162 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
teknium1	7a99c4d13c	fix(send): the 'not configured' error lists the home and sources it consulted ... The error now names the resolved home's `.env` (and whether the platform's token key is defined there), `config.yaml` (block absent / `enabled: false` / no token) and the environment variable(s) checked, so a Windows or profile home user can fix the file this process actually read. When a gateway started from the same home already has the platform connected, the message says its token lives only in that process's environment and which key to add to `.env`. Docstrings in `gateway/channel_directory.py` and `send_cmd._load_hermes_env` stop naming `~/.hermes`; the pipe-script-output guide documents the message.	2026-09-18 10:11:14 -07:00
Rook-CodeVolt	59e40220e2	fix(send): derive hermes send path hints from the resolved Hermes home ... `hermes send --help`, the `--list` empty-state hint and the "Platform 'x' is not configured" error hardcoded `~/.hermes/...`, which does not exist on a Windows install rooted at `%LOCALAPPDATA%\hermes` or under a profile home. Build the strings from `get_hermes_home()` instead. Salvaged from #114297 (the `_load_hermes_env` secret-scope rewrite and its reload-based tests are dropped; see the PR body).	2026-09-18 10:11:14 -07:00
liuhao1024	0f76689076	fix(tools): scrub lone surrogates from the outbound send body ... `hermes send MESSAGE` hands surrogateescape-decoded argv straight to send_message_tool; a lone surrogate then crashes the UTF-8 marshal inside platform SDK request bodies (feishu/lark) and the message is silently lost after the retries. Every send_message caller (model tool call, `hermes send`, dashboard console) enters _handle_send, so scrub there — before media extraction, the session mirror and the platform sender see the text. Model output delivered by the gateway/cron is already scrubbed by finalize_turn / the gateway reply boundary. Fixes #113799	2026-09-18 10:02:30 -07:00
Teknium	a9838c2100	fix(multiplex): tool and memory-provider env reads stay inside the routed profile ... Under gateway.multiplex_profiles, os.environ holds the DEFAULT profile's .env; a secondary profile's values exist only in the per-turn secret scope. Every reader below still read os.environ/os.getenv at call time, so a secondary profile's turn silently used the default profile's value. Credentials (F6): FIRECRAWL_API_KEY (read_file hosted OCR), OPENVIKING_API_KEY, mem0-OSS OPENAI_API_KEY, MODAL_TOKEN_ID/SECRET and BROWSER_USE_API_KEY presence gates, and the xAI video plugin's os.getenv("XAI_API_KEY") fallback AFTER the scoped resolver had already missed — the exact fallback-after-miss shape gateway/AGENTS.md forbids. Deleted, not re-scoped: the resolver is the scope. Identity / tenant (F7): MEM0_USER_ID/AGENT_ID/HOST/MODE, SUPERMEMORY_CONTAINER_TAG, RETAINDB_PROJECT, OPENVIKING_ACCOUNT/USER/AGENT (and the whole layered() env read), HINDSIGHT_BANK_ID/MODE/retain shaping, HERMES_HONCHO_HOST. A raw read put a secondary profile's memories into the default profile's account/bank/ project/tenant and recalled them back into the default's turns. Each now uses get_secret with the provider's own per-profile default on a miss. Endpoints (F8): OPENAI_BASE_URL (aux custom runtime + direct-alias expansion), XAI_BASE_URL/HERMES_XAI_BASE_URL (aux OAuth), NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL (#65941, both the aux builder and hermes_cli.auth_nous._nous_inference_env_override), GATEWAY_PROXY_URL (same UnscopedSecretError-only fallback shape as GATEWAY_PROXY_KEY three lines below), FIRECRAWL_API_URL, BROWSERBASE_BASE_URL, SUPERMEMORY/RETAINDB/HONCHO/HINDSIGHT URLs. The keys beside them were already scoped, so a secondary's key was sent to the default profile's proxy or host. Targets / display (F11): WEIXIN_HOME_CHANNEL (message posted into the default's chat), HERMES_LANGUAGE, and agent/i18n's process-wide lru_cache of display.language — now keyed by HERMES_HOME. Outbound webhooks: hooks.outbound[].secret_env resolved from os.environ while the gateway registers each profile's targets inside that profile's scope, so a secondary's deliveries were signed with the default's secret or left unsigned. Agent-cache eviction: _spawn_release_thread started a bare threading.Thread, so commit_memory_session -> provider on_session_end ran with an EMPTY context. The thread now runs copy_context() and, for the unscoped housekeeping sweep, enters the owning profile's _profile_runtime_scope resolved from the session key (agent:<profile>:...). The pressure batch does the same per key. session_search (#82903): agent/inline_tool_executors.py::_session_search forwarded every schema argument except `profile`, so a gateway agent could never select a named profile's store. Forwarded; the ownership-scoping design in #87779/#87847 is a separate design call and is not attempted here. Live repro (/tmp/mux_audit/fix-tool-memory-reads/repro.py): 28 FAIL on origin/main -> 0 FAIL with this change; 10 new invariant tests red on base. Fixes #82903 Fixes #65941 Fixes #99121 Addresses #87779 Co-authored-by: webtecnica <75556242+webtecnica@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Michael Versluis (Berry) <michael@wve.nl>	2026-09-11 15:26:46 -07:00
Ben Barclay	866332bfb5	fix(relay): authorize send_message targets and surface egress declines (P5) (#99220) ... * fix(relay): authorize send_message targets and surface egress declines P5 of the relay egress-authorization workstream. The relay path authenticated the SENDER but never authorized the DESTINATION, and the gateway compounded it from both ends. (a) send_message could silently name an arbitrary relay target. Its `target` parameter is free-form ('platform:chat_id'), so a model could name ANY chat id and the gateway would emit an outbound frame for it. gateway/relay/egress.py adds an attestation floor: a relay-routed destination must have a provenance this gateway can show -- the operator's home channel, the channel directory, or its own gateway session origins. Anything else is refused HERE, with a visible tool error naming the target, before a frame is written. Non-relay platforms and platforms served by a live native adapter in this process are untouched (same precedence resolve_delivery_transport applies). (b) Connector declines were swallowed into apparent successes. The connector's egress floor answers an unauthorized destination with a DEFINITE failure whose text is deliberately uniform (F-005). Several relay lanes degrade a *transport drop* by design and were degrading an *authorization refusal* the same way: - _send_media returned None, sending the caller into BasePlatformAdapter's text fallback -- a DIFFERENT op re-addressed at the very chat the connector had just refused. - _send_prompt returned None, so exec-approval / slash-confirm / clarify reported "relay prompt op unavailable" (a wrong reason) and ran their numbered-text fallbacks into the refused chat. - task_card_stop discarded the error entirely. - typing / delete / react / thread ops degraded silently at debug. is_egress_decline() classifies THAT a decline happened (never why -- the uniform text is not parsed for reasons) and requires a definite, non-ambiguous failure, so a lost-ack retry is still a transport outcome. Lanes with an error-carrying contract now report the decline verbatim; cosmetic bool/None lanes still degrade but log it at WARNING. Advisory progress drops that legitimately degrade are unchanged: the task_card send lane, the draft ambiguous/except branches, and every transport-exception path keep their existing fail-open behaviour. Tests: 21 mutations of the production source, all KILLED. * fix(relay): authorize the RESOLVED target; declines must not fall back Review round 1 (independently confirmed by a second reviewer) found three blockers. Two are fixed here; the third (B-2, Telegram @username) is a policy decision left open deliberately. B-1 — THE FIX CAUSED THE OUTAGE IT PREVENTED (tools/send_message_tool.py) The P5(a) guard ran ABOVE Slack user->DM resolution, so it authorized the internal pseudo-id `_parse_target_ref` emits (`user_name:ben`, `user:U...`). Provenances only ever hold RESOLVED conversation ids, so a fully attested DM was compared as a handle against a set of `D...` ids and refused: base slack:@ben SENT head(before) slack:@ben REFUSED Every Slack DM by handle was broken. Moved the guard below resolution; it now authorizes the destination that is actually sent to, and the refusal names the resolved id. Position is load-bearing, so it is commented as such and pinned: reverting the move turns exactly the four new cases red. B-3 — A DECLINE IS NOT A LANE FAILURE (gateway/run.py) `_approval_send_outcome` had only sent/failed/ambiguous, so a connector decline collapsed into `failed` — which is the cue to run the plain-text fallback into the chat the connector had just refused. The adapter fix in the previous commit improved the error STRING while user-visible behaviour stayed identical to base; the commit message overstated it. Fixed properly: - new `declined` verdict, recognised via the shared `is_egress_decline` contract (not string sniffing at the call site) - exec-approval returns without the text fallback - slash-confirm suppresses the text reply AND clears the registration, so a card that never rendered cannot capture the user's next message `send_clarify` was already correct (returns early inside the adapter). MUTATIONS (production source; both directions) classifier never returns 'declined' -> KILLED (4 cases) ALL failures classified as 'declined' -> KILLED (2 cases) guard moved back above Slack resolution -> KILLED (4 cases) decline CODE changed (review M05) -> KILLED marker match made case-sensitive (M10) -> KILLED M05 was a tautology: the test asserted the imported constant against itself, so changing the constant could not fail it. The wire contract is now pinned as a literal, because the connector stamps that exact string and a one-sided change is a silent cross-repo break. REGRESSION CHECK: the 12 failures + 1 collection error in this test selection are PRE-EXISTING cross-test contamination — the identical set fails at 7cf86188ac. Verified by diffing the failing sets: no new failures, 363 -> 374 passed. NOT FIXED (deliberate): B-2, Telegram `@username`. The Bot API resolves handles at send time, so there is no id to compare and no canonicalization exists yet. That is a policy decision, not a code move. * fix(relay): fail CLOSED on guard faults; classify the structured decline Third independent review. Two more blockers, both reproduced before fixing. 1. THE GUARD ITSELF FAILED OPEN (tools/send_message_tool.py:158) `_authorize_relay_target` wrapped BOTH the import and the call in one `except Exception: return None` — and None means AUTHORIZED at every call site. So any runtime bug inside the guard silently switched the entire P5(a) boundary off. Reproduced: with the guard raising, an unattested target sent. The docstring already stated the correct intent ("must not fail closed on its own IMPORT error") and the code did something broader. The two failures are not the same: a missing gateway package means there is no relay egress to authorize; a fault inside the guard means authorization did not happen. The import is tolerated, the call is not — a guard that cannot answer refuses. 2. THE STRUCTURED DECLINE WAS THROWN AWAY (gateway/run.py) The adapter preserves the connector's dict in `SendResult.raw_response`. My previous commit rebuilt a dict from the error STRING, which loses two contracts: * a decline carrying `code: egress_declined` and NO text renders as "relay egress declined" — no marker colon — so it classified as `failed`, which is exactly the cue to run the fallback into the refused chat; * `ambiguous: True` (lost ack) was flattened into a DEFINITE failure, re-sending a card that may already be on the user's screen. That is the duplicate-card bug the ambiguous verdict exists to prevent, reintroduced by the fix meant to harden the same path. Both call sites now classify `raw_response` when present, ambiguity first, and fall back to the wire sentence only for connectors that send no structured response. I had fixed the text-marker path and tested only the text-marker path. Worth naming: the review's probe was a shape my tests never produced. MUTATIONS (production source) guard fault returns None (fail open again) -> KILLED classifier ignores raw_response -> KILLED (3 cases) ambiguous treated as a definite failure -> KILLED (2 cases) 40 focused tests pass. Regression check vs be321faf27: identical 13-item failing set (pre-existing cross-test contamination), no new failures. STILL OPEN: B-2 / finding 3, Telegram `@username`. The reviewer is right that this is a REGRESSION of an existing contract (#53573 added Bot API username support), not merely an unspecified input, since relay provenance stores the numeric chat id. Fixing it means resolving the handle before authorization, or explicitly revoking the contract. That is a policy decision, not a code move, and it is Ben's call. * test(relay): pin M21 and M25, the survivors whose comments called them load-bearing Round-2 review reported six unpinned survivors from round 1. Two guard real behaviour and are now covered; the other four are cosmetic-lane warnings and fail-open branches I am leaving documented rather than pretending to close. M25 — thread-qualified session ids. `_session_ids` adds BOTH "chat:thread" and the bare chat, because the connector authorizes the CHAT. Without the split a gateway whose session origin is `-100999:77` cannot send to `-100999`, the chat it is demonstrably already talking in. KILLED. M21 — the generic `relay` plane must union every fronted platform, since a relay session is filed under its LOGICAL platform. KILLED. MY FIRST M21 TEST WAS THE DEFECT IT WAS TESTING FOR. I patched `_relay_fronted` — the very function the mutation empties — so emptying it changed nothing the test could see, and the mutation SURVIVED against a green test. Rewritten to drive the real `relay_fronted_platforms()` through its env source (`GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORMS`), which is how production learns it. That is the same "the test verifies my stand-in" failure I have spent this workstream removing from the connector harnesses, reproduced here in three lines of Python. The tell was identical: a mutation that survives a test written specifically to kill it. 334 tests pass. NOT PINNED, deliberately: M03 (success-guard on a malformed dict), M24 (empty-target allowance — the one fail-open branch, reachable only when the bare-platform path already resolved a home channel), M35/M36 (decline WARNINGs on cosmetic lanes). All four are observability or defence-in-depth rather than authorization, and the review agrees they are non-blocking. * fix(relay): defer Telegram @username authorization to the connector (B-2) Closes the last blocker. Two reviewers independently called this a REGRESSION of the public-channel username support added in #53573, not an unspecified input, and they were right: provenance stores RESOLVED numeric chat ids, so comparing `@channel` against them could only ever refuse. WHY THE GATEWAY CANNOT ANSWER IT. The guard fires only when there is no live native adapter — i.e. relay-fronted deployments — and on exactly those the CONNECTOR holds the bot token, not this process. There is no local way to turn a handle into the numeric id. Refusing here is not "fail closed", it is "fail always". WHY DEFERRING IS SAFE. The destination is still authorized one layer out: the connector's Telegram egress floor (gg#238, merged 743a7c2) classifies and refuses unauthorized destinations after ITS resolution — the layer that closed the reported vulnerability in the first place. Handles go from two guards to one, the authoritative one, not to zero. The carve-out is deliberately narrow and its EDGES are pinned, because the failure mode of an exemption is silent widening: telegram `@handle` -> deferred (the regression case) telegram numeric id -> still guarded matrix `@user:server` -> still guarded (telegram-only) bare name, no `@` -> still guarded attested handle -> normal path, attestation still consulted MUTATIONS carve-out widened to all platforms -> KILLED carve-out widened to every target -> KILLED carve-out removed (regression back) -> KILLED carve-out checked BEFORE attestation -> KILLED THE ORDERING MUTANT SURVIVED MY FIRST TEST. Both orderings return None, so asserting the verdict could not tell them apart — the test asserted the claim instead of the mechanism. Rewritten to observe that attestation is actually consulted. Same defect class as the M21 test earlier in this branch: a mutation surviving a test written specifically to kill it means the test is measuring the wrong thing. 341 tests pass. FOLLOW-UP (option 2, Ben's call, deliberately NOT done here): resolve the handle before authorizing so BOTH layers apply. That needs a resolution round-trip through the connector — new wire surface — so it belongs in its own phase rather than bolted onto this one. Recorded in the code comment at the carve-out, not just here. * fix(relay): close two fail-open boundaries; test the code-only decline for real Both blockers from review, each REPRODUCED before fixing. 1. STRUCTURED DECLINE HAD NO GUARD. Deleting `raw_response=result` from both `_send_prompt` return branches left all 34 tests green — a surviving, non-equivalent security mutant. The `code` field is the documented PREFERRED signal precisely because a connector may send no prose, and a caller rebuilding `{"success": False, "error": ...}` cannot see it. Cause: every existing case declines with marker TEXT. The evidence for the code-only path was a hand-built SimpleNamespace in a different file — a stand-in for the adapter, so it verified my fixture instead of production. Fixed with a CodeOnlyDecliningConnector driving the real `send_exec_approval` -> `_send_prompt`, feeding the REAL SendResult to the REAL `_approval_send_outcome`, plus the same shape on the media lane. drop raw_response SURVIVED (34 passed) -> KILLED 2. TWO FAIL-OPEN BOUNDARIES, both "absence" and "fault" sharing a return. `_relay_fronted` swallowed EVERY exception and returned an empty set, which `relay_routed_platform` reads as "not relay-routed" — skipping the guard. Probe, with a positive control in the same run: positive_control_denied = True discovery_fault_denied = False <- unattested target AUTHORIZED `_authorize_relay_target` caught every exception during IMPORT as "no gateway package". A module that exists and fails to initialize is a fault, not an absence, and returning None there means authorized. Now: ImportError alone is absence; anything else raises RelayRouteUnknown and `authorize_relay_target` converts it to a REFUSAL STRING (not a raised exception — every caller treats the return value as the verdict, so raising would trade a fail-open for a crash). Kept the converse under test so "fail closed" does not silently become "refuse everything in CLI/cron", which is the outage the broad except existed to prevent. discovery fault -> empty set KILLED RelayRouteUnknown -> authorized KILLED import fault -> authorized KILLED 397 passed (was 392, +5 new cases), zero failures. * fix(relay): close all seven review-round-3 blockers Every finding reproduced before fixing; every fix mutation-checked after. CONTENT LEAKS (the decline was laundered into a different op, same chat) #1 A declined DRAFT SEAL replayed as a plain send. On stream-is-the-message platforms the turn-final becomes draft(final=True); `_seal_open_draft` dropped the structured body, so `_absorb_into_open_draft` read a REFUSAL as a lane failure and fell through. Probe, Slack descriptor: before: draft(partial) -> draft(final,SECRET) -> send(SECRET) after: draft(partial) -> draft(final,SECRET) My first probe of this used a discord descriptor and showed no seal at all — the leak is real, my probe was wrong (streams only arm for Slack). #6 Task-card PROGRESS had the same defect one lane over: a bare failed SendResult reads as "card lane unavailable", and TurnRunner then sends the task text to the same chat. Both card methods now carry raw_response and the caller suppresses the fallback on a decline. AUTHORIZATION BYPASSES #2 `except ImportError` was NOT the fix I claimed last round. ImportError also covers a broken dependency inside an INSTALLED gateway; review probed `ImportError.name = "gateway.relay.dependency"` and got an authorized verdict. Now only a name identifying the gateway relay module itself is absence. An ImportError with NO name stays absence — refusing on a fault we cannot attribute would trade an unidentifiable bug for a real CLI/cron outage, and an existing test caught exactly that when I first got it wrong. #3 `relay_routed_platform` lowercases the requested platform; `_relay_fronted` returned configured names verbatim. A platform configured as "Discord" missed the membership test, looked native, and skipped the guard: 'discord' => refused 'Discord' => ALLOWED 'DISCORD' => ALLOWED An attestation bypass on a string comparison. UNDELIVERABLE PROMPTS THAT HUNG #4 `_clarify_send_disposition` handled `failed` and `ambiguous` but not `declined`, so a REFUSED clarify card fell through to wait_for_response and blocked until clarify_timeout — indefinitely when configured non-positive. A decline is more definitive than a failure, not less. #5 The exec-approval decline branch returned quietly, which suppressed the text fallback (right) but left the CENTRAL approval entry pending (wrong) — the dangerous command stayed blocked until the approval timeout. My comment claimed the registration was torn down; only RelayAdapter's private map was. It now raises `_ExecApprovalDeclined`, which propagates to `_await_gateway_decision`'s existing notify-failure path (drops the entry, unblocks the tool). A dedicated type, re-raised past the local `except Exception` that would otherwise have restored the leak. #7 THE GAP THAT LET ALL OF THIS SHIP. Both caller-level suppressions were unfalsifiable: deleting either branch left 36/38 tests green. The suites drove `_approval_send_outcome` and `RelayAdapter` but never the real TurnRunner / busy-session callers, so nothing observed whether a text send FOLLOWED a decline — which is the whole property. tests/gateway/test_decline_fallback_suppression.py drives both real callers and records every send. Each decline case is paired with an ordinary-FAILURE control, because without one a caller that never falls back would also pass. MUTATIONS (all on production source, anchors count-checked, restored after) #1 seal decline -> plain send KILLED #1b seal drops raw_response KILLED #2 nested ImportError -> authorized KILLED #3 fronted set not normalized KILLED #4 clarify declined branch removed KILLED #5 approval decline returns not raises KILLED #6 task_card drops raw_response KILLED #7 slash-confirm suppression removed KILLED #7's two were the reviewer's SURVIVORS (36/38 passing); both now die. 425 passed, zero failures. * fix(relay): close the three round-4 blockers Round 4 confirmed six of seven round-3 fixes and found three more. Each reproduced before fixing, each mutation-checked after. 1. A NAMELESS ImportError still authorized. Last round I admitted it as "absence" to protect the CLI/cron path. That reasoning was WRONG and the interpreter says so: import gateway.relay.nope -> ModuleNotFoundError, name="gateway.relay.nope" import totally_absent_pkg -> ModuleNotFoundError, name="totally_absent_pkg" Genuine absence is ALWAYS ModuleNotFoundError with `.name` set, so the CLI/cron path never produces a bare ImportError and nothing legitimate was being protected. A plain or nameless ImportError comes from an import hook or a module that failed while initializing — an unattributable FAULT. Now: absence is ModuleNotFoundError naming gateway / gateway.relay / gateway.relay.egress; everything else refuses. Two existing tests raised a bare ImportError to simulate absence and were corrected to the real shape. 2. SESSION ATTESTATION INVENTED IDS. `_session_ids` split every id on the first colon to recover "chat" from "chat:thread". Matrix ids contain a colon natively, so `!room:server.org` attested a bare `!room` — the guard vouching for a destination on its own fabrication. The split now applies only to platforms whose ids genuinely carry a `:thread` suffix (allow-list; unknown platforms are treated as un-splittable, which can only refuse more). Kept a Slack control: dropping the split entirely would refuse legitimate thread replies, which is the outage the split exists to prevent. 3. THE TASK-CARD FIX WAS UNFALSIFIABLE — my own round-3 mistake, and the same one round 3 caught me making. I added the production branch AND a test, but the test stopped at RelayAdapter: it proved `raw_response` is carried and never called `TurnRunner._task_card_publish`, which owns the property. Deleting the real branch left 30 tests green. Now driven through the real caller, with an ordinary-failure control. The lesson generalises: proving the DATA reaches the boundary is not proving the CALLER acts on it. Every one of these decline fixes has two halves and the second half is where the security lives. Also closed the round-4 non-blocking finding: `gateway/relay/egress.py` has its OWN import boundary, and the existing test intercepted the earlier import in tools/send_message_tool.py, so it was never exercised. Mutating that classifier to treat every ImportError as absence now dies. MUTATIONS (production source, anchors count-checked, restored after) R4-1 nameless ImportError -> authorized KILLED R4-2 session split unconditional KILLED R4-3 task-card caller branch removed KILLED (was SURVIVED) egress classifier: any ImportError = absence KILLED Also probed and found NOT a leak: a refused OPENING draft frame disarms the stream and the turn-final goes out via `send`. That send is itself guarded and the connector refuses it too, so no content is delivered — unlike the seal case (round 3, #1) where the seal was the only check on that path. 452 passed, zero failures. * fix(relay): recover the thread parent from thread_id, not a colon split Round 4 blocker 2 was closed with an allow-list of platforms whose ids have no native colon. Reviewing my own fix while round 5 ran, the allow-list is the wrong mechanism: it NARROWS a guess instead of removing it, and it still gets Matrix wrong the moment a Matrix session is thread-qualified (`!room:server.org:$thr` -> split yields `!room`). The structured field was there all along. `_session_entry_id` composes the id as f"{chat_id}:{thread_id}" and the entry still carries `thread_id` separately, so the parent is knowable EXACTLY: strip the known suffix, or add nothing. No platform list, no guessing, correct for ids that contain colons. Mutations: back to splitting on the first colon KILLED thread parent never recovered (over-refuse) KILLED Both directions matter: the first invents attestations, the second refuses legitimate thread replies. One existing test (M25) asserted the right PROPERTY with a fixture that omitted `thread_id` — a shape real entries never have. Fixture corrected, assertions untouched. 453 passed. * fix(relay): close the four round-5 blockers Each reproduced before fixing, each mutation-checked after. R5-1 A DISABLED NATIVE ADAPTER BYPASSED AUTHORIZATION. `_has_live_native_adapter` treated any entry in the adapter map as native; `resolve_delivery_transport` ignores a native adapter whose config is disabled and routes over Relay. Two independent routing classifiers, disagreeing: guard says native: True delivery routes relay: True So the guard skipped authorization for a send that went over the relay. The guard now applies the router's enabled-state rule; probed both configurations and they agree. R5-2 THREAD IDS WERE NEVER AUTHORIZED. The parser splits chat_id and thread_id; only chat_id reached the guard. On Discord the thread IS the destination — `POST /channels/{thread_id}/messages` — so an attested parent channel authorized an arbitrary caller-supplied thread. `authorize_relay_target` now takes thread_id and requires its own attestation (bare id or the `chat:thread` form a session origin produces); both call sites forward it. R5-3 A DECLINED **INITIAL** DRAFT WAS RETRIED AS A PLAIN SEND. Round 3 fixed the declined SEAL; the declined OPEN was a different path. `send_draft` returned a bare failure, so the stream consumer read "draft transport unusable", disabled drafts and fell through to `_first_send`. Measured through the real adapter and real StreamTransportMixin: before: ops ['draft', 'send'] after: ops ['draft'] send_draft now carries raw_response; a decline is terminal for the run and the guard sits in `_first_send`, where every fallback path converges. R5-4 MY ROUND-4 TASK-CARD FIX SUPPRESSED EXACTLY ONE UPDATE. It set `native_failed`, which the entry gate already uses for an ordinary broken lane, so the next progress event skipped the decline branch and went straight to the text fallback: after first publish: [] after second: ['send'] Terminal declines are now a separate `egress_declined` state checked at the entry gate. A refusal does not expire after one tick. MUTATIONS R5-1 disabled native counts as native KILLED R5-2 thread_id not authorized KILLED R5-2b tool does not forward thread_id KILLED (was SURVIVED) R5-3 initial-draft decline not terminal KILLED R5-3b _first_send guard removed KILLED R5-4 declined state not persistent KILLED R5-2b is the same gap that produced findings 3 and 4 of the last two rounds, a third time: every test called `authorize_relay_target` directly, so dropping the argument from the TOOL WRAPPER changed nothing. Testing the callee never proves the caller uses it — now pinned explicitly. Each fix ships with an ordinary-failure control, because every one of these makes the guard refuse MORE, and over-refusal is now the larger risk. 474 passed, zero failures. * refactor(relay): declare the terminal-decline state where it lives Both terminal-decline flags were set dynamically. They worked (neither class is frozen or slotted) but an undeclared attribute hides the state from anyone reading the class, and this one is security-relevant. _TaskCardState.egress_declined — declared dataclass field StreamConsumer._egress_declined — initialised in __init__ Lifetime verified while checking whether a refusal can leak ACROSS turns and mute a healthy destination: it cannot. _TaskCardState is constructed per progress-drain (run_turn_runner.py:420) and the consumer's flags per run (stream_consumer.py:163), so both are fresh each turn. Also verified the guard's blast radius after adding thread authorization: the ONLY callers of authorize_relay_target are the two model-facing send_message call sites. Gateway-internal sends — notably the handoff path, which creates a thread and immediately posts to it with no session provenance yet — go through transport.adapter directly and are unaffected. That was the most plausible over-refusal, and it does not reach this guard. 461 passed. * fix(relay): close the four round-6 blockers — the edit lane R6-1 MY OWN R5-1 FIX REINTRODUCED THE BYPASS IT CLOSED. I wrote `except Exception: return True` around the config lookup, so a config read fault declared the platform native while the ROUTER, reading the real config, sends over the relay: guard_has_live_native True guard_verdict None router relay Routing we cannot determine is UNKNOWN. It now raises RelayRouteUnknown, which the outer handler must re-raise rather than flatten to False, and `authorize_relay_target` turns into a refusal. This is the second time a convenience `except` in this function created a bypass; there is now no permissive return left in it. R6-2/3/4 THE NINTH LANE: `edit`. ONE dropped field, THREE leaks. `RelayAdapter.edit_message` discarded the connector response, and three independent callers read a bare edit failure as "editing is unavailable" and re-send the content as a NEW message to the same chat: stream edit fallback ['edit', 'edit', 'send'] the unseen tail queued reconciliation ['edit', 'send'] the WHOLE response task-card fallback ['edit', 'send'] the task text again Fixed at the source (edit_message carries raw_response) plus each caller: `_on_edit_failure` — the single funnel for stream edit failures — makes a decline terminal for the run, `_send_fallback_final` refuses to deliver a continuation after one, the queued reconciler returns instead of sending, and the task-card fallback sets the same terminal state R5-4 introduced. R5-4 fixed the native task-card op and I did not check its sibling fallback path. The pattern across rounds 3-6 is consistent: the fix goes where the decline is OBSERVED, and the leak lives wherever someone else later decides to retry. MUTATIONS R6-1 config fault -> assume native KILLED R6-1b RelayRouteUnknown swallowed as False KILLED R6-2 edit drops raw_response KILLED R6-2b edit-failure decline not terminal KILLED R6-3 queued reconcile falls back on decline KILLED R6-4 task-card fallback edit decline KILLED Each with an ordinary-failure control: a genuinely un-editable message must still be delivered, and a broken card lane must still reach the user. 481 passed, zero failures. * fix(relay): add a terminal-decline latch at the adapter choke point THE STRUCTURAL FIX, not a twelfth local check. Rounds 3-6 of review found ONE defect in eleven lanes: the connector refuses an op, and some caller downstream reads that as 'this lane is unavailable' and retries the same content through a DIFFERENT op against the SAME chat. Media, prompt, draft-open, draft-seal, native task card, task-card fallback edit, slash-confirm, exec-approval, clarify, stream edit, queued reconciliation. Each was closed by adding a check at one more call site. That approach cannot converge: gateway/ has ~60 outbound call sites, every one of them a place a future change can reintroduce this, and four consecutive review rounds each found another. The reviewer's own count of lanes is the argument against the per-site design. Every relay frame from every one of those callers passes through _transport.send_outbound. One latch there covers them all: once the connector refuses a chat, this adapter stops emitting CONTENT frames for that chat. Proven to subsume the local checks: with the stream-edit per-site check DISABLED, the leak probe still reports blocked=true — the frame never reaches the wire. The local checks stay as defence in depth and for their better error messages, but they are no longer the only thing standing between a decline and a re-addressed send. Scope is deliberately narrow, and each limit is mutation-pinned: per CHAT - a refusal must not mute other conversations CONTENT ops - typing/delete carry nothing; latching them would leave a stuck typing indicator for no security gain self-healing - cleared when the connector accepts that chat again, so a transient policy change does not need a restart Mutations: latch never set KILLED latch never consulted KILLED latch is global, not per-chat KILLED latch never clears KILLED 485 passed. * fix(relay): one route source; the latch already covered round 7's lanes Round 7 reviewed 573e41e294 — one commit BEFORE the terminal-decline latch — and independently reached the same conclusion I had: 'The per-call-site approach is structurally wrong. Use one turn-scoped choke point.' That is the latch in 6dbc004594. Its four 'still broken' lanes (tool-progress edit, progress-overflow edit, long-running heartbeat edit, stale streamed-final reconciliation) all share the shape edit_message->declined->adapter.send(same chat, same content), and NONE has a local check. Probed all four against the latch: tool_progress ops ['edit'] blocked progress_overflow ops ['edit'] blocked heartbeat ops ['edit'] blocked stale_final ops ['edit'] blocked That is the argument for the choke point, measured: lanes nobody patched are safe anyway. Pinned by a parametrized test named for those four lanes. R7-1 IS A REAL BYPASS THE LATCH DOES NOT COVER, and it is fixed here. The guard rebuilt routing from GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORMS while resolve_delivery_transport asks the CONNECTED adapter (fronts_platform, from the handshake identity set). Different snapshots: with env discovery stale or momentarily empty, the guard said 'native' and the router sent over the relay, skipping authorization. before: guard_relay_routed False / delivery relay after: guard_relay_routed True / delivery relay / unattested target refused The guard now asks the live adapter first and falls back to config only when there is no runner (CLI/cron) — pinned in both directions. R7-5 (non-blocking, and a fair hit): my stream-fallback test asserted _egress_declined and never drove _send_fallback_final, so removing that early return SURVIVED. The test now calls the real fallback and asserts the wire is untouched; the mutation dies. Mutations: R7-1 guard ignores the live adapter KILLED (was SURVIVED) R7-5 fallback early return removed KILLED (was SURVIVED) latch not consulted KILLED 491 passed. * fix(relay): close three holes found by attacking my own latch Round 8's brief told the reviewer to attack the latch. I did the same in parallel and found three real holes in it before the review returned. 1. send_for_platform BYPASSED THE LATCH ENTIRELY. It builds and posts its frame directly rather than through _outbound — and it is the delivery resolver's OWN entry point, so it is the single most important caller. before: ops ['edit', 'send'] after: ops ['edit'] gateway/AGENTS.md states the rule I had just broken: 'Seal-interception exists at BOTH egress doors (send() and send_for_platform()); a new egress door needs the same two checks.' The latch is a third such check and I had wired it to one door. 2. A COSMETIC SUCCESS CLEARED THE LATCH. Clearing on ANY success meant a typing indicator — routinely allowed for a chat whose content is refused — re-opened the door for the very next send: ops ['edit', 'typing', 'send'] Only a CONTENT op the connector accepted may clear it now. 3. A THREAD INSIDE A REFUSED CHAT WAS NOT COVERED. A thread lives inside its parent, so the same content reached the same conversation one level down: ops ['edit', 'send'] The latch key now strips the thread suffix. Also normalised int/str chat ids (callers pass both; a type mismatch would silently unlatch). MUTATIONS send_for_platform not latched KILLED cosmetic success clears the latch KILLED thread suffix not stripped KILLED draft-seal retry not latched SURVIVED — EQUIVALENT, proven: is unreachable while latched (a declined edit before the seal produces ZERO seal frames, measured). Kept as defence in depth because it posts directly, and documented at the site rather than covered by a test that could not fail. One self-inflicted bug on the way: a blanket replace put 1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Turn on the 1Password app integration and sign in to get started. Run 'op signin --help' to learn more. For more help, read our documentation: https://www.1password.dev/cli 1Password CLI is built using open-source software. View our credits and licenses: https://downloads.1password.com/op/credits/stable/credits.html Usage: op [command] [flags] Management Commands: account Manage your locally configured 1Password accounts connect Manage Connect server instances and tokens in your 1Password account document Perform CRUD operations on Document items in your vaults events-api Manage Events API integrations in your 1Password account group Manage the groups in your 1Password account item Perform CRUD operations on the 1Password items in your vaults plugin Manage the shell plugins you use to authenticate third-party CLIs service-account Manage service accounts user Manage users within this 1Password account vault Manage permissions and perform CRUD operations on your 1Password vaults Commands: completion Generate shell completion information inject Inject secrets into a config file read Read a secret reference run Pass secrets as environment variables to a process signin Sign in to a 1Password account signout Sign out of a 1Password account update Check for and download updates. whoami Get information about a signed-in account Global Flags: --account account Select the account to execute the command by account shorthand, sign-in address, account ID, or user ID. For a list of available accounts, run 'op account list'. Can be set as the OP_ACCOUNT environment variable. --cache Store and use cached information. Caching is enabled by default on UNIX-like systems. Caching is not available on Windows. Options: true, false. Can also be set with the OP_CACHE environment variable. (default true) --config directory Use this configuration directory. --debug Enable debug mode. Can also be enabled by setting the OP_DEBUG environment variable to true. --encoding type Use this character encoding type. Default: UTF-8. Supported: SHIFT_JIS, gbk. --format string Use this output format. Can be 'human-readable' or 'json'. Can be set as the OP_FORMAT environment variable. (default "human-readable") -h, --help Get help for op. --iso-timestamps Format timestamps according to ISO 8601 / RFC 3339. Can be set as the OP_ISO_TIMESTAMPS environment variable. --no-color Print output without color. --session token Authenticate with this session token. 1Password CLI outputs session tokens for successful 'op signin' commands when 1Password app integration is not enabled. -v, --version version for op Run 'op [command] --help' for more information on the command. into send_for_platform, which has no such variable. Two existing unfurl tests caught it — NameError at adapter.py:1407. 504 passed. * fix(relay): Telegram handle exemption + a turn boundary for the latch Round 8 blockers. Two of its four were already closed by 93750e351a (it reviewed the commit before it); these two are real and both are mine. B1 — THE TELEGRAM @HANDLE EXEMPTION COVERED A NATIVE SEND. _is_unresolved_handle exempts telegram @handles from attestation because "the connector resolves and authorizes it". That justification is FALSE whenever the gateway holds its own token: _send_to_platform calls _send_telegram(pconfig.token, ...) directly and no connector is involved. So an unattested @handle went out under the gateway's own credential while the numeric control was correctly refused. The exemption now requires that no native credential exists. A probe fault WITHDRAWS the exemption (falls back to the ordinary attestation check) rather than granting it. Shipped with the converse control: relay-only config still exempts @handles, and numeric targets stay guarded in both modes. B4 — THE LATCH HAD NO BOUNDARY, SO IT WAS AN OUTAGE MECHANISM. My own regression, and worse than reported. Removing "clear on cosmetic success" (correctly) removed the ONLY way the latch could ever clear: a content op can never reach the connector to succeed, because the latch blocks it locally first. A refusal at 09:00 muted that chat forever. A new inbound message for a chat is the generation marker — the natural teardown point. Suppression still holds for the whole turn. same_turn_blocked: true next_turn_delivered: true MUTATIONS (all killed) handle exemption ignores native credential native-credential fault GRANTS the exemption no turn boundary (latch never clears) teardown clears ALL chats not just this one teardown ignores the chat The last two SURVIVED first: I tested _clear_declined_for_turn directly and never proved _on_inbound calls it — the caller-level gap that has now produced four blockers on this branch. Added a test driving the real inbound entry point. One self-inflicted bug, caught by my own fault test: the probe imported load_config, which does not exist (it is load_gateway_config), so it always threw and returned the fault default. The test that pinned fault behaviour is what exposed it. 510 passed. * fix(relay): correct latch identity and boundary; one config snapshot Round 9, four blockers, all reproduced. B1+B4 — THE TEARDOWN WAS AT THE WRONG PLACE, twice over. It sat on the adapter's raw _on_inbound, which runs BEFORE profile routing, the ignored-channel guard, plugin hooks and user authorization. An unauthorized or dropped event could therefore clear a refusal belonging to an active turn, and stale content then went out as a different op. The same placement missed Discord interaction passthrough, which builds its own MessageEvent and calls handle_message directly, so slash commands and modal submits stayed muted after an earlier decline. Both are one mistake: I picked a lane instead of a boundary. Teardown now runs immediately after _hm_admit_event, the single admission gate every entry path shares. dropped event -> latch survives, stale send blocked admitted event -> latch clears B2 — THE LATCH KEY SPLIT ON ':', WHICH IS A MISTAKE I ALREADY FIXED ONCE. _latch_key did str(chat_id).split(":", 1)[0], so !room:tenant-a and !room:tenant-b both keyed !room: a decline in one Matrix room muted another, and inbound from one cleared the other's refusal. egress.py ::_session_ids stopped doing exactly this in round 4 and I reintroduced it three rounds later. Parent identity is never recoverable from identifier TEXT. Thread coverage is now structural: _thread_parent looks the relationship up in the recorded auto-thread map. B3 — AUTHORIZATION AND DISPATCH USED DIFFERENT CONFIG SNAPSHOTS. _handle_send retains one pconfig; the guard independently reloaded config. Across a transition the authorization snapshot could see a connector-only setup (exemption granted) while dispatch still held the native token and sent the unattested @handle itself. The guard now takes native_token from the SAME snapshot dispatch will use. A caller that omits it does not silently look like "no token". NB-1/2/3 also closed: real-object snapshot tests, an exception shield that faces a real exception, and send_follow_up no longer discards the connector's verdict (that discard is exactly how the edit lane laundered declines). MUTATIONS (all killed) latch key splits on colon again thread parent lookup disabled dispatch token ignored by guard tool drops the snapshot token admission teardown removed teardown moved BEFORE admission exception shield removed follow_up drops raw_response "admission teardown removed" SURVIVED first: I had tested the helper, not _handle_message. Added a test driving production _handle_message with admission stubbed both ways. Fifth caller-level gap on this branch. One self-inflicted bug caught before commit: I passed pconfig.token in _handle_react, which has no pconfig — a NameError on every reaction. 516 passed. * docs(relay): pin the latch's thread coverage limit as a deliberate trade _thread_parent only sees connector auto-threads, and that map is capped at 256 entries, so a user-created or evicted thread does not inherit its parent's latch. Documented at the site and asserted by a test, because the alternative - deriving parents from identifier text - is exactly what muted unrelated Matrix rooms in round 9. The primary control is unaffected: authorize_relay_target takes thread_id as part of the destination and attests it on every send (6 thread tests). * refactor(relay): one SendResult decline classifier for all 8 gateway lanes The extraction found a DEFECT, not just repetition. Eight gateway lanes each hand-rolled the unwrapping of a decline from a SendResult, and they did not agree. Six checked only raw_response. Two also checked the error text. A connector that answers with the uniform decline SENTENCE and no structured code - the documented contract for older connectors, per _approval_send_outcome - was therefore classified as an ordinary failure by those six lanes, so each treated a refusal as "editing unavailable" and retried through another op. Measured: text-only decline six-site check False two-site check True structured decline six-site check True two-site check True No content leaked, because the adapter latch classifies the transport dict directly and catches both shapes (verified: text-only decline still latches C1 and keeps SECRET off the wire). The cost was wrong verdicts and futile retries, not disclosure. declined_send(result) in gateway/relay/egress.py now owns this. It checks raw_response when structured, else the error text, and preserves the ambiguous exclusion - an ambiguous result is a transport outcome, so it must never read as a refusal. run.py keeps its own shape deliberately: that lane has three verdicts (ambiguous / declined / failed), so it checks ambiguous first and then delegates the boolean. MUTATIONS (all killed) helper drops the text-only branch helper drops the structured branch ambiguous no longer excluded draft lane decline check removed edit-failure lane decline check removed prompt verdict lane check removed slash-confirm lane check removed draft lane goes terminal on ANY failure (over-refusal direction) "draft lane decline check removed" SURVIVED first: _send_draft_frame had no test driving an unsuccessful send_draft at all. Added one, with an ordinary-failure control so the fix cannot silently become "one flaky frame mutes the chat". A non-unique anchor also masked the edit-failure lane on the first pass - the trap my own skill warns about. This closes the duplication that caused four of nine rounds of blockers: a new lane now calls one classifier instead of copying three lines. 519 passed. * fix(relay): latch identity, new-turn boundary, seal arming, ambiguity Round 10, four blockers, each reproduced before fixing. Two are my own regressions from the previous two rounds. B1 - ADMISSION IS NOT A NEW-TURN BOUNDARY. Round 9 moved teardown to just after _hm_admit_event. That is only an ADMISSION gate: an authorized message can be steered into a running session, answer a pending prompt, run a busy slash command, or be refused by the pause/drain gates - all without starting a turn. Each of those cleared the ACTIVE turn's refusal, and a later fallback from that turn reached the wire (probe: latch emptied, wire ops ['edit', 'send']). Teardown now runs after _claim_active_session_slot, the first point the runner OWNS a new turn. The new test drives production _handle_message through all four non-turn lanes plus the real new-turn path. B2 - LATCH IDENTITY OMITTED THE LOGICAL PLATFORM. One relay adapter fronts several platforms, so native ids collide. A Discord refusal for chat 42 was cleared by clear_egress_latch("telegram", "42") - the method took a platform and ignored it - and the Discord fallback then reached the connector. Keyed by normalized platform plus exact chat id; thread-parent expansion keeps the platform component. B3 - THE DIRECT DRAFT-SEAL PATH DID NOT ARM THE LATCH. _seal_open_draft posts through _attempt directly rather than _outbound, so a definite decline logged and returned but never latched. The immediate plain-send fallback was suppressed by the caller's own check; later same-turn sends were not (wire ['draft', 'draft', 'send'], the third frame carrying refused content). B4 - MY OWN REFACTOR MADE AMBIGUOUS RESULTS TERMINAL. send_draft's ambiguous projection discarded raw_response, so declined_send fell through to the error-text branch - and an ambiguous result whose text carries the decline marker ("... egress declined: ack lost") read as a DEFINITE refusal and terminated the run. Ambiguous means the frame may well have been delivered: a transport outcome, never an authorization one. Fixed on both layers: the projection carries the body (and the seal's ambiguous return is now explicit too), and declined_send's text-only branch - which cannot see the ambiguous flag - treats ack-lost text as transport ambiguity. Audited every SendResult projection in adapter.py for the same shape. MUTATIONS (all killed) latch key drops the platform clear_egress_latch ignores platform draft seal does not arm the latch ambiguous projection drops raw body declined_send infers decline from ack-lost text teardown back at admission 523 passed. * refactor(relay): split the terminal-decline latch out of the guard PR The latch moves to feat/p5-egress-decline-latch (pushed at 3cf45736d7, which retains the full history) for redesign. This PR keeps the authorization guard and the per-site decline checks. WHY. Across eleven review rounds the two halves behaved very differently. The guard is a PURE FUNCTION of the destination - its blockers were all "you asked the wrong question" (case sensitivity, nested ImportError, missing thread_id, config snapshot skew), each a one-line correction that then stayed fixed. Rounds 7-10 found nothing new in it. The latch is MUTABLE STATE WITH A LIFETIME living on RelayAdapter - an object registered once per process that holds the WebSocket and has no concept of a turn. Nine of its blockers reduce to three questions the adapter cannot answer: when does it end, who arms it, what is it keyed on. Every answer so far has been a proxy (a successful op, an inbound message, an admitted event, a claimed session slot) and every proxy was wrong in a lane found later. The per-site checks hold identical information on `st` - a PER-TURN object - and have produced zero blockers, because the state dies with the turn and nobody has to decide when it ends. The no-relaunder property does NOT depend on the latch. Measured on the real consumer path with the latch absent: a declined draft frame sets _egress_declined and puts nothing on the wire. Removal verified structurally rather than by eye: an AST diff of every symbol between HEAD and this tree reports only latch symbols gone, nothing added. That check caught two over-deletions my strip made - _on_inbound (consumed by a "next def" boundary) and _SEEN_INBOUND_MAX (a class constant inside the removed span). Both restored; 19 failures went to 0. ALSO: RESTORED A TEST I WRONGLY REPORTED AS PASSING. test_tool_guard_forwards_thread_id never made it into the repo - `git log -S` finds it in no commit - though round 5 recorded its mutant as killed. Dropping thread_id from the guard call therefore survived the entire tests/tools suite (146 passed). Written properly this time, driving the real _handle_send far enough to reach the guard. It now KILLS that mutant. MUTATIONS on this tree guard fault authorizes instead of refusing KILLED thread_id dropped from the guard call KILLED (was SURVIVED) handle exemption ignores native credential KILLED draft lane decline check removed KILLED prompt verdict lane check removed KILLED slash-confirm lane check removed KILLED 503 passed. * test(relay): close the phantom-coverage gaps the guard audit found The thread_id test that was reported as killing a round-5 mutant turned out never to have been committed. That is a reason to distrust the other claimed kills, so I re-ran every guard mutation against the COMMITTED tree instead of trusting the earlier reports. Result: 9 of 11 killed, and the two "SKIPPED" ones had non-unique anchors hiding SIX separate sites. Mutating those individually found three real survivors. CASE NORMALISATION (round 3, finding 3) WAS HALF-COVERED. test_relay_fronted_matching_is_case_insensitive varies the CONFIGURED name but always requests lowercase "discord", so it pins _relay_fronted's normalisation and nothing else. The REQUESTED name's `.lower()` was covered by nothing at all. Probe with it removed: relay_routed("Discord") -> False authorize("Discord", unattested) -> AUTHORIZED which is exactly the bypass round 3 reported, alive again and untested. Two further sites were untested in the OVER-REFUSAL direction: the attested store is keyed lowercase, so a mixed-case request missed its own attested set and refused legitimate traffic. attested_relay_targets' own normalisation was invisible to every existing test because they all monkeypatch that function away; it is now asserted against the real function with only its leaf sources stubbed. Three tests added. All six case sites now die when mutated. I also re-did the three fail-closed RelayRouteUnknown mutations properly. The first pass swapped whole lines and produced IndentationErrors, so "KILLED" there proved nothing but a syntax error. Neutralising each raise at correct indentation: all three genuinely KILLED. FINAL AUDIT ON THIS TREE — 17 mutations, zero survivors guard: thread_id dropped at the call site guard: react path unguarded guard: handle exemption ignores native credential guard: 3x fail-closed raise neutralised guard: 6x case-normalisation site classifier: ambiguous treated as a decline classifier: text-only decline branch removed lane: draft / stream-edit / prompt / slash-confirm checks removed 511 passed. * test(relay): make the stream-edit test fail for the right reason Review of 45835a282d raised one blocking issue and three non-blocking ones. All four are addressed; none was a production defect. BLOCKING — the stream-edit test failed on the double, not on a leak. test_declined_stream_edit_does_not_send_the_unseen_tail implemented only the GUARDED path in its consumer double. Removing either guard therefore raised AttributeError inside the fake before any send could be observed: guard 1 removed -> AttributeError: no attribute '_is_flood_error' guard 2 removed -> AttributeError: no attribute '_clean_for_display' Red, but for the wrong reason — the test could not have caught the leak it is named for. My own docstring claimed it drove the fallback and checked the wire; it did neither. The double now implements everything the UNGUARDED path reaches (_is_flood_error, _flood_strikes, _current_edit_interval, _last_edit_time, _notify_new_message, _try_strip_cursor, _clean_for_display, _fallback_prefix, _metadata_for_send). Both mutations now fail on real assertions: guard 1 removed -> assert consumer._egress_declined is True guard 2 removed -> AssertionError: the unseen tail reached the wire: ['send'] NON-BLOCKING 1 — a docstring claimed more than the test exercises. test_requested_platform_name_is_also_normalised described a mixed-case send_message(target="Discord:999") bypass. That entry point cannot reach it: _resolve_tool_target lowercases the platform at tools/send_message_tool.py:47 before the guard runs. The test still pins a real contract — the helpers must not assume a lowercased argument, for the gateway lanes and any future non-normalising caller — so the claim is narrowed to that rather than the test removed. NON-BLOCKING 2 — the module docstring said "every lane drives the REAL RelayAdapter". The stream tests drive mixin doubles by design, because the behaviour under test belongs to the adapter's CALLER. Docstring now distinguishes the two kinds. NON-BLOCKING 3 — latch-deletion residue in gateway/relay/adapter.py:418: return None return latched if surface_declines else None The second line was unreachable and referenced a name deleted with the latch. Removed, along with the 20-line comment block describing the latch as "the structural fix" — that mechanism now lives on feat/p5-egress-decline-latch, not here. The reviewer independently confirmed the large deletion: an AST census between 3cf45736d7 and f57a2298fa reports only latch symbols removed and nothing added. 511 passed. * docs(relay): correct three claims that outran the code Review of 41ce3cc765 found no new production defect but three overstated claims, one of them in my own commit message. 1. THE LATCH COMMENTARY WAS STILL THERE. My previous commit message said it removed "the 20-line comment block describing the latch as the structural fix". It removed only the unreachable statement. Twenty lines at adapter.py:361-380 still described a per-chat latch, a choke point and its scope rules - none of which exist on this branch. In a refusal-sensitive module that reads as coverage this branch does not have. Now removed for real. This is the same defect class as the tests: a claim that outran what the code does. I made it while fixing that class. 2. THE STREAM-TEST DOCSTRING OVERSTATED BOTH MUTANTS. It said the mutation "now fails on the assertion that a send reached the wire" - true of one guard, not both. Verified separately: remove the _on_edit_failure check -> dies on _egress_declined, never reaches the fallback remove the fallback early return -> dies on the wire: ['send'] Both are valid behavioural failures, which is what the blocker asked for; they are different observables and the docstring now says so. 3. Duplicate `from types import SimpleNamespace` from an earlier scripted insert; imports reordered. 112 tests pass in the four focused files. * fix(relay): close two authorization defects found in review Both were reproduced before fixing and both mutants are pinned. 1. A LIVE relay adapter whose fronts_platform() raised degraded into the config fallback. `_live_relay_fronted` returned None for every failure, and None means "no live adapter, use the config snapshot" — so a faulting adapter plus an empty/stale snapshot made the guard conclude "not relay-routed" and authorize an unattested destination, while resolve_delivery_transport asks that same adapter and still routes over the relay. Measured: relay_routed=False, verdict None for chat 999. Absence and fault now have separate return values: None only when there is no runner or no relay adapter; a live adapter that cannot answer raises RelayRouteUnknown. This is the third instance of this bug class in this file, and the first two were also mine. 2. An attested chat whose id equalled the requested THREAD id vouched for that thread. The `thread in attested` arm proved nothing about parentage. Measured: attested {"-100A", "7"} authorized (-100A, thread 7). Only the bound `parent:thread` form is accepted now. Nothing legitimate needed the bare arm — _session_entry_id records a threaded origin as f"{chat_id}:{thread_id}", and a thread addressed as its own channel arrives as chat_id and passes the parent check. The existing test blessed the bare form via parametrize, so it PINNED the defect. Corrected, plus negative controls for the sibling-chat and other-parent cases and a positive control proving genuine absence still takes the config path (otherwise fix 1 would break native-only deploys). Merged origin/main (was 22 behind). 428 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh; full 10-row mutation ledger re-killed on the merged tree, none dying on an exception rather than an assertion. * fix(relay): only a missing adapter is absence; everything else is a fault Reviewer BLOCKER, reproduced before fixing. Two more paths where a PRESENT relay adapter still degraded into the config snapshot: 1. `fronts_platform` may be a property or descriptor, so the ATTRIBUTE LOOKUP can raise — and the lookup sat inside the absence handler. Probed with a raising property plus an empty snapshot: live=None, routed=False, verdict=None, i.e. an unattested target authorized. The previous test made an already-retrieved METHOD raise, so it could not reach this. 2. A present adapter with no usable `fronts_platform` returned None for the same reason. An adapter that cannot say what it fronts is broken, not absent, so it now raises too. Also found by my own spot-check while the review ran: the nested imports of `gateway.config` / `gateway.run` inside the live probe shared the broad handler, so a broken installation degraded to the snapshot as well. Probed with a healthy-adapter positive control in the same run — healthy refused the unattested target, faulted authorized it. `_relay_fronted` one function below already drew this exact distinction for its own import. The boundary is now: `relay is None` is the ONLY absence. Everything about a present adapter — attribute access, callability, the call itself, and the imports needed to reach it — is a fault and raises RelayRouteUnknown. This is the fourth variant of absence-vs-fault in this file and all four were mine. The lesson is in the code as a comment rather than in a commit message nobody re-reads. Four controls keep genuine absence benign: no runner, no relay adapter in the runner, a real ModuleNotFoundError naming the gateway package, and the configured-attested-target-still-sends case. 434 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh; 9-row mutation ledger re-killed including both new guards, none dying on an exception. * fix(relay): invert the live probe to fail closed by default Reviewer BLOCKER round 2, reproduced: reading the adapter registry can also raise. A runner whose `adapters.get()` raised gave relay_present=True, live=None, routed=False, verdict=None — unattested discord:999 authorized. That was the FIFTH boundary in one function with the same defect: the call, the attribute lookup, a non-callable attribute, the nested imports, and now the registry lookup. Each round I patched the reported boundary and the defect moved one statement up. The cause was the shape, not the statements: the function asked "did something go wrong?" and answered None, and None MEANS "no live adapter, use the config snapshot" — so every statement was a new chance to fail open, and every new statement would have been too. Inverted rather than patched a sixth time. Each `return None` now sits behind an explicit narrow check that cannot itself be the fault (no runner, no adapters, no relay key, gateway package genuinely absent), and one outer handler turns anything else into RelayRouteUnknown. A statement added inside this function is now fail-CLOSED by default. Verified all six fault shapes raise (call, attribute, missing method, registry .get, .adapters property, runner ref) and all five absence shapes stay benign, plus a liveness control where the config snapshot disagrees with a healthy adapter and the adapter still wins. Four new tests, including the two absence controls that keep native-only and CLI deployments working. 438 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh. Mutation ledger: 8 killed. One survivor recorded as a proven equivalent mutant — widening `if not registry` to `or {}` is behaviourally identical because `{}.get()` returns None, i.e. the same absence; it is a readability guard.	2026-09-08 17:51:35 +10:00
Teknium	d63e380324	compat(plugins): warn once per name when a plugin resolves an old import path; lint step restored in CI ... Every PLUGIN-COMPAT __getattr__ now calls hermes_cli.plugin_compat.warn_once(facade, name, target) before resolving, emitting a HermesPluginCompatWarning (FutureWarning) once per process per name: old path, new path, removal target. Importing a facade for its live API stays silent; only resolving a moved name warns. COMPAT_MANIFEST.md documents the warning and how to silence it during migration. Verified the runtime never routes through a pointer: every entry point (run_agent, cli, hermes_cli.main, gateway.run, tui_gateway.server, web_server, model_tools + tool discovery, hermes_state, cron.scheduler, browser_tool, mcp_tool, kanban, auth) imports clean and `hermes doctor` runs end to end with the warning promoted to an error. Also restores the check_compat_pointers CI step to .github/workflows/lint.yml, which a0be177aac dropped when the compat layer was regenerated (the lint script itself was present; the workflow step was not). hermes_cli/plugin_compat.py, tests/test_plugin_compat_warning.py and the two-line insert per facade are part of the compat layer and go away with it.	2026-09-04 00:15:16 -07:00
Teknium	2776813df3	compat(plugins): temporary import-path shims for external plugins — ONE commit, revert on schedule ... The Sep 2026 decomposition (PR #102117) makes internal import paths a non-API: names now live in the focused modules that define them. This commit is the ONLY thing keeping the old paths alive, so external plugins have time to update. It is deliberately a single, unsquashed commit: git revert <this sha> removes every shim, stub and manifest at once on the announced date. Nothing in-tree may depend on these pointers: scripts/check_compat_pointers.py (wired into lint.yml) fails CI if it does. What it adds (see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md, compat_manifest.json): - 332 facade modules get one delimited `PLUGIN-COMPAT` block appended at the end of the file - 1,172 moved names resolved lazily via a module `__getattr__` (PEP 562) — never a top-level import, so no import cycles; facades that already had `__getattr__` get a chained one - 592 third-party/stdlib names the old modules used to expose, with their original import statements - 266 public definitions that had been deleted as unused, restored byte-for-byte from the pre-decomposition tree (+40 private helpers and 16 imports pulled in only because a restored definition needs them) - 3 deleted modules recreated as re-export stubs (gateway/startup_watchdog, hermes_cli/observability/ relay_runtime, tools/environments/modal_utils) - private names (`_x`) get no pointer: they were never API (3,792 skipped) Verified: all 335 touched modules import under a fresh HERMES_HOME and every manifest name resolves; the lint reports zero in-tree uses; ruff clean; targeted suites unchanged.	2026-09-03 17:13:22 -07:00
Teknium	707161e77b	simplify(compat): file_tools/send_message_tool/cronjob_tools/process_registry — drop 34 re-exports, repoint 5 callers + 27 test files	2026-09-03 13:30:27 -07:00
Teknium	e83816a4d1	review-fix(comments): restore lost #NNNN rationale comments across non-test source (mechanical sweep, condensed, code unchanged) ... For each issue anchor present in BASE 63279301bc non-test .py and absent on HEAD, the BASE comment/docstring block was re-attached at the HEAD location of the code it explained (matched by the distinctive code line / enclosing def). Sentences already covered by an existing HEAD comment were deduped; the issue number always survives. Insert-only: no code lines changed.	2026-09-03 09:44:26 -07:00
Teknium	691e2f7d9f	refactor(tools): send_message wave-2 cut — table-driven telegram media, shared platform-module guard, flattened slack/target resolution, compact docs	2026-09-03 01:36:04 -07:00
Teknium	19a479bc06	refactor(tools): tidy signal retry logging and platform config guard	2026-09-02 23:38:33 -07:00
Teknium	dc79b0a11a	refactor(tools): compact send_message routing call sites	2026-09-02 23:34:21 -07:00
Teknium	0a9bc0f3e6	refactor(tools): share _NO_DELIVERABLE, tighten telegram format helper	2026-09-02 23:31:11 -07:00
Teknium	4228d0f20a	refactor(tools): compact send_message literals and telegram media warnings	2026-09-02 23:28:01 -07:00
Teknium	51d44c5e32	refactor(tools): fold small conditionals in send_message helpers	2026-09-02 23:25:00 -07:00
Teknium	c9d52c05b2	refactor(tools): unify adapter media-method selection across matrix and live-adapter sends	2026-09-02 23:19:33 -07:00
Teknium	6260446b15	refactor(tools): tighten send_message target/home/mirror helpers	2026-09-02 23:15:03 -07:00
Teknium	6b226dbce9	refactor(tools): compact signal RPC builder and blank squeeze	2026-09-02 23:09:31 -07:00
Teknium	3106c534c2	refactor(tools): extract telegram format + gateway-loop dispatch helpers, compact media descriptors	2026-09-02 23:03:04 -07:00
Teknium	37ae28f187	refactor(tools): compact send_message docstrings and standalone fallback	2026-09-02 22:39:46 -07:00
Teknium	b99a74a3c7	refactor(tools): share live-adapter lookup, prune unused re-exports, hug brackets in send_message	2026-09-02 22:29:00 -07:00
Teknium	79f0c28840	refactor(tools): dedupe send_message helpers (success payloads, target resolve, signal batch, slack forms)	2026-09-02 22:15:32 -07:00
Teknium	6723628de9	refactor(tools/messaging): split send_message into senders/targets tables; dedupe discord/bot_mode/relay helpers; extract feishu_lark shared plumbing; compact graph client/auth	2026-09-02 14:45:42 -07:00
Teknium	d4cec15b47	refactor(tools): first-wave simplification of tools/ (file ops split, lazy_deps, code_exec, approval, browser, delegate, mcp, skills, terminal, voice, media) ... Behavior-neutral structural pass over tools/*: god-file extractions into sibling modules (file_operations_common/lint/search, file_tools_paths/ read_tracking/write, code_execution_env/rpc, tool_search_catalog/names/ validation, tts_command_provider, ...), duplicate helper unification, if/elif -> dispatch tables, dead-code removal, docstring compaction. Tool schemas (get_tool_definitions) verified byte-identical to base.	2026-09-02 14:43:45 -07:00
EmpireOperating	fcd34e57a2	fix(buzz): complete media-only delivery reporting	2026-08-31 10:06:34 -07:00
EmpireOperating	9c25704257	fix(buzz): verify live media delivery receipts	2026-08-31 10:06:34 -07:00
EmpireOperating	37c943997b	fix(buzz): support media in standalone sends	2026-08-31 10:06:34 -07:00
blunkjamie-dev	1885a40ad3	fix(buzz): preserve literal mentions and exact UUID targets	2026-08-31 09:05:41 -07:00
wansui	42dc0dea70	fix(send_message): cross-loop dispatch to live WeCom adapter ... When send_message is invoked from the agent's worker thread (a different event loop than the gateway's), awaiting the WeCom adapter directly can hang because the adapter enqueues onto the gateway loop. Dispatch via run_coroutine_threadsafe onto the gateway loop when the caller loop differs, with caller-cancellation shielded so an already-enqueued send is not cancelled mid-flight (which would otherwise cause a false-failure retry -> duplicate). Recognizes WeCom native chat IDs as explicit send targets and whitelists WeCom for media delivery. Part of the async queue design this branch introduces.	2026-08-27 07:33:36 -07:00
Teknium	48f69e51d3	fix(signal): chunk long standalone sends and cover both delivery paths (salvage #57929 + #67279) ... Follow-up to lkz-de's adapter chunking commit: long Signal messages no longer truncate on ANY delivery path. - tools/send_message_tool.py: register Signal's 8000-char limit in _MAX_LENGTHS (imported from the adapter module so the two paths can't drift) so hermes send / cron standalone / MCP sends split via the shared truncate_message() pass instead of signal-cli rejecting them. Standalone-path idea credited to @5L-hermes01 (#67279). - tests: regression test proving standalone Signal sends chunk at the adapter limit with no truncation footer (fails on pre-fix main). - docs: Long Messages section on the Signal page (en + zh-Hans). Both fixes verified by sabotage A/B (tests fail with the respective half reverted to origin/main) and a real-import E2E: 27k-char message with emoji + cross-boundary bold + code blocks -> 4 chunks, all styles in-range UTF-16, lossless reassembly.	2026-08-24 20:03:24 -07:00
Adolanium	ed4f50de51	fix(send_message): hand unresolved cron and react targets to the adapter again ... Restores pass-through behavior for cron delivery and react/unreact that was lost when d409f6748 routed them through resolve_send_target. Stored cron job targets the channel directory doesn't recognize (e.g. telegram:ops-room on a fresh install, photon group GUIDs) used to go to the adapter verbatim; after d409f6748 they were silently dropped. Same for react on platform-native ids. Adds an opt-in pass_unresolved_references flag to resolve_send_target, passed only by cron and react. Model-facing send tool stays strict. Plugin platforms with a parser stay strict for all callers. The optional validator still has the final say over passed-through ids. Follow-up fixes on salvage: - Update test_cron_relay_delivery_guards.py mock lambdas to accept **kw (file added to main after PR branch point; lambdas didn't accept the new keyword argument) - Consolidate duplicated pass-through blocks into _pass_through_unresolved local helper Fixes #85128 Co-authored-by: Adolanium <Adolanium@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-08-15 07:07:40 +05:30
Teknium	d409f67485	feat(platforms): add typed plugin send paths ... Route plugin target parsing, validation, and host-driven delivery through PlatformEntry across CLI and cron while preserving the host-only send_message policy.	2026-08-12 16:27:19 -07:00
Mark Mennell	d3ebe14b03	fix(send_message): constrain opaque plugin fallback	2026-08-12 16:27:19 -07:00
Kevin Anderson	a37192546e	feat(gateway,send_message): plugin platform target parsing via PlatformEntry.parse_target_ref_fn and verbatim fallback (#67941 #33547)	2026-08-12 16:27:19 -07:00
Kevin Anderson	274214d3c9	fix(send_message): avoid shared schema mutation and support sync enricher handlers	2026-08-12 16:27:19 -07:00
Kevin Anderson	482682db78	send_message: plugin enricher registry for custom platforms	2026-08-12 16:27:19 -07:00
Da7-Tech	e8c5cb5710	fix(qqbot): scope the authz, startup-validation, and direct-send QQ reads ... Review follow-up: the adapter-level resolver alone left three paths reading per-profile QQ_* values from raw os.getenv, so a secondary multiplex profile's scoped opt-in or credentials were ignored (or the primary's environ values leaked in): - gateway/authz_mixin.py: route the per-platform allow-all flag and the per-platform/group allowlist + allow-bots reads through the scope-aware gateway.config._getenv. Deployment-global GATEWAY_* reads intentionally stay on os.getenv. This makes the same fix effective for every own-policy platform, not just QQ; unscoped behavior is byte-identical to os.getenv. - gateway/run.py (_own_policy_open_startup_violation): resolve the per-platform dm/group policy and allow-all opt-in via _getenv; the secondary-profile caller already runs inside _profile_runtime_scope. - tools/send_message_tool.py (_send_qqbot): the QQ_APP_ID / QQ_CLIENT_SECRET fallbacks now honor the active profile scope. Tests: tests/gateway/test_qqbot_scope_paths.py covers all three paths end-to-end (scope wins, no environ inheritance for non-opted profiles, single-profile environ fallback unchanged); the STT suite now asserts QQ_STT_BASE_URL and QQ_STT_MODEL scoping alongside the API key. All five scoped-behavior tests fail on the previous commit and pass here.	2026-08-02 10:01:16 -07:00
teknium1	5b751dc0ad	chore: remove unused imports and dead locals (ruff F401/F841 sweep) ... Cleans F401 unused imports and F841 dead local assignments across root *.py, agent/, hermes_cli/, tools/, gateway/, cron/, tui_gateway/ (tests/, plugins/, skills/ excluded). Intentionally KEPT (false positives / test-patch surfaces): - agent/transports/__init__.py package re-exports - cli.py browser_connect re-exports (DEFAULT_BROWSER_CDP_URL area, used by tests/cli/test_cli_browser_connect.py) - hermes_cli/main.py _prompt_auth_credentials_choice / _model_flow_bedrock_api_key (accessed via main_mod attr in tests) - gateway/run.py aliased replay_cleanup + whatsapp_identity re-exports and _PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_VALUES (test-referenced) - hermes_cli/web_server.py get_running_pid (tests monkeypatch it) and _OAUTH_TOKEN_URL availability probe - hermes_cli/config.py get_process_hermes_home re-export (noqa'd F811 chain) and yaml availability-probe import - hermes_cli/nous_subscription.py managed_nous_tools_enabled (tests patch hermes_cli.nous_subscription.managed_nous_tools_enabled) - try/except ImportError availability probes (env_loader, tts_tool, mcp_tool, web_server anthropic OAuth block) - tools/web_tools.py noqa F401 re-exports - hermes_cli/setup_whatsapp_cloud.py:263 'proceed' skipped: possible missing-guard bug, flagged for separate review - unused function parameters (signature changes out of scope) Side-effect RHS calls preserved where only the binding was dead (e.g. web_server proc = _spawn_hermes_action -> bare call).	2026-07-29 11:53:39 -07:00
teknium1	1a7f73b8ea	refactor: migrate hand-rolled error envelopes to shared tool_error() ... Replace json.dumps({"error": ...}) boilerplate with the documented tools/registry.py tool_error() helper across 13 files. Migrated: 59 sites (58 code sites + 1 docstring example in path_security.py), incl. multi-key envelopes passed via kwargs (available_actions, path/already_read, pattern/already_searched, parameters/hint, needs_reauth/server, error_type/tool/result_type). Also removed 2 now-redundant local tool_error imports in mcp_tool.py in favor of a module-level import. Skipped (not byte/shape-compatible with tool_error): - {"success": false, "error": ...} envelopes (browser_tool, browser_camofox, browser_dialog_tool, web_tools, tts_tool, skills_tool, image_generation_tool, project_tools, memory_tool, cronjob_tools, x_search_tool, xai_video_tools) — leading keys differ; key order would change. - terminal_tool/code_execution_tool envelopes carrying output/ exit_code/status leading keys. - tool_search.py:912-area multi-key success paths (non-error). - mcp_tool.py MCPSampling._error — returns MCP-spec ErrorData object, not a JSON string; incompatible. - send_message_tool._error — returns a dict (not str) and applies secret redaction; return type must be preserved. Behavior note: sites that previously omitted ensure_ascii=False now emit raw UTF-8 (tool_error's canonical behavior) — JSON-equivalent. Tests: 23 targeted files (tool_search, discord, file_tools/read guards/operations, registry, clarify, homeassistant, code_execution, send_message, delegate, terminal, mcp, model_tools, sanitize_tool_error, retaindb plugin) — all pass. ruff clean.	2026-07-29 10:14:00 -07:00
Teknium	f041c95b7f	fix(send_message): pass photon DM chat GUIDs through as explicit targets ... 'photon:any;-;+1555...' targets matched no parser pattern, so _handle_send bounced them off the channel directory and failed resolution even though the adapter accepts the GUID verbatim (the react handler already passed them through). Recognize the DM chat GUID shape (mirrors the adapter's _DM_CHAT_GUID_RE) in _parse_target_ref for photon only.	2026-07-28 18:21:01 -07:00
luyifan	4ae27548d6	fix(media): recognize m2a audio attachments	2026-07-28 11:52:44 -07:00
andy	0ec1b9f7fa	fix(gateway,tools): add missing .3gp and .webm to video extension sets ... MEDIA_DELIVERY_EXTS in gateway/platforms/base.py omitted .3gp, causing MEDIA: tags with .3gp files to leak as plain text instead of being extracted for native video delivery. _VIDEO_EXTS in tools/send_message_tool.py and _MIGRATION_VIDEO_EXTS in the Feishu adapter omitted .webm, causing .webm files to be classified as documents instead of video on Telegram and other platforms. Both extensions are already present in every gateway-side _VIDEO_EXTS definition (run.py, kanban_watchers.py, weixin.py, base.py local). Closes #71621, Closes #71603	2026-07-26 12:52:31 -07:00
replygirl	d9fe008db8	fix(slack): prefer live send adapter and try multi-workspace tokens individually ... Two related Slack delivery fixes for send_message text sends: - Route Slack text delivery through _send_via_adapter so the live in-process gateway adapter (multi-workspace aware, channel→client mapping, adapter-side gates) is preferred, with the plugin's _standalone_send as the out-of-process fallback — matching how the media path already behaves. - _standalone_send: SLACK_BOT_TOKEN can be a comma-separated list in multi-workspace installs and slack_tokens.json carries OAuth per-workspace tokens; the standalone Web-API path used to send the literal comma-joined string, which Slack rejects as invalid_auth. Try each token individually, retrying on token-scoped errors (invalid_auth / not_in_channel / channel_not_found …) and stopping on terminal ones. User-DM resolution (U…/W… targets) also tries each token. Adapted from #47547 by @replygirl — the original patched the legacy tools/send_message_tool.py::_send_slack helper, which moved to the Slack plugin's _standalone_send in #41112. Salvaged from #47547	2026-07-23 12:01:24 -07:00
davesecops	57f8ba3b19	fix(slack): open DMs for user send targets	2026-07-22 21:58:13 -07:00
HexLab98	5f4c952ab0	fix(slack): support MEDIA attachments in send_message ... Slack could already deliver files in-channel via the gateway, but send_message omitted MEDIA for Slack and told the model it was unsupported — causing agents to inconsistently refuse PDF sends. Wire Slack through files_upload_v2 in the standalone sender.	2026-07-22 21:58:13 -07:00
kandotrun	4f726ed467	fix(slack): preserve media in standalone cron delivery	2026-07-22 20:57:25 -07:00
liuhao1024	6160a80253	fix(gateway/platforms): migrate all Weixin fallbacks to get_secret() for consistent profile-scoped resolution ... Per egilewski's security review, WEIXIN_BASE_URL and WEIXIN_CDN_BASE_URL were still resolved from process-global environment variables, leaving mixed-scope bypasses in multiplex mode. Changed files: - gateway/platforms/weixin.py: Added get_secret import, replaced os.getenv() with get_secret() for WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID, WEIXIN_TOKEN, WEIXIN_BASE_URL, WEIXIN_CDN_BASE_URL in WeixinAdapter.__init__() and send_weixin_direct() - tools/send_message_tool.py: Added get_secret import, replaced os.getenv() with get_secret() for all WEIXIN_* fallbacks in _handle_send() All runtime Weixin send paths now resolve both credentials and endpoint configuration from the same profile-scoped source.	2026-07-16 05:39:58 -07:00
szafranski	d73a6f5ac2	fix(telegram): include duration in standalone sends	2026-07-16 04:40:35 -07:00
kshitijk4poor	709da844b5	feat(gateway): attach MEDIA: caption to the media bubble on standalone sends ... hermes send "MEDIA:/x.png This Caption" now arrives as one native captioned bubble instead of a separate text message followed by an uncaptioned bubble. Root cause: the standalone senders (hermes send / cron / send_message tool) stripped the MEDIA: tag, sent the remaining text as its own message, and called the media send with no caption -- even though hermes send's help advertises the captioned form and the bridges/adapters already support a caption. Signal already captioned correctly. - tools/send_message_tool.py: new _media_caption_split() chokepoint decides caption-vs-separate-body (single captionable non-voice file within the platform's message-length cap). Wired into the Telegram, WhatsApp and Discord dispatch paths. - Telegram/WhatsApp/Discord: when the single captioned file is missing, the caption text is delivered as a plain message so it is never silently lost. - Telegram caption send gets a MarkdownV2->plain parse fallback. - Tests: _media_caption_split unit tests + per-platform caption tests (ride, multi-file fallback, voice exclusion, over-limit fallback, missing-file text fallback); updated the 3 tests that asserted the old text-then-media split. Closes the gap reported against #58911 (the MEDIA_CAPTION directive PR); credit to @ferreiraesilva for surfacing the caption behavior.	2026-07-09 15:38:32 +05:30
Teknium	55e3ee1ab8	fix: remove dead f-string prefixes via ruff F541 (216 sites) (#52336) ... ruff check --fix --select F541 . on current main. Pure prefix removals; adjacent-string concatenations keep the f only on interpolating fragments. No string content or live placeholder altered.	2026-07-05 13:42:46 -07:00