The bind address never changes for an app's lifetime, so create_app now
canonicalises it and computes the wildcard flag and allowed Host set once
instead of on every request. _WILDCARD_HOSTS duplicated what
ip_address().is_unspecified already answers (only "" needs a special case),
the Sec-Fetch-Site sets become named module constants, and fetch_site is a
required argument so no caller can silently skip that check.
The 403 message now says what is actually refused (browser requests and
foreign Host names) rather than implying every non-local client is.
The parametrized proxy test asserted 200-vs-"some 4xx" via a tuple
comparison; it now pins status == 200/403 and the exact upstream request
count, so a regression to a different status or a leaked forward fails.
Browsers send no Origin on a GET, so a cross-site page (or a DNS-rebound
page on a wildcard bind) could still reach /v1/models with the operator's
credential. Sec-Fetch-Site, which a page cannot forge, now refuses those.
The Origin check compares the parsed host and port instead of the raw
string, so an Origin that omits the default :80 or spells an IPv6
address differently is matched the way a browser means it.
Co-authored-by: JoaoMarcos44 <joaomarcosdias444@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 72bf4e9c34f6c6200658e42345f775291462697c)
A wildcard bind accepts any Host name, so a DNS-rebound page reaches it
with Origin equal to its own Host and the same-origin rule let it through
to the operator's credential. A wildcard listener has no origin of its
own, so an Origin-bearing request is refused there; API clients without
Origin keep working. Also treat the absolute form localhost. as localhost
and detect expanded IPv6 unspecified binds as wildcard.
(cherry picked from commit 5ce7aac4d7e4d160b2a6447f0442e747f489d72f)
hermes proxy attaches the operator's subscription credential to every
forwarded request but accepted any Host header and any Origin. A
loopback or specific-IP bind now serves only its own Host names, and a
request whose Origin is not the proxy's own is refused with 403.
Non-browser clients send no Origin and are unaffected; a wildcard bind
keeps accepting any Host.
(cherry picked from commit 3cf3870cfc2a795e439b1a8c0c53424f79c24505)
`handle_proxy` already offloads the two credential reads on the happy path,
but the rotation inside the `upstream_resp.status in {401, 429}` branch still
called `adapter.get_retry_credential` inline on the event loop.
That is the most expensive of the three blocking methods on the
`UpstreamAdapter` contract, not the cheapest:
* `NousPortalAdapter.get_retry_credential` routes into
`_get_credential(force_refresh=True)`, so the token-refresh POST that
`get_credential` performs only near expiry is unconditional here — and it
runs under the same `_auth_store_lock()`, a cross-process advisory lock
with a 15s timeout.
* `XAIGrokAdapter.get_retry_credential` loads the key pool off disk and
calls `try_refresh_current` / `mark_exhausted_and_rotate` under its lock.
So every upstream 401 or 429 froze the proxy's single event loop — and with
it every other in-flight streaming completion — for the whole rotation. A 429
is exactly when the proxy is busiest, which is the worst moment to stall.
Wrap it in `asyncio.to_thread`, matching the two sites above. The error
contract is unchanged: `to_thread` re-raises the worker's exception in the
awaiting frame, so the existing `except Exception -> retry_cred = None` still
swallows a failed rotation and streams the upstream's own rejection back.
`handle_health` called `adapter.is_authenticated()` inline from an
`async def`. `UpstreamAdapter.is_authenticated` is documented as
"Should be cheap — no network calls. Used by `proxy start` for a clear
up-front error before binding a port." (`adapters/base.py`), and that is
true of the `proxy start` preflight, which runs in a plain synchronous
CLI function. It is not true on the event loop:
`NousPortalAdapter.is_authenticated` goes through `_read_state()`, which
takes `_auth_store_lock()` — the same cross-process lock with a 15s
timeout as credential resolution — and `XAIGrokAdapter` reads its key
pool off disk.
`/health` is precisely what a supervisor, systemd unit, container
healthcheck or load balancer polls, on a fixed interval, so it is the
endpoint least able to afford a lock wait; and a wait here freezes every
concurrent proxied stream, not just the healthcheck.
Offload it with `asyncio.to_thread`. The response body is byte-identical;
only the scheduling changes.
`create_app` registers `handle_proxy` as an `async def`, and it called
`adapter.get_credential()` directly on the aiohttp event loop.
`UpstreamAdapter` is a synchronous contract (`adapters/base.py` — every
method is a plain `def`), and the shipped adapters implement it with
blocking I/O. `NousPortalAdapter.get_credential` takes
`_auth_store_lock()` — a cross-process advisory lock with
`AUTH_LOCK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 15.0` (`hermes_cli/auth.py:110`) — reads
`auth.json` off disk, and may issue a token-refresh POST; on a terminal
`AuthError` it takes that lock a second time to persist the quarantined
state. `XAIGrokAdapter.get_credential` reads its key pool off disk.
The proxy is one process with one loop, and `handle_proxy` streams with
`sock_read=300`, so long-lived completions are the normal case. Blocking
inside credential resolution therefore freezes *every* concurrent
in-flight stream mid-token for the duration — a concurrent `hermes auth`
command holding the auth-store lock is enough to do it. Every proxied
request goes through this path.
Dispatch through `asyncio.to_thread` instead. This is a pure scheduling
change: `to_thread` re-raises the worker's exception in the awaiting
frame, so the existing `except Exception` -> 401 `upstream_auth_failed`
mapping is unchanged, and the adapters' own `self._lock` still serialises
concurrent resolutions exactly as before. Fixing it at the handler also
leaves the synchronous `UpstreamAdapter` ABC untouched, so it covers
every adapter without conflicting with in-flight work that subclasses it.
Follow-ups on the salvaged cluster:
- sse_done.py: dispatch SSE events at blank-line boundaries and join
consecutive data: lines per the SSE spec (a split JSON event no longer
reads as two malformed fragments that disable synthesis)
- accept integer/string-truthy lastOne sentinels (1 / "true") in both the
proxy tracker and the agent stream reader
- server.py: guard the [DONE] append against client hangup at EOF and
widen the interrupt tuple with OSError
- contributor email mappings for loulanyue and jon-nielsen
Complete Portal streams can finish with finish_reason/lastOne and clean
EOF without data: [DONE], which strict OpenAI clients treat as truncation.
Normalize at the hermes proxy boundary after clean EOF only.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Removes Homebrew and PyPI wheel/sdist as Hermes distribution paths while
preserving the supported source, Docker, and Nix workflows.
Changes:
- Removes the Homebrew formula, PyPI publish workflow, sdist manifest
(MANIFEST.in), and wheel/sdist release-attachment logic from scripts/release.py.
- Keeps setuptools metadata and entry points required by editable installs
and Docker/Nix builds, but adds a setup.py guard that rejects wheel/sdist
builds outside a sealed Nix derivation (HERMES_NIX_BUILD=1).
- Removes pip/Homebrew install detection, PyPI update checks, the pip
self-update path, the deprecation-banner state, the postinstall subcommand,
wheel data-directory fallbacks in agent/i18n.py and hermes_constants.py,
and the ACP Registry manifest/version-lockstep release logic.
- Adds /nix/store/ path detection so `nix run` / `nix profile install`
installs (which don't set HERMES_MANAGED) are correctly identified as
"nix" rather than falling through to "git"/"unknown".
- Retired install-method values ("pip", "homebrew") in existing
.install_method stamps (both code-scoped and home-scoped) are ignored by
the allowlist reader and fall through to "unknown" instead of resurrecting
a retired enum value.
- Updates Nix packaging to ship bare runtime data (locales, optional-mcps)
through store symlinks and wrapper env vars instead of wheel data-files.
- Removes the ACP Registry manifest/icon and their version-lockstep tests.
- Deletes or rewrites packaging, pip-update, Homebrew, and ACP Registry
tests; adds parametrized coverage for the packaging build guard covering
BOTH sdist and wheel paths (the guards live in separate cmdclass entries
— a passing sdist test proves nothing about the wheel path).
- Updates installation/platform documentation and related user-facing copy.
- Adjusts the supply-chain scan so deleted install-hook files do not trigger
a finding, while additions or modifications still require the existing
ci-reviewed label gate.
Supported installation paths (unchanged):
- git installer (install.sh)
- Docker
- Nix/NixOS
- editable development installs (uv sync, uv pip install -e ., pip install -e .)
Sibling sweep from the #58902 raft review found aiohttp servers still
running on the implicit 1 MiB default with no explicit body cap:
- bluebubbles webhook (127.0.0.1): 1 MiB explicit cap — events are small
JSON/form payloads; attachments arrive via the REST API
- teams Bot Framework listener (0.0.0.0 bind — most exposed): 1 MiB cap;
activities are JSON well under that
- hermes proxy server: 10 MB cap mirroring api_server's MAX_REQUEST_BYTES
(chat-completion payloads can be large, but must stay bounded)
client_max_size bounds every read path including chunked transfer-encoding
requests that carry no Content-Length (#58536/#58902 pattern).
Deliberately excluded: feishu, whatsapp_cloud, sms, line, wecom, msgraph —
open contributor PRs (#54938, #54944, #54620, #54931, #54934, #25296)
already cover those; reviewing them separately preserves their credit.
3 regression tests pin the wiring.
Vulture + per-symbol verification (whole-repo grep incl. tests, string
literals, getattr, decorator/registry/argparse dispatch) confirmed each of
these has zero callers anywhere — not reachable via any dynamic-dispatch path,
not referenced by tests, not re-exported.
Removed:
- acp_adapter/tools.py: _build_patch_mode_content
- agent/anthropic_adapter.py: read_claude_managed_key (diagnostics-only, never called)
- agent/bedrock_adapter.py: get_bedrock_model_ids
- agent/browser_registry.py: get_active_browser_provider
- agent/chat_completion_helpers.py: _take_request_client (x2 nested closures, never invoked)
- gateway/platforms/weixin.py: _rewrite_headers_for_weixin, _rewrite_table_block_for_weixin
- hermes_cli/banner.py: _skin_branding
- hermes_cli/debug.py: _delete_hint
- hermes_cli/gateway.py: _setup_email, _setup_sms, _setup_yuanbao
(platform keys absent from the _builtin_setup_fn dispatch dict; handled by
the _setup_standard_platform fallback)
- hermes_cli/kanban_db.py: set_max_runtime, active_run
- hermes_cli/kanban_diagnostics.py: severity_of_highest, _latest_clean_event_ts
- hermes_cli/main.py: _build_provider_choices, cmd_portal
(portal subcommand is wired via portal_cli.add_parser, not this wrapper)
- hermes_cli/model_switch.py: CustomAutoResult (orphaned by the switch_model() extraction)
- hermes_cli/models.py: format_model_pricing_table, fetch_nous_account_tier
- hermes_cli/portal_cli.py: _nous_portal_base_url
- hermes_cli/proxy/server.py: handle_models_fallback (defined but never registered on the router)
- tools/computer_use/cua_backend.py: _parse_element, _is_arm_mac
- tools/file_operations.py: _get_safe_write_root (prod uses the imported
agent.file_safety.get_safe_write_root directly)
- tools/skills_tool.py: _load_category_description
Also dropped two imports left unused by the removals:
- tools/file_operations.py: get_safe_write_root alias
- tools/computer_use/cua_backend.py: import platform
Pure deletion: -551 LOC. No behavior change. Test files covering the edited
modules pass (640/640); the broader suite's pre-existing/env-dependent
failures reproduce unchanged on origin/main.
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
get_retry_credential only triggered on 401; a 429 Too Many Requests from
xAI was silently streamed back with no key rotation or back-off signal.
- server.py: widen retry gate from == 401 to in {401, 429}
- xai.py: on 429, skip token refresh and call mark_exhausted_and_rotate
to stamp the 1-hour cooldown on the rate-limited key and return the
next available credential. Returns None if pool is exhausted.
Six days after #23937 (608 fixes) the codebase had accumulated 241 new
PLR6201 violations. Same mechanical `x in (...)` → `x in {...}` fix,
same zero-risk profile: set lookup is O(1) vs O(n) for tuple and the
two are semantically equivalent for hashable scalar membership tests.
All 241 instances fixed via `ruff check --select PLR6201 --fix
--unsafe-fixes`, zero remaining. Every changed value is a hashable
scalar (str/int/None/enum/signal); no risk of unhashable runtime
errors. No behavior change.
Test plan:
- 119 files changed, +244/-244 (net zero) — exactly one-line edits
- `ruff check` clean afterward
- Compile checks pass on the largest touched files (cli.py, run_agent.py,
gateway/run.py, gateway/platforms/discord.py, model_tools.py)
- Subset broad test run on tests/gateway/ tests/hermes_cli/ tests/agent/
tests/tools/: 18187 passed, 59 pre-existing failures (verified against
origin/main with the same shape — identical failure count, identical
category — all xdist test-order flakes unrelated to this change)
Follows the same template as PR #23937 ([tracker: #23972](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/23972)).
The call site at line 246 is already wrapped in try/except NotImplementedError
(added in #25969). The checker just doesn't peek at surrounding context.
Mark with the suppression comment so the blocking check passes.
Adds 'hermes proxy start' — a local HTTP server that lets external apps
(OpenViking, Karakeep, Open WebUI, ...) use a Hermes-managed provider
subscription as their LLM endpoint. The proxy attaches the user's real
OAuth-resolved credentials to each forwarded request, refreshing them
automatically; the client can send any bearer (it gets stripped).
Ships with one adapter — Nous Portal. The UpstreamAdapter ABC and
registry in hermes_cli/proxy/adapters/ are designed for additional
OAuth providers to plug in by name without server changes.
Commands:
hermes proxy start [--provider nous] [--host 127.0.0.1] [--port 8645]
hermes proxy status
hermes proxy providers
Allowed Portal paths: /v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions,
/v1/embeddings, /v1/models. Anything else returns 404 with a clear
error pointing at the allowed list.
aiohttp is gated like gateway/platforms/api_server.py (try-import,
clean runtime error if missing). No new core dependency.
Tests: 24 unit tests + 1 separate E2E that spawns the real subprocess
and verifies the upstream receives the right bearer with the client's
header stripped.
