DiscordAdapter.connect() set self._running = True directly instead of
calling self._mark_connected(), unlike every other platform adapter
(Telegram, WeCom, Matrix, Feishu, Google Chat, IRC, LINE, Mattermost,
ntfy, photon, raft, simplex, a2a, buzz, dingtalk, whatsapp).
_mark_connected() clears _fatal_error_code/_fatal_error_message/
_fatal_error_retryable and rewrites the runtime status file as
"connected". Bypassing it meant a transient connect failure (e.g. a
one-off DNS blip: "Cannot connect to host discord.com:443 ssl:default
[Temporary failure in name resolution]") left the platform reported as
permanently fatal in gateway_state.json / the dashboard, even after the
adapter successfully reconnected and was actively serving messages for
hours.
Reproduced under gateway.multiplex_profiles: true with a secondary
profile's Discord bot (sarathi:discord) — the bot reconnected
repeatedly ("Connected as ..." logged many times over 18+ hours) while
the dashboard kept showing the original fatal error the entire time.
Fixes#102554.
Added a regression test asserting connect() clears a previously
recorded fatal error.
config_loader._dm_behavior_choice still normalized against {"pair","ignore"},
so `unauthorized_dm_behavior: decline` in config.yaml (top level or a
platform block) was coerced back to "pair" on the real startup path
(load_gateway_config), and `unauthorized_dm_decline_message` was never
bridged into gw_data. Both now go through gateway.config.UNAUTHORIZED_DM_BEHAVIORS
(single source) and the presence bridge. The round-trip test exercises
load_gateway_config with a real config.yaml (top-level decline, telegram
override, custom message) instead of GatewayConfig.from_dict.
Telegram's intake prefilter only forwarded unauthorized DMs when the
behavior was exactly "pair", so with an allowlist configured a decline was
never sent. Anything that needs an outbound reply (!= "ignore") passes.
`hermes gateway setup` gains a "Politely decline unknown senders" choice
that writes platforms.<platform>.unauthorized_dm_behavior: decline; docs
mention it. Upstream-source references dropped from docstrings.
Port from earendil-works/pi#8337 (UTF-8 BOM normalization in text inputs):
sibling sites the merged #81967 BOM sweep missed. json.loads hard-fails on
a leading U+FEFF and every one of these loaders swallows the exception and
silently falls back to defaults — a user who edited mem0.json, honcho.json,
hindsight/config.json, or supermemory.json in Notepad lost their whole
config with no error, and Qwen CLI OAuth creds saved with a BOM raised
qwen_auth_read_failed.
- plugins/memory/{honcho,mem0,hindsight,supermemory}: 13 read sites -> utf-8-sig
- hermes_cli/auth.py: _read_qwen_cli_tokens -> utf-8-sig
- tests: BOM regression tests per loader (sabotage-proven) + plain-UTF-8 guard
fal's LTX 2.5 fast endpoints accept 6-20s only up to 1080p — "At 1440p and
2160p, all frame rates support up to 10 seconds" — so a 4K request with the
family's 20s ceiling was rejected by the vendor. Families can now declare
`duration_cap_by_resolution`, applied after the enum snap / range clamp on the
resolved resolution enum.
An unset duration on a duration_enum family also snapped to enum[0] (6s),
silently overriding the endpoint's own "auto" default; None now omits the key
for enum families exactly as it already did for range families.
test_managed_media_gateways asserts the alibaba/happy-horse/ namespace by
prefix rather than the exact v1.1 literal so the next version bump doesn't
flip an unrelated gateway test.
`durations` carried two meanings told apart only by len==2 and gap>1: a
(min, max) range to clamp, or an enum to snap. A family with exactly two
legal values would have been misread as a range (review finding on #91311).
`durations` is now always the (min, max) window (what capabilities()/
list_models() read) and families with discrete values add `duration_enum`;
_clamp_duration takes the family and branches on the key, not the shape.
Also: restore the exact v1.1 endpoint assertion in the gateway namespace
test (a startswith/endswith check would not catch a silent version drift),
add the ltx-2.5 i2v snap case, and keep happy-horse on audio_native (the
schema test forbids audio+audio_native together, and v1.1 audio is always on).
Adds two new FAL video families and upgrades one:
- ltx-2.5 (cheap tier): lightricks/ltx-2.5/{text,image}-to-video/fast.
Lightricks' open-source audio-video model. Native audio, 6-20s integer
duration enum, 720p-2160p (i2v), $0.09/s at 720p. duration_int + 2k/4k
resolution aliases; no seed key in the schema.
- kling-o3 (premium tier): fal-ai/kling-video/o3/standard/{text,image}-to-video.
Kuaishou's frontier multi-shot model, 3-15s, optional native audio
($0.084/s off, $0.112/s on). String durations, i2v drops aspect_ratio,
no seed/resolution keys.
- happy-horse upgraded from the sparse-docs 1.0 endpoints to
alibaba/happy-horse/v1.1/{text,image}-to-video with the full published
schema: nine aspect ratios, 720p/1080p, 3-15s integer durations, seed
supported, audio native (no generate_audio key), i2v drops aspect_ratio.
All flags derived from each endpoint's llms.txt schema. Payload builder
asserted locally against the schemas; test for the old Happy Horse
"prompt-only" contract updated to pin the v1.1 schema, plus new payload
tests for ltx-2.5 and kling-o3.
Two review findings on the salvage stack:
- _write_turns' _quietly consolidation keyed failure on a None result,
implicitly assuming add_memory never legitimately returns None. A None-
returning stub (the most common mock idiom) would mark every successful
write failed and re-append the batch forever. Module-level _FAILED
sentinel: only a raised exception re-queues.
- _pending_turns had no bound: a persistently failing service accumulated
one entry per turn for the process lifetime (gateway runs never
re-initialize), and every retry re-sent the whole accumulated payload —
O(n^2) upload bytes, and a size-rejected batch could never shrink. Cap
the buffer (50 turns / 256 KiB, drop oldest, warn once per trim).
The per-turn capture rewrite removed the raw urllib /v4/conversations
ingest, but stale references survived outside the diff hunks:
- README "Behavior" still carried the "written once via the conversations
endpoint" paragraph contradicted by the new bullets right above it.
- website memory-providers (EN + zh-Hans) still listed full-session ingest,
session-end /v4/conversations ingest, and ingest in the base-url and
api_timeout rows — the PR had updated one line per file but missed the
rest of the section.
Now every surface describes per-turn documents.add capture with retry.
Two cleanups on the salvaged per-turn capture path (review of #109359):
- _write_turns hand-rolled the try/except/log that the file's own _quietly
helper already provides (same exception class, level, exc_info shape);
the deleted _ingest path used _quietly for the identical call. Consolidate:
add_memory always returns a dict, so a None result is the failure sentinel.
- _capture_custom_id's `or 'hermes'` never fires: _sanitize_tag already
returns _DEFAULT_CONTAINER_TAG on empty input, and the literal duplicated
the constant the helper owns. Verified behavior-preserving (tests green
with the fallback artificially restored).
sync_turn runs on the MemoryManager worker, but on_session_switch and
shutdown run on the caller thread, so two _write_turns() calls could
snapshot the same pending batch and each replace the whole list (duplicate
append or lost pending turn). A capture lock now covers the
snapshot/write/replace sequence; _write_turns() reads pending turns inside
the lock instead of taking a caller-built list.
Retries are at-least-once: the documents API appends on a shared custom_id
and does not dedupe by content, so a write it accepted but whose response
was lost is appended again. Stated in the docstring and README instead of
implied.
Addresses review on #109359.
A failed flush at on_session_switch() restored the pending buffer and
then cleared it on the next line, so an unavailable service at the switch
boundary still lost every pending turn. Pending turns now carry their own
session_id; _write_turns() batches per session, so a later retry (next
turn, session end, shutdown) writes old-session turns under the old
session's custom_id even after the switch.
Addresses review on #109359.
sync_turn now writes each completed turn through the SDK's documents.add,
keyed by custom_id "<session>_<date>_b<0-5>" so all turns of a session in
one 4-hour window append to a single document. This matches the capture
shape of the other Supermemory agent integrations and removes the raw
urllib POST to /v4/conversations, which the self-hosted server does not
implement (#101270).
Failed turn writes stay pending and are retried with the next turn, at
session end, on session switch, and at shutdown. Previously a failed
session-end ingest was logged once and the whole session was lost.
Inline base64 data URIs in captured text are replaced with "[image]" so
pasted screenshots no longer land in the document as megabytes of text.
Metadata stays type/session_id/timestamp plus the existing sm_source.
The stack inserted the errcode table directly after _strip_reply_fallback's
return with no blank lines, which reads as if the constant belongs to the
function body and trips E305. Two blank lines restore the module-level
boundary; no behaviour change.
The inherited fixture coordinate "40.4302" does not contain the substring
"403" (the dot splits it), so the old substring classifier also passed on
it and the case proved nothing. Use a coordinate that genuinely embeds the
digits so the test is red on the pre-fix classifier.
The pinned mautrix 0.21.1 raises MatrixRequestError (carrying errcode and
http_status) from HTTPAPI._send on every non-2xx and sync() returns only
the parsed JSON dict, so the result-object auth branch in _sync_loop was
unreachable; it dated from the nio client whose SyncError objects were
real. Drop it together with the nio-mock test that pinned it.
With structured attributes guaranteed, the leading-status regex and the
bounded keyword scan over the message text were the only remaining ways
for body digits or HTML words to leak into the verdict, so drop them too:
no errcode/http_status auth signal means retry. Trim the contributor's
17 tests to the two loop-level invariants: both production repros (502
HTML body embedding "403" via an SVG coordinate; timeout echoing a since
token embedding "401") keep looping, and a 401/M_UNKNOWN_TOKEN stops.
The comment above the result-object branch in _sync_loop claimed mautrix's
Client.sync() returns an object carrying a message string for auth failures.
That is wrong. In the pinned mautrix 0.21.0, HTTPAPI._send raises
make_request_error() for any non-2xx and otherwise returns parsed JSON, so a
real M_FORBIDDEN arrives as an exception and is handled by the except branch.
The claim was introduced by this PR, which rewrote an accurate comment about
the earlier matrix-nio client (whose SyncError result objects were genuine).
The branch itself is kept as defense in depth against a future client swap,
but it now classifies with the same errcode/http_status logic as the
exception path instead of a lone "unknown_token" substring test, which
silently missed M_MISSING_TOKEN and M_FORBIDDEN and resynced forever
against a credential that can never succeed.
A structured errcode/http_status is authoritative; the message text is only
consulted when the object exposes neither, since str(object) is an opaque
repr. The text scan deliberately cannot override a structured verdict, so a
transient 502 whose HTML body contains "Forbidden" is still retried.
Adds four tests. Three are discriminating RED/GREEN cases that fail against
the old substring branch (M_MISSING_TOKEN errcode, http_status=401 with no
keyword in the message, and an unstructured object whose only signal is
.message). The fourth pins the precedence rule and passes either way.
Verified: 136 passed / 1 failed in tests/gateway/test_matrix.py; the single
failure (test_password_login_uses_device_id) fails identically at the
pristine PR head and is unrelated.
(cherry picked from commit bc9e6a8dafcf349a4e6b20a261fb2449603c0239)
The independent-verifier caught that my first loop-level test did not
actually prove anything. The 502/SVG coordinate fixture I reused from
gmoranxyz's unit-level test does not contain the substring 403 once
case-folded, so the old naive substring classifier already treated it
as transient. A test that passes under both the buggy code and the
fix proves nothing about the fix.
I replaced the fixture with a plain connection timeout whose message
wraps the real Matrix sync pagination token, an arbitrary digit
string that happens to contain 401. I verified this directly: with
the pre-fix classifier restored, the retry test now fails (the old
code stops the loop on this fixture), and with the fix in place it
passes (the loop retries as it should). That is the RED/GREEN proof
the maintainer originally asked for.
I also documented in the stop test's docstring that it does not
discriminate old from new, since the word forbidden in its message
trips the old naive check too. It is still worth keeping as a
regression test proving genuine auth errors stop the loop, just not
as proof of this specific fix.
While I was in there I also fixed a stale comment above the
M_UNKNOWN_TOKEN sync-object pre-check. It said nio returns SyncError
objects, but the dependency here is mautrix, not matrix-nio, and
importing nio raises ModuleNotFoundError in this codebase. The
pre-check logic itself was already correct and untouched.
Co-authored-by: gmoranxyz <gmoranxyz@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit ad3aad579a675a5aae544a50f88a82717c0ac3b6)
I added two more classifier unit tests for the attribute narrowing:
a bare .code attribute that happens to be 401, and a bare .status
attribute that happens to be 403, both must stay classified as
transient since only .http_status is trustworthy. I also added a
parametrized test for the five transient exception types the sync
loop now short-circuits on.
On top of that I added two tests that exercise _sync_loop directly
instead of just the classifier function in isolation. One replays the
real 502 Umbrel repro string through a mocked client.sync and confirms
the loop retries with the 5s backoff. The other raises a genuine
M_FORBIDDEN error and confirms the loop stops on the first call with
no retry sleep. These catch a regression in how the loop wires the
classifier in, not just a regression in the classifier itself.
(cherry picked from commit f747bb4b5a6e6da1bb9136168f08d6e7af5ea64b)
I hit a bug where the Matrix sync loop treated a passing 502 from
Umbrel's app proxy as a permanent auth failure and stopped syncing for
good. The old check did a naive "403" in str(exc) substring match, and
the 502 HTML error body embedded an SVG path with the coordinate
40.4302, which contains the digit sequence 403.
I replaced the substring check with a layered classifier. Transport
exceptions like TimeoutError, ConnectionError, and OSError are always
treated as transient regardless of their message text. Structured
signals take priority next: the errcode attribute against a known set
of permanent Matrix error codes, then the http_status attribute
against 401/403 specifically (not status, status_code, or code, which
belong to unrelated exception shapes and risk coincidental integer
matches). Only when none of those are present does it fall back to a
bounded, word-boundary-safe text scan on the first 200 characters.
Added tests covering the attribute narrowing, the transient exception
types, and two loop-level tests exercising _sync_loop directly to
confirm it retries on a transient error and stops on a genuine 401/403.
(cherry picked from commit 96d3363e45a63e08d9f07518ed949df334a33b3c)
The zero-knob test only asserted that ack_stale still trips with the knob
at 0. Because _read_websocket_health evaluates ack age before the
event-silence dimension, the test stayed green even with the
`_event_max_silence_seconds > 0` guard deleted: it never observed the
stale stamp being ignored. Assert (True, "healthy") with knob=0, a stale
stamp and a green transport first, then make the ACK stale and keep the
ack_stale assertion. Dropping the guard now fails this test.
Also correct the on_socket_event_type comment: discord.py dispatches
socket_event_type before the op-code switch but only for a non-null `t`;
heartbeat ACK frames carry `t: null`, they do not "return before" it.
The #109521 explanation (socket_event_type fires for every parsed
DISPATCH frame and is not debug-gated unlike on_socket_raw_receive;
op-11 ACKs carry no event type) was written out four times: knob init,
stamp init, the on_socket_event_type handler, and _read_websocket_health.
Keep the authoritative paragraph on the handler that actually stamps, and
point the other three sites at it so a future edit has one place to go.
Drop the math.isfinite(event_silence) half of the silence guard. Both
operands are our own perf_counter floats, so their difference cannot be
non-finite; the ack_age guard is different because _last_ack comes from
discord.py. math stays imported for the remaining finiteness checks.
`_warn_liveness_config_disabled` told operators an unusable value turns
off "the websocket liveness probe". That is true for the interval,
threshold, ack-age and latency knobs, which sit in the probe's startup
guard, but `websocket_event_max_silence_seconds` is only checked inside
`_read_websocket_health`, so ack-age/latency keep guarding. Say so, or
an operator reading the log would believe the whole watchdog is down.
Incident 2 of #109521: a Gateway socket can stay ESTABLISHED and keep
ACKing heartbeats while zero DISPATCH events are parsed, so every
transport-side liveness sample (ready/open/ack-age/latency) reads
healthy for hours. The merged #109963 deliberately dropped the
event_silence dimension: a raw-frame stamp is debug-gated
(on_socket_raw_receive needs enable_debug_events) and, since heartbeat
ACKs are frames, ack_stale always fires first by construction.
This adds the dispatch-side signal that was requested instead:
- stamp on on_socket_event_type, which discord.py 2.7.1 dispatches for
every parsed DISPATCH frame with no debug gate (verified live against
the real received_message path: 4/4 frames fired with
enable_debug_events=False, on_socket_raw_receive 0/4)
- new knob websocket_event_max_silence_seconds (default 4h, the
incident report's field-proven operator bound); 0 opts out of this
dimension ONLY — the #109782 review failure put the knob in
_start_liveness_probe's all-or-nothing guard, killing the whole
watchdog; it is gated strictly inside _read_websocket_health here
- the stamp resets per connection (connect() clears it), and a None
stamp (no event parsed yet on this connection) is not silence
- docs (en + zh-Hans) cover the new knob and the per-dimension opt-out
Fixes#109521
(cherry picked from commit b4baa97fc45794209711a45e052111d7d44d5f90)
Add HTTP-Referer, X-Title, User-Agent (HermesAgent/<version>) and
X-Pplx-Integration: hermes-agent to the Perplexity web provider's
/search and /sdk/content/snippets requests. Same static headers Hermes
already sends Kimi and OpenCode; nothing per-user, no extra requests.
The openai-codex image provider rode a Responses call with a hosted
image_generation tool on a pinned chat model (gpt-5.5). Two failure
classes came with that shape: when OpenAI withdrew gpt-5.5 from an
account cohort every image call 404'd while chat kept working
(#105398, #107076), and the host model was free to answer in text
instead of calling the tool, so we streamed SSE, kept partial frames
and retried on empty streams.
Post to chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex/images/generations and
images/edits instead - the route the official Codex client uses
(codex-rs/ext/image-generation). No host model, no SSE, no
partial-frame handling; the response is a plain JSON body with
b64_json. Remote source URLs are fetched client-side and inlined as
data URLs because the backend's own downloader 400s on ordinary
public images.
The backend treats model/quality/size as advisory (#107233), so the
result now reports reported_quality/reported_size next to the
requested values plus the x-codex-imagegen-request-id for support.
GPT Image 2.5 is deliberately not added to this catalog: the backend
accepts any model id, including nonexistent ones, and generates with
its server-managed engine (C2PA reports gpt-image 2.0), so a 2.5 tier
here would be a label with no effect (#106708).
Gateway, dashboard, ACP server and the CLI already hold one registry-shared
SessionDB per state.db path, yet several in-process call paths still opened
a bare SessionDB() beside it. Each one is a full writer: schema init, write
lock, token-writer thread and a close-time WAL checkpoint. On a dashboard
serving overlapping requests that stacked up to the "5 live SessionDB
handles" precursor within seconds; per #110544 they are now harmless to each
other's WAL generation, but the leak itself remained.
Pure readers attach read_only=True (no writer connection, no write lock):
- plugins/hermes-achievements/dashboard/plugin_api.py::scan_sessions
(dashboard, per background scan and per /rescan; highest-frequency site)
- hermes_cli/console_engine.py::_session_db (dashboard console; list,
stats and export are reads; rename/optimize opt in to a writer)
- tools/process_registry_results.py::_owns_result (gateway, per retained
result load)
- hermes_cli/main.py::_session_db (last-session / title / cwd lookups)
- hermes_cli/terminal_breadcrumbs.py, hermes_cli/status.py,
hermes_cli/main_tui_launch.py (lookup one-shots)
Writers share the process's registry handle (hermes_state_registry.acquire;
close()/release_or_close release one refcount):
- acp_adapter/session.py::SessionManager._get_db — the AIAgent it builds
acquires the same path, so the ACP server held two writers per process
- hermes_cli/kanban_db_dispatch.py::_retag_legacy_worker_sessions
(gateway dispatcher tick)
- hermes_cli/main.py::_create_titled_session, hermes_cli/oneshot.py,
hermes_cli/foreign_sessions.py — the CLI acquires the same handle a
moment later
The "N live SessionDB handles" warning now counts only writable members:
read-only attaches are the sanctioned per-request shape for dashboard
routers and CLI lookups, and counting them turned a healthy topology into
an operator alarm (#100896 field reports of restart loops keyed on it).
Live repro (one registry writer + 4 overlapping dashboard/gateway paths in
one process): before 5 writable opens, 5 live handles, warning fired;
after 1 writable open (the registry handle), 0 from the request paths,
no warning.
Refs #100896#103339
FAL shipped google/gemini-omni-flash/v1.1/* (Aug 2026): the family gains a
text-to-video endpoint, 360p/720p/1080p/4k resolution enum, and keeps
3-10s integer durations with always-on native audio.
- plugins/video_gen/fal: bump gemini-omni-flash to the v1.1 endpoints,
declare the resolution enum, refresh display/strengths copy
- tests: family test asserts the versioned dual-modality endpoints; the
i2v-only clean-error guard survives via a synthetic family; catalog
invariant now requires both endpoints on every family
Schema verified against FAL OpenAPI (t2v: prompt required, 16:9/9:16,
360p-4k, duration 3-10 int; i2v adds image_url + optional end_image_url).
Pricing: $0.03/s 360p, $0.10/s 720p, $0.15/s 1080p, $0.30/s 4K.
Alibaba's Wan 3.0 generation went live on FAL (was "Coming Soon" since
the Wan 2.7 rollout). Adds two families to FAL_FAMILIES:
- wan-3.0: alibaba/wan-3.0/{text,image}-to-video — 2-30s integer
durations, 480p/720p/1080p, native audio, adaptive aspect handling
($0.05-$0.20/s by resolution)
- wan-3.0-prime: alibaba/wan-3.0-prime/{text,image}-to-video — premium
tier, same surface ($0.068-$0.28/s)
Schema quirks mapped from the FAL OpenAPI/llms.txt:
- i2v takes `start_image_url` (image_param_key, Kling-4K pattern)
- duration is a JSON integer (duration_int)
- audio toggle key is `audio`, not `generate_audio` — new generic
`audio_param_key` family flag in _build_payload (veo3.1 regression
asserted unchanged)
Anthropic's /v1/models is cursor-paginated with a default page size of 20.
Both hermes fetchers read a single unpaginated page, so any model past the
first page silently vanished from the /model picker and provider catalogs.
- hermes_cli/models.py _fetch_anthropic_models(): request limit=1000 and
follow has_more/last_id (bounded, repeated-cursor guarded, de-duped)
- plugins/model-providers/anthropic fetch_models(): same pagination walk,
and it now honors the base_url argument instead of hardcoding
api.anthropic.com
- tests: live-HTTP paginated-server regression tests for both fetchers,
incl. single-page and stuck-cursor termination; updated the two URL-pinning
pool-discovery tests for the ?limit=1000 contract
Live anonymous probes (2026-09-13, HermesAgent UA, 4 rounds): nemotron-3.5-lightning-free
returned zero bytes for >90s on every attempt and nemotron-3-ultra-free took ~40s, while
mimo-v2.5-free answered 200 in 2-4s each time. An aux model (titles, compression, memory)
that hangs is worse than a delisted one, so the default moves to the model that works.
The OpenCode Zen relay no longer serves hy3-free (since ~2026-08-31) or
laguna-s-2.1-free (new, verified 2026-09-09): both are gone from the live
GET /zen/v1/models catalog and anonymous chat completions return
401 {"type":"ModelError","message":"Model <id> is not supported"}
(2 probes >=60s apart, x-opencode-session header present).
- hermes_cli/models_catalog_static.py: remove both slugs from the
opencode-free offline floor and the opencode-zen discovery floor;
document the delist dates in the catalog comment.
- plugins/model-providers/opencode-free: default_aux_model moves from the
dead laguna-s-2.1-free to nemotron-3.5-lightning-free (fastest surviving
anonymous model).
- tests: swap fixtures off the dead slugs; extend the floor-exclusion
invariant to cover both.
The live revalidation path already hides them when the relay is reachable;
this fixes the OFFLINE floor and the aux default, which would otherwise
offer/route to models that 401.
Adds kling-v3 (fal-ai/kling-video/v3/standard/*) and kling-v3-pro
(fal-ai/kling-video/v3/pro/*) to FAL_FAMILIES: start_image_url i2v key,
aspect_ratio dropped on i2v, string duration 3-15s, generate_audio and
negative_prompt real, no seed/resolution keys per the published llms.txt
schemas. Payload shapes pinned in tests; docs mention updated.
The rebase moved the inbound attachment loop into SlackAdapter._append_link_unfurls,
so the nested-table hunk now lives there and is asserted directly. Drop the source-
provenance references and duplicate cell-level cases; one ragged/malformed-row test
covers raw_text, rich_text, None and unknown cell types.
Port from qwibitai/nanoclaw#3666: Slack represents a pasted table as
'table' blocks — usually nested in attachments[].blocks[], sometimes
top-level. They appear in neither the message text nor the file list,
so the agent received the sentence before the table and nothing else.
- _render_slack_table_block(): projects rows as 'cell | cell' lines,
collecting text leaves from raw_text/rich_text cell subtrees; capped
at 20k chars with a visible '[table truncated]' marker.
- Wired into all three ingestion paths: _extract_text_from_slack_blocks
(thread history + attachment-nested blocks), the live inbound
attachment loop, and _extract_additional_text_from_slack_blocks
(top-level blocks on live messages).
- _serialize_slack_blocks_for_agent skips 'table' blocks — the
allowlist drops 'rows', so it only emitted an empty husk.
send_voice built its own discord.File from the audio bytes and never ran
the size preflight, so an oversized audio attachment still burned the
doomed 413 round-trip that #50846 is about. Route it through the same
_reject_oversized_upload helper as _send_file_attachment.
The limit constant and _discord_upload_limit_bytes lived on the adapter
facade while every consumer is in adapter_media.py; the facade+sibling
layout puts topic code in the sibling, so they move there.
Discord raised the default file upload limit from 10 MiB to 20 MiB for
users, bots, webhooks and interaction responses (developer changelog,
Sep 3 2026). The 25 MiB constant here predates the preflight salvage and
never matched the platform; more importantly discord.py 2.7.1 still
reports 10 MiB via guild.filesize_limit for unboosted guilds, so the
guild-aware path under-reported the cap and rejected 10-20 MiB files
Discord now accepts. Floor the guild value at the platform default so a
stale library constant can only widen, never shrink, the preflight.
The adapter facade is ~6.6k lines; new behaviour belongs in a topical sibling per the
facade+siblings layout. expand_link_entities() now lives in telegram_entities.py and
reuses the encode/decode UTF-16 slicing the adapter already uses for entity spans.
Also: skip inlining when the anchor text already is the URL (no 'url (url)' duplication),
trim the test file to the invariants and point it at the sibling.
Image.open() was never closed; convert()/resize() return new images so the
source file object lingered until GC (a real leak on Windows where the open
handle blocks later deletion of the original). Use the context manager.
- Keep main's media_write_timeout=60s (PR's HERMES_* env var dropped per
.env-is-secrets-only policy; main already fixed the timeout half).
- Replace stdlib imghdr (removed in Python 3.13) with a magic-byte sniff.
- Exclude GIFs: JPEG conversion flattens animations to one frame.
- Fix transparent-PNG handling: RGBA hit the len(getbands())==4 branch
before the white-background composite, rendering transparency black.
- Clean up temp JPEGs after send (both single and media-group paths);
the docstring promised caller cleanup that neither call site did.
- Write temp files via tempfile default dir instead of an undefined
DEFAULT_OUTPUT_DIR (NameError at runtime in the original PR).
- Add real-Pillow regression tests incl. a sabotage-verified
white-background test.
Behind an HTTP proxy (e.g. tgapi.indevs.in) the PTB
media_write_timeout (~20s) is exceeded by raw PNGs > 1-2MB, causing
TimedOut errors on both send_photo and the send_document fallback.
Add TelegramAdapter._compress_image_to_jpeg() which converts large
PNG/raster images (>1MB) to progressive JPEG at 85% quality, with
optional resize above 1600px. Applied in send_image_file() and in the
media-group path of send_multiple_images(). Compression is a no-op for
JPEGs, small files, and non-raster formats, and falls back gracefully
if Pillow is unavailable.
Co-authored-by: user
Swallowing FeatureUnavailable returned a bare False, so a hosted operator
saw the same generic "requirements not met / run hermes setup" line the
original report started with. The registry's _probe already logs a raised
exception with its message, so propagating the error is what puts
"target not writable" / "quarantine 404" in gateway.log.
Hosted/Docker images lock /opt/hermes/.venv, so --install-deps writing
site-packages fails with Permission denied and the adapter never starts.
Route Google Chat through lazy_deps (HERMES_LAZY_INSTALL_TARGET) and bake
the extra into the published image so a configured gateway can connect.
Rebase reconciliation with main's JSON-allowlist decoding (#109423): the two
remaining readers that consulted config.extra before the env var now follow the
per-profile precedence rule (explicit scoped env → the profile's YAML → default),
and ignored_threads still decodes a JSON-string list after the read.
The Matrix blank-YAML test asserted YAML-over-env, the old precedence #108440's
review flagged; it now pins the contract: explicit env beats YAML, a blank env
value is unset (YAML applies), YAML beats the default, and an explicit empty
list is a real "no rooms" value.
_bridge_env copied os.environ (the default profile's WHATSAPP_* values under
multiplex) and only overlaid scoped hits, so a secondary with YAML
`dm_policy: pairing` launched its Node bridge under the default profile's
`allowlist` policy and the bridge rejected valid pairing DMs before Python saw
them. The child env now carries the values the adapter resolved (scoped env →
own YAML → default); a scoped miss removes the key rather than inheriting it.
Refs #108440 (ehz0ah inline, plugins/platforms/whatsapp/adapter.py)
545e74d0ea correctly stopped writing telegram.proxy_url into TELEGRAM_PROXY
for a multiplexed secondary, but _build_ptb_requests still resolved the proxy
only from that env var, so the secondary silently connected direct (or via the
default's proxy). #100448 had deliberately left this bridge unscoped for that
reason; this finishes the consumer migration instead.
_apply_yaml_config seeds proxy_url into extra and resolve_proxy_url gains a
`configured` rung: scoped TELEGRAM_PROXY → the profile's YAML → HTTPS_PROXY/
HTTP_PROXY/ALL_PROXY (trust_env) → macOS system proxy, with NO_PROXY semantics
unchanged.
Refs #108440 (finding 6)
One reader (gateway.platforms._shared.extra_or_secret) now implements the
precedence every per-profile setting follows for the OWNING profile:
explicit scoped env/.env → that profile's config.yaml (PlatformConfig.extra)
→ the adapter's default. A scoped miss returns the default, never the launch
process's os.environ; single-profile / default-profile installs keep the
documented env-over-YAML contract.
Why: 545e74d0ea (#108705) stopped bridging a secondary's YAML into the
process env and moved readers to config.extra, but the shared reader and the
hand-rolled helpers in Discord/Slack/Matrix/Telegram consulted YAML FIRST and
then fell back to a scoped env read. Two bug classes followed (#108440
post-merge review by andrexibiza, #109032):
- an explicit env value could no longer beat YAML for the owning profile
(DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_EVERYONE=false lost to allow_mentions.everyone: true;
TELEGRAM_REACTIONS=true lost to the stock reactions: false);
- a secondary that OMITTED a key inherited the launch profile's bridged env
through the fallback (Matrix process_notices/session_scope, Discord
auto_thread/reactions/mentions, Slack reactions/ignored_channels).
Consumers migrated to the shared reader: Discord _build_allowed_mentions and
_extra_or_env_flag; Slack _slack_allow_bots, _reactions_enabled (the
_extra_or_env_* getters already used it); Matrix _extra_truthy, _extra_csv_set,
session_scope, reactions, require_mention parsers, and — new — the
allowed_users / ignore_user_patterns consumers that never read the seeded YAML
lists; Telegram _extra_bool, _extra_str_set, _reactions_enabled; Feishu
allow_bots; WhatsApp dm_policy/group_policy.
Refs #108440, #109032
A2A_PORT and A2A_ADVERTISED_TOOLSETS are already captured at
construction time (inside _profile_runtime_scope) via
_get_scoped_secret(), but A2A_PUBLIC_URL was still read with a bare
os.getenv() inside A2ARequestHandler._request_public_url() - which
runs on ThreadingHTTPServer's per-connection OS thread, not the
constructing thread.
Raw threading.Thread never inherits contextvars, so even swapping the
reader to _get_scoped_secret() at that call site would not help: the
request thread has no scope, secret_scope falls back to os.environ
either way. The value must be captured once at construction time
(which does run in profile scope) and threaded through as instance
state instead - same fix shape as A2A_PORT above.
A secondary multiplex profile without its own A2A_PUBLIC_URL now
falls back to the X-Forwarded-Host/Host-derived URL (or the bind
host) instead of silently advertising the default profile's public
URL in its Agent Card / discovery response.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0c36aca5de53d88bbbc0b4cfceaed8307c744f7a)
