read_file/search_files passed file_read=True, which folded into code_file=True and skipped
the ENV/JSON/YAML assignment passes, so an opaque prefix-less credential under a
credential-shaped key reached the model in cleartext from a secret-bearing file — the
file-read half of the #110228 gate (#110567).
Two defects on that path, both fixed here:
- The rendered line-number gutter ("5| ADS_API_TOKEN: ..." from read_file,
"6: ADS_API_TOKEN: ..." from grep -n / cat -n) defeated the line-anchored patterns,
so the real rendered read leaked exactly what the raw text masked. A gutter-free fixture
cannot see this, which is why the tool-level tests carry the real render shape.
- _is_secret_file_arg() could not see the RESOLVED Hermes home: the default home's basename
is an installation detail (".hermes" on POSIX, "hermes" under AppData/Local on Windows) and
a resolved path never spells $HERMES_HOME, so the managed Windows home's config.yaml was
classified as ordinary YAML on both the file-read and the terminal surface.
Changes:
- redact_sensitive_text(): secret_file= re-enables the assignment passes for content the
caller classified with _is_secret_file_arg, keeping code_file behaviour everywhere else.
It is authoritative over code_file, so a caller cannot be fail-open on the security flag
by setting both.
- _redact_assignments(): mask_nonreusable selects the non-reusable sentinel for file reads,
so the #35519 write-back hazard stays closed.
- _should_redact_assignment(): no longer re-masks an already-masked value, which was erasing
the vendor label the sentinel deliberately keeps.
- _is_secret_file_arg(): consult the resolved Hermes home for the config.yaml arm.
- _CFG_ANCHORED_RE / _YAML_ASSIGN_RE: tolerate a rendered line-number gutter.
- file_tools.py: classify the resolved path at all three file-read call sites.
Closes#110567
