by normalized platform plus exact chat id; thread-parent expansion keeps the platform component. B3 - THE DIRECT DRAFT-SEAL PATH DID NOT ARM THE LATCH. _seal_open_draft posts through _attempt directly rather than _outbound, so a definite decline logged and returned but never latched. The immediate plain-send fallback was suppressed by the caller's own check; later same-turn sends were not (wire ['draft', 'draft', 'send'], the third frame carrying refused content). B4 - MY OWN REFACTOR MADE AMBIGUOUS RESULTS TERMINAL. send_draft's ambiguous projection discarded raw_response, so declined_send fell through to the error-text branch - and an ambiguous result whose text carries the decline marker ("... egress declined: ack lost") read as a DEFINITE refusal and terminated the run. Ambiguous means the frame may well have been delivered: a transport outcome, never an authorization one. Fixed on both layers: the projection carries the body (and the seal's ambiguous return is now explicit too), and declined_send's text-only branch - which cannot see the ambiguous flag - treats ack-lost text as transport ambiguity. Audited every SendResult projection in adapter.py for the same shape. MUTATIONS (all killed) latch key drops the platform clear_egress_latch ignores platform draft seal does not arm the latch ambiguous projection drops raw body declined_send infers decline from ack-lost text teardown back at admission 523 passed. * refactor(relay): split the terminal-decline latch out of the guard PR The latch moves to feat/p5-egress-decline-latch (pushed at 3cf45736d7, which retains the full history) for redesign. This PR keeps the authorization guard and the per-site decline checks. WHY. Across eleven review rounds the two halves behaved very differently. The guard is a PURE FUNCTION of the destination - its blockers were all "you asked the wrong question" (case sensitivity, nested ImportError, missing thread_id, config snapshot skew), each a one-line correction that then stayed fixed. Rounds 7-10 found nothing new in it. The latch is MUTABLE STATE WITH A LIFETIME living on RelayAdapter - an object registered once per process that holds the WebSocket and has no concept of a turn. Nine of its blockers reduce to three questions the adapter cannot answer: when does it end, who arms it, what is it keyed on. Every answer so far has been a proxy (a successful op, an inbound message, an admitted event, a claimed session slot) and every proxy was wrong in a lane found later. The per-site checks hold identical information on `st` - a PER-TURN object - and have produced zero blockers, because the state dies with the turn and nobody has to decide when it ends. The no-relaunder property does NOT depend on the latch. Measured on the real consumer path with the latch absent: a declined draft frame sets _egress_declined and puts nothing on the wire. Removal verified structurally rather than by eye: an AST diff of every symbol between HEAD and this tree reports only latch symbols gone, nothing added. That check caught two over-deletions my strip made - _on_inbound (consumed by a "next def" boundary) and _SEEN_INBOUND_MAX (a class constant inside the removed span). Both restored; 19 failures went to 0. ALSO: RESTORED A TEST I WRONGLY REPORTED AS PASSING. test_tool_guard_forwards_thread_id never made it into the repo - `git log -S` finds it in no commit - though round 5 recorded its mutant as killed. Dropping thread_id from the guard call therefore survived the entire tests/tools suite (146 passed). Written properly this time, driving the real _handle_send far enough to reach the guard. It now KILLS that mutant. MUTATIONS on this tree guard fault authorizes instead of refusing KILLED thread_id dropped from the guard call KILLED (was SURVIVED) handle exemption ignores native credential KILLED draft lane decline check removed KILLED prompt verdict lane check removed KILLED slash-confirm lane check removed KILLED 503 passed. * test(relay): close the phantom-coverage gaps the guard audit found The thread_id test that was reported as killing a round-5 mutant turned out never to have been committed. That is a reason to distrust the other claimed kills, so I re-ran every guard mutation against the COMMITTED tree instead of trusting the earlier reports. Result: 9 of 11 killed, and the two "SKIPPED" ones had non-unique anchors hiding SIX separate sites. Mutating those individually found three real survivors. CASE NORMALISATION (round 3, finding 3) WAS HALF-COVERED. test_relay_fronted_matching_is_case_insensitive varies the CONFIGURED name but always requests lowercase "discord", so it pins _relay_fronted's normalisation and nothing else. The REQUESTED name's `.lower()` was covered by nothing at all. Probe with it removed: relay_routed("Discord") -> False authorize("Discord", unattested) -> AUTHORIZED which is exactly the bypass round 3 reported, alive again and untested. Two further sites were untested in the OVER-REFUSAL direction: the attested store is keyed lowercase, so a mixed-case request missed its own attested set and refused legitimate traffic. attested_relay_targets' own normalisation was invisible to every existing test because they all monkeypatch that function away; it is now asserted against the real function with only its leaf sources stubbed. Three tests added. All six case sites now die when mutated. I also re-did the three fail-closed RelayRouteUnknown mutations properly. The first pass swapped whole lines and produced IndentationErrors, so "KILLED" there proved nothing but a syntax error. Neutralising each raise at correct indentation: all three genuinely KILLED. FINAL AUDIT ON THIS TREE — 17 mutations, zero survivors guard: thread_id dropped at the call site guard: react path unguarded guard: handle exemption ignores native credential guard: 3x fail-closed raise neutralised guard: 6x case-normalisation site classifier: ambiguous treated as a decline classifier: text-only decline branch removed lane: draft / stream-edit / prompt / slash-confirm checks removed 511 passed. * test(relay): make the stream-edit test fail for the right reason Review of 45835a282d raised one blocking issue and three non-blocking ones. All four are addressed; none was a production defect. BLOCKING — the stream-edit test failed on the double, not on a leak. test_declined_stream_edit_does_not_send_the_unseen_tail implemented only the GUARDED path in its consumer double. Removing either guard therefore raised AttributeError inside the fake before any send could be observed: guard 1 removed -> AttributeError: no attribute '_is_flood_error' guard 2 removed -> AttributeError: no attribute '_clean_for_display' Red, but for the wrong reason — the test could not have caught the leak it is named for. My own docstring claimed it drove the fallback and checked the wire; it did neither. The double now implements everything the UNGUARDED path reaches (_is_flood_error, _flood_strikes, _current_edit_interval, _last_edit_time, _notify_new_message, _try_strip_cursor, _clean_for_display, _fallback_prefix, _metadata_for_send). Both mutations now fail on real assertions: guard 1 removed -> assert consumer._egress_declined is True guard 2 removed -> AssertionError: the unseen tail reached the wire: ['send'] NON-BLOCKING 1 — a docstring claimed more than the test exercises. test_requested_platform_name_is_also_normalised described a mixed-case send_message(target="Discord:999") bypass. That entry point cannot reach it: _resolve_tool_target lowercases the platform at tools/send_message_tool.py:47 before the guard runs. The test still pins a real contract — the helpers must not assume a lowercased argument, for the gateway lanes and any future non-normalising caller — so the claim is narrowed to that rather than the test removed. NON-BLOCKING 2 — the module docstring said "every lane drives the REAL RelayAdapter". The stream tests drive mixin doubles by design, because the behaviour under test belongs to the adapter's CALLER. Docstring now distinguishes the two kinds. NON-BLOCKING 3 — latch-deletion residue in gateway/relay/adapter.py:418: return None return latched if surface_declines else None The second line was unreachable and referenced a name deleted with the latch. Removed, along with the 20-line comment block describing the latch as "the structural fix" — that mechanism now lives on feat/p5-egress-decline-latch, not here. The reviewer independently confirmed the large deletion: an AST census between 3cf45736d7 and f57a2298fa reports only latch symbols removed and nothing added. 511 passed. * docs(relay): correct three claims that outran the code Review of 41ce3cc765 found no new production defect but three overstated claims, one of them in my own commit message. 1. THE LATCH COMMENTARY WAS STILL THERE. My previous commit message said it removed "the 20-line comment block describing the latch as the structural fix". It removed only the unreachable statement. Twenty lines at adapter.py:361-380 still described a per-chat latch, a choke point and its scope rules - none of which exist on this branch. In a refusal-sensitive module that reads as coverage this branch does not have. Now removed for real. This is the same defect class as the tests: a claim that outran what the code does. I made it while fixing that class. 2. THE STREAM-TEST DOCSTRING OVERSTATED BOTH MUTANTS. It said the mutation "now fails on the assertion that a send reached the wire" - true of one guard, not both. Verified separately: remove the _on_edit_failure check -> dies on _egress_declined, never reaches the fallback remove the fallback early return -> dies on the wire: ['send'] Both are valid behavioural failures, which is what the blocker asked for; they are different observables and the docstring now says so. 3. Duplicate `from types import SimpleNamespace` from an earlier scripted insert; imports reordered. 112 tests pass in the four focused files. * fix(relay): close two authorization defects found in review Both were reproduced before fixing and both mutants are pinned. 1. A LIVE relay adapter whose fronts_platform() raised degraded into the config fallback. `_live_relay_fronted` returned None for every failure, and None means "no live adapter, use the config snapshot" — so a faulting adapter plus an empty/stale snapshot made the guard conclude "not relay-routed" and authorize an unattested destination, while resolve_delivery_transport asks that same adapter and still routes over the relay. Measured: relay_routed=False, verdict None for chat 999. Absence and fault now have separate return values: None only when there is no runner or no relay adapter; a live adapter that cannot answer raises RelayRouteUnknown. This is the third instance of this bug class in this file, and the first two were also mine. 2. An attested chat whose id equalled the requested THREAD id vouched for that thread. The `thread in attested` arm proved nothing about parentage. Measured: attested {"-100A", "7"} authorized (-100A, thread 7). Only the bound `parent:thread` form is accepted now. Nothing legitimate needed the bare arm — _session_entry_id records a threaded origin as f"{chat_id}:{thread_id}", and a thread addressed as its own channel arrives as chat_id and passes the parent check. The existing test blessed the bare form via parametrize, so it PINNED the defect. Corrected, plus negative controls for the sibling-chat and other-parent cases and a positive control proving genuine absence still takes the config path (otherwise fix 1 would break native-only deploys). Merged origin/main (was 22 behind). 428 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh; full 10-row mutation ledger re-killed on the merged tree, none dying on an exception rather than an assertion. * fix(relay): only a missing adapter is absence; everything else is a fault Reviewer BLOCKER, reproduced before fixing. Two more paths where a PRESENT relay adapter still degraded into the config snapshot: 1. `fronts_platform` may be a property or descriptor, so the ATTRIBUTE LOOKUP can raise — and the lookup sat inside the absence handler. Probed with a raising property plus an empty snapshot: live=None, routed=False, verdict=None, i.e. an unattested target authorized. The previous test made an already-retrieved METHOD raise, so it could not reach this. 2. A present adapter with no usable `fronts_platform` returned None for the same reason. An adapter that cannot say what it fronts is broken, not absent, so it now raises too. Also found by my own spot-check while the review ran: the nested imports of `gateway.config` / `gateway.run` inside the live probe shared the broad handler, so a broken installation degraded to the snapshot as well. Probed with a healthy-adapter positive control in the same run — healthy refused the unattested target, faulted authorized it. `_relay_fronted` one function below already drew this exact distinction for its own import. The boundary is now: `relay is None` is the ONLY absence. Everything about a present adapter — attribute access, callability, the call itself, and the imports needed to reach it — is a fault and raises RelayRouteUnknown. This is the fourth variant of absence-vs-fault in this file and all four were mine. The lesson is in the code as a comment rather than in a commit message nobody re-reads. Four controls keep genuine absence benign: no runner, no relay adapter in the runner, a real ModuleNotFoundError naming the gateway package, and the configured-attested-target-still-sends case. 434 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh; 9-row mutation ledger re-killed including both new guards, none dying on an exception. * fix(relay): invert the live probe to fail closed by default Reviewer BLOCKER round 2, reproduced: reading the adapter registry can also raise. A runner whose `adapters.get()` raised gave relay_present=True, live=None, routed=False, verdict=None — unattested discord:999 authorized. That was the FIFTH boundary in one function with the same defect: the call, the attribute lookup, a non-callable attribute, the nested imports, and now the registry lookup. Each round I patched the reported boundary and the defect moved one statement up. The cause was the shape, not the statements: the function asked "did something go wrong?" and answered None, and None MEANS "no live adapter, use the config snapshot" — so every statement was a new chance to fail open, and every new statement would have been too. Inverted rather than patched a sixth time. Each `return None` now sits behind an explicit narrow check that cannot itself be the fault (no runner, no adapters, no relay key, gateway package genuinely absent), and one outer handler turns anything else into RelayRouteUnknown. A statement added inside this function is now fail-CLOSED by default. Verified all six fault shapes raise (call, attribute, missing method, registry .get, .adapters property, runner ref) and all five absence shapes stay benign, plus a liveness control where the config snapshot disagrees with a healthy adapter and the adapter still wins. Four new tests, including the two absence controls that keep native-only and CLI deployments working. 438 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh. Mutation ledger: 8 killed. One survivor recorded as a proven equivalent mutant — widening `if not registry` to `or {}` is behaviourally identical because `{}.get()` returns None, i.e. the same absence; it is a readability guard.	2026-09-08 17:51:35 +10:00
Teknium	5280fe9987	fix: cron and local DMs reach an open Desktop Bot Chat ... Route local producers to durable owner ingress before attempting the unowned CLI lane. Preserve per-run/per-message IDs and receipt-first retry handling; never fall back after ambiguous admission. Report cron admission as queued, not completed or failed, in job status, the execution ledger and CLI/tool UX. Native isolated Electron validation reproduces SESSION_NOT_OWNED on main for both idle and busy owners. Fixed owner consumes idle cron, busy cron, local DM and mounted-chat cron exactly once, keeps its lease, yields to queued human input, and preserves the prior model-request prefix and tool schema. Inference alone used a deterministic loopback wire stub; no paid model call.	2026-09-07 16:48:29 -07:00
FalconOrtiz	db96c8ced7	fix: admit Bot Chat deliveries through the live session owner ... Adapt FalconOrtiz's owner-mailbox proposal from #101564 onto the current notification poller and topical modules. The durable mailbox is cross-process ingress only: the existing owner admits its normal prompt turn after the current turn and human FIFO clear. Retain immutable receipts, stable admission identities, capability and lease fencing, compression lineage, and disable blind recovery replay of imported turns. The original stale server hunks and expiring receipt protocol were rebuilt rather than cherry-picked: the current facade decomposition and durable busy admission contract differ. Credit the earlier owner-mailbox work in #100544 and durable producer work in #100319. Co-authored-by: fangliquanflq <fangliquan@qq.com> Co-authored-by: 686f6c61 <github@00b.tech>	2026-09-07 16:48:29 -07:00
Teknium	6178e9f4ee	fix(approvals): honor GNU env split escapes and argv0 operands	2026-09-07 14:30:41 -07:00
Teknium	50617d1c75	fix(approvals): preserve env argv and shell comment boundaries	2026-09-07 14:30:41 -07:00
Teknium	58faa10134	fix(approvals): match denied executable paths behind shell prefixes ... Adapt the command-position, bounded-candidate and launcher-option work from embwl0x's #76063 to the current detection owner, then add executable basename projection from Rohith Pariki's #104338. Parse raw quote state before applying existing text normalization so quoted arguments do not become commands. Cover shell payloads and literal env split-string carriers, retain path-specific rules and whole-command globs, and document the supported normalization rather than claiming an OS capability sandbox. Related: #104308, #76037, #76063, #104338, #78521, #86711. No automatic closing directives: the older carriers also contain broader case syntax and git-option work not included here. Co-authored-by: embwl0x <embwl0x@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Rohith Pariki <rohithpariki@gmail.com>	2026-09-07 14:30:41 -07:00
Teknium	4810074d73	fix: retain completions until explicit adapter admission	2026-09-07 14:16:57 -07:00
Teknium	3b7ff435fd	fix(kanban): preserve durable origins for worker-created tasks ... Carry the owning task's notification subscriptions independently of dependency edges, within the creation transaction. Prefer its durable session over worker and request-local sessions while preserving explicit overrides. Cover worker CLI create and built-in decomposition, and retain conversation route anchors. Auto-subscribe no longer upgrades an inherited passive subscription. Slim adaptation of Christopher-Schulze's session-precedence fix in #85687, expanded to durable subscription provenance and sibling creation paths. Related: #85575, #85687 Validation: strict RED/GREEN (7 failing cases before; 7 passing after), then 58 Kanban test files: 383 passed, 2 skipped. Real dispatcher-spawn subprocess probe covers direct, linked, unlinked, explicit-session, worker CLI, built-in children and a plain CLI negative control, with recording transport only. Co-authored-by: Christopher <210261288+Christopher-Schulze@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-07 14:16:57 -07:00
kshitijk4poor	16fe50b1a2	refactor(gateway): inline the user-bus adoption gate at the run_gateway call site ... Drop the 3-line facade wrapper (hermes_cli/gateway.py is already 3x the facade threshold) and call the existing _ensure_user_systemd_env() directly under `is_linux() and INVOCATION_ID` — the same Linux gate the process_registry seam uses, instead of os.name == "posix". The fail-closed test now targets _ensure_user_systemd_env() itself. Hedge the scope-unavailable error text: the probe also returns False when systemd-run is missing or times out, so the D-Bus diagnosis is the usual cause, not the only one.	2026-09-08 02:28:21 +05:30
HexLab98	802f0f97ad	fix(gateway): adopt the user D-Bus session when systemd starts the gateway ... A system-level unit (/etc/systemd/system, User=<someone>) is exec'd with neither XDG_RUNTIME_DIR nor DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS, and a process environment is fixed at exec time. 'systemd-run --user --scope' therefore fails for the whole lifetime of that gateway even after the user manager is up and /run/user/<uid>/bus is reachable. That is the seam every restart-safe worker crosses (restart_safe_gateway_child_argv), and it fails closed by design — so on headless systemd installs every agent-driven cron job and every Kanban dispatch died at launch, ~26ms in, with nothing but 'error' on the job row. _ensure_user_systemd_env() already derives both values from our own uid and adopts them only when the runtime dir is really ours and the socket really exists; it was just wired exclusively to the systemctl management paths, never to the gateway's own boot. Call it from run_gateway() — the single in-process boot every entry point goes through — so the adoption precedes every worker-environment snapshot (cron builds its env after the scope check, Kanban before it, so fixing this at the dispatch seam would only fix one of them). The fail-closed posture is unchanged: with no user manager at all the probe still reports unavailable and dispatch still refuses. That refusal now names the remedy in the message the operator actually reads (it is stored as the cron execution's error), instead of only the symptom. Fixes #104893	2026-09-08 02:28:21 +05:30
kshitijk4poor	99e1c16868	test(tools): pin the Git Bash probe's detached stdin in the existing probe test ... The new standalone test file duplicated TestGitBashExternalProgramProbe's harness; one assertion on the recorded kwargs covers the #78820 contract. The sibling ASLR-probe assertion is dropped (unchanged code, already green on main). Comment trimmed to the WHY.	2026-09-08 02:26:39 +05:30
Shimakaze514	869432301b	fix(tools): detach stdin in the Windows Git Bash probe (#78820) ... `_bash_starts()` in tools/environments/local_gitbash_probe.py ran bash.exe with capture_output=True but no stdin=, so the MSYS2 child inherited the TUI gateway's stdin pipe. The MSYS2 runtime switches that shared pipe to PIPE_NOWAIT; the gateway's next sys.stdin.readline() then fails with ERROR_NO_DATA, which the CRT maps to OSError(EINVAL), and the gateway exits with code 1 ("gateway exited") on the first terminal call. The sibling probe _mandatory_aslr_enabled() already passes stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL; this brings _bash_starts() in line with it. Add tests/tools/test_gitbash_probe_stdin.py asserting both probes forward stdin=DEVNULL to subprocess.run (fails on the pre-fix source).	2026-09-08 02:26:39 +05:30
kshitijk4poor	1e24a8de39	refactor(delegation): resolve the child fallback chain through the canonical normalizer ... _resolve_child_fallback_chain re-implemented hermes_cli.fallback_config's entry validation to log per-index warnings, wrapped a pure function in try/except, and carried two names (routing_cfg / fallback_cfg) for one argument. It now delegates to get_fallback_chain() and keeps the single warning for "no usable routes"; the facade re-export is dropped (import from the defining module). Tests collapse to the parametrized decision table plus the pin-derivation, real-config-loader, review-ownership and activation invariants (22 -> 20 cases, 417 -> ~230 lines).	2026-09-08 02:26:05 +05:30
Ayush Nangia	c47bf78d68	fix(delegation): keep child routes and fallback policy together	2026-09-08 02:26:05 +05:30
Teknium	869228cab4	feat(delegation): surface process accounting as top-level process_notes in the sync result; add live stress harness ... Stress run with a real orchestrator subagent showed the per-task keys buried in results[] were not relayed upward; the same prose lines now sit at the top of the sync delegate_task result. evals/subagent_process_handoff/ stress_handoff_live.py runs 12 real parent+child scenarios (handoff, orphan, unread, clean read, cap, exited refusal, mixed fan-out, parent controlling the inherited process, sibling theft incl. adversarial, nested orchestrator, 5-way burst) and scores them against runtime accounting, never model prose.	2026-09-07 12:50:29 -07:00
Teknium	ef9239571d	feat(delegation): report a child's exited-but-unread notify processes to the parent ... A process that finishes while the child is alive needs no handoff, but if the child never polls/waits/logs it, the result vanished: the completion notice is suppressed in the parent and the child's summary never mentions it. Finalization now attaches exit code + output tail as unread_completions, rendered in the parent's delegation notice.	2026-09-07 12:50:29 -07:00
Teknium	3c0d90e8ef	feat(delegation): subagents hand background processes to the parent; leftovers are named, not trusted ... A child's background processes are killed at its teardown and their notify_on_complete notices are suppressed in the parent, yet the child's terminal result still said `notify_on_complete: true` and the parent's delegation notice said nothing about processes left behind. Orchestrators believed "CI watcher running" and waited on a completion that could never arrive (recurring in the Sep 7 campaign sessions). - process_manage(action="handoff", session_id, data="<purpose>"), children only: process_registry.transfer_ownership flips owner_task_id/task_id/ session_key to the parent under the registry lock, so the completion is stamped with the parent's owner at exit, passes the parent's sa- filter, and is reaped by the parent, not the child. Cap 3 per child; an exited, foreign, or non-child request is a tool error. The purpose rides the event as handoff_note and renders in the parent's notice. - Child terminal(background=True, notify=True) now returns notify_on_complete=false plus a note: wait, kill, or hand off. - _ChildRun.account_background_processes records handed_off_processes and orphaned_processes on the result before cleanup kills the leftovers; the parent's delegation block renders both.	2026-09-07 12:50:29 -07:00
kshitijk4poor	2f1609a86c	refactor: sms AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE flag; ElicitationHandler call_context defaults to a no-op thunk; drop stale TYPE_CHECKING/type-ignore in two tests ... Self-review follow-ups on the F821 sweep: - plugins/platforms/sms/adapter.py: the optional-import block now sets AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE like the homeassistant / webhook / whatsapp_cloud adapters, and both call sites test the flag. Removes the `if not aiohttp is not None:` double negation left by inlining `_aiohttp_available()`. - tools/mcp_tool_sampling.py: `call_context` defaults to `lambda: None` so the use site is a single call instead of an Optional guard; the only None caller was a test. The `from __future__ import annotations` was noise (`Context` is a runtime import). Comment names the actual cycle (mcp_tool_server_run imports this module). - gateway/platforms/helpers.py: drop the `from __future__ import annotations` — the only MessageEvent annotations are attribute-target locals, which are never evaluated. - tests/gateway/test_telegram_audio_vs_voice.py, test_video_context_note.py: module-level `from gateway.run import GatewayRunner` like the ~100 sibling files; the TYPE_CHECKING block + `# type: ignore[name-defined]` were contradicting each other. (tests/e2e/conftest.py and test_feishu.py keep TYPE_CHECKING deliberately: they stub telegram/discord before importing, and FeishuAdapter is gated on optional lark_oapi.) Mutation check: neutralising the thunk read (`captured = None`) fails test_captured_context_is_replayed_in_consent_call; restored → 14/14 green. ty on the three touched production files vs origin/main: 0 new, 6 resolved.	2026-09-07 22:47:33 +05:30
kshitijk4poor	ab2f4602de	refactor: MessageEvent to gateway/platforms/event.py; ElicitationHandler takes a call_context thunk ... Breaks the two import cycles that forced Protocol stand-ins in the F821 sweep, so the two sites now name the real types. gateway/platforms/event.py (new leaf): MessageType, ProcessingOutcome, MessageEvent moved out of base.py verbatim. Their only dependency is gateway.session.SessionSource; base.py imported helpers.py at module level, so helpers could not name MessageEvent. Now TextBatchAggregator is typed by the real MessageEvent. 249 importers repointed (`from gateway.platforms.base import` -> `.event`, preserving each import's layout); gateway.platforms.__init__ re-exports from .event. The three revert-scheduled PLUGIN-COMPAT pointers that named these symbols (gateway.slash_commands → MessageType, dingtalk → MessageType, photon → ProcessingOutcome) and their COMPAT_MANIFEST rows now target gateway.platforms.event. Docs updated: ADDING_A_PLATFORM.md, adding-platform-adapters.md (en + zh-Hans). tools/mcp_tool_sampling.py: ElicitationHandler no longer holds a back-reference to its MCPServerTask (mcp_tool imports sampling, so the task type cannot be named there). It only ever read owner._pending_call_context, so it takes `call_context: Callable[[], Context | None]` and MCPServerTask passes `lambda: self._pending_call_context`. The consent call is one `functools.partial`, run directly or inside the captured Context. ty on the 11 touched production files vs origin/main: 0 new diagnostics, 14 resolved. (The one `source: SessionSource = None` diagnostic moves with the class; typing it Optional exposes ~60 unguarded call sites — separate follow-up.) Tests: tests/gateway + tests/plugins + tests/tools + touched files, 18,235 passed; the 31 failures reproduce identically on origin/main (macOS /private/tmp, systemd socket, long-path fixtures, live-service tests).	2026-09-07 22:47:33 +05:30
kshitijk4poor	c5ff900761	fix: resolve the 33 F821 undefined names outside tui_gateway / feishu / godmode ... Sweep of `ruff check . --select F821 --target-version py311`: 2,234 hits. 2,201 are left alone on purpose: tui_gateway (2,169; bind_module rebinds bodies onto server.py globals, all names verified to resolve there), the Feishu adapter (27; globals().update() SDK binding) and the godmode script (5; dead standalone script). The other 33 were all genuine defects. No lint config change; no TYPE_CHECKING escape hatches — every annotation names a real, imported type; ty on the touched files: 0 new diagnostics. - gateway/slash_commands.py: HISTORY_UNREADABLE never imported after #102117 → NameError on the /btw error branch (same one-liner as #102952). - gateway/platforms/whatsapp_common.py: `-> Path` return annotation with no Path import (the body uses `_Path`). Never raised at runtime thanks to `from __future__ import annotations`, but `typing.get_type_hints()` and ty both fail on it. - gateway/run.py: ActivityProvenance imported at module level (agent.session_activity has no gateway deps); stringly annotation and the lazy in-function import are gone. - tools/patch_parser.py: PatchResult imported at module level; real return annotation. The "avoid circular import" lazy import guarded a cycle that does not exist (file_operations_common never imports patch_parser). - gateway/platforms/helpers.py: base.py imports helpers at module level, so MessageEvent cannot be named here; TextBatchAggregator only reads .text and .source, so it is typed by a BatchableEvent Protocol that MessageEvent satisfies structurally. - tools/mcp_tool_sampling.py: mcp_tool imports this module, so MCPServerTask cannot be named here; ElicitationHandler only reads owner._pending_call_context, typed by an ElicitationOwner Protocol. - plugins/platforms/sms/adapter.py: aiohttp is an optional dep ([messaging] extra) → module-level try/except ImportError binding `aiohttp = web = None`, the pattern the homeassistant / webhook / whatsapp_cloud adapters already use. Retires three lazy in-function imports and the `_aiohttp_available()` wrapper; `_handle_webhook` typed `web.Request -> web.Response`. - plugins/platforms/teams/summary_writer.py: plain module-level `import httpx` — httpx is a hard core dependency (pyproject `httpx[socks]==0.28.1`), so the lazy import and the "imported on every CLI start" docstring premise were both wrong (plugin discovery never imports this module; it is reached only via the Teams adapter / meeting pipeline). Tests: - tests/hermes_cli/test_config.py: a test body orphaned by the wave-1 prune (6b81590c55) sat inside the class as dead code with self/tmp_path unbound — header restored, so the v11→12 custom_providers migration is covered. - tests/tools/test_mcp_tool.py: @staticmethod recursing on `self` in the win32 branch; call portalocker directly. - tests/test_background_review_list_shapes.py: main() still ran 3 pruned tests. - tests/agent/test_cursor_optimizations_parity.py: bench() used names only imported inside a sibling test. - GatewayRunner / FeishuAdapter / Dict / Optional: missing imports.	2026-09-07 22:47:33 +05:30
Teknium	39ed610f8c	feat(cron): create paused jobs without a scheduling race ... Persist paused state, timestamp, reason and no first trigger in the original locked creation write. Forward the same boolean contract across CLI, tool, gateway API and dashboard API, validating at the store boundary. Preserve explicit operator force-run behavior and normal enabled creation. The live CLI probe also caught the command shim dropping failure return codes; forward them so invalid creation reports exit 1 rather than success. Credit earlier atomic-creation work in #78935 and #94952 and the focused implementation in #104578. The broader manifest staging layer is not imported. Co-authored-by: Konstantin Khlopkov <konstantin.khlopkov93@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Chloé DuPont <321112755+misschloedupont@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-07 08:27:50 -07:00
Teknium	9af6e9fc8b	fix: coalesce interactive completion backlogs without losing identity ... Based on the earliest batching proposal by BrunoBza (#104686) and JoaoMarcos44 structured correction (#104703). Slim redo into topical siblings and shared TUI poller/post-turn routing. Reported by Xipong (#104671). Local shell-to-loopback probes demonstrate 12 to 1 turn dispatches; suites await the campaign test lock. Co-authored-by: joaomarcos <joaomarcosdias444@gmail.com>	2026-09-07 08:27:07 -07:00
Teknium	1735ccde44	fix(tools): always redact durable process receipts	2026-09-07 08:25:33 -07:00
Teknium	0522ae934e	fix(tools): retain producer profile scope in process readers	2026-09-07 08:25:33 -07:00
Teknium	fbed1d4584	fix(tools): keep retained terminal results scoped to their owner ... Capture the durable parent session before output readers start, including CLI and non-notifying spawns. Require that parent or its compression continuation for retained reads; exact and prefix handles alone do not authorize access. Live Linux terminal/one-shot linger/fresh-reader A/B: base loses results; updated owner recovers both streams and exit 7. Unbound, foreign session, delegated child, and other profile cannot recover the receipt. No notifications are replayed. Full tools suite is queued behind the campaign test lock. Follow-up to contributor salvage #104805 for #104511.	2026-09-07 08:25:33 -07:00
maximilliangrand	1770825481	fix(tools): register readers atomically with completion	2026-09-07 08:25:33 -07:00
maximilliangrand	633955408b	fix(tools): keep retained result reads off live status scans	2026-09-07 08:25:33 -07:00
maximilliangrand	b72e373e23	fix(tools): retain completed background process results across exit	2026-09-07 08:25:33 -07:00
maximilliangrand	5695ebc40f	refactor(tools): extract process checkpoint persistence	2026-09-07 08:25:33 -07:00
Teknium	f94307a7f7	fix: ignore malformed MCP OAuth metadata caches ... Guard device metadata subtype selection with a dictionary check so valid non-object JSON reaches the existing validation-and-ignore path. Preserve null handling, cache contents, and normal/device metadata cold-load types. Extend the existing corrupt-cache invariant rather than adding test functions. Live filesystem A/B reproduces list/string/number/boolean AttributeError on the prior head and clean ignore after this change. Nine CLI OAuth wire scenarios, browser S256 and profile-scoped storage controls pass locally.	2026-09-07 08:22:35 -07:00
Teknium	965f18b02f	fix: restore prior device OAuth state if persistence fails	2026-09-07 08:22:35 -07:00
Teknium	f5afe8bd40	feat: authorize MCP servers with device codes from the CLI ... Add explicit RFC 8628 device login and oauth.flow selection while keeping browser PKCE and the SDK runtime refresh path. Reuse issuer/resource validation, configured client authentication and profile-scoped storage. Only persist an approved, validated grant; never echo endpoint error bodies. Slim redo of #104752 by @wjorgensen, replacing duplicate HTTP/storage wrappers with the existing SDK and two real-wire invariant tests. Refs #104742 Co-authored-by: Wes Hermes <weshermes@Wess-Mac-mini.localdomain>	2026-09-07 08:22:35 -07:00
Teknium	e1a161538a	fix(cron): make failed runs diagnosable without verbose delivery errors ... Persist a redacted chained traceback in the private run output and expose redacted last_error in tool and slash listings, including historical errors. Keep the run_job concise error return unchanged for delivery classification. Slim redo of liuhao1024's earliest #104545; adds forced redaction and keeps formatting in a topical sibling. Local SDK/socket A/B verifies diagnosis visibility plus healthy-script, clearing, and private-file controls. Canonical tests queued under the campaign lock at commit time. Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <sunsky.lau@gmail.com>	2026-09-07 08:18:56 -07:00
Teknium	549e6aab38	fix(bot-mode): preserve refusal reasons across local delivery ... Emit the one-shot reason marker outside the CLI facade; parse whole codes before falling back to legacy prose. Explicit coordination and unknown codes cannot be labeled target_busy. Fixes #104784 Co-authored-by: William Echo <2054936695@qq.com>	2026-09-07 08:15:32 -07:00
Teknium	8aaf1aca62	fix(schemas): preserve required intent without invalid boolean flags ... Normalize boolean required only at schema positions; lift true property flags into parent arrays. Preserve literal default/const/extension data. Fixes #104796 Inspired by #104831 and the lifting proposal by @AdJIa.	2026-09-07 08:14:51 -07:00
Teknium	7876d183c9	fix(approval): recover legacy list values without character grants ... Recover legacy stringified lists with a warning. Reject malformed shapes and nonstring members without admitting approvals or rewriting user config on read. Fixes #104779 Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <sunsky.lau@gmail.com>	2026-09-07 08:13:38 -07:00
Teknium	5904c7a395	fix(threats): keep unrelated role prose in context files ... Salvage the bounded target-slot design from #104617, using mandatory word separators to avoid ambiguous repeated matches. Preserve long payload detection and execution-verb boundaries. Replace the three candidate tests with two context-loader invariants and document the heuristic's limits. Fixes #104609 Co-authored-by: Konstantin Khlopkov <konstantin.khlopkov93@gmail.com>	2026-09-07 08:09:20 -07:00
Teknium	b578261584	fix: keep Kanban worker scope out of descendant processes ... Carry the existing write fence across Hermes-owned spawn boundaries without dropping board routing or changing credential policy. Grant dispatcher and managed tool runtimes explicit task scope; align CLI task mutations with tools. Verify real shell/CLI descendants, dispatcher startup, and supervised stdio transport against isolated SQLite boards. This is cooperative runtime scoping, not OS confinement. Refs #103974, #104058, #104904	2026-09-07 07:10:28 -07:00
Teknium	9745a7f0f1	fix(terminal): show sudo password prompts for paths and env prefixes	2026-09-07 07:09:30 -07:00
Teknium	727c2d7525	fix: accept the live ClawHub version-list response shape	2026-09-07 07:05:59 -07:00
Teknium	76de6ec5a8	fix: retain ClawHub owner through version and bundle requests	2026-09-07 07:05:59 -07:00
liuhao1024	f986a2b103	fix(skills): pass the ClawHub owner hint as ?owner= so ambiguous slugs resolve ... ClawHub's detail endpoint now answers a slug claimed by multiple owners with 409 AMBIGUOUS_SKILL_SLUG; the bare GET in _skill_detail returned None for every such slug, so 'skills install clawhub/@owner/slug' (and the owner/skills/slug URL form) failed at fetch time even though the requester already knew the owner (#104117). - _skill_detail forwards expected_owner as the ?owner= query param on the detail GET (params already flows through _get_json's **kwargs). - _parse_identifier also accepts the clawhub/@owner/slug combination: the @ surfaces only after the clawhub/ prefix is stripped, so the had_at check now re-runs on the stripped form. GitHub-style owner/repo/skill paths stay rejected.	2026-09-07 07:05:59 -07:00
Teknium	05315a6f26	fix: keep pagination signature inspection local and preserve exact decoder error	2026-09-07 07:04:52 -07:00
holny	55c223e247	fix(mcp): probe the list signature instead of masking its TypeError (#104150) ... _paginate_full_list wrapped the paginated list call in try/except TypeError to detect the mcp 1.x calling convention. The same except also caught TypeErrors raised INSIDE the modern list call — e.g. a server response decode failure — and retried with the legacy cursor= keyword, replacing the real error with a misleading 'unexpected keyword argument cursor' and making genuine MCP pagination failures undiagnosable. Probe list_method's signature instead (_list_method_accepts_params): the legacy cursor= fallback fires only when the method genuinely doesn't accept the mcp 2.0 params= keyword (or takes **kwargs), so a TypeError from inside the list call propagates to the caller. Regression tests: the decode TypeError surfaces and the legacy retry doesn't run; a genuinely 1.x-shaped method keeps using the cursor fallback.	2026-09-07 07:04:52 -07:00
Teknium	ae9cd7073e	fix(delegation): keep the 'wait or poll' contract token in the tool description	2026-09-07 06:46:54 -07:00
Teknium	c89f3b8800	fix(delegation): one completion per call by default; queued units no longer stalled; tell the model results land between turns ... Three orchestrator failures traced through the Sep 7 gpt-6-astra campaign sessions: 1. delegation.independent_completions (new, default false). #104299 made every ungrouped task its own completion message, so a 15-task call woke the orchestrator up to 15 times; one chain received 132 notices and answered 130 of them with "already incorporated". A multi-task call now returns as ONE consolidated message unless the flag is on; `group` is inert until then. 2. Queued units were killed before they started. Units of one call share a pool slot but the executor was still sized by slots, so with 15 units live a new unit queued behind a full pool; the stale monitor's clock ran from dispatch, interrupted it at 450 s, and the child exited `interrupted 0.02s` when its thread finally came up (13 such lanes in one session). The executor now grows to the number of live units and the stall clock arms when the runner actually starts. 3. The tool text said "do not wait or poll — just continue" without saying that completions are delivered only BETWEEN turns. A model that never ends its turn (one 203-minute turn, 717 API calls) never received 40 finished results. Tool description, dispatch note and completion header now say to finish independent work, give a one-line status, and end the turn.	2026-09-07 06:46:54 -07:00
liuhao1024	14b9b93668	fix(deps): sync LAZY_DEPS platform.discord brotlicffi pin to 1.2.0.2 ... The previous commit bumped pyproject.toml and uv.lock but missed the LAZY_DEPS exact pin for platform.discord, so test_pyproject_pins_match_lazy_deps_pins and test_every_lazy_deps_exact_pin_matches_uv_lock fail with {'brotlicffi': {'platform.discord': {'lazy_pin': '1.2.0.1', 'uv_lock': ['1.2.0.2']}}}. Update the third registration site to keep all three in lockstep.	2026-09-07 06:35:14 -07:00
Teknium	fd3565deec	fix: remove dedicated user-facing output cap controls	2026-09-07 06:15:43 -07:00