Real catalog pins from the 2026-09-20 intake batch scored on text that cannot run on
the installing host:
1. `.github/workflows/*.yml` — a CI step's own `os.environ['RUNNER_TEMP']` read scored
`python_os_environ/high` and made a clean plugin `caution` (remarkable). A workflow
runs on the forge's runner; it now takes the README prose cap (one step down,
agent-facing shapes like `curl | sh` keep full severity).
2. "pip install" inside a user-facing message literal (`"... no pip install is needed"`,
image-utils) scored `unpinned_pip_install/medium`; mid-literal, non-command position,
no exec verb on the line → low. `"pip install x"`, `python -m pip install`, `uv pip`,
`subprocess.run("pip install …")` keep medium.
3. `desktop_surface_findings()` was being run by batch tooling over every `*.js`/`*.mjs`
in a repo and flagged a Node sidecar's lazy `import('jszip')` (remarkable). The
product check was already scoped to `desktop/`; expose that scope as
`is_desktop_surface()` / `desktop_surface_hits()` so tooling shares it.
4. `127.0.0.1:<port>` (README, .mcp.json, client defaults) scored `hardcoded_ip_port` as
network egress; a line whose every IP:port is loopback → low. A routable address on
the line keeps medium.
Every finding stays in the report. PLUGIN_SCANNER_VERSION → plugin-guard-v8 so cached
verdicts on quarantined pins are re-evaluated.
Desktop lint: /<script[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi in a feed sanitiser scored as
'script injection' and failed pinned-source-validate for rss-reader. Mask
JS regex literals for the markup-shaped rule only; <script in a string
literal (an innerHTML payload) and createElement('script') still fail.
Install scanner: "printenv" as a whole-string entry of a read-only
allowlist (frozenset({..., "printenv"})) fired dump_all_env high →
caution on hermes-jev. Extend the literal-token demotion: a token that is
the ENTIRE quoted literal on a line that executes nothing steps down like
an alternation member; "sudo" inside subprocess.run([...]) and
os.system("printenv") keep high.
A/B vs origin/main: attack probes identical (23 rows), in-tree sweep 319
entries 0 worse/0 changed; both new tests red on base. Bumps
PLUGIN_SCANNER_VERSION to v6 so cached caution verdicts refresh.
Signed-off-by: teknium1 <teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
A desktop/plugin.js is evaluated in the Electron renderer with the app's
full authority; the runtime loader documents itself as error isolation
only and says a remote source must not reuse it without a boundary. The
catalog is that remote source, so admission now fails a plugin whose
desktop code patches prototypes, uses eval/new Function, dynamically
imports anything but the SDK (app chunks, blob/http URLs), or injects
script tags. Against the 18 desktop plugins in the current sweep the lint
passes 17 and fails the one the security review flagged for exactly these
moves. Policy written down in plugin-catalog/README.md rule 8 and the
user-facing catalog doc.
