NAS maps the agent-cron bearer to a provisioned instance via an `agent:*` client or the
`hermes-cli-vps` bootstrap session (hermes-portal `server/agent-cron/instance-auth.ts`). A
container whose auth.json holds a plain `hermes-cli` user login is refused with 403
invalid_client on every arm, re-arm and list, for the life of that credential - and the
re-login users try first (`hermes auth logout nous` + device code) replaces the bootstrap
session, making it permanent. Chronos previously logged one bare warning per job and left
the jobs with no trigger at all: they only ran through the misfire sweep, minutes late.
NasCronClientError now carries the HTTP status and the OAuth `error` code. On an identity
rejection the provider logs ONE warning that names the real remedy (restore the hosted
credential from the Nous Portal; re-login cannot fix it), stops calling NAS, and starts the
built-in ticker with the gateway's own adapters/loop so scheduled jobs keep firing on time.
Transient 5xx/transport failures keep retrying on the next reconcile.
Supersedes #97566 (@wesleysimplicio), whose runtime-credential swap resolves to the same
bearer on main (`agent_key` is the access token) and so could not change the 403.
docs/ was not the documentation site; it was a grab bag of long-form
design notes, wire contracts and observability guides that landed with
feature PRs because their authors needed somewhere to put them. Root
AGENTS.md already says long-form dev docs live in
website/docs/developer-guide/; this moves the 14 living documents there
(or to the matching user-guide section) so they are published, searchable
and linked from the sidebar instead of being found by grep only.
Developer guide: micro-compaction, gateway-session-lifecycle (was
session-lifecycle), state-db-recovery, multiplexing-gateway,
chronos-managed-cron-contract, relay-connector-contract, observer-hooks
(was observability/README), gateway-monitoring (observability/monitoring),
relay-shared-metrics, middleware, streaming-tts, billing-lifecycle.
User guide: egress/network-isolation (was security/network-egress-
isolation), features/kanban-multi-gateway (was kanban/multi-gateway).
Each page got title/description frontmatter and a sidebar entry; repo-
relative links became site links or GitHub blob URLs; two MDX brace
hazards escaped. Every in-tree pointer (module docstrings, config
comments, the relay conformance test's Path, the monitoring-doc test,
gateway-internals, cron-internals, kanban docs, .dockerignore, AGENTS.md)
now names the new location. `docusaurus build` passes with no unresolved
links on the moved pages.
The Sep 2026 decomposition (PR #102117) makes internal import paths a non-API: names now live in
the focused modules that define them. This commit is the ONLY thing keeping the old paths alive,
so external plugins have time to update. It is deliberately a single, unsquashed commit:
git revert <this sha>
removes every shim, stub and manifest at once on the announced date. Nothing in-tree may depend on
these pointers: scripts/check_compat_pointers.py (wired into lint.yml) fails CI if it does.
What it adds (see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md, compat_manifest.json):
- 332 facade modules get one delimited `PLUGIN-COMPAT` block appended at the end of the file
- 1,172 moved names resolved lazily via a module `__getattr__` (PEP 562) — never a top-level import,
so no import cycles; facades that already had `__getattr__` get a chained one
- 592 third-party/stdlib names the old modules used to expose, with their original import statements
- 266 public definitions that had been deleted as unused, restored byte-for-byte from the pre-decomposition
tree (+40 private helpers and 16 imports pulled in only because a restored definition needs them)
- 3 deleted modules recreated as re-export stubs (gateway/startup_watchdog, hermes_cli/observability/
relay_runtime, tools/environments/modal_utils)
- private names (`_x`) get no pointer: they were never API (3,792 skipped)
Verified: all 335 touched modules import under a fresh HERMES_HOME and every manifest name resolves;
the lint reports zero in-tree uses; ruff clean; targeted suites unchanged.
Read text files with the encoding utf-8-sig so a BOM at the start of a
file does not cause a Unicode decode error (Windows editors add BOMs).
Reconstructed from ethie/pm commits 48a32b135b + 013219e814 onto the
current upstream/main base: only the utf-8 -> utf-8-sig transforms were
carried (370 exact line pairs across 205 files); pm-rename hunks that
rode in the original commit were left to the pm-store commit, and
utf8sig hunks entangled with content changes ride their owning commit.
Rebuilt on ethie/pm-clean off ac6c8028e0 (upstream/main).
- The gateway api_server fire webhook acknowledges 202 only after a
durable claim + execution row exist (admission failure stays retryable
as 503; a live claim answers 200 duplicate), then dispatches the
claimed snapshot with the live runner adapters (delivery parity with
the built-in ticker, including relay-fronted and E2EE platforms).
- Legacy single-phase providers (a documented fire_due override without
split hooks) keep being driven through their own hook. Capability
detection now credits claim_fire AND fire_claimed overrides, so
Chronos is correctly classified split-aware (its re-arm lives in
fire_claimed; the redundant fire_due passthrough override is removed).
- Multi-profile dashboards fail closed for external providers: an
unscoped reconcile would disarm other profiles' armed one-shots in the
shared NAS registry.
- Manual runs (cronjob run) carry the owner-bearing claimed snapshot
through every entry point, composing with upstream's manual-run
heartbeat (#76502) and background dispatch.
Note: current main moved the dashboard NAS webhook to a pure
forward-to-gateway design (the gateway owns execution and live
adapters), so the dashboard-side claim/tracking machinery from earlier
revisions of this PR is dropped; the durable admission contract lives in
the gateway webhook path.
The chronos cron-fire verifier constructed PyJWKClient without explicit
headers, so its JWKS fetch to the NAS portal hit the same WAF 403 the
dashboard-auth providers already guard against. It reaches the same
portal issuer, so it's the same bug class — mirror the fix here and add
a constructor-contract regression test.
Co-authored-by: James Hodgkinson <james@terminaloutcomes.com>
AST-driven pass over every Path.read_text()/write_text() without an
explicit encoding= across non-test code: 71 sites in 34 files
(skills_hub, hermes_cli/main+profiles+service_manager+container_boot,
mem0/hindsight/honcho plugins, achievements dashboard, release/CI
scripts, productivity+comfyui skill helpers, agent/*). Verified zero
positional-encoding collisions before insertion; per-file compile()
check after.
Adds a check-windows-footguns rule flagging bare single-line
read_text/write_text (multi-line forms stay covered by the AST guard
test from #38985). Together with the salvaged contributor commits this
retires the ~169-site bare file-I/O class (#37423's long tail).
The inbound cron-fire verifier constructed a fresh PyJWKClient on every
fire, discarding the client's key cache and forcing a synchronous JWKS
HTTP GET to the portal on each fire. Under a burst of concurrent fires
(a hosted instance with several cron jobs firing in the same window) this
fanned out into N simultaneous JWKS fetches that the portal rate-limited
(HTTP 403 -> verification fails -> agent 401), or that blocked the event
loop long enough that the fire webhook could not return its 202 before
the relay's 30s timeout (observed in prod as relay 504s concentrated on
high-job-count instances).
Cache one PyJWKClient per JWKS URL at module scope (double-checked lock)
so the signing keys are reused across fires; NAS keys rotate rarely, so
the steady state is zero JWKS fetches per fire.
Regression test proves 5 fires -> 1 client construction (was 5).
