Scoped secrets — `gateway.platforms._shared.get_scoped_secret` is the single implementation of
the "scope authoritative, unscoped default-profile falls back to os.environ" read:
- plugins/platforms/buzz/adapter.py::_get_scoped_secret (113 LOC, ~100 of which were one
docstring paragraph pasted 16x) -> 3-line forwarder over the canonical with
`external_fallback=True`. Its one genuine extra rung (one-shot profile-scope build so a
Bitwarden-managed key is visible to the startup gate, #95216) moves into `_shared` as that
keyword plus `_unscoped_profile_secrets`.
- weixin::_wx_secret, matrix::_startup_env_secret, the inline try/except copies in slack
(SLACK_APP_TOKEN) and telegram (TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET/_URL) -> canonical.
- The "extra-first, then scoped env" reader written 11x under 6 names (weixin._extra_or_env,
bluebubbles/ntfy/photon/wecom `_setting`, dingtalk `_extra_get`, mattermost `_extra_or_env`,
slack `_extra_or_env_flag/_channel_set`, feishu closures) -> `_shared.extra_or_secret`.
- `authz_mixin._platform_gate_env` -> `_shared.platform_gate_env`; discord/telegram drop their
`_scoped_gate_env` twins; run.py / run_config_loaders.py / slack import it directly.
Boilerplate — three table-driven helpers in `_shared` replace the pasted docs template:
- `seed_extra_from_env(spec, home_env=)` replaces 8 `_env_enablement` bodies (buzz, google_chat,
irc, line, ntfy, photon, simplex, teams; raft is a one-liner and untouched).
- `apply_yaml_bridge(cfg, spec)` replaces 7 `_apply_yaml_config` bodies (buzz, dingtalk, feishu,
matrix, mattermost, slack, whatsapp); discord/telegram keep bespoke bridges (alias keys,
nested `platforms.*.extra`, generic-key exclusions). buzz and mattermost previously bypassed
`yaml_env_setter` with hand-rolled `os.environ` writes.
- `env_is_connected(*vars)` replaces 5 identical `_is_connected` (discord, homeassistant,
mattermost, slack, sms).
- 8 identity `_build_adapter` wrappers deleted; `adapter_factory=<Class>`.
Behavior change:
- buzz `_apply_yaml_config` returned None, so under multiplex a secondary Buzz profile got
neither env (correctly skipped) nor `extra` for relay_url/channels/allow_all_users/...; it now
seeds `extra` like every other hook. It also wrote reply_in_thread/reply_to_mode to the process
env even inside a secondary profile's scope (first-writer-wins leak, #80099 class); it no longer
does. BUZZ_POLL_INTERVAL is bridged through the same table.
- `home_channel.name` default when `<X>_HOME_CHANNEL_NAME` is unset is now the literal "Home" for
all plugins (irc/ntfy/buzz used the chat id; simplex/teams/photon/google_chat already used
"Home", as do the built-in platforms in gateway/config_env.py).
- weixin's non-secret tunables (send_chunk_*, rate_limit_circuit_*) now read through the scoped
reader instead of raw os.getenv — a secondary profile no longer inherits the default's values.
- `extra_or_secret` treats a blank string in extra as unset (falls to env) and an explicit False
as a real value, the strictest of the merged copies.
- slack `reaction_trigger_target` bridges via str(); `reaction_triggers` comma-joins any list-ish
value (was list/tuple/set only) — same env text for every real YAML shape.
Docs: website/docs/developer-guide/adding-platform-adapters.md (the template the copies were
pasted from) and gateway/platforms/ADDING_A_PLATFORM.md now show the helpers and the scoped
reader; gateway/AGENTS.md points at the one implementation.
Tests: tests/gateway/test_shared_platform_boilerplate.py — every plugin `_env_enablement`
reads only through the scoped getter (parametrized over the 8 plugins, spy on the seam, raw
`os.getenv`/`get_env_value` asserted untouched); buzz bridge seeds `extra` for a secondary
profile and still bridges env for the default; one home-name rule; extra_or_secret contract;
external_fallback rung. Existing tests repointed: tests/agent/test_secret_scope_tier1_migration.py,
tests/plugins/platforms/buzz/test_buzz_unscoped_requirement_gate.py.
Six adapters defined their own `_cancel_task` and nine more inlined the same
cancel + suppress(CancelledError) + await block; five kept a hand-rolled TTL-dict
`_is_duplicate` next to the existing `helpers.MessageDeduplicator`; three carried a
`_bounded_put`. Each copy fixed the same bugs on its own schedule (self-cancel deadlock,
done-task re-await, eviction under load).
- `helpers.cancel_task`: None/done no-op, never awaits the current task, swallows the
task's own exception at teardown. Replaces qqbot/signal/yuanbao/buzz/photon/simplex
definitions and the inline copies in weixin, discord, email, irc, line, mattermost,
whatsapp and telegram.
- `helpers.MessageDeduplicator` replaces `_is_duplicate` in qqbot, ntfy, photon,
wecom_callback and LINE's `_MessageDeduplicator`; every site keeps its own
max_size/TTL (qqbot and ntfy 1000/300s, photon 4000/48h, wecom_callback 2000/300s,
LINE 1000/no TTL).
- `helpers.bounded_put` replaces photon/wecom/whatsapp_cloud copies; a re-put now
refreshes the key to the newest slot at every site.
- telegram gmail-triage scripts resolve under `get_hermes_home()` instead of a hard
`~/.hermes`, so profiles with HERMES_HOME set find them.
Not changed: `get_chat_info` stays `@abstractmethod` because
tests/gateway/test_relay_capability_surface.py locks the abstract set to exactly
{connect, disconnect, send, get_chat_info} as a cross-repo contract, so the ~17 no-op
overrides remain.
Behavior change: whatsapp_cloud `_bounded_put` was a pure FIFO (no refresh on re-put);
it now refreshes like the other two sites. Task cancellation at the migrated sites
swallows a task's terminal exception where a few copies previously only suppressed
CancelledError (all are shutdown/disconnect paths).
Photon forked BasePlatformAdapter._send_with_retry before three fixes landed there: the server's
retry_after is honoured over exponential backoff, a long server penalty (> 60s) returns a typed
failure instead of sleeping inline (#91969), and an exhausted rate-limited send no longer posts the
failure notice inside the flood penalty. The fork got none of them. Photon's two genuine differences
are now hooks on the base — `_send_retry_is_final(result)` (structured auth/target refusals are
returned as-is, no retry, no plain-text resend) and `_send_plain_fallback(...)` (no Markdown banner,
richlink() bypassed) — and the 42-line fork is deleted.
Slack's `_retry_after_from_exc` and Discord's `_extract_discord_retry_after` parsed the header by
hand and only understood the numeric form; both now call agent.retry_utils.parse_retry_after_seconds
(numeric or HTTP-date, either header casing). Discord keeps its `retry_after` attribute path, the
`X-RateLimit-Reset-After` fallback and the 1s floor.
Behavior change: Photon retries now add up to 1s of jitter to the backoff and honour a server
retry_after; Slack/Discord recognise an HTTP-date Retry-After they previously ignored.
20 `plugins/platforms/*/adapter.py::_standalone_send` paths (the out-of-process cron /
send_message delivery) built `{"error": f"... {e}"}` by hand — 83 literals. The exception text
of an httpx/aiohttp failure can carry the Authorization header, a signed URL or a response body
with the token in it, and that string became the tool result the model reads. Only sms went
through the redacting `tools.send_message_senders._error`; discord kept a private regex that
only knew `Authorization: Bot`.
`gateway.platforms._shared.send_error(message)` wraps that helper (agent.redact +
URL-secret scrub) and every standalone literal now goes through it, including the three
envelopes that carry extra keys (discord warnings, photon error_class/retryable, whatsapp's
`(None, err)` tuple). The sms and discord local wrappers are deleted. Telegram already
delegated to the core sender and is untouched.
Behavior change (security): vendor exception text in standalone-send failures is redacted
before reaching the model.
Four bundled plugins wrapped get_hermes_home() in a try/except that fell back
to ~/.hermes on ImportError (a2a/protocol._hermes_home, photon/auth
._auth_json_path, google_chat adapter inline, openviking done in the previous
commit). A bundled plugin cannot lose hermes_constants -- each already imports
gateway.* / agent.* from the same tree -- so the fallback was dead code that
was also wrong on Windows (%LOCALAPPDATA%/hermes) and under a profile override.
telegram's gmail-triage verb path used Path.home()/".hermes" outright, ignoring
profiles. mem0/_oss_providers baked os.path.expanduser("~/.hermes/mem0_qdrant")
into VECTOR_PROVIDERS at import time, so the Qdrant default landed in the
user's ~/.hermes for every profile; the default is now a lazy callable resolved
by vector_default_config(provider_id) at setup time. a2a/security.py only
changes its import (it borrowed protocol._hermes_home).
Behavior change: on Windows and under profiles these paths now follow the
active HERMES_HOME (they were previously anchored to ~/.hermes in the impossible
fallback / at import time); the default-profile POSIX layout is unchanged.
Test: tests/plugins/test_plugin_paths_follow_profile.py asserts each resolver
(a2a conversations, photon auth.json, mem0 qdrant default, openviking log)
lands inside a HERMES_HOME ContextVar override; sabotage red for the mem0
import-time constant and the photon ~/.hermes fallback.
Ten hand-rolled "write a token file safely" routines each carried a
different subset of {0600-on-create, fsync, atomic_replace, parent-0700
guard, BaseException cleanup}. Two of them (iron_proxy state files,
the exchanged-JWT store) still opened the temp file at process umask
and chmod'ed afterwards - the exact TOCTOU window the others document
as fixed. None of the bare-os.replace copies got atomic_replace's
Windows-contention retry or EXDEV fallback.
utils gains fsync_dir= (absorbs auth.py's dir fsync), atomic_write_bytes
(vault blob) and mode= on atomic_write_text; the ten sites become 1-3
line callers. mkstemp creates the temp file O_EXCL at 0600 regardless of
umask, so the payload is never umask-readable.
Behavior change: iron_proxy proxy.yaml/mappings.json and the exchanged-JWT
store are now 0600 from creation and fsync'd; every credential write goes
through atomic_replace (symlink-preserving, Windows retry, EXDEV copy).
auth_nous shared store now uses atomic_replace too (it forced os.replace
with no recorded reason). secret_sources cache parent-0700 goes through
the guarded secure_parent_dir instead of an unguarded chmod.
Same bug class as the Slack/Feishu picks: buzz, dingtalk, email, google_chat,
line, ntfy, photon, sms, teams, wecom and whatsapp already had the platform
message id on the MessageEvent but built the SessionSource without it, so
source.message_id consumers (reply anchor in run.py, /sethome synthetic-thread
check, relay _event_ids fallback, shutdown notice anchor) saw None. Only sites
where the id variable was already in scope are widened.
Breaks the two import cycles that forced Protocol stand-ins in the F821 sweep, so the two
sites now name the real types.
gateway/platforms/event.py (new leaf): MessageType, ProcessingOutcome, MessageEvent moved
out of base.py verbatim. Their only dependency is gateway.session.SessionSource; base.py
imported helpers.py at module level, so helpers could not name MessageEvent. Now
TextBatchAggregator is typed by the real MessageEvent. 249 importers repointed
(`from gateway.platforms.base import` -> `.event`, preserving each import's layout);
gateway.platforms.__init__ re-exports from .event. The three revert-scheduled PLUGIN-COMPAT
pointers that named these symbols (gateway.slash_commands → MessageType, dingtalk → MessageType,
photon → ProcessingOutcome) and their COMPAT_MANIFEST rows now target gateway.platforms.event.
Docs updated: ADDING_A_PLATFORM.md, adding-platform-adapters.md (en + zh-Hans).
tools/mcp_tool_sampling.py: ElicitationHandler no longer holds a back-reference to its
MCPServerTask (mcp_tool imports sampling, so the task type cannot be named there). It only
ever read owner._pending_call_context, so it takes `call_context: Callable[[], Context | None]`
and MCPServerTask passes `lambda: self._pending_call_context`. The consent call is one
`functools.partial`, run directly or inside the captured Context.
ty on the 11 touched production files vs origin/main: 0 new diagnostics, 14 resolved.
(The one `source: SessionSource = None` diagnostic moves with the class; typing it Optional
exposes ~60 unguarded call sites — separate follow-up.)
Tests: tests/gateway + tests/plugins + tests/tools + touched files, 18,235 passed; the 31
failures reproduce identically on origin/main (macOS /private/tmp, systemd socket,
long-path fixtures, live-service tests).
Every PLUGIN-COMPAT __getattr__ now calls hermes_cli.plugin_compat.warn_once(facade, name, target) before
resolving, emitting a HermesPluginCompatWarning (FutureWarning) once per process per name: old path, new
path, removal target. Importing a facade for its live API stays silent; only resolving a moved name warns.
COMPAT_MANIFEST.md documents the warning and how to silence it during migration.
Verified the runtime never routes through a pointer: every entry point (run_agent, cli, hermes_cli.main,
gateway.run, tui_gateway.server, web_server, model_tools + tool discovery, hermes_state, cron.scheduler,
browser_tool, mcp_tool, kanban, auth) imports clean and `hermes doctor` runs end to end with the warning
promoted to an error.
Also restores the check_compat_pointers CI step to .github/workflows/lint.yml, which a0be177aac dropped
when the compat layer was regenerated (the lint script itself was present; the workflow step was not).
hermes_cli/plugin_compat.py, tests/test_plugin_compat_warning.py and the two-line insert per facade are
part of the compat layer and go away with it.
The Sep 2026 decomposition (PR #102117) makes internal import paths a non-API: names now live in
the focused modules that define them. This commit is the ONLY thing keeping the old paths alive,
so external plugins have time to update. It is deliberately a single, unsquashed commit:
git revert <this sha>
removes every shim, stub and manifest at once on the announced date. Nothing in-tree may depend on
these pointers: scripts/check_compat_pointers.py (wired into lint.yml) fails CI if it does.
What it adds (see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md, compat_manifest.json):
- 332 facade modules get one delimited `PLUGIN-COMPAT` block appended at the end of the file
- 1,172 moved names resolved lazily via a module `__getattr__` (PEP 562) — never a top-level import,
so no import cycles; facades that already had `__getattr__` get a chained one
- 592 third-party/stdlib names the old modules used to expose, with their original import statements
- 266 public definitions that had been deleted as unused, restored byte-for-byte from the pre-decomposition
tree (+40 private helpers and 16 imports pulled in only because a restored definition needs them)
- 3 deleted modules recreated as re-export stubs (gateway/startup_watchdog, hermes_cli/observability/
relay_runtime, tools/environments/modal_utils)
- private names (`_x`) get no pointer: they were never API (3,792 skipped)
Verified: all 335 touched modules import under a fresh HERMES_HOME and every manifest name resolves;
the lint reports zero in-tree uses; ruff clean; targeted suites unchanged.
dingtalk: drop DINGTALK_TYPE_MAPPING/EXT_MAP re-exports. google_chat: card_spec_to_cards_v2 test -> .cards.
matrix: drop module-level MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH alias (no importers). teams: drop TeamsSummaryWriter re-export
(teams_pipeline/runtime + tests -> summary_writer). wecom: drop WeComStreamExpiredError/STREAM_EXPIRED_ERRCODE/
MAX_INTERMEDIATE_FRAMES re-exports (tests -> .streaming). parallel: drop _get_parallel_client/_get_async_parallel_client
aliases (tests -> _get_sync_client). email: drop stale 'alias' comment (_esecret_int is the only name).
photon: re-remove credential_summary() (shim-only, cb9b7c36f3); its no-leak test now drives print_credential_summary.
For each issue anchor present in BASE 63279301bc non-test .py and absent on HEAD, the BASE comment/docstring block was re-attached at the HEAD location of the code it explained (matched by the distinctive code line / enclosing def). Sentences already covered by an existing HEAD comment were deduped; the issue number always survives. Insert-only: no code lines changed.
ethernet8023: the no-leak test was deleted alongside the function it pinned; the
display-only credential status is live in print_credential_summary. credential_summary
restored byte-identical to BASE so the leak contract is CI-pinned again.
The previous commit removed cache_media_bytes from teams/adapter.py's import
block but left one bare call at the Bot-Framework image path — a NameError
that the surrounding 'except Exception' swallowed, so every BF image
attachment was silently dropped (ruff F821). Route it through
cache_media_bytes_async like the file's two other sites.
Same bug class at the sites the sweep did not reach:
- buzz _download_attachment / _localize_inbound_media: cache_media_bytes
called from async methods → cache_media_bytes_async.
- photon _dispatch_inbound: _normalize_binary_payload (base64 decode +
cache write of possibly multi-MB payloads) ran on the loop → closure made
async, helper offloaded via asyncio.to_thread.
Tests: cover cache_media_bytes_async (thread-id + kwarg forwarding);
teams/buzz tests re-pointed at the async seam.
PhotonAdapter.__init__, check_requirements, validate_config,
_env_enablement, _markdown_enabled, _reactions_enabled, and
_standalone_send in adapter.py, plus load_project_credentials and
load_dashboard_project_id in auth.py, all read PHOTON_PROJECT_ID/
PHOTON_NODE_BIN/PHOTON_SIDECAR_PORT/PHOTON_SIDECAR_AUTOSTART/
PHOTON_PROBE_*/PHOTON_REQUIRE_MENTION/PHOTON_MENTION_PATTERNS/
PHOTON_REACTIONS/PHOTON_MARKDOWN/PHOTON_HOME_CHANNEL(_NAME)/
PHOTON_DASHBOARD_PROJECT_ID via raw os.getenv -- only
PHOTON_PROJECT_SECRET and PHOTON_SIDECAR_TOKEN were already scoped via
_get_scoped_secret.
Notably __init__'s project_id read was a stronger variant of the bug
(like the IRC fix in this series, item 11): the original
`os.getenv("PHOTON_PROJECT_ID") or extra.get("project_id") or stored_id`
ordering let a raw env read override even an explicitly configured
config.yaml extra -- a secondary profile that set its own project_id via
extra would still silently authenticate against the default profile's
Spectrum project, because the default profile's project id is always
bridged to os.environ under multiplex and env was checked first.
_reactions_enabled() and the require_mention/mention_patterns reads in
__init__ are exercised on every live inbound message / tapback, not just
at construction, so a secondary profile's reaction/mention-gating
behavior would be driven by the default profile's settings for the
adapter's entire runtime lifetime.
Switch every raw PHOTON_* read (except the two already scoped) to
_get_scoped_secret(), matching the module's existing helper (already
defined identically in both adapter.py and auth.py). Left
_dashboard_host()/_spectrum_host() and the interactive device-login flow
functions in auth.py untouched -- these are CLI-only management-plane
calls (`hermes photon login`/`setup`), not part of the gateway's
per-profile adapter construction/connection lifecycle, so they are not
reachable under a multiplexed secondary profile's scope; noted as a
"Scope note" in the PR body rather than silently expanding scope to
unreachable call sites.
Adds a new tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_multiplex_profile_scope.py
(9 tests, two classes covering auth.py and adapter.py separately)
mirroring the fixture/assertion style established in
tests/gateway/test_line_plugin.py's TestMultiplexProfileScope, reusing
test_auth.py's tmp_hermes_home isolation pattern so tests don't depend on
the real ~/.hermes/auth.json fallback. Mutation-verified: stashed the
production fix and confirmed 7 of 9 new tests fail against pre-fix code
(the other 2 are non-differentiating regression guards -- unscoped-
default-profile-precedence, one per class -- which correctly pass either
way). Restored the fix; all 140 tests in tests/plugins/platforms/photon/,
the 10 photon-related parametrized tests in
test_adapter_startup_secret_scope.py, and the broader
test_multiplex_adapter_registry.py / test_adapter_connect_classification.py
suites (45 tests) pass.
Follow-ups on top of #98964's cherry-pick:
- PHOTON_READ_RECEIPTS env toggle (default true) so users can keep
messages at Delivered; declared in plugin.yaml optional_env
- adapter drops both 'read' and 'read_receipt' content types (alias
coverage from #91759 by @mooserini) + regression test
- docs: photon.md feature note + environment-variables.md row
ctx.register_platform_handler(platform, factory) — the generic surface for
plugins to wire native handlers into any platform adapter at connect()
time. Factories receive (native, adapter): the platform's client/app
object (PTB Application, discord.py Bot, slack_bolt AsyncApp, Teams App,
DingTalkStreamClient, aiohttp web.Application) or None for adapters with
no separate native object.
- BasePlatformAdapter._wire_plugin_handlers(native): shared, isolated
invocation helper — a raising plugin cannot block a platform connect.
- All 27 connectable adapters call it: telegram/slack/teams/line/
api_server/msgraph_webhook wire before their dispatch tables freeze;
the rest hook at connect success.
- register_telegram_handler and get_telegram_handler_factories retained
as thin back-compat aliases over the telegram bucket.
- Source-invariant test guarantees every adapter with connect() keeps
calling the hook.
Fleet triage after the 2026-08-11 storm resolution found agents whose sole
platform had been silently 'retrying' for weeks: revoked Telegram tokens,
Discord privileged-intent rejections, and Photon sidecars that can never
start were all funnelled into the indefinite reconnect queue with no owner
signal (OOF-151/152/153, epic OOF-156).
Two-part fix:
1. Per-adapter classification — by exception TYPE only, never message text:
- telegram: InvalidToken/Forbidden -> telegram_auth_error, retryable=False
(new _looks_like_auth_error, mirrors _looks_like_network_error)
- discord: LoginFailure -> discord_auth_error, PrivilegedIntentsRequired
-> discord_intents_required (both retryable=False); every other path now
sets an explicit code (previously the generic branch set NO fatal info,
which the gateway read as 'probably transient')
- photon: new typed PhotonSidecarStartupError; deps-install failure ->
SIDECAR_DEPS_MISSING and missing node binary -> SIDECAR_NODE_MISSING
(retryable=False); ambiguous startup crashes stay retryable
- email: IMAP/SMTP failures now always set a fatal code;
SMTPAuthenticationError -> email_auth_error, retryable=False (IMAP4.error
is type-ambiguous between bad creds and transient NOs, so IMAP stays
retryable)
2. Gateway escalation — platforms continuously in the reconnect queue past
HERMES_RECONNECT_ATTENTION_AFTER_SECONDS (default 2h, 0 disables) get
needs_attention=true + retrying_since stamped into runtime status, once
per episode, cleared on successful reconnect.
Deliberately NOT a circuit breaker: retries never stop. The auto-pause
mechanism was removed for good reason (transient DNS outages left bots
silently dead); this preserves that and only adds visibility. No new
platform_state enum values — NAS's status schema is strict — only additive
fields.
Unknown exception types always stay retryable: a false terminal recreates
the silently-dead-bot problem, and the escalation path covers
misclassified permanent failures.
Main (7537de9e7) moved most of the vulnerable locked versions, but some
fixes live only in the lockfiles and some advisories stayed open. This
commit closes the rest:
website/package.json gets durable overrides for js-yaml 4.3.1,
dompurify 3.4.13, mermaid 11.16.1, and tar 7.5.22. The root workspace
gets the same tar override, which moves the tar 6.2.1 copies under
get-windows and @mapbox/node-pre-gyp past twelve open advisories.
Without an override, a reinstall can pull an old transitive copy back
in.
image-size <=2.0.2 has two infinite-loop DoS advisories and no fixed
release upstream. An override points it at @nous-research/image-size
2.0.3, our maintained fork of the real repo. The OSV scanner resolves
the aliased fork cleanly, so no ignore entries are needed.
The photon sidecar moves @opentelemetry/core to 2.10.0. The
whatsapp-bridge gets a body-parser 1.20.6 override, so the lockfile-only
fix from main cannot regress on reinstall.
website/.npmrc gets matching min-release-age exclusions for the fix
releases that are less than two weeks old.
electron stays at 40.10.2. The 41.x fix for GHSA-9f4c-93c8-jc8g brings
back the install failure that bb8280b75 reverted: install.js in 40.10.3+
extracts with an MSVC native binding, which fails on Windows machines
without the VC++ Redistributable. Upstream tracks this in
electron/electron#52481, with no fix released.
FEISHU_APP_SECRET/FEISHU_ENCRYPT_KEY/FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN, WECOM_SECRET,
PHOTON_PROJECT_SECRET/PHOTON_SIDECAR_TOKEN (adapter + auth.load_project_credentials)
and BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY now read through _get_scoped_secret.
- base.on_processing_complete implements the opt-in remove-ack/add-outcome
flow driven by _OK_EMOJI/_FAIL_EMOJI class attrs and the
_add_reaction(chat_id, message_id, emoji)/_remove_reaction(chat_id,
message_id) primitive shape; default stays a no-op.
- photon drops its override (exact behavioral match).
- slack/discord/feishu/matrix/telegram/google_chat keep overrides: divergent
primitive signatures (team_id routing, raw message objects, reaction-id
handles, replace-semantics setMessageReaction) or extra state protocols.
resolve_sidecar_dir() probes the filesystem (touch/unlink) and can mirror
sidecar files to HERMES_HOME. Doing that as a module-import side effect
meant plugin discovery, `hermes --help`, and test collection all paid a
filesystem probe (and possibly a mirror copy) just for importing the
photon adapter or CLI.
Convert _SIDECAR_DIR/_NPM_ERROR_LOG in adapter.py and cli.py to lazy
cached accessors (_sidecar_dir()/_npm_error_log()); resolution now
happens on first actual use. Existing tests that monkeypatch the
_SIDECAR_DIR module global keep working — the accessors honor a
non-None value. Adds a regression test proving import performs no
resolution.
The Photon iMessage sidecar needs node_modules under
plugins/platforms/photon/sidecar/, but hosted/managed images keep the
whole install tree under an immutable /opt/hermes — every install and
self-heal path (setup CLI, stale-deps reinstall, cold install) died on
EROFS, and hosted users have no shell to work around it.
Three-layer fix, mirroring the WhatsApp bridge resolver pattern:
1. Bake the deps into the image. The Dockerfile now runs npm ci for the
sidecar in the layer-cached dependency stage (deterministic installs
from the committed lockfile; the postinstall spectrum-ts patch runs
at build time). Hosted happy path needs no runtime install at all.
2. New sidecar_paths.resolve_sidecar_dir() decides where the sidecar
runs from: PHOTON_SIDECAR_DIR override > writable source dir (dev
installs, unchanged) > read-only dir with baked fresh deps (managed
image) > mirror to $HERMES_HOME/photon/sidecar (writable data
volume) when deps are missing or stale in a read-only tree. The
mirror refreshes changed source files on image updates while
keeping node_modules, so the existing lockfile-staleness self-heal
works there.
3. connect() can now cold-install: _start_sidecar() runs the bounded
npm ci bootstrap when node_modules is missing instead of raising
immediately, and check_requirements() reports available when a
self-install is possible (npm present + writable resolved dir) so
the gateway actually creates the adapter on hosted instances. A
failed bootstrap still raises the actionable error, which connect()
surfaces as the retryable SIDECAR_FAILED fatal state on the
dashboard.
Tests: resolver decision table (env override, in-place, mirror,
refresh, fail-open), cold-install lifecycle paths, and a Dockerfile
contract test guarding the baked-deps + no-chown invariants.
Fixes NS-606.
Maintainer rework of #45580 (issue #54036) on top of the contributor's
cherry-pick, which targeted spectrum-ts 3.1.0 while main pins 8.0.0:
Sidecar (primary detection, new):
- stream-staleness.mjs: pure decision rules, executable under node.
* classifyProbeRejection: only a not-found-shaped rejection of the
synthetic-id read counts as a completed round-trip (ALIVE); any other
rejection is INCONCLUSIVE — never alive. The original /probe treated
ANY rejection as alive, which was too loose.
* shouldProbe: probe only after 10+ min of stream silence (configurable
via PHOTON_STREAM_SILENCE_PROBE_MS; <=0 disables) with a cooldown.
* isZombieSuspect: zombie only on silence past threshold AND a
probe-proven live channel. Silence alone NEVER degrades (shared lines
can be quiet for hours); inconclusive probes NEVER degrade (network
may be down — the iterator will throw and the re-subscribe loop
recovers on its own).
- index.mjs: track last inbound-iterator yield (noteInboundYield), run a
30s watchdog tick, and on a confirmed zombie feed markStreamDegraded ->
the existing exit-75 restart path. /healthz gains a stream.staleness
block (silentForMs, threshold, lastProbeOutcome, zombieSuspected).
/probe reworked to strict semantics: 200 only on a proven round-trip,
503 with outcome hung|inconclusive otherwise.
Adapter (second layer, reworked):
- _probe_once returns tri-state alive|hung|inconclusive; only a hung
sidecar HTTP call counts toward the respawn counter — inconclusive
resets nothing and triggers nothing.
- default probe_interval_seconds 60 -> 600 (conservative; avoid restart
storms on quiet lines).
- _monitor_sidecar_health surfaces zombieSuspected from /healthz as a
warning; the fatal UPSTREAM_STREAM_DEGRADED path is unchanged and fires
when the sidecar escalates.
Tests: test_zombie_stream_watchdog.py executes the real node decision
module and drives the adapter against mocked /healthz responses;
test_presence_watchdog.py updated for the tri-state probe.
Also adds contributor mappings for nickkarhan (#53283) and vaibhavjnf
(#45580).
Follow-up to the URL markdown fix: extract the /send builder decision into
sidecar/send-format.mjs and rewrite test_url_send_path.py to execute the real
module under node (format+text in -> chosen builder out) instead of regex-
grepping index.mjs source, which is a banned test pattern in this repo.
spectrum-ts's live-stream consumer (consumeLive in spectrum-ts 3.x) only
reconnects when its inbound async iterator throws or ends. A half-open
("zombie") gRPC socket — where the TCP connection stays ESTABLISHED but the
peer is gone (NAT idle-timeout, network blip, laptop sleep) — makes the
iterator hang forever: no error, no end. The SDK exposes no gRPC keepalive
knob (createClient takes only {address, tls, token}; grpc.keepalive_time_ms
defaults to -1 = pings off), so the inbound stream silently dies and stays
dead until the gateway is restarted. Symptom: the agent's iMessage line goes
"online but deaf" — Photon's cloud-side fallback answers users with "the agent
isn't online right now" and inbound never reaches the gateway.
Fix, entirely in the code we own (no SDK fork):
- Sidecar gains a POST /probe endpoint that drives a cheap unary read
(space.getMessage on a synthetic id) over the SAME gRPC channel the inbound
stream uses. A live channel round-trips in ms (server returns not-found,
which is success for liveness); a zombie hangs. It sends nothing to any user
and creates no chat (space.get is local in shared/dedicated mode; only the
message read touches the wire).
- The adapter runs a presence watchdog: it probes on an interval, skips the
probe when natural inbound traffic already proved liveness within the
window, and after N consecutive failed probes respawns the sidecar — a fresh
Spectrum() re-subscribes the stream and re-registers presence. Successful
probes double as application-level keepalive, helping prevent the zombie
from forming at all. Respawn is lock-guarded against double-spawn and the
watchdog is torn down cleanly on disconnect.
Behavioural settings live in config.yaml (extra), bridged to env per the
.env-is-secrets-only convention:
probe_interval_seconds (60), probe_timeout_seconds (10),
probe_max_failures (3). A non-positive interval disables the watchdog.
Tests: tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_presence_watchdog.py covers config
resolution, the disable switch, probe alive/dead(500)/timeout/no-client, the
core N-failures->one-respawn detection, success-resets-failures, stop-then-
start respawn ordering, and lock-guarding — all without spawning Node or
hitting the network.
Contributed by Vaibhav Sharma (X: @vabbyshabby).
imessage.effect.message crashed the sidecar at import against SDK stubs/
builds lacking the effect surface (caught by the patch-failure health test).
Optional-chain with {} fallback; /send-effect rejects cleanly instead.
Follow-up to the #48194 pick: it was written before #43665 landed and
re-added its own /send-poll sidecar route and poll import. Collapse the
duplicates:
- keep #43665's /send-poll route (>=2 trimmed string options) as the
single sidecar implementation; drop #48194's variant
- drop the duplicated poll import in the sidecar destructure
- make adapter.send_poll() a thin wrapper over _sidecar_send_poll(), the
one /send-poll client (shared with the poll-backed clarify path), and
align its validation to the sidecar's >=2-options contract
The `clarify` tool's multiple-choice prompts flattened to a numbered text
list on Photon/iMessage, even though iMessage has a native poll bubble and
spectrum-ts already exposes it via the `poll()` content builder. Two gaps
caused the flattening:
* Outbound: the sidecar only had `/send` (text); there was no way to send
a poll, so the base adapter's numbered-text fallback was used.
* Inbound: `normalizeContent()` handled only text/attachment/voice, so a
poll vote (`poll_option`) was dropped on the floor ("[Photon content
type not handled: poll_option]") and never resolved the clarify.
Fix, end to end:
* Sidecar: import `poll` from spectrum-ts; add a `/send-poll` route
(`space.send(poll(title, ...options))`); serialize inbound `poll_option`
(the vote: chosen title + selected bool) and `poll` content in
`normalizeContent()`.
* Adapter: override `send_clarify` — for choices, send a native poll via
`_sidecar_send_poll` and call `mark_awaiting_text` so the gateway's
existing pending-clarify text-intercept resolves the answer; open-ended
clarifies keep the plain-text path. Inbound `poll_option` selections are
dispatched as a plain-text MessageEvent carrying the chosen option
(deselections / empty votes are dropped). If the poll send fails (an
older sidecar without `/send-poll`, or a send error) it falls back to the
numbered-text clarify, so nothing regresses on a half-upgraded restart.
No new model tool, no new env var, no core change — the capability lives at
the platform edge. The poll vote reuses the existing clarify text-intercept
resolution path, so no new gateway resolution mechanism is introduced.
Tests: tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_poll_clarify.py — inbound vote ->
choice text, deselection/empty-vote dropped, send_clarify sends a poll +
enables text-capture, open-ended stays text, and poll-failure falls back to
the text list. Full photon suite green.
Contributed by Vaibhav Sharma (X: @vabbyshabby).
Maintainer follow-up to the #51193 salvage:
- _send_with_retry: permanent classes (auth_or_config, target_not_allowed)
now short-circuit BEFORE the unconditional plain-text fallback resend,
including when a retry attempt surfaces one — no more double-sends of
permanently-failing requests.
- sidecar classifySidecarError: new structured code target_not_allowed for
Spectrum's 'Target not allowed for this project' AuthenticationError
(shared/free-tier lines cannot initiate outbound sends to new targets).
Classification applies to every handler sharing the catch-all
serverError path (/send, /send-attachment, /react, /typing, ...).
- _standalone_send now parses the structured error body too (it reads
sidecar responses independently of _sidecar_call) and returns
error_class/retryable alongside the message.
- target_not_allowed maps to a canonical user-facing message in both
paths; raw upstream error text never leaks through the structured code.
Closes the actionable halves of #50971, #51897, #52794.
