Four writers each dropped their own uniquely-named copy of config.yaml next to
the real file and none of them ever deleted anything: hermes setup
(config.yaml.bak.YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS, one per run even with no change), the
corrupt-YAML snapshot (config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak), hermes migrate xai
(config.yaml.bak-pre-migrate-xai-<ts>) and the Docker boot migration
(config.yaml.bak-<ts>, .env.bak-<ts>). A home dir accumulated a dozen variants
with no way to tell which mattered.
hermes_cli/config_backups.py::backup_config is now the single writer:
backups/config/config.yaml.<reason>.<YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS>, skipped when the newest
copy for that reason is byte-identical, rotated to the newest five per reason.
backups/ is already excluded from full backups so nothing nests. Legacy
siblings written by the old schemes are moved into the dir on first use;
hand-named copies (config.yaml.bak-my-note) are left alone.
Live: three `hermes setup --non-interactive` runs against an unchanged config
went from three .bak files in HERMES_HOME to one pre-setup copy under
backups/config/; repeated loads of broken YAML produce one corrupt copy
instead of one per process (deduped by content).
Every PLUGIN-COMPAT __getattr__ now calls hermes_cli.plugin_compat.warn_once(facade, name, target) before
resolving, emitting a HermesPluginCompatWarning (FutureWarning) once per process per name: old path, new
path, removal target. Importing a facade for its live API stays silent; only resolving a moved name warns.
COMPAT_MANIFEST.md documents the warning and how to silence it during migration.
Verified the runtime never routes through a pointer: every entry point (run_agent, cli, hermes_cli.main,
gateway.run, tui_gateway.server, web_server, model_tools + tool discovery, hermes_state, cron.scheduler,
browser_tool, mcp_tool, kanban, auth) imports clean and `hermes doctor` runs end to end with the warning
promoted to an error.
Also restores the check_compat_pointers CI step to .github/workflows/lint.yml, which a0be177aac dropped
when the compat layer was regenerated (the lint script itself was present; the workflow step was not).
hermes_cli/plugin_compat.py, tests/test_plugin_compat_warning.py and the two-line insert per facade are
part of the compat layer and go away with it.
The Sep 2026 decomposition (PR #102117) makes internal import paths a non-API: names now live in
the focused modules that define them. This commit is the ONLY thing keeping the old paths alive,
so external plugins have time to update. It is deliberately a single, unsquashed commit:
git revert <this sha>
removes every shim, stub and manifest at once on the announced date. Nothing in-tree may depend on
these pointers: scripts/check_compat_pointers.py (wired into lint.yml) fails CI if it does.
What it adds (see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md, compat_manifest.json):
- 332 facade modules get one delimited `PLUGIN-COMPAT` block appended at the end of the file
- 1,172 moved names resolved lazily via a module `__getattr__` (PEP 562) — never a top-level import,
so no import cycles; facades that already had `__getattr__` get a chained one
- 592 third-party/stdlib names the old modules used to expose, with their original import statements
- 266 public definitions that had been deleted as unused, restored byte-for-byte from the pre-decomposition
tree (+40 private helpers and 16 imports pulled in only because a restored definition needs them)
- 3 deleted modules recreated as re-export stubs (gateway/startup_watchdog, hermes_cli/observability/
relay_runtime, tools/environments/modal_utils)
- private names (`_x`) get no pointer: they were never API (3,792 skipped)
Verified: all 335 touched modules import under a fresh HERMES_HOME and every manifest name resolves;
the lint reports zero in-tree uses; ruff clean; targeted suites unchanged.
For each issue anchor present in BASE 63279301bc non-test .py and absent on HEAD, the BASE comment/docstring block was re-attached at the HEAD location of the code it explained (matched by the distinctive code line / enclosing def). Sentences already covered by an existing HEAD comment were deduped; the issue number always survives. Insert-only: no code lines changed.
Conflict in hermes_cli/model_setup_flows.py: took simp/cli-models's
simplified version and re-applied simp/cli-main's 2-line change (import
_current_reasoning_effort/_set_reasoning_effort from hermes_cli.setup
instead of hermes_cli.main, since cli-main removed the main.py copies).
simp/cli-models had dropped those two helpers from hermes_cli.setup.py as
dead (their only base caller was main.py's own copy); restored them there
so the cli-main import path resolves.
PR re-review caught that cli-config.yaml.example and the setup wizard
still described the OLD day-stamp gate ("period starts on or after the
day you opted in"). The actual gate (CONSENT_GATE_SQL) requires the
entire package period to be contained in one recorded consent window -
stricter, and privacy-significant at opt-in/revocation boundaries: a
package straddling a revocation starts after opt-in yet is correctly
held back. Both surfaces now state the containment rule literally;
docs A.1 already did.
- Tavily plugin deleted (plugins/web/tavily), keyless endpoints and
ring entry removed from keyless_mcp, legacy backend set / credential
ladder / preference walks / rescue key map scrubbed.
- TAVILY_API_KEY deregistered across config, setup, status, dump, and
nous_subscription surfaces. The tvly- redaction pattern stays --
legacy keys in user envs still deserve masking.
- Sibling test pins migrated (keenable/exa stand in where tavily was
the fixture vendor); tavily test suite deleted.
- Docs updated: web-search, configuration, integrations,
environment-variables, tools-reference, web-dashboard, provider
plugin dev guide.
Live-verified from an isolated HERMES_HOME with all web creds blanked:
zero-config resolution lands in the 4-vendor ring, live keyless ring
search succeeds, no tavily anywhere in resolution order.
- Widen opencode_zen_free_runtime healing to the union of the static floor,
the in-process live memo, and the SWR disk cache — a newly-live free model
now heals opencode-go/zen selections without a release (sibling site the
original PR missed).
- Memoize _fetch_opencode_free_models() in-process (5 min, negative caching
included) so direct provider_model_ids() validation callers don't each
block on a network round-trip or timeout.
- Drop delisted x-preview-f-free from the offline floor and setup.py sample
list (offline fallback must not offer a model that 401s); add the newly
live deepseek-v4-flash-free / mimo-v2.5-free to setup.py.
- Update stale test fixtures to a live exemplar; add regression tests for
memoization, negative caching, and union healing; docs note in providers.md.
Product-owner decision, 2026-08-27: the analytical need is stable
cross-window identity (retention curves, longitudinal install
behaviour), which the rotating pseudonym destroyed by design. The
feature has not shipped - zero consented users, zero production
transmissions - so identity semantics can change without breaking any
promise made to a user; existing (dev-only) consent windows carry
forward unchanged.
Removed in full rather than weakened in place:
- shared_metrics_identity.py (salt generation/rotation, HMAC-SHA256
derivation, payload substitution) and its 19-test file.
- The sender's derivation step. _freeze_identity keeps its validation
role (unreadable/non-object/id-less payloads still reject rather than
block the queue) and now records the raw install_id in
sent_install_id; _body rewrites the payload's install_id from that
frozen column, keeping byte-identical resends anchored to one
recorded value.
Consent surface updated in the same change: the setup wizard now states
plainly that packages carry the stable profile-scoped install ID (a
random UUID, no personal information, reset by deleting the
shared-metrics directory). No consent was ever collected under the old
wording in any shipped build.
Docs A.2/A.3 rewritten as decision records rather than silently
edited: A.2 records what is transmitted now and states the
consequences plainly (indefinite cross-package correlation is the
designed behaviour); A.3 records why rotation existed and why its
removal was accepted. The main-body "must not reuse the persistent
local identifier by default" escape hatch is exercised, not deleted:
that paragraph required exactly this product decision, which has now
been made. A.6's deletion note updated: install_id is now itself the
lookup key, so a future delete-on-request needs only a service-side
API, not a mapping.
Tests: the two privacy assertions invert deliberately
(test_the_stable_install_id_is_transmitted_as_is and the e2e wire
variant); freezing/byte-identical-retry coverage unchanged. Staging
E2E script now asserts transmitted == install_id.
258 targeted tests pass; ruff + footguns clean; both staging E2E
harnesses green with the raw id observed on the wire (202s).
OpenRouter and Nous already list z-ai/glm-5.3-flash (#95621). The
native z.ai picker, OpenCode Go/Zen fallbacks, setup wizard, and
Coding Plan probes did not. Context still resolves through the
existing glm-5.3 1M key.
387 commits from main; no conflicts (verified with merge-tree before
merging). Overlap limited to hermes_cli/config_defaults.py and
hermes_cli/setup.py, both auto-merged; all shared-metrics surfaces
untouched by main.
Structural fix after five review rounds put four blockers in the same
subsystem. The root cause was representational: consent history is a
sequence of on/off intervals, but it was stored as ONE moving day-stamp
plus a revoked flag. Every fix had to mutate that scalar at exactly the
right moment from exactly the right place, and each round the mutation
was missing from some reachable path (write-once stamp in R3; recorded
inside a loop that never runs when sending is off in R4; dead code
whenever collection was off in R5).
Consent is now recorded as explicit intervals (send_consent_windows) and
eligibility is a pure derivation: a package is sent only when its whole
period falls inside a recorded window. One writer -
reconcile_send_consent - derives window state from an observation of
(config, now). It is idempotent and order-independent, so the wizard,
the relay, and the mid-pass check all call the same function and cannot
disagree; there are no edges to detect and no ordering between writers
to get wrong. The relay reconciles once per process BEFORE the
collection gate, which fixes round-5 D1 (enabled:false made the only
idle-path observer unreachable). The claim reads the table and never
writes it, removing the read-path mutation (D2's rewrite vector).
Timestamp discipline, each rule load-bearing and mutation-tested:
- 'obs' high-water mark: monotonic, advanced only by observations;
confirms an open window forward (last_confirmed_at).
- 'data' high-water mark: advanced only by stored package period_end;
clamps window OPENS so a rolled-back clock cannot slide a window
under refused packages already on disk (round-5 D2).
- A close stamps last_confirmed_at, never "now": consent is asserted
only for observed time, so a hand-edited config with no process
running for 90 days fails closed (round-5 D1 strongest form).
- The gate requires period containment, not period_start >=, so an
intra-day revoke/re-enable holds back the day package (round-5 D3).
- Unlike the day-stamp, a revoke/re-enable cycle no longer destroys the
undelivered backlog from the earlier consented window (round-5 D4).
The redesign was validated BEFORE implementation against all 13
reproduced defect scenarios on a real store; the first two drafts each
failed scenarios in that harness (v1 leaked the unobserved-gap case by
closing at "now"; v2 leaked refused windows by letting data stamps
confirm consent). The harness ships as
tests/hermes_cli/test_shared_metrics_consent_windows.py.
Deleted: OPT_IN_PERIOD_KEY, SEND_REVOKED_KEY, LAST_SEEN_SEND_KEY,
opt_in_period(), record_revoked(), the relay edge detector body, and the
setup wizard's key bookkeeping (~170 lines of transition machinery).
Schema: two additive tables, version deliberately unchanged; verified
against a copy of the real production DB (13 rows intact, reopen no-op).
Also kills round-5's M8 survivor: the seen-exclusion mutation now fails
the suite. New mutation sweep: 8/8 killed, including one vacuous test of
my own this round (obs-mark monotonicity was covered only by
coincidence of the data mark; now pinned directly).
Documented cost: a fresh package waits at most one process start after
its period completes before release (fail-closed direction).
270 tests pass; ruff and windows-footguns clean. Staging E2E re-run
through the interval gate: both packages 202.
Fourth independent review. Two more consent leaks, both reproduced through
the real relay entry point before and after the fix. Both are failures of
my own round-3 fix, which recorded revocation in the wrong place.
BLOCKER 1 - revoking while idle recorded nothing. _record_revocation lived
inside send_pending's loop, but _send_exported_packages returns early when
send is false, before a sender is ever constructed. The dominant case is a
user turning sending off while no pass is running, so the loop that was
meant to observe the revocation could never run. Reproduced: 6 periods
collected during a refused window were transmitted on re-enable.
The window now closes on the observed config EDGE, before the early return.
Last-seen send state is persisted because each hook fires in a fresh
process, so a true->false transition is only visible by comparison. The
rising edge also opens the window explicitly: the sender only runs when
there is something to send, so a user who opts in and out before any
package exists would otherwise have no window for record_revoked to close.
BLOCKER 2 - turning COLLECTION off never recorded revocation. The
not-enabled branch in setup.py force-set send=false and returned without
calling _record_send_consent_change, so `hermes tools` -> disable shared
metrics silently dropped consent while leaving the window open. Same
retroactive release on re-enable. Both consent surfaces now record, and
setup keeps the relay's edge detector in step.
Also, from the same review's mutation sweep:
- the scheme check is now pinned as an allowlist. Replacing the http test
with `if True` survived the entire suite, because every non-http case
targeted a REMOTE host where the loopback branch rejects anyway. Only a
non-http scheme on loopback distinguishes the two. Shipped behaviour was
already correct; nothing guarded it.
- A.3 no longer claims rotation bounds long-term linkability outright.
Measured against 11 real packages: resource is a stable low-entropy
tuple and periods are contiguous across a rotation, so for a RARE
configuration those can bridge windows. The honest claim is that
rotation raises the cost, not that it makes correlation impossible.
Two mutants are documented as unkillable rather than papered over with
tests that only appear to cover them: the _defer clamp is unreachable from
any current caller, and widening the falling-edge check to an
unconditional else is behaviourally equivalent because record_revoked is
idempotent and no-ops without an open window.
An earlier version of the anti-spurious-revocation test could not fail
either - it used a never-consented store, where record_revoked no-ops
regardless. Rewritten to opt in, revoke, re-enable, and then assert that a
steady enabled state does not re-close the reopened window.
259 tests pass. Staging E2E re-run: both packages 202.
Third independent review. Both blockers reproduced against a real store
before and after the fix.
BLOCKER 1 — head-of-line starvation. The claim query is LIMIT 1, and a
package already handled this pass was rejected AFTER the fetch, so
_claim_next returned None and send_pending read that as 'queue empty'.
Any row that sorts first and becomes eligible again mid-pass therefore
terminated the pass. This is reachable normally: a 429 with a short
Retry-After, or a pass outliving the 15-minute failure backoff (a legal
pass runs ~1900s). Measured: 10 of 19 healthy packages silently dropped.
The seen-set is now excluded IN SQL, so None genuinely means no eligible work.
Same scenario now delivers 19 of 19.
BLOCKER 2 — revoking consent leaked once it was re-granted. opt_in_period
was write-once, so packages collected while the user had send: false
still had period_start >= the ORIGINAL opt-in day; re-enabling released
the whole refused window. Reproduced: 5 packages from a 5-day opted-out
window transmitted on re-enable. Turning sending off now closes the
consent window, and the next enabled pass opens a new one from that day.
Recorded both in the setup wizard and in the sender itself, because
config.yaml can be hand-edited where the wizard never sees it.
Also: a send_attempts ceiling (a poisoned head row burned ~160 requests
over 30 days, unbounded), _defer clamps to >= 1s so it cannot write a
past deadline, and the dead skipped_not_due field is removed.
Test-quality fixes, since vacuous tests have been the recurring problem:
- the lease test asserted only 'in the future', passing for a 1s lease;
it now requires the lease to outlast one package's worst legal case
- test_shutdown_joins_the_send_thread grepped getsource for a method
name — a change-detector AGENTS.md rejects — and is now behavioural
- gzip determinism was unguarded: both retries in one pass compress in
the same second, so removing mtime=0 was caught by nothing. Now
compares output across a real second boundary.
All five new regressions are mutation-verified: reintroducing each bug
fails its test. The first attempt-ceiling test SURVIVED its mutation
(the seeded row was excluded by another predicate) and was rewritten to
drive the real loop.
251 tests pass. Staging E2E re-run: both packages 202.
The last piece of the macOS permissions campaign (#52010 follow-up): macOS
prompts per-folder (Desktop, then Downloads, then Documents, ...) as the
agent touches each one — a drip-feed of dialogs on first use. ONE Full Disk
Access grant covers all of them permanently, and with the stable signing
identities merged this week it survives every update. Nothing in Hermes
taught users that.
- hermes doctor: check_macos_full_disk_access() — prompt-free probe (the
FDA-gated TCC db dir returns EPERM without a dialog; TCC only prompts on
protected-CATEGORY paths), reports granted state or prints the one-switch
setup with the Privacy_AllFiles deep link.
- hermes setup: same probe at the end of onboarding — the moment users are
primed to do system setup — silent when already granted, indeterminate,
or non-macOS.
- docs: desktop.md TCC section now leads with the one-switch guidance.
- 7 tests (granted / denied / indeterminate / non-macOS, both surfaces).
Independent review found the claim mechanism did not work. Reproduced
against the real store: two senders POSTed the same package.
The claim wrote next_attempt_at = now, but selection requires
next_attempt_at <= now, so a concurrent pass matched the same row
immediately. It now writes a LEASE INTO THE FUTURE
(_CLAIM_LEASE_SECONDS), which is what actually excludes another pass,
and expires by itself if a process dies mid-send. _mark is additionally
guarded on send_state so a straggler whose lease lapsed cannot
overwrite a completed send back to pending.
The old concurrency test could not fail: it raised AssertionError from
inside a transport, and _send_one catches every exception as a
retryable transport error. It now records what the second pass saw.
Also from review:
- shutdown() never joined the send thread; the join was only wired into
deactivate(). A short-lived CLI therefore killed an in-flight send at
exit, on the only cadence this feature has.
- Removed HERMES_TELEMETRY_ENDPOINT. AGENTS.md reserves HERMES_* for
secrets, and a behavioural override here was a consent hazard: an
inherited variable could silently redirect telemetry a user agreed to
send to Nous. The staging E2E writes the endpoint into its throwaway
profile instead, which also exercises the real config path.
- Added the shared-metrics toggle that AGENTS.md requires
as the third opt-in surface, delegating to the setup prompt so the
consent rules stay in one place.
- Non-429 4xx (401/403/404/413/422) are now permanent. Only 400 was,
so a wrong path or oversized body retried every 15 minutes for 30
days until retention pruned it.
- The opt-in day is stamped when the user consents, not on the first
send pass, which silently dropped the opt-in day whenever the next
export crossed midnight UTC.
- gzip now uses mtime=0. The embedded timestamp made two sends of one
package differ on the wire, so the 'byte-identical retry' E2E was
comparing parsed bodies and could not have caught it. It now compares
raw request bytes.
- Reconciled the three stale claims in relay-shared-metrics.md that
said no remote-delivery path exists.
233 tests pass (was 213). Staging E2E re-run through the config path:
both packages 202, and the service logged both objects written to S3.
Step 1+2 of the shared-metrics exporter.
Config: telemetry.shared_metrics.send (default false) and .endpoint
(default production), resolved by a new shared_metrics_send_config
module. Precedence is HERMES_TELEMETRY_ENDPOINT > config > default; the
env var exists so the live staging E2E never has to mutate a user's
config. send requires enabled and never implies it — that combination
is a misconfiguration the user believes is working, so it logs an ERROR
once per process rather than silently doing nothing. Plaintext
endpoints are refused unless the host is loopback, so a typo cannot
send telemetry in clear text.
Per AGENTS.md, outbound telemetry needs a user-facing opt-in, so
setup_telemetry now prompts for sending as a second, separate question
and force-disables send when collection is turned off.
Storage: six additive nullable columns on package_outbox for send
bookkeeping. The store schema version deliberately does NOT move —
_ensure_schema_in_transaction raises on any version it does not
recognise and has no forward-compatibility branch, so bumping it would
hard-fail an older Hermes, a second profile on an older build, or a
rollback, against the same file. Old readers select named columns and
never SELECT *, so the additions are invisible to them.
Also corrects the two places that promised telemetry is never uploaded
(config_defaults comment and cli-config.yaml.example); leaving them
would make them false privacy statements once sending ships.
Tests: 26 covering config precedence, the enabled/send relationship,
transport safety, fresh-database creation, upgrade from a pre-send
database (rows preserved, version pinned, idempotent), and that the
shipped export query still runs. Mutation-checked: bumping the schema
version fails 5 of them.
Audit finding (Blank Slate): the system prompt advertised web_search,
skill_view, todo, and the hermes-agent skill even when the toolset had
none of them — the model chases phantoms it can't call.
- hermes-agent skill is now essential: cannot be disabled (config reads
strip it, hermes tools writes drop it), cannot be deleted by
skill_manage, is re-seeded past curator suppression, and is seeded
even on .no-bundled-skills profiles (Blank Slate / --no-skills).
- Blank Slate core toolsets grow from file+terminal to
file+terminal+vision+skills: read_file cannot read images and points
at vision_analyze; the essential skill needs skill_view to load.
- HERMES_AGENT_HELP_GUIDANCE degrades to a docs-URL-only variant when
skill tools are absent.
- Execution-discipline guidance drops its web_search lines when web
tools are off (execution_guidance_text renderer).
- Skills-index preamble says 'basic tools like terminal' instead of
naming web_search when web tools are off.
- Coding operating brief drops the todo-tracking sentence when the todo
tool isn't loaded.
All gating keys off agent.valid_tool_names, fixed at session
construction — prompt stays byte-stable per session (cache-safe).
Decode Ghostty/Kitty enhanced selection and cancellation keys, make setup cancellation terminal, and add cross-terminal previous-step navigation to setup and model flows.
Refs #92833
Live verification (2026-08-21): big-pickle and mimo-v2.5-free return 429
FreeUsageLimitError for ANY User-Agent except the opencode CLI's own
'opencode/latest' — same IP, no cooldown effect, while the other six free
models serve our honest HermesAgent UA freely. Hermes sends deliberate
attribution headers and does not impersonate other clients, so these two
models are broken for our users by policy on OpenCode's side; delist them
rather than ship dead picker entries.
- opencode-free catalog: 8 -> 6 models (both curated lists)
- plugin default_aux_model: big-pickle -> laguna-s-2.1-free (fastest
non-gated free model)
- keyless predicate keeps big-pickle (it IS free-tier; correct routing if
a user enters it manually — they get the relay's own 429, not our 401)
E2E: picker shows 6, laguna aux default completes a keyless agent turn.
Adds an OpenCode Free provider plugin. Free model discovery uses models.dev
(cost.input == 0 AND status != "deprecated"), matching opencode CLI's exact
filter logic.
The free tier requires a real account API key and throttles third-party
clients by User-Agent:
- With OPENCODE_FREE_API_KEY configured, the key is sent as a Bearer token
and requests identify as "opencode/latest".
- Without a key, the keyless fallback strips the SDK's always-injected empty
Authorization header and still sends the opencode User-Agent.
- The credential resolver no longer blanks OPENCODE_FREE_API_KEY
unconditionally (the stale keyless-tier assumption), and credential-pool
exhaustion no longer surfaces the misleading "Set OPENCODE_FREE_API_KEY"
message.
Co-authored-by: Jean-François <jfm@laposte.net>
Signed-off-by: Rudraksh Chahal <131520192+rudrakshchahal@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add x-preview-f-free (Ox Alpha: free, 1M context, ZDR) plus all newly
listed Zen models (gpt-5.6 sol/terra/luna, claude-opus-5, gemini-3.7/3.6
flash + lite, grok-4.6/4.5, muse-spark-1.2, kimi-k3, qwen3.7-max,
hy3-free, laguna-s-2.1-free, nemotron-3.5-lightning-free,
muse-spark-1.2-contributor-free) and Go models (gpt-5.6-luna, grok-4.5,
glm-5.3, qwen3.8-max, hy3, hy3-preview, muse-spark-1.2-contributor).
- Drop delisted north-mini-code-free from Zen.
- Route grok-* on Zen and Go through /v1/responses per the published
endpoint tables (grok-4.6/4.5/build-0.1 on Zen, grok-4.5 on Go).
- 1M context fallback for x-preview-f (Ox Alpha).
- Refresh hermes setup provider samples for both providers.
Catalogs verified against live GET /zen/v1/models and /zen/go/v1/models
plus https://opencode.ai/docs/zen/ and /docs/go/ endpoint tables (2026-08-20).
Widens #90327's line_input() to the whole bug class: all 46 bare input()
free-text prompt sites across the setup wizards (model_setup_flows, setup,
config, gateway, auth, auth_commands, plugins_cmd, skills_hub, bundles,
setup_whatsapp_cloud, main) now route through line_input(), and the shared
cli_output.prompt() / setup.prompt() helpers do too — so every CLI wizard
gets cursor editing, not just the custom model prompt.
Redirected stdin and missing prompt_toolkit keep builtin input() behavior.
E2E: real PTY with raw escape bytes through line_input, cli_output.prompt,
and setup.prompt (arrows + Ctrl+A/E edit correctly); redirected-stdin
fallback verified.
Users who install Hermes and then restore a backup (hermes import) ended
up with bot tokens and cron jobs fully registered but nothing running
them: the setup wizard's service-install prompt lived at the end of the
Messaging Platforms section, so skipping messaging (the normal case on a
box whose tokens arrive with the import afterward) skipped the service
entirely, and run_import never touched the service layer at all.
A platform-less gateway is already a supported mode (gateway/run.py runs
the cron scheduler and picks platforms up as tokens appear), so there is
no reason to gate the service on messaging config — or to ask at all.
- hermes_cli/gateway.py: new ensure_gateway_service() — prompt-free,
never-raising install+start of the user-scope service (systemd /
launchd / Scheduled Task), no-op in containers and on hosts without a
service manager, refuses to pile onto conflicting user+system units.
- hermes_cli/setup.py: setup_gateway() service block now runs
unconditionally (zero platforms included) and auto-installs instead of
prompting; restart-on-config-change keeps its prompt. Quick-setup and
migrated-config paths that skip the messaging section now call
ensure_gateway_service() so they can no longer skip the service.
- hermes_cli/backup.py: run_import() ends by installing/starting the
service when none is running, with a manual fallback hint on failure.
- tests: new tests/hermes_cli/test_ensure_gateway_service.py (9 cases)
+ 3 run_import wiring tests; existing backup tests get an autouse
fixture so they never touch the host's real service manager.
Hermes installs runtimes for itself — `uv` at `$HERMES_HOME/bin/uv`, Node
at `$HERMES_HOME/node` — and neither directory is on an arbitrary
process's PATH. Every `shutil.which("node"/"npm"/"npx"/"uv")` in Hermes's
own code therefore has two failure modes: the managed runtime is invisible,
so the caller reports "not installed" or degrades to a slower tier on a
machine that has exactly what it needed; and when a system copy also
exists, the one Hermes does not own wins.
Routed the Hermes-owned call sites through managed-aware resolvers:
- `agent/lsp/install.py`, `hermes_cli/dep_ensure.py`, `hermes_cli/main.py`
(`_make_tui_argv`), `hermes_cli/tools_config.py` (`_run_post_setup`) now
use `find_node_executable()`.
- `hermes_cli/tools_config.py::_pip_install` and `hermes_cli/setup.py`'s
vercel install use `ensure_uv()` (installing uv is in scope during setup,
and the Windows installer's `uv venv` does not seed pip, so the fallback
tier is "No module named pip"). `tools/lazy_deps.py` uses `resolve_uv()`
— a lookup, not a bootstrap, because it runs mid-turn for an optional
dependency and downloading a runtime as a side effect exceeds what the
caller asked for.
- `hermes_cli/gateway.py`: extracted `_append_node_dir_for_service()`,
shared by the systemd unit and launchd plist generators, which appends
the managed dirs before the PATH-resolved one. A service definition is
written once and survives reboots, so resolving a system Node that
happens to lead the installing shell's PATH bakes the wrong interpreter
in permanently. Managed dirs are profile-scoped, so each profile's unit
still names its own Node; the existing symlink-parent rule (don't
`.resolve()`) is preserved verbatim.
- `tools/environments/local.py`: the terminal tool's subshell PATH gains
the managed dirs, appended alongside the sane entries rather than
prepended — a tool the user deliberately put on their own PATH still
wins, and the managed one only fills a gap. This is also what makes the
bare `which("uv")` in `tools/env_probe.py` correct: that probe reports
the environment the *model* sees, and the model can only run what is on
that subshell's PATH.
`scripts/install.ps1`: the persisted User PATH update becomes
`Set-ManagedNodeFirstOnUserPath`, a move-to-front rather than an
add-if-missing. Installs made by an older install.ps1 already have the
managed dir in User PATH — at the tail, behind a system Node — and an
add-if-missing check sees it present and leaves that ordering in place
forever, so the users the bug hurt would never be repaired. Unrelated
entries keep their relative order (empty segments included; a trailing
`;` is legal and the installer's other PATH code preserves them),
duplicates collapse, and it writes only when the string actually changes.
Tests:
- `tests/test_managed_runtime_resolution.py` — AST guard that fails any
new bare `which()` for a managed runtime, with a short justified
allow-list and a companion test that fails when an allow-list entry goes
stale. Reading source is banned by AGENTS.md and this is the documented
exception: the property is "no call site anywhere spells it this way",
which no runtime seam can observe.
- `scripts/ci/test_install_ps1_path_migration.ps1` — behavioral, not a
source regex: it lifts the real `Set-ManagedNodeFirstOnUserPath` out of
install.ps1's AST and rewrites only the two registry calls into an
in-memory store, so the shipped split/dedupe/prepend/change-detection
logic executes for real. Not in the default lane (Linux runners have no
PowerShell host); runs under `pwsh`. 13/13 assertions pass.
Cancelling the API-key prompt mid-wizard (Enter → 'Cancelled.') let the
wizard continue through Terminal/Gateway/Tools and finish 'successfully'
with no model configured — the user exits believing they're set up, then
hits a broken chat.
_print_setup_summary() (called by every setup path: full, quick,
blank-slate, portal) now probes resolve_provider() and, when nothing is
configured, prints an unmissable warning with the two one-line fixes
(hermes model / hermes setup --portal).
Consumer-onboarding audit finding #7 (sev 4), Aug 2026.
