The multiplex gateway imports plugins/platforms/matrix/adapter.py once, so
the module-level _STORE_DIR/_CRYPTO_DB_PATH resolved against the root
HERMES_HOME for every profile: all bots' Olm identities landed in one
crypto.db and inbound E2EE failed with "no session found" (#89168).
connect() runs inside _profile_runtime_scope, so resolve the store dir
there via get_hermes_dir (honors the context-local HERMES_HOME) and cache
it on the instance -- diagnostics and error-log paths read outside the
scope then still report the store actually in use. Mirrors the
pairing-store fix (a6397c379).
Salvage of #89169 (per-call resolvers collapsed into one cached resolve;
dead `_CRYPTO_DB_PATH = None` alias dropped -- no external importers).
Also routes the last raw MATRIX_HOMESERVER read in check_matrix_requirements
through _startup_env_secret like its token/password neighbours (#69943).
Fixes#89168
Co-authored-by: Michael Short <18595461+mjshorty@users.noreply.github.com>
Same class as #100627's WECOM_BOT_ID: the one remaining raw os.getenv in
WeComAdapter.__init__ let a secondary multiplex profile pick up the
default profile's bridged websocket URL. Route it through
_get_scoped_secret; folded into the existing scoped-miss test.
SimplexAdapter.__init__ (auto_accept, group_allowed), the registry gates
check_requirements/validate_config/is_connected, _env_enablement and
_standalone_send all read SIMPLEX_* via raw os.getenv. Under
gateway.multiplex_profiles those paths run inside a secondary profile's
scope where os.environ holds the DEFAULT profile's YAML-to-env bridge
output -- so a secondary profile that never configured SimpleX was
auto-enabled on the default's daemon URL and inherited its group
allowlist / auto-accept setting.
Route every read through the module-local `_get_scoped_secret` wrapper
(get_secret; UnscopedSecretError -> os.getenv for the default profile,
which constructs unscoped) -- the same helper the IRC/ntfy/Photon/
Mattermost siblings use. Unlike the extra-only `_scoped_platform_setting`
shape proposed in #100241, this honors BOTH the secondary profile's own
.env (the scope) and its config.yaml extra, and needs no config.yaml
re-read in check_requirements.
Rewrite of #100241.
Co-authored-by: nftpoetrist <264138787+nftpoetrist@users.noreply.github.com>
WeComAdapter.__init__ read WECOM_BOT_ID via a raw os.getenv() call, while
the immediately adjacent line for WECOM_SECRET already used the module's
_get_scoped_secret() helper. Under gateway.multiplex_profiles, a secondary
profile's adapter is constructed inside a scoped context where os.environ
still holds the DEFAULT profile's env-bridge output -- so a secondary
profile's bot would silently connect using the default profile's bot_id
while (correctly) using its own secret, or vice versa on a scope miss.
Switch the bot_id read to _get_scoped_secret(), matching the sibling
_secret/_dm_policy/_group_policy/allow_from reads in the same __init__
that were already migrated in #76664/#93545. _standalone_send's
out-of-process fallback branch constructs a fresh WeComAdapter(pconfig)
and therefore inherits this fix automatically -- no separate change
needed there.
Adds two regression tests to the existing TestWeComAdapterAuthzScope
class (already covering dm_policy/allow_from scoping per #93522),
mirroring its established fixture/assertion style. Mutation-verified:
both fail against the pre-fix code (asserting the default profile's
bot_id leaks into a secondary profile's scope) and pass with the fix.
MattermostAdapter.__init__, validate_mattermost_config, _standalone_send,
and _handle_ws_event's mention-gating block all read MATTERMOST_URL/
MATTERMOST_REPLY_MODE/MATTERMOST_REQUIRE_MENTION/
MATTERMOST_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS/MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_CHANNELS via raw
os.getenv -- only MATTERMOST_TOKEN was already scoped via
_get_scoped_secret. _apply_yaml_config additionally wrote
MATTERMOST_REQUIRE_MENTION/MATTERMOST_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS/
MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_CHANNELS into the process-global os.environ
unconditionally (guarded only by `not os.getenv(...)`, first-writer-wins),
the same apply_yaml_config_fn bug class already fixed for the
Discord/Telegram/WhatsApp/DingTalk adapters in this series.
Under gateway.multiplex_profiles, os.environ holds the DEFAULT profile's
env-bridge output. A secondary profile with its own (or no) Mattermost
config could silently connect to the default profile's server, thread
its replies per the default profile's reply_mode, or -- since
_handle_ws_event's mention-gating block runs on every LIVE inbound
message, not just at construction -- have its require_mention/
free_response_channels/allowed_channels decisions driven by the default
profile's settings for the adapter's entire runtime lifetime.
Fix, mirroring the WhatsApp/DingTalk apply_yaml_config_fn pattern:
- Add _profile_scoped_config_load() (same helper as DingTalk).
- Rewrite _apply_yaml_config to skip the env-bridge write under a
multiplexed secondary profile's scope, and instead return the YAML
values as a dict merged into this profile's own PlatformConfig.extra.
- Make require_mention/free_response_channels read extra first (matching
the existing allowed_channels precedent), falling back to
_get_scoped_secret() instead of raw os.getenv when extra is absent --
fixing a residual gap the DingTalk fix (#100615, this series' item 6)
left in its own analogous extra-first-with-raw-fallback read sites
(_dingtalk_require_mention et al. still fall back to bare os.getenv).
- Switch __init__'s url/reply_mode, validate_mattermost_config's url, and
_standalone_send's url to _get_scoped_secret().
- Leave check_mattermost_requirements() (no longer reads any MATTERMOST_*
var on current main -- just an aiohttp-importability probe) and
_is_connected() (already scope-aware via hermes_cli.gateway.get_env_value,
which itself routes through agent.secret_scope.get_secret) untouched.
Adds a new TestMultiplexProfileScope class to tests/gateway/test_mattermost.py
(7 tests) mirroring the fixture/assertion style established in
tests/gateway/test_line_plugin.py's TestMultiplexProfileScope, plus two
tests exercising _apply_yaml_config's new seeded-dict return directly.
Mutation-verified: stashed the production fix and confirmed 5 of 7 new
tests fail against pre-fix code (the other 2 are non-differentiating
regression guards -- extra-wins-over-env and unscoped-default-profile-
precedence -- which correctly pass either way). Restored the fix;
all 30 tests in the file, the plugin-setup test, and the full 75-test
tests/gateway/test_adapter_startup_secret_scope.py suite pass.
PhotonAdapter.__init__, check_requirements, validate_config,
_env_enablement, _markdown_enabled, _reactions_enabled, and
_standalone_send in adapter.py, plus load_project_credentials and
load_dashboard_project_id in auth.py, all read PHOTON_PROJECT_ID/
PHOTON_NODE_BIN/PHOTON_SIDECAR_PORT/PHOTON_SIDECAR_AUTOSTART/
PHOTON_PROBE_*/PHOTON_REQUIRE_MENTION/PHOTON_MENTION_PATTERNS/
PHOTON_REACTIONS/PHOTON_MARKDOWN/PHOTON_HOME_CHANNEL(_NAME)/
PHOTON_DASHBOARD_PROJECT_ID via raw os.getenv -- only
PHOTON_PROJECT_SECRET and PHOTON_SIDECAR_TOKEN were already scoped via
_get_scoped_secret.
Notably __init__'s project_id read was a stronger variant of the bug
(like the IRC fix in this series, item 11): the original
`os.getenv("PHOTON_PROJECT_ID") or extra.get("project_id") or stored_id`
ordering let a raw env read override even an explicitly configured
config.yaml extra -- a secondary profile that set its own project_id via
extra would still silently authenticate against the default profile's
Spectrum project, because the default profile's project id is always
bridged to os.environ under multiplex and env was checked first.
_reactions_enabled() and the require_mention/mention_patterns reads in
__init__ are exercised on every live inbound message / tapback, not just
at construction, so a secondary profile's reaction/mention-gating
behavior would be driven by the default profile's settings for the
adapter's entire runtime lifetime.
Switch every raw PHOTON_* read (except the two already scoped) to
_get_scoped_secret(), matching the module's existing helper (already
defined identically in both adapter.py and auth.py). Left
_dashboard_host()/_spectrum_host() and the interactive device-login flow
functions in auth.py untouched -- these are CLI-only management-plane
calls (`hermes photon login`/`setup`), not part of the gateway's
per-profile adapter construction/connection lifecycle, so they are not
reachable under a multiplexed secondary profile's scope; noted as a
"Scope note" in the PR body rather than silently expanding scope to
unreachable call sites.
Adds a new tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_multiplex_profile_scope.py
(9 tests, two classes covering auth.py and adapter.py separately)
mirroring the fixture/assertion style established in
tests/gateway/test_line_plugin.py's TestMultiplexProfileScope, reusing
test_auth.py's tmp_hermes_home isolation pattern so tests don't depend on
the real ~/.hermes/auth.json fallback. Mutation-verified: stashed the
production fix and confirmed 7 of 9 new tests fail against pre-fix code
(the other 2 are non-differentiating regression guards -- unscoped-
default-profile-precedence, one per class -- which correctly pass either
way). Restored the fix; all 140 tests in tests/plugins/platforms/photon/,
the 10 photon-related parametrized tests in
test_adapter_startup_secret_scope.py, and the broader
test_multiplex_adapter_registry.py / test_adapter_connect_classification.py
suites (45 tests) pass.
NtfyAdapter.__init__, _env_enablement, check_requirements, validate_config,
is_connected, and _standalone_send all read NTFY_SERVER_URL/NTFY_TOPIC/
NTFY_PUBLISH_TOPIC/NTFY_MARKDOWN/NTFY_HOME_CHANNEL(_NAME) via raw os.getenv
-- only NTFY_TOKEN already went through the module's _get_scoped_secret
helper. Under gateway.multiplex_profiles, env_enablement_fn/check_fn/
is_connected all run inside the registry-enablement loop in
load_gateway_config() (confirmed in gateway/config.py, lines ~2704-2820,
inside _profile_runtime_scope for secondary profiles), and adapter
construction likewise runs scoped -- so os.environ there still holds the
DEFAULT profile's env-bridge output. A secondary profile with its own (or
no) ntfy topic configured could silently:
- get auto-enabled via _env_enablement()/is_connected() using the default
profile's topic, even though it never configured ntfy itself
- have its adapter subscribe to / publish on the default profile's topic
and server instead of (or in addition to) its own
- deliver cron/send_message_tool messages via _standalone_send to the
wrong topic
Switch every raw NTFY_* read (except the two secret-material fields
already scoped: NTFY_TOKEN) to _get_scoped_secret(), matching the
established helper already defined in this module and used for
NTFY_TOKEN, and the same pattern applied to the sibling LINE/DingTalk/
Teams/SMS/WeCom adapters in this series.
Adds a new TestMultiplexProfileScope class to tests/gateway/test_ntfy_plugin.py
(7 tests) mirroring the fixture/assertion style established in
tests/gateway/test_line_plugin.py's TestMultiplexProfileScope. Mutation-
verified: stashed the production fix and confirmed 5 of the 7 new tests
fail against pre-fix code (the other 2 are non-differentiating regression
guards -- extra-wins-over-env and unscoped-default-profile-precedence --
which correctly pass either way); restored the fix and confirmed all 37
tests in the file, plus the file's 5 parametrized _get_scoped_secret tests
in test_adapter_startup_secret_scope.py, pass.
IRCAdapter.__init__, check_requirements, validate_config, is_connected,
_env_enablement, and _standalone_send all read IRC_SERVER/IRC_PORT/
IRC_NICKNAME/IRC_CHANNEL/IRC_USE_TLS via raw os.getenv -- only
IRC_SERVER_PASSWORD/IRC_NICKSERV_PASSWORD already went through the
module's _get_scoped_secret helper. Under gateway.multiplex_profiles,
env_enablement_fn/check_fn/is_connected all run inside the registry-
enablement loop in load_gateway_config() (gateway/config.py, ~lines
2704-2820), scoped for secondary profiles via _profile_runtime_scope,
and adapter construction runs scoped the same way -- so os.environ there
still holds the DEFAULT profile's env-bridge output.
Notably, __init__'s original `os.getenv("IRC_SERVER") or extra.get(...)`
ordering let a raw env read override even an explicitly configured
config.yaml extra -- a secondary profile that set its own server/channel
via config.yaml extra would still silently connect to the default
profile's IRC server/channel/nick if the default profile bridged its own
config to env (which it always does under multiplex). This is a stronger
variant of the same bug fixed for the sibling LINE/DingTalk/Teams/SMS/
WeCom/ntfy adapters in this series -- there, extra already won because
of the `extra.get(...) or os.getenv(...)` order.
Switch every raw IRC_* read (except IRC_SERVER_PASSWORD/
IRC_NICKSERV_PASSWORD, already scoped) to _get_scoped_secret(), matching
the module's existing helper. Also collapses a double os.getenv("IRC_USE_TLS")
read in __init__ into a single _get_scoped_secret() call (same behavior,
one scope lookup instead of two).
Adds a new TestMultiplexProfileScope class to tests/gateway/test_irc_adapter.py
(6 tests) mirroring the fixture/assertion style established in
tests/gateway/test_line_plugin.py's TestMultiplexProfileScope. Mutation-
verified: stashed the production fix and confirmed 5 of 6 new tests fail
against pre-fix code -- including the "extra wins" test, since IRC's
original env-first ordering meant even an explicit extra config was not
a safe differentiator boundary before the fix (only the DEFAULT-profile-
unscoped-precedence test is a non-differentiating regression guard that
correctly passes either way). Restored the fix; all 23 tests in the file
pass, plus the file's 5 parametrized _get_scoped_secret tests in
test_adapter_startup_secret_scope.py.
ThreadingHTTPServer request threads do not inherit the gateway's profile
ContextVars, so security.authenticate()/is_trusted_peer() read the
process-global A2A_* env on every request — every secondary profile's
listener authenticated against the default profile's tokens. Capture an
immutable A2ASecurityContext at adapter construction (which runs inside
_profile_runtime_scope for secondary profiles) and have the request
handler consult it instead of re-reading env per request.
Salvage note: the original `get_secret() / except UnscopedSecretError:
os.getenv()` fallthrough in _startup_env was replaced by _profile_scoped()
gating (Buzz/Raft pattern) — inside a secondary profile's scope the scope
is authoritative and a miss never falls through to os.environ.
Salvaged from #80956.
A2AAdapter.__init__ / _default_agent_name / _load_served_agents read
A2A_PORT, A2A_AGENT_NAME and A2A_AGENT_DESCRIPTION from raw os.environ,
so a secondary multiplex profile borrowed the default profile's port and
Agent Card identity. Skip the env read when constructed inside a
secondary profile's scope (_profile_scoped(), #98738 pattern) and fall
to config.extra / module defaults instead. The default profile keeps its
unscoped env precedence.
Salvaged from #100382 (tests trimmed to two).
_spawn_bridge, _env_enablement and register()'s platform_hint read
RAFT_PROFILE via raw os.environ. Under a multiplexed secondary profile
os.environ holds the DEFAULT profile's bridged value, so the bridge
subprocess / CLI hint pointed at another profile's Raft identity.
Resolve through get_secret() only when running inside a secondary
profile's scope (Buzz/SimpleX _profile_scoped() pattern, #98738); the
default profile keeps its unscoped os.environ read. No fallthrough to
os.environ after a scoped miss.
Salvaged from #100392 (tests trimmed to two).
Route every GOOGLE_CHAT_* / GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS read through a
module-local `_get_scoped_secret` (scope-authoritative under multiplex,
os.environ fallback only for the unscoped default-profile constructor, so
startup/reconnect never hits UnscopedSecretError — #70652 class). Snapshot
Pub/Sub callback knobs on the instance while the scope is still installed,
and seed them into `extra` from `_env_enablement`.
When a scoped profile has no service-account setting, do NOT fall through
to google.auth.default(): ADC reads the process env directly and would
authenticate the profile as another profile's SA. Fail closed with an
explicit error (adapter and standalone send).
Also resolve the bot-id cache path at call time via get_hermes_home() so
profiles don't share one identity cache.
Fixes#73439.
Salvaged from #73445 (Jony) with the ADC guard from #57674 (Ray, first submitter).
Co-authored-by: Ray <rayjun0412@gmail.com>
lark_oapi.ws.client keeps the asyncio loop used by Client.start() in a
module-level global, and Hermes monkey-patched websockets.connect on the
shared module. Under multiplex every profile runs its own WS client on a
dedicated thread, so N threads overwrote each other's globals
(last-write-wins): clients scheduled tasks on a sibling's loop ('Future
attached to a different loop') or bound to the wrong loop and went deaf.
Install process-wide shims once: the module loop becomes a proxy that
forwards to the calling thread's registered loop, and websockets.connect
a dispatcher merging the calling thread's ping overrides. Add a per-adapter
supervisor: the executor future was only awaited by disconnect(), so a
dead WS thread left the profile silently deaf; now it is rebuilt with
capped exponential backoff while the adapter is meant to be connected.
Salvaged from PR #84165, trimmed: the legacy fallback path when the shim
cannot install was dropped (the shim only touches two attributes the
adapter already depended on); tests reduced to three. The loop-isolation
approach was first proposed by @zmlgit in #64247/#69904.
Co-authored-by: zmlgit <6995990+zmlgit@users.noreply.github.com>
Route FEISHU_ALLOW_BOTS, FEISHU_GROUP_POLICY, FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS,
FEISHU_BOT_*, FEISHU_APP_ID and FEISHU_REQUIRE_MENTION through
_get_scoped_secret, and snapshot FEISHU_ALLOW_ALL_USERS /
GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS into settings.allow_all_dm at construct time so
_admit (running on the lark_oapi WS thread, no secret scope) no longer
reads the default profile's os.environ. Feishu open_ids are app-scoped,
so a secondary bot's DMs were always dm_policy_rejected against the
default profile's allow-list.
Salvaged from PR #86908 trimmed to the adapter call-site migration; the
fail-closed _get_scoped_secret / _auth_env rewrites are already on main
(2912c36aa4, agent/secret_scope.py get_secret policy).
`SlackAdapter._is_interactive_user_authorized` (approval / slash-confirm /
clarify Block Kit clicks) and the early pre-fetch gate in the message
handler recovered the runner via `_message_handler.__self__`, which is
None on a multiplexed adapter (closure handler) — so both fell to env-only
auth. The fallback read `SLACK_ALLOW_ALL_USERS` raw from `os.environ` and
its `_env` helper fell through to `os.environ` on a scoped miss: the
DEFAULT profile's allow-all flag / allowlist authorized callers on every
other profile's bot.
- Prefer the wired `set_authorization_check` callback (profile-bound
`_make_adapter_auth_check`) at both sites; keep `__self__` introspection
only for adapters wired without one.
- Env-only fallback reads go through `authz_mixin._platform_gate_env`
(scoped miss under multiplex → "", never os.environ); drop the raw
`os.getenv("SLACK_ALLOW_ALL_USERS")` pre-read.
Reapplies #72657 onto current main (original commit carried a bot
co-author trailer). Same class as Telegram #86296 / #65589.
Co-authored-by: MilaArtyNew <261982280+MilaArtyNew@users.noreply.github.com>
Under `multiplex_profiles` the primary adapter's message handler is a
profile closure, so the Telegram inline-button gate (and the early
message prefilter) cannot recover the runner via `_message_handler.__self__`
and fell to env-only auth. #65589 made the gate prefer the injected
`_authorization_check`, but `_make_adapter_auth_check` built a bare
`(user_id, chat_type, chat_id)` source: never route-stamped, never
`is_bot`.
- `_make_adapter_auth_check`: for the shared primary adapter under
multiplex, mirror the inbound message path exactly — stamp the
`profile_routes` match so the routed profile's pairing store is
consulted, and authorize under the TRANSPORT home via
`_is_user_authorized_for_source` (same split as
`_make_default_profile_message_handler`, 2afed50863). A rejected route
fails closed like the ingress gate. Retain the receiving adapter as
`_transport_adapter_ref` so config.yaml policy reads stay on it.
Accept `is_bot` / `thread_id` keywords. (#86296)
- `BasePlatformAdapter._is_sender_authorized`: forward `is_bot` /
`thread_id` as keywords only when set, so legacy 3-positional callbacks
keep working.
- Telegram `_source_from_message_for_auth` carries `from_user.is_bot`;
the prefilter forwards it so `TELEGRAM_ALLOW_BOTS=mentions|all` is
honored at the early gate under multiplex. (#92840)
- Telegram `_should_pass_unauthorized_dm_for_pairing`: same `__self__`
introspection class — fall back to the injected `gateway_runner` and
the adapter's owner profile.
Fixes#86296Fixes#92840
Co-authored-by: PRATHAMESH75 <118293218+PRATHAMESH75@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ahmett101 <297889955+Ahmett101@users.noreply.github.com>
_is_callback_user_authorized resolved the gateway's auth chain through
_message_handler.__self__. For a secondary multiplexed adapter the
message handler is a per-profile closure with no __self__, so the
introspection silently fell through to the env-only fallback -- which
knows nothing about config allowlists or the pairing store, denying
every button caller on that profile (fail-closed, but wrong).
Prefer the auth callback GatewayRunner already injects at connection
time via set_authorization_check (registered for primary and multiplexed
adapters alike, delegating to the full _is_user_authorized chain), and
keep the introspection plus env fallback for adapters wired without it.
Same resolution pattern the admin-tier gate uses.
Address hermes-sweeper review on #76487:
- Prefer hermes_profile from send metadata when pruning stale topic
bindings so profile_routes cannot delete the transport adapter's
namespace instead of the routed runtime's
- Namespace lobby/capability cooldowns and /topic off cleanup by
(profile, chat_id)
- Document profile_name PKs and scoped cleanup SQL in telegram.md
- Regression: primary-adapter stamp + routed metadata prune isolation
_build_slash_event and _dispatch_thread_session built their SessionSource
without guild_id/parent_chat_id, while on_message passes both. Route
matching in build_source keys off exactly those fields, so under
gateway.multiplex_profiles a guild- or channel-routed profile never matched
a native slash command: /new, /reset, /model, /profile, /status ... all ran
against the default profile and reset the wrong session (#69178, #91633).
Pass guild_id (interaction.guild_id, falling back to channel.guild like the
message path) and the thread's parent channel id into build_source at both
sites. One test pins channel + thread routing parity with messages.
Fixes#69178Fixes#91633
Co-authored-by: Sora-bluesky <179361977+Sora-bluesky@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jondgilbert <42873618+jondgilbert@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: tensorbit89-netizen <257030052+tensorbit89-netizen@users.noreply.github.com>
The two sibling is_bot computations (SessionSource construction and the
thread-history fetch) re-derived bot-ness from bot_id/subtype only, so an
api_human_users post would be human at the drop gate but still flagged
is_bot downstream. Use the single predicate everywhere.
Posts made with a user token (xoxp-) arrive with app_id and no
client_msg_id, so _event_declares_bot_sender dropped them as app traffic;
the only workaround was allow_bots: all. Adds
platforms.slack.extra.api_human_users (SLACK_API_HUMAN_USERS fallback), a
users-only allowlist consulted inside the predicate.
Salvaged from #100964 (users only: an app-id allowlist would also admit
the app's own xoxb bot posts, which share the user+app_id shape).
Follow-up to the #99641 salvage:
- One module-level _normalize_security() (ssl/tls/implicit -> tls, starttls,
plain/none -> plain; unknown -> WARNING + secure default) replaces the three
copies of the alias set; _connect_imap/_connect_smtp/_standalone_send all
compare against the canonical value. Unknown modes no longer raise.
- _tls_context(verify, host) is module-level and shared by all sites; when
verification is disabled for a non-loopback host it logs a WARNING.
- _esecret_bool: an unset/empty env var now yields the caller's default
(previously is_truthy_value('') returned False, silently disabling TLS
verification whenever EMAIL_*_TLS_VERIFY was unset).
- Documented surface is platforms.email.extra.{imap,smtp}_security and
{imap,smtp}_tls_verify in config.yaml; env vars remain an internal bridge
and are NOT added to plugin.yaml (optional_env feeds hermes setup prompts).
- Docs: Proton Mail Bridge / local relays recipe in user-guide/messaging/email.md.
- Tests: starttls builds IMAP4 then .starttls(); unknown mode falls back to
tls/starttls with verification still on.
Adds EMAIL_IMAP_SECURITY / EMAIL_SMTP_SECURITY and EMAIL_IMAP_TLS_VERIFY /
EMAIL_SMTP_TLS_VERIFY (env or platforms.email.extra.*) so the adapter can
talk to local relays such as Proton Mail Bridge (IMAP 1143 / SMTP 1025 with
STARTTLS and a self-signed certificate) instead of hardcoding IMAP4_SSL and
SMTP+STARTTLS with a verified default context.
Salvaged from #99641 (adapter.py only).
Every gateway/plugin platform adapter hard-coded aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True)
(~20 sites), so a gateway launched by a Windows Scheduled Task that inherits a stale
HTTP_PROXY (Clash/V2Ray on 127.0.0.1:7890) looped on 'Cannot connect to host' with no
way to opt out short of NO_PROXY hacks per vendor host.
- gateway/platforms/base.py: gateway_trust_env() reads gateway.trust_env (default true);
resolve_proxy_url() skips generic HTTP(S)_PROXY/ALL_PROXY + macOS system-proxy
auto-detect when false (explicit per-platform vars still win).
- All aiohttp ClientSession sites in weixin, qqbot, matrix, line, wecom, slack, sms,
teams, google_chat now pass trust_env=gateway_trust_env(); mattermost + homeassistant
bare sessions gain the same kwarg (intent of #70119 / #56229).
- DEFAULT_CONFIG + cli-config.yaml.example + messaging docs.
- tests/gateway/test_gateway_trust_env.py: config flip + no-bare-literal sweep.
Reported-by: @ranlingfeng (#48820), @frontnopipe-cloud (#76309)
Co-authored-by: rcarrata <rcarratalasanchez@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Backroads4Me <TEDLANHAM@GMAIL.COM>
A record-less delivery flag (final_response_sent /
final_content_delivered set with no recorded turn-final payload) was
trusted blindly by delivered_final_matches (None -> legacy trust), so a
first-edit prefix or a truncated finalize suppressed the gateway's
corrective send — silent partial delivery.
- delivered_final_matches: record-less flags are now reconciled against
the FINAL content via has_delivered_text; only the explicitly-marked
ambiguous-timeout path (_delivery_ambiguous) keeps legacy trust.
- _try_fresh_final and the native-streaming optimistic finalize now
record their delivered payload (the last record-less flag setters);
the optimistic record rolls back on definitive dispatch failure.
- Discord adapter: dead-transport send failures (client gone, WS
closed/reset) are classified as send_path_degraded (retryable) so the
delivery-obligation ledger's reconnect sweep replays the stranded
final response instead of losing it until a process restart.
Fixes#95382; closes the #98552 false-positive class.
The "Connecting to Telegram (attempt N/8)…" line logs at WARNING and
reaches the gateway's default stderr handler, but the matching
"Connected to Telegram (… mode)" line was INFO and went to the log file
only. A healthy startup therefore looked permanently hung at
"attempt 1/8" on the terminal — the logging-illusion half of #90835.
Promote the success line to WARNING so both sides of the connect
transition share the same console sink; a genuine hang is now the
absence of the success line. Adds an AST-level regression test pinning
the level pairing. Sibling adapters (homeassistant, wecom) log both
sides at INFO, so they don't have this asymmetry.
Fixes#90835
Prevent the dedicated getUpdates pool from reusing server-closed connections and replace a polling HTTP client left open after a timed-out CLOSE-WAIT drain. Keep the general Bot API pool reusable so concurrent sends and edits are unaffected. Add regression coverage for both transport limits and stale-client replacement. Fixes#87057
After updater.stop() times out, HTTPXRequest.initialize() is a no-op unless
the client is already closed, so start_polling reused the wedged socket and
the gateway stayed alive but deaf. Rebuild the polling client after a hung
drain, watch getUpdates I/O independently of get_me(), and enable TCP
keepalive on the fallback transport.
The synchronous card-action handlers and the update-prompt resolver
authorized clicks with _allow_group_message(), which answers "may this
sender chat in this group?" — with group_policy=open it returns True
for everyone. The approval resolver already used the correct operator
gate (_is_interactive_operator_authorized), so the three code paths
disagreed: with an open group policy an out-of-allowlist click on an
update-prompt card was fully executed, and approval clicks returned a
resolved-looking card before being rejected asynchronously.
Authorize all three paths with _is_interactive_operator_authorized(),
which checks membership of admins ∪ allowed_group_users (wildcard and
the empty pairing-mode allowlist keep their existing allow semantics,
matching _admit's DM pairing default). A missing operator identity now
fails closed on the update-prompt resolver instead of skipping the
check.
Fixes#96045
Salvage hardening on top of the three cherry-picked contributor commits
(#91297 gebilaowang404 + AlexMnrs, #96741 burak33bb, #98826 ayushnangia),
closing the remaining unverified-PID kill sites as one class (#98814, #89614):
- pid_is_hermes: token-boundary 'hermes' match (no more loose substring
false-positives), and an explicit start-time expectation is now honored
on POSIX too (a mismatched fingerprint is a recycled PID on any platform).
- kill_process_tree: drop the guard on our OWN retained Popen child — a
retained handle pins the PID, so the check could only false-refuse.
- gateway.status.terminate_pid: POSIX force-kills also refuse when a
caller-provided expected_start_time no longer matches.
- kill_gateway_processes: re-verify the LIVE cmdline at kill time (the
scan-time match is a TOCTOU window).
- _reap_unsupervised_gateway_orphans: fingerprint orphans at scan time and
require a still-matching identity before the delayed SIGKILL escalation.
- whatsapp _kill_port_process: never kill a bare netstat/lsof-scanned PID
unless the live process is actually a node bridge (was a stranger-kill).
- browser daemon reap/close paths: pass the start-time fingerprint into
ProcessRegistry._terminate_host_pid (previously unverified), and the
session-close path now runs the same daemon identity verification as
the orphan reaper.
- tests/hermes_cli/test_taskkill_identity_windows_live.py: live Windows
probes (real spawned processes, real psutil ancestry) wired into the
on-demand windows-latest wine2e lane.
Fixes#98814Fixes#89614
Post-rebase composition over #99431/#99429/#99427: file-attachment sends
route through _run_message_send so the mention-recovery ladder covers
media captions; _send_file_attachment/_send_local_file honor the
resolved thread-root anchor and reply_to_mode opt-out; send() records
event_meta on the verified receipt id (#75826); test fakes gain the
auth_tag kwarg and accepted-receipt shape.
Follow-up reconciliation: _send_file_attachment (the merged #95688/#74999
helper) now uses #78046's strict _parse_send_receipt contract and
redact_path error bounding, so CLI failures never leak host filesystem
paths and zero-exit unverified receipts are rejected on every outbound
media path.
#95688's _send_file_attachment refactor re-probed file existence, which
#74999's tests prove can race into a false 'not found' when the file
disappears between the caller's check and the helper's. Callers that
already verified the file pass probe=False; unverified document/video/
voice callers keep the guard.
Reconciles #84113 (authenticated same-relay URL localization) with #78051
(native imeta ingestion): _dispatch_message now merges caller-provided
verified imeta attachments with text-localized relay media instead of
clobbering them, dedupes paths, and downgrades mixed-source media to
DOCUMENT semantics so audio members are not routed through STT.
